People v. Washington CA2/2

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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Washington CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B331427

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA081613)
v.

JUSTIN MARCEL
WASHINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Amy N. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.

Noriega Law Firm and Lauren Noriega for Defendant and
Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
In an amended information filed by the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Justin Marcel
Washington was charged with premeditated attempted murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1).1 It was alleged that a
principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)),
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds.
(d) & (e)(1)). It was further alleged that defendant committed his
crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the intent to
promote, further, and assist that criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)), and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury
on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Finally, it was alleged that
defendant had suffered a serious or violent felony conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant
pleaded guilty to the sole count and admitted that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm. The
remaining allegations were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced
to an upper term of nine years plus an additional 10 years
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1).
On March 10, 2021, defendant filed a petition to recall his
sentence pursuant to section 1172.6.2 Following briefing and an

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Defendant actually filed his petition pursuant to section
1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new
numbering.

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evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and
defendant appeals.
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
A. The victim is shot
Gardena Police Department (GPD) Lieutenant Alexander
Rivera investigated a shooting that occurred in Rowley Park on
June 29, 2011. Rowley Park is claimed by the Shotgun Crips
gang as its territory. One of the rivals is the 60’s Crips. Rowley
Park has four or five cameras that are controlled and operated by
GPD. Lieutenant Rivera had the relevant surveillance video
pulled and booked into evidence.3
At 7:41:14, defendant and DeAnthony Davis (Davis) can be
seen in the video. At 7:41:49, they got into a fistfight with two
individuals at the eastside of the parking lot. After the two
individuals got in their car and started to leave, defendant chased
the car on foot for another 20 to 30 feet.
At 7:44:59, defendant and Davis were seen walking through
the basketball courts, where people were playing basketball.
They then left the park.
Minutes later, defendant Davis returned to the park in a
car. Defendant, who was about a foot or two ahead of Davis,
approached Khary Malone (Malone) and a verbal altercation
occurred. Specifically, defendant shoulder bumped Malone and
asked him and his companions where they were from. They
replied, “‘[w]e don’t bang.’” Defendant responded, “‘So way [sic.]

3 The video was played at the evidentiary hearing.

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Shotgun Crip.” Davis then came from behind defendant, pulled
out a gun, and fired at Malone, hitting him in the left side of his
jaw.
B. Evidence of gang affiliation
Officers executed search warrants of defendant’s and
Davis’s residences, as well as Davis’s phone. Officers found gang
paraphernalia inside defendant’s bedroom, including a folder that
had gang graffiti on it. A photo recovered from Davis’s phone
showed defendant and Davis shirtless; both had gang tattoos.
They also recovered a shirt from Davis’s residence containing “S”
and “G” for Shotgun Crips, along with “Rowley Park” and various
cliques of the gang. During a call that Davis made from jail, he
said that he got into an altercation with someone from 60’s,4 a
rival gang, and that he would be in jail for a long time.
C. Police interview with Davis
GPD Detective Roberto Rosales interviewed Davis.5 Davis
stated that he was no longer in a gang. He also said that he
walked to the park. Davis also claimed the shooting was
accidental, swearing that he did not mean to do it. Davis also told
Detective Rosales that he was alone at the time of the shooting.
At that point, because he had already seen the park video,
Detective Rosales knew that Davis’s statements were untrue,
leading him to conclude that Davis was covering for defendant.

4 There was no evidence that Malone was affiliated with a
gang.

5 An audio recording of the interview was played at the
evidentiary hearing.

4
II. Defense Evidence
Davis testified that he went to the Rowley Park on June 29,
2011, and defendant arrived after him. In fact, Davis did not
know that defendant would be there.
In the first altercation, Davis was knocked unconscious.
After he regained consciousness, he and defendant walked 20 feet
from the park and then returned.
Davis further testified that defendant was not involved in
the first altercation. Because defendant was not involved in the
first fight, he did not know anything had happened, and Davis
did not tell him what had just happened. But, after viewing the
video of the first altercation, Davis acknowledged that he was
with defendant at the time. He also acknowledged that
defendant had chased after the men after they got in the car.
Defendant and Davis then got into a car to leave the park.
As they were leaving, Davis saw someone he knew in the park, so
he and defendant got out of the car. Defendant, who did not
know the person in the park, was walking ahead of Davis. Davis
did not know why defendant got out of the car and was walking
in front of him. They had no conversation about getting out of
the car or walking back to the park. But, after being shown the
video, Davis acknowledged that a car can be seen parking by the
basketball courts as he and another man got out of the car.
Before the second incident, defendant and Davis had no
conversation about anyone having a gun. He further testified
that defendant was standing 15 to 20 feet in front of him during
the second incident. Davis did not remember if defendant had
any contact with the victim (Malone) in the second incident.
When shown the video of defendant confronting and shoulder

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bumping Malone, Davis invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
silence.
Defendant did not use a firearm in the second altercation,
and he did not let Davis know of any weapons present in the
park. When asked if anyone used a firearm in the second
incident, Davis asserted his right to silence.6 When asked to
identify himself and defendant on the video prior to the second
incident, Davis again invoked his right to silence. Davis had the
same response when asked whether he saw himself approaching
Malone, and whether the video captured the shooting that
occurred.
When interviewed by the police a few days after the
incident, Davis told the police that defendant was not involved.
Defendant did not testify.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2021, defendant filed a petition to recall his
sentence pursuant to section 1172.6. Over the People’s
opposition, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
The parties filed prehearing and posthearing briefs.
After listening to the evidence7 and entertaining oral
argument, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. First, the

6 Davis invoked his right to silence in response to numerous
questions regarding the shooting.

7 As part of its evidence, the prosecution submitted a
compact disc with various folders, the “fourth [of] which had the
preliminary hearing transcript.” The trial court indicated that it
had “the original transcript of the preliminary hearing” and “that
is what I will be considering.”

6
trial court summarized the evidence: “The evidence presented at
the hearing established proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
following facts: During the evening hours of June 29th, 2011,
[defendant and] . . . Davis[] committed two separate violent
attacks, minutes apart, at Rowley Park in Gardena, both of which
were captured on surveillance video. Prior to the first of these
two assaults, [defendant and] Davis can be seen on the
surveillance footage walking in the parking lot at the location,
and either grasping hands or handing off an
object as they walked. Defendant . . . , wearing a dark colored
shirt, can be seen on the video pointing at the victims of the first
attack, after which [he] and his co-perpetrator walk toward the
victims. [Defendant] pushes and then strikes a victim in a white
shirt, immediately after which a physical altercation involving
[defendant] and Davis against a pair of males erupts. When the
pair of assault victims leave the location in their car, [defendant]
can be seen following along on foot as the car pulls away,
repeatedly punching the passenger side of the outside of the car.
“[Defendant] and Davis then left the location, only to
return approximately five minutes later, walking onto a
basketball court within Rowley Park, where [defendant]
confronted . . . Malone. Malone had gone to the park to play
basketball with his cousin and two friends. [Defendant]
shoulder-bumped Malone and asked him, ‘Where are you from?’
Malone replied, ‘We don’t bang.’ [Defendant] said, ‘So way [sic.]
Shotgun Grip.’ Davis then stepped forward and shot Malone in
the face in the area of the left jaw. The bullet entered Malone’s
chin and exited below his earlobe. As shown on the surveillance
video, [defendant] is standing behind . . . Davis when the shot is
fired, and [defendant] can be seen on the video briefly patting or

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tapping Davis on the lower back in a swatting motion away from
[defendant’s] body immediately before they both [ran] away from
the crime scene, in a gesture that appears to communicate to
Davis that it is time to go. Malone identified [defendant] and
. . . Davis at the preliminary hearing.”
The trial court then determined that the motivation for the
attacks was defendant and Davis’s gang membership, namely
their gang’s claim to Rowley Park as part of its territory:
“Detective Toshio Hirai testified at the [p]reliminary [h]earing as
a gang expert . . . . [T]he testimony by Det. Hirai that he had two
prior contacts with [defendant], that [defendant] admitted to
membership in the Shotgun Crips gang, and his tattoos reflected
membership in the Shotgun Crip gang, all remain admissible
post-[People v.] Sanchez [(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665]. Also admissible
post-Sanchez is Det. Hirai’s testimony . . . that the criminal street
gang known as the Shotgun Crips, in existence since the 1970’s,
claims Rowley Park as their territory and their ‘main area,’ as
well as Det. Hirai’s opinion that asking a victim, ‘Where are you
from?[,]’ shouting out the name of the Shotgun Crips gang and
then shooting the victim in the face benefit and further the gang
in claiming their territory.”
The trial court found Davis’s testimony not credible: “The
testimony given by . . . Davis lacked credibility. The testimony
given by Davis was internally inconsistent, was inconsistent with
his prior recorded statements made to Gardena Police
Department Detective Roberto Rosales, and was directly
contradicted by the video evidence.”
Finally, the trial court concluded that the evidence
presented at the hearing established a coordinated attack on the
behalf of both defendant and Davis: “The video footage of the

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shooting and the attack that preceded it is compelling evidence of
coordinated teamwork on the part of [defendant] and Davis. This
court rejects as unreasonable the inference that the sequence of
events involving victim selection and identification, followed
immediately by a violent attack, twice repeated, was anything
other than a coordinated plan. [Defendant] gave clear signals to
his co-perpetrator that he had selected two separate victims, first
by pointing at a victim, and second by shoulder-bumping a victim
and asking, ‘Where you from?’ and announcing the gang
membership [that defendant] shared with his co-perpetrator.
Each of these signals of victim-selection was followed swiftly by a
violent attack. This pattern was executed twice in succession,
merely minutes apart. The only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the totality of the evidence presented at the . . . [s]ection
1172.6(d)(3) hearing is that [defendant] knew of . . . Davis’s
intent to shoot the victim, and [defendant] specifically intended
to, and did in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, and
instigate the commission of the attempted murder.
“The People having proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
[defendant] is guilty of attempted murder as a direct aider and
abettor under current law, his petition filed under . . . [s]ection
1172.6 . . . is DENIED.”
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with

9
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to include convictions
of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
“To accomplish this objective, Senate Bill No. 1437
. . . amended section 188, defining malice.” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 950.) Specifically, Senate Bill No.
1437 and its amendment to section 188 require “that a principal
‘act with malice aforethought’ in order to be convicted of
[attempted] murder.” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 950.)
Malice may not be imputed to a person based solely on his
participation in a crime. (Ibid.) “Senate Bill 1437 [did] not
eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because
a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice
aforethought. [Citation.]” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 848, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6, which
“provides a mechanism whereby people ‘who believe they were
convicted of [attempted] murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as [attempted] murder following the crime’s redefinition
. . . may seek vacatur of their . . . conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arnold
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 382.)
In order to obtain resentencing relief, the petitioner must
file a facially sufficient section 1172.6 petition. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(a)(1)-(3) & (b)(1)(A).)
If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an

10
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing, the parties may rely upon
evidence in the record of conviction or new evidence to
demonstrate whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The prosecution bears the burden of
proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Only if the
prosecution cannot meet its burden is the petitioner entitled to
vacatur of the murder conviction and resentencing as set forth in
section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
II. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s order for substantial evidence.
(People v. Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) Applying this
standard of review, we may only ask whether the appellate
record contains “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hubbard
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 392.) In so doing, we view the record “in
the light most favorable” to the trial court’s finding. (Ibid.)
Critically, we may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses
nor reweigh any of the evidence. (People v. Sumahit (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 347, 352; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 890.)
III. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order
Ample evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant acted as an aider and abettor with actual malice.
(People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [“Aiding and
abetting may be shown by circumstantial evidence. It is well
settled that the presence at the scene of the crime and failure to
prevent it, companionship and conduct before and after the

11
offense, including flight, are relevant to determining whether a
defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime”].)
Specifically, the sequence of events supports the inference
that the two men intended to engage in a fatal coordinated
violent gang attack on a suspected rival8 that involved defendant
selecting their victim and announcing their gang affiliation while
Davis acted as the shooter in an attempt to murder the suspected
rival. (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 [“‘Evidence
of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial,
but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to
support a conviction’”].) First, defendant and Davis engaged in a
fight that ended with the victims driving away as defendant
continued to chase them, punching their car as they drove away.
The two men then continued to assert their gang dominance over
the park by walking through the basketball courts as people were
playing.
Minutes later, defendant initiated a confrontation by
shoulder bumping Malone, asking Malone and his companions
which gang they were from, and then responding by announcing
Shotgun Crips. Davis then immediately came from behind

8 The evidence established that both men were Shotgun
Crips and that they were claiming Rowley Park as part of their
territory. While defendant’s mere membership in the gang would
be insufficient to establishing aiding and abetting, his gang
affiliation, companionship with Davis, and conduct before and
after the offense were relevant factors in determining aider and
abettor liability. (See Calderon v. Superior Court (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 933, 940–941; Mitchell v. Prunty (9th Cir. 1997)
107 F.3d 1337, 1342, overruled on other grounds in Santamaria
v. Horsley (9th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3d 1280.)

12
defendant, pulled out a gun and fired at Malone, hitting him in
the left side of his jaw. From these “facts and circumstances”
(People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 420), the trial court
reasonably inferred that defendant and Davis intended their
coordinated gang attack to be a fatal one, with defendant taking
the lead role in selecting the victim and initiating the attack and
Davis playing the role of the shooter.9
Urging us to reverse, defendant characterizes the evidence
differently. He argues that “[t]he evidence is clear that a plan
may have existed to assault individuals at the park, or to assert
their dominance as gang members against people at the park,
perhaps even assault or commit battery against people at the
park. However, these offenses do not demonstrate the intent to
aid and abet attempted murder.” In so doing, he relies heavily
upon Davis’s testimony. But the trial court rejected Davis’s
testimony as not credible.10 (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51 [at a subd. (d)(3) evidentiary hearing, the
court may make factual findings and credibility determinations,
and weigh evidence].) We cannot, and will not, redetermine

9 The fact that no firearm was found during the search at
defendant’s home or that there is no evidence that defendant was
involved in Davis’s procurement of a firearm does not compel a
different result.

10 Defendant also directs us to an apology letter written by
Davis to Malone in which, according to defendant, Davis takes
sole responsibility for the shooting. But the trial court was free
to disregard defendant’s interpretation of Davis’s letter. Even if
we agreed with defendant’s characterization of the letter, in light
of the other evidence of his and Davis’s coordinated attack on
Malone, the letter is insufficient to compel reversal of the trial
court’s order.

13
Davis’s credibility, especially here given that his testimony was
riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions.
Defendant further claims that the trial court’s rejection of
Davis’s testimony was insufficient to prove that he acted as an
aider and abettor. (See People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296,
319 [“While the jury was not required to accept [the defendant’s]
account of events, ‘merely disbelieving’ him does not amount to
‘evidence’ [that the defendant] was in fact the shooter, or if the
jury did believe [that another man] was the shooter, that [the
defendant] willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, aided
and abetted in the murderous act”].) While we do not disagree
with defendant’s statement of the law, it does not apply here. As
set forth above, there was sufficient evidence that defendant and
Davis engaged in an orchestrated and coordinated attack on
Malone.
And to the extent defendant asks us to interpret the
evidence differently—to support his narrative—we decline to do
so. (Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245 [“We do
not review the evidence to see if there is substantial evidence to
support the losing party’s version of events, but only to see if
substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the
prevailing party”].)
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 does not compel a
different result. In Reyes, our Supreme Court held that a
defendant was entitled to a second evidentiary hearing because
the trial court misunderstood the legal requirements of implied
malice murder. (Id. at p. 992.) Not so here. As set forth in its
order, the trial court correctly understood the law and applied it
by finding that defendant (1) knew of Davis’s intent to shoot the
victim, and (2) specifically intended to, and in fact did, aid,

14
facilitate, promote, encourage, and instigate the attempted
murder. (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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