In re M.M. CA2/2

CourtListener 9546398Calctapp13 de jun. de 2024

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Filed 6/13/24 In re M.M. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.M., a Person Coming B328908, consolidated with
Under the Juvenile Court Law. B329901
(Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 22CCJP03441A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Michael M.,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed with directions.

Jesse Frederic Rodriguez and Giselle Marie Achecar, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
In this juvenile dependency case, Michael M. (father)1
challenges the juvenile court’s exertion of jurisdiction over his
teenage daughter, its order removing her from his custody, and
its order granting Tiffany B. (mother) and the caregiver co-
educational rights over the daughter. Concluding there was no
error, we affirm but direct the juvenile court to enter its
educational rights order on a JV-535 form.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Family
M.M. was born to mother and an unknown man in
February 2008.
In December 2016, the family court granted father full
legal and physical custody over M.M.
Although a DNA test confirmed that father is not M.M.’s
biological father, the juvenile court ruled that he is her presumed
father.

1 Father now uses the name Brother M.

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II. “Whoopings” and Isolation
Father openly admitted to “whooping” M.M. with a leather
belt on more than one occasion. He did it at least one time when
she was 11 or 12 years old. He did it again in August 2022, when
she was 14 years old. In the August 2022 incident, father became
“outrage[d]” and “angry” when M.M. was texting mother on a cell
phone; he proceeded to give her a “whooping” by “lashing” her
five times on the buttocks, leg, and back with a leather belt.
After each of the first four lashes he explained why he was
whooping her, and described the fifth lash as “one to grow on.”
Father converted to Islam in 2018 and is a sheik of the Moorish
Science Temple of America. He explained that he “obey[s] the
ordinance of Allah.” When asked why he repeatedly lashed M.M.
with a belt, father further explained that M.M. needed to “return
back to the Divine Creed of her ancient mothers and fathers and
regain the true love of Allah.”
Father also isolated M.M. from “worldly activities and
worldly things” as a way to remove her from “anything that
causes harm.” M.M. attended school in person prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, but father did not permit her to be
vaccinated so she completed the seventh and eighth grades
through remote learning.
III. Dependency Petition
On September 1, 2022, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert dependency
jurisdiction over M.M. on the basis of the August 2022 lashings
as well as other beatings M.M. reported receiving, all of which
placed her at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The
petition alleged that jurisdiction was appropriate under

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subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.2
IV. Jurisdictional Hearing
The juvenile court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing
in December 2022 and January 2023, at which father and M.M.
testified. M.M. reported frequent, twice weekly beatings by
father. Father disputed using a belt on M.M. with such
frequency, and expressed his view that M.M. was exaggerating
because she no longer wanted to live with him. Father was
concerned about the lack of discipline in society and cited his
belief that “the rod of correction shall drive the foolishness away
from the heart[, that h]e who loves his [child] will be careful to
discipline [them, and that] he who hates this child spares the
rod,” and “so as a part of that love . . . [w]e have to impart
discipline.”
The juvenile court did not credit M.M.’s testimony about
the frequency of beatings, but found that there had been at least
two beatings with a belt based on father’s own admissions. The
court found father generally credible, except for the “parts where”
father “understated” “the depths of his anger.” In light of these
findings, the court ruled that father’s use of the belt constituted
“inappropriate” physical discipline that was neither “reasonable”
nor “appropriate.” The court accordingly dismissed the allegation
under subdivision (a) of section 300, but sustained the allegation
under subdivision (b) of section 300 once it was amended to
reflect that father had “inappropriately disciplined” M.M. “by
striking the child’s leg and back with a belt” on more than one
occasion, which was “not reasonably necessary.”

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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V. Dispositional Hearing
Father resisted the juvenile court’s jurisdictional ruling.
He immediately filed a section 388 petition attacking the ruling,
which the court denied. Father also ignored the court’s interim
order for father not to contact daughter by going to M.M.’s high
school; while there, father displayed anger at the school officials.
The juvenile court held its dispositional hearing in April
2023. The court removed M.M. from father’s and mother’s
custody, and ordered that she remain in the custody of Ms. J., in
whose custody she had been since August 2022, with father to
have monitored visitation. The court ordered reunification
services for father, ordering him to complete (1) parenting
classes, (2) individual counseling to address case issues including
domestic violence, and (3) conjoint counseling with M.M. if M.M.’s
therapist so recommended.
VI. Hearing on Educational Rights
In early June 2023, the juvenile court held a two-day
hearing regarding who should possess the rights to control M.M.’s
education. M.M. had by that time been attending a high school
for nine months and was starting to make academic and social
progress; the court designated that high school to be her “school
of origin.” The court named both mother and father as co-holders
of the decisionmaking rights over M.M.’s education, finding that
it was in M.M.’s best interest to have both parents “involved.”
Because father wished to enroll M.M. in a different high school
and because the court found it was in M.M.’s best interest for her
to remain where she was attending, the court granted the
caregiver Ms. J. co-holder rights for purposes of “tie breaking
authority” only as to which high school M.M. attended. The court
told the parents to bring any other decision on which they could

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not agree to the court. The court rejected father’s concern that
the high school was a haven of drugs and gang-related activity
after assuring itself that the school—and the one father
preferred—each had “zero tolerance” policies for drugs and gang
activity.
VII. Appeals
Father timely appealed from the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders and the post-dispositional order regarding
educational rights. We consolidated the two appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdictional Finding
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes a juvenile court
to exert dependency jurisdiction over a child if the child “has
suffered, or there is a substantial likelihood that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) We review
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that M.M. had previously suffered serious physical harm.
“Serious physical harm” excludes the exercise of a parent’s right
to reasonably discipline their child. (In re D.M. (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 634, 640-641.) “Whether a parent’s use of discipline
on a particular occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope
of this parental right to discipline turns on three considerations:
(1) whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2)
whether the punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the
discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3)
‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or

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excessive.’” (Id. at p. 641.) Here, father admitted he was “angry”
when he “whoop[ed]” M.M. in August 2022, and the court
specifically found that father was understating the depths of his
anger. A beating inflicted out of anger is not “genuinely
disciplinary” (under the first element of D.M.’s test). The court
also found that whipping M.M. with a belt on her back and leg
was not “necessary” or “reasonable” (implicating the second two
elements). Dependency jurisdiction has been upheld when a
parent hit a three year old with a belt causing bruises for
refusing to write a letter of the alphabet and spraying perfume in
his eyes (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438-439)
and when a parent hit a minor with a belt and electric cord hard
enough to leave welts due to misbehavior (In re David H. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1645). This case is similar, where father
most recently lashed M.M. repeatedly with a belt when he
discovered text messages and images on her cell phone. Father
resists this conclusion, urging that there was no evidence that his
beating of M.M. caused her bruises or welts, but M.M. testified
that the beatings caused bruises and parts of her body to swell.
Father also urges the juvenile court here did not apply D.M.’s
test, but the court’s express reference to father’s anger and to the
necessity and appropriateness of the discipline echo the elements
of that test. Father lastly urges that the court’s decision to
dismiss the allegation of “physical abuse” under subdivision (a)
while interlineating the allegation under subdivision (b) to
“inappropriate discipline” undermines the court’s ruling. It does
not: D.M.’s test refines when parental discipline crosses the line
into actionable “serious physical harm” within the meaning of
section 300; the court’s decision here to use the phrase
“inappropriate discipline” rather than “physical abuse” does not

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negate the legal significance of its determination under the test
that M.M. suffered “serious physical harm.”
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
finding that M.M. continued to face a “substantial risk” of serious
physical harm. Father testified that “the rod of correction” was
an integral part of his parenting philosophy; he had stated that
he would discipline M.M. for running away from home, an act for
which father had not yet disciplined her. This constitutes an
ample factual basis from which the court could find father might
lash her again in the future. Father responds that he had not
physically disciplined her in the six months prior to the
jurisdictional hearing, but that was because she was in Ms. J.’s
custody, not father’s; that father did not do what he had no
opportunity to do says very little. Father also assured the court
that he would not “whoop” her in the future, but the juvenile
court was well within its rights to discount that assurance in
light of father’s prior conduct and statements.
Father lastly urges that M.M.’s testimony that she feared
father was substantially impeached by text messages she sent to
mother, but M.M.’s fear or lack of fear has no bearing on the
pertinent analysis.
II. Removal Order
Once a juvenile court exerts dependency jurisdiction over a
child, the court may remove the child from her parent if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were
returned home,” and (2) “there are no reasonable means” short of
removal “by which the [child’s] physical health can be protected.”
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(c)(1).) We

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review a removal order by asking whether substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that removal was appropriate. (In re V.L. (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 147, 155.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s removal
finding in this case. Father has repeatedly reaffirmed his deep
belief in the divine propriety of physically discipling children and
has indicated that he has yet to discipline M.M. for running away
from home after the August 2022 beating; this poses a
“substantial danger” to her physical health, safety, and well-
being if she were returned to his custody. The juvenile court was
within its rights to disregard father’s subsequent assurances that
he would not physically beat her in the future. Father also
admitted to isolating M.M. from the world, which she testified
has harmed her emotional well-being. The court’s related finding
that no reasonable means short of removal could assure M.M.’s
safety is also supported by substantial evidence. Citing In re
Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530, father suggests
that unannounced visits by the Department would suffice; we
disagree, as they would not protect M.M. unless they occurred all
the time because father and M.M. appear to be at loggerheads,
the beatings have occurred more than once, and father has yet to
demonstrate adherence to his newfound disavowal of the
propriety of physical punishment. (Cf. Henry V., at pp. 529-530
[unannounced visits may be a viable alternative to check on
bruises due to excessive child discipline, at least where discipline
is a one-time incident and the parent has embraced counseling].)
Unannounced visits also would not protect M.M. from the
emotional harm of being wholly isolated.
Father resists this conclusion with two further arguments.

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First, he argues that the earlier beatings are insufficient to
warrant removal, which looks toward whether being in his
custody in the future will cause harm. (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 68, 77.) Father correctly states the rule, but the juvenile
court’s removal finding did look toward the substantial danger
that being in father’s custody might pose to M.M. in the future.
Second, he argues that M.M. is not in any danger because
the root problem is M.M. herself, whom father describes as
“rebellious, dishonest, incorrigible, [and] selfish” and who is
willing to do anything not to be “parented by father’s lifestyle and
rules.” Father’s character assassination of M.M. ignores the
pertinent inquiry, which is whether father’s self-admitted history
of physically beating M.M. places her in substantial danger until
such time as he demonstrates an ability to stop.
III. Educational Rights Order
Once a juvenile court exerts dependency jurisdiction over a
child, the court “may limit” any parent’s “right . . . to make
educational . . . decisions for the child.” (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).)
Limits are valid as long as they do “not exceed those necessary to
protect the child” and ensure that the ensuing decisions are
“based on the best interests of the child.” (§ 361., subds. (a)(1) &
(a)(6); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.649(a); In re R.W. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276; In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 58-
59, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re
A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 322; In re Samuel G. (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 502, 511.) Factors relevant to whether an order is in
a child’s best interests are (1) the child’s wishes (see In re Aljamie
D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432), and (2) whether the parent
has been harassing school officials (D.C., at pp. 58-59). We
review an order limiting a parent’s rights for an abuse of

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discretion. (R.W., at p. 1277.)
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making
father and mother co-holders of educational rights over M.M., or
in granting the caregiver Ms. J. “tie breaking authority” solely
over the decision of which high school M.M. would attend. As a
threshold matter, it is unclear whether the court’s order “limits”
father’s educational rights; although he had sole legal custody
over M.M. prior to the initiation of this dependency case, any
decisions on which the parents now disagree—except for the
choice of her high school—are to be brought back to the court for
resolution; because the court would have supervision over those
decisions by virtue of its jurisdiction over M.M.—even if father
were the sole person making them—the court’s order does not
appear to place any limits on father’s rights as to those decisions.
Putting this to the side, the court in any event found it necessary
to protect M.M.’s emotional well-being given the isolation she had
suffered and the progress she was beginning to make at her high
school as well as the need for stability that would be undercut if
she were forced to transfer to the school father preferred. The
court also found it in M.M.’s best interests for both of her parents
to be “involved” in those decisions. In granting the caregiver “tie
breaking authority,” the court found that M.M. wished to
continue where she was attending and was making strides there;
father’s belligerent harassment of school officials in the past
reinforced the need to allow the caregiver tie-breaking input.
Father responds with what boil down to four arguments.
First, he argues that we must reverse because the juvenile
court never articulated the “necessity” and “best interests”
standard. Father says that we must therefore infer the court
applied the wrong standard. Father has it backwards; we

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construe a juvenile court’s silence as evincing a proper
understanding and application of the law—not, as father would
suggest, as evincing a misunderstanding and misapplication of
the law. (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499; In re
Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325, 330; see generally, Evid. Code, §
664.)
Second, father challenges the necessity of allowing M.M. to
remain at her high school because it is not in M.M.’s best
interests to allow her to “make choices that enable her to use
drugs and associate with gangs” simply because “those choices
make her happy.” Once again, this character assassination
ignores the juvenile court’s explanation as to why it was
necessary and better for M.M. to remain where she was
attending. It also ignores the juvenile court’s inquiry into the
anti-drug and anti-gang policies at the high school.
Third, father argues that it is impermissible for educational
decisionmaking rights to be held by more than one person or for
them to be granted to a non-parent. This argument directly
contradicts father’s concessions to the juvenile court that those
rights could be granted to more than one person and to a non-
parent. At best father has waived these alleged errors; at worst,
he has invited them. They are not errors in any event, as the
pertinent statutes contemplate than any “responsible adult” may
hold educational rights over a child and nowhere prohibit the
sharing of those rights. (§ 361, subds. (a)(1), (a)(4)(A).)
Fourth and finally, father argues that the court erred in not
placing its findings on a JV-535 form. This is certainly required.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.650(a), 5.649(a), (e).) The juvenile
court was aware of this requirement, repeatedly discussed with
the parents what language should be used in the JV-535 form,

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and ordered minor’s counsel to prepare one. No JV-535 form
appears in the record on appeal. The absence of this form is of no
moment because father has not shown how it was prejudicial
given that the court’s minute order spelled out all the pertinent
information that would have been included in an order prepared
with that form.
We direct the juvenile court to memorialize its order in a
JV-535 form.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. The juvenile court
is directed to memorialize its educational rights order on a JV-
535 form.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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