People v. Cervantes CA2/5

CourtListener 9567230Calctapp14 de jun. de 2024

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Cervantes CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B330271

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA174590)
v.

RUBEN CERVANTES, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING PETITION FOR
Defendant and Appellant. REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed on May 15, 2024, is
modified as follows:
On page 2, line six of the first full paragraph, in the
parenthetical immediately after the words “committed multiple
murders”, delete “§ 192” and replace it with “§ 190.2”.
On page 2, line 3 of the second full paragraph, delete
“1203.1” and replace it with “1203.01”.
At the top of page 5, delete the heading, “Due Process”,
and replace the heading with “Equal Protection”.
On page 5, line 6 of the first full paragraph, end the
paragraph after the first sentence, and then insert a new
paragraph as follows:
“Cervantes’s argument that there is not a rational basis for
distinguishing between juveniles under the age of 18 who are
serving LWOP sentences and youthful offenders between the
ages of 18 and 25 who are serving LWOP sentences has been
rejected by every Court of Appeal that has considered it. (People
v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079; People v. Sands
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204; In re Murray (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 456, 463–465; People v. Morales (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 326, 347; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
189, 196–198; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779–
780.) In light of the United States Supreme Court precedent
holding that there is a rational basis for treating juveniles and
nonjuveniles differently in the context of criminal sentencing, we
see no reason to diverge from the other Courts of Appeal. (Miller
v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [“children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [“The
age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood”].)”
Following this newly inserted paragraph, begin the next
paragraph with the sentence that starts “The issue”, and after
the words “The issue” and before the words “is one that had
divided the Courts of Appeal,” insert the following language: “of

2
whether there is a rational basis for distinguishing between
young adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 25 years old
who are serving LWOP sentences and young adult offenders
serving non-LWOP sentences”.
On page 8, line 3 in the sentence under the heading
“DISPOSITION”, delete “1203.1” and replace it with “1203.01”.

The petition for rehearing filed on May 30, 2024, by
defendant and appellant is denied.

There is no change in judgment.

MOOR, Acting, P. J. KIM, J. LEE, J.*

*
Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

3
Filed 5/15/24 P. v. Cervantes CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B330271

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA174590)
v.

RUBEN CERVANTES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Noah P.
Hill, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
In 1999, the jury found Ruben Cervantes guilty of two
counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code1, § 187; counts 2 & 3),
and five counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664; counts 1, 4, 5, 6, & 7). The jury
found true the special circumstance allegations that Cervantes
committed multiple murders (§ 192, subd. (a)(3)), personally used
a firearm in the commission of the offenses (§§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)), and personally inflicted great
bodily injury upon the victim in count 1 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The jury also found true the allegation that the offenses were
gang-related. Cervantes was 23 years old when he committed the
crimes. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).
In 2023, Cervantes moved for a hearing to preserve
evidence for use at a future youth offender parole hearing
pursuant to section 1203.1. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th
261; In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.) The trial court denied the
motion on the ground that youth offender parole hearings are not
available for people serving LWOP sentences for an offense
committed after the offender attained 18 years of age. (§ 3051,
subd. (h).)
On appeal, Cervantes contends that excluding from youth
offender parole consideration defendants like himself, who were
between the ages of 18 and 26 years old at the time of the
offenses for which they were sentenced to LWOP, violates the
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
We affirm the trial court’s order.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
FACTS

At the time of the offenses, Cervantes was a member of a
street gang known as 36th Street. The 36th Street gang was “at
war” with the Clanton gang. Members of the Clanton gang had
been shooting at 36th Street members. Cervantes told a large
group of 36th Street members that he believed it was time to
retaliate. Cervantes was armed with a nine-millimeter handgun.
He said that he wanted to shoot Clanton members. Cervantes
and other 36th Street gang members drove into Clanton territory
looking for targets.
A Clanton member rode his bicycle in front of the car that
defendant was riding in. One of the 36th Street gang members
said “36th Street” and the person on the bicycle responded,
“Clanton.” Cervantes and another gang member fired shots at
the person on the bicycle, hitting him in the leg and the ankle.
That evening around 9:00 p.m., Elizabeth Juarez, who was
hosting a party for a friend who was a Clanton gang member,
heard gunshots and saw a car go by her house. The front
passenger was shooting and someone yelled “36th Street.”
Jaurez’s aunt, who was standing on the corner, was shot, as was
a neighbor. The car was the same make and model of the car
Cervantes was riding in earlier that day when he shot the person
on the bicycle.
By 4:00 a.m. the next morning, there were between 80 and
100 people congregating in Juarez’s back yard. Many of the
party-goers were Clanton gang members. Yesenia Zaldivar was
in Jaurez’s backyard when she heard between eight and thirteen

3
shots fired. A bullet skinned Zaldivar’s shoulder. Five other
people at the party were shot; two of those people were killed.
The next day Cervantes told a fellow 36th Street member
that he had jumped over a wall and started shooting his nine-
millimeter handgun at the people attending Juarez’s party. He
said that he “ ‘took care of them fools.’ ”

DISCUSSION

“California’s youth offender parole statute offers
opportunities for early release to certain persons who are
incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. (§§ 3051,
4801.) When it was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied
only to individuals who committed their crimes before the age of
18; the purpose of the statute was to align California law with
then-recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment
limitations on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.
In more recent years, however, the Legislature has expanded the
statute to include certain young adult offenders as well. Under
the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a
crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole
hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.
(§ 3051, subd. (b).) But not all youthful offenders are eligible for
parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others, offenders
who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. (Id., subd.
(h).)” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838 (Hardin).)

4
Due Process

Cervantes first contends, as he did in the trial court, that
section 3051 violates federal and state constitutional guaranties
of equal protection by excluding from eligibility for youth offender
parole hearings persons serving LWOP sentences for crimes
committed when they were between 18 and 25 years of age. The
issue is one that had divided the Courts of Appeal, but after
briefing in this case was complete, the California Supreme Court
resolved the conflict by holding that section 3051 does not violate
equal protection. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839 [“Hardin
has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in
declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult
offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has
granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of
other offenses.”].) Although the court left open the possibility of
“other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special
circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more
focused as-applied inquiry” (id. at p. 862), here Cervantes has
not made an as-applied challenge based on the special
circumstances found true by the jury against him. Hardin is
controlling, and Cervantes’s contention necessarily fails.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Cervantes next contends that the amendments to section
3051 that provide youth offender parole hearings for persons
serving non-LWOP sentences who committed their controlling
offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 years old rendered his

5
LWOP sentence cruel and unusual punishment under article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution. We reject this
contention as well.
“A punishment may violate article I, section 17 of the
California Constitution if ‘it is so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.’ (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted [(Lynch)].) It requires that we
‘examine the circumstances of the offense’ and the defendant in
determining whether the ‘the penalty imposed is “grossly
disproportionate to the defendant’s culpability.” ’ [Citation.] We
assess three factors in making this determination: (1) the nature
of the offense and the offender, and the degree of danger posed to
society; (2) a comparison with sentences for more serious offenses
under California law; and (3) a comparison with sentences
imposed by other states for the same offense. (Lynch, at pp. 425–
427.)” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 191.)
Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of
the California Constitution under the legal principles set forth in
Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 through 427, “presents a
question of law subject to independent review; it is ‘not a
discretionary decision to which the appellate court must defer.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994, 1000.)
The reduction of a sentence based on the determination it is cruel
or unusual under the California Constitution “ ‘is a solemn power
to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the
Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Furthermore, such a reduction “ ‘ “must be
viewed as representing an exception rather than a general
rule” ’ ” and “ ‘[i]n such cases the punishment is reduced because

6
the Constitution compels reduction, not because a trial court in
its discretion believes the punishment too severe.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
Cervantes acknowledges that his sentence “may not meet
the three-part test set forth in Lynch, supra,” and does not
attempt to argue any of the factors set forth above. Instead, he
asserts that, because he was 23 years old at the time he
committed the offenses, he—like any other person under the age
of 26—was immature and less culpable than a person 26 years
old or older, regardless of the crimes he committed. Cervantes
argues that his reduced culpability essentially renders the
circumstances of the crimes and the fact that he committed two
murders irrelevant. This is simply incorrect. The number and
nature of the crimes Cervantes committed cannot be ignored—
article I, section 17 requires that we “ ‘examine the circumstances
of the offense’ and the defendant.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.)
In this case, Cervantes told others that he wanted to shoot
members of a rival gang in retaliation for earlier shootings
committed by its members. He jumped over a wall and fired
between eight and thirteen shots into a group of party-goers,
fatally wounding two of his victims. The next day he bragged
that he “ ‘took care of them fools.’ ” Even taking into account his
diminished culpability as a 23 year old, Cervantes’s crimes are
such that the sentence does not exceed the constitutional limit.

7
DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Cervantes’s
motion for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1203.1.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, Acting, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KIM, J.

LEE, J.

Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

8

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.