In re L.L. CA2/3

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Filed 6/12/24 In re L.L. CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re L.L., a Person Coming B328327
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NJ30422
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.L.,

Minor and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John C. Lawson II, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Minor and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

In this juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 602, the juvenile court sustained a
petition alleging that L.L. had committed murder and attempted
murder. On appeal, L.L. contends that the court abused its
discretion in committing him to a secure youth treatment facility
(SYTF), rather than attempting a less restrictive alternative.
Relying on In re Ernesto L. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 31 (Ernesto L.),
L.L. further argues that the court erred in applying his
precommitment custody credits to his maximum term of
confinement rather than the baseline term of confinement under
section 875 and that the court violated his equal protection rights
in so doing. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
filed a petition under section 602 alleging that L.L., who was
then 15 years old, had committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187,
subd. (a); count 2) on June 3, 2022. L.L. was detained on July 26,
2022.
Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found
both counts to be true beyond a reasonable doubt and sustained
the petition.2 In preparation for the hearing, the court reviewed
the probation officer’s report, supplemental reports concerning

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
2 At the disposition hearing, the court clarified that the murder was

second degree murder.

2
L.L.’s behavior while detained, the sentencing memoranda
submitted by the parties, and section 875. The court explained
that it understood that L.L. had no prior history with the juvenile
justice system. It acknowledged that it had broad discretion to
determine an appropriate placement, taking into consideration
public safety, safety of the minor, and the interests of facilitating
rehabilitation while preventing future offenses. Under section
875, subdivision (a), the court found that L.L. was at least 15
years old at the time of the offenses and the offenses were
offenses described in section 707, subdivision (b). Considering the
severity of the offenses, L.L.’s voluntary and active participation
in the crimes, and the fact that he was “entrenched” in gang
culture, the court concluded that a SYTF placement was
appropriate. The court explained that the programming,
treatment, and education (including continued education and
community college courses) offered in a SYTF were appropriate to
meet L.L.’s treatment and security needs. It concluded that a less
restrictive disposition would not achieve the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety in light of the severity of the
crimes.
The court set a maximum term of confinement of 17 years
four months to life and a baseline term of seven years. The court
applied 279 days of precommitment custody to the maximum
term of confinement.
L.L. timely appealed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of June 3, 2022, Krystal Delgado, who was
staying with her friend, Duwayne Thomas, texted or called
Thomas to ask whether he wanted to go get food. Thomas agreed
and asked Delgado to meet him at the apartment they were

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sharing. Delgado parked her car in the alley next to the
apartment and went inside to use the restroom. While inside, she
heard four gunshots back-to-back. She did not hear any fighting
or shouting. Delgado looked out the back door of the apartment
and saw Thomas on the ground in the alley. She rushed down to
see what happened and saw him bleeding out. She returned to
the apartment to get her phone and called 911.
Katherine Murison lived in a nearby apartment. On the
evening of June 3, 2022, she went to her car, which was parked in
the alley, to pick up her boyfriend from work. Another car was
parked with its lights on, facing her car, and blocking her exit
from the alley in that direction. Murison decided to wait to see if
the car would move. She was looking down when she heard at
least four loud, rapid pops. Murison did not see any lights but
believed the sound was caused by fireworks. She was about to
turn her car around to exit the alley in the other direction when
she heard the sound of something slamming and the sound of
shoes on gravel. Murison saw at least one male but believed there
were three. She made eye contact with one individual who
pointed a gun at her driver’s side window and shot at her
multiple times. The window shattered and Murison slumped over
the center console of her car. She felt a searing pain in her thigh
and a soreness in her upper back. She did not see anyone else fire
at her. Murison remained quiet and slumped over the console
after the initial shots in case the men doubled back. She waited
for a few seconds before leaving her car and returning to her
apartment building, where she called for help. Murison was
ultimately taken to the hospital where her leg was bandaged. A
bullet was lodged in her upper back, which was later removed in
an out-patient procedure.

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When officers arrived at the scene at around 10:56 p.m.,
Thomas was facedown in a pool of blood. An autopsy determined
that Thomas suffered seven gunshot wounds, including two
gunshot wounds to the head, which were fatal. The cause of death
was determined to be multiple gunshot wounds.
Officers located several cameras in the area and obtained
the footage from the individuals to whom the cameras belonged.
Based on the video evidence, they determined three individuals
entered the alley shortly before the shootings took place and two
of them opened fire on Thomas, unprovoked. Thomas fell to the
ground and the suspects ran north in the alley. Officers were able
to identify the outfits worn by the three suspects. The video also
captured audio, including the sound of additional gunshots after
the shooting of Thomas and a woman crying out for help. Based
on the car that one of the suspects was driving in a video, officers
were able to identify the individual as Filasifoki Pio.
Detectives identified an Instagram account they believed
belonged to Pio and obtained the records for that account with a
search warrant. These records included the account’s messaging
history. At 11:06 p.m. on June 3, 2022, shortly after the
shootings, someone shared an Instagram post describing the
shootings in a group chat including Pio. An account with the
name “Eaglest.sagger” wrote, “ ‘Just know bkadnews is a boy.’ ”
Eaglest.sagger later re-sent the post describing the crime and
stated, “ ‘That’s my new dance move.’ ” Eaglest.sagger also wrote,
“ ‘That n-i-g-g-a family gonna hate me n Bkadnews.’ ” A video
sent by Eaglest.sagger also showed two individuals in clothes
that matched the surveillance videos obtained by the police. One
of them was Pio and the other was L.L.

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On June 5, 2022, Pio messaged the group, “ ‘They just
picced up the video from Mya’s mom house.’ ” This message was
sent shortly after an officer picked up a DVR containing
surveillance footage from one of the properties near where the
shooting took place. Eaglest.sagger wrote “ ‘It is what it is at the
end of the day’ ” and “ ‘Love y’all tho we gonna be ok.’ ” Bkadnews
wrote, “ ‘We gonna be smoove.’ ” Eaglest.sagger replied,
“ ‘ “Regalrdless” u are.’ [¶] ‘Ur 15.’ ”
Detectives issued search warrants for the Eaglest.sagger
and Bkadnews accounts and determined that the Eaglest.sagger
account belonged to Santiago Rivera and the Bkadnews account
belonged to L.L. On June 8, 2022, Rivera sent a picture of himself
holding a black pistol and wearing the outfit captured in the
surveillance videos from the day of the murder, as well as a photo
of Thomas in the group chat. On June 10, 2022, a photo sent in
the group chat showed L.L. shirtless. No tattoo was visible in the
picture. However, when L.L. was arrested on July 21, 2022, his
booking photograph reflected that he had a large tattoo spanning
the width of his chest that read “Exotic Family.” Detectives also
obtained the record for Thomas’s Instagram account but did not
find any interactions between his account and that of the
suspects.

DISCUSSION

1. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering L.L.
committed to a SYTF.
A juvenile court may order commitment to a SYTF if each
of the following criteria under section 875 is met: “(1) The
juvenile is adjudicated and found to be a ward of the court based
on an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was

6
committed when the juvenile was 14 years of age or older. [¶]
(2) The adjudication described in paragraph (1) is the most recent
offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated. [¶] (3) The
court has made a finding on the record that a less restrictive,
alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875,
subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
L.L. does not argue that the court failed to make the
finding required under the third criterion but that it erred in
finding that a less restrictive alternative disposition would not be
suitable. To determine whether a less restrictive alternative
disposition is unsuitable, “the court shall consider all relevant
and material evidence, including the recommendations of
counsel, the probation department,” and each of the following
criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or offenses for which the
ward has been most recently adjudicated, including the ward’s
role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to
victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including
the adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile
court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the programming,
treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth
treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and
security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the
ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental
maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special
needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing the ward to
a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment facility.”
(§ 875, subd. (a)(3).)

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We review the juvenile court’s placement decision for an
abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1154.) The juvenile court abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘when the
factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence.’ ” ’ ” (In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5.) We will
not disturb the juvenile court’s findings when there is substantial
evidence to support them. (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th
1285, 1288.) “ ‘ “ ‘In determining whether there was substantial
evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the
record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the
purposes of the Juvenile Court Law,’ ” ’ ” which includes public
safety as well as the rehabilitation of the juvenile offender.
(Carlos J., at p. 5, quoting In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
522, 527–528; § 202.)
The record shows that the court carefully considered all the
relevant evidence and criteria in determining that a less
restrictive placement was not suitable, including L.L.’s lack of
any previous delinquent history, the severity of the offenses
(including the scope of L.L.’s role and the harm inflicted on the
victims), and the programming available at a SYTF. The court
acknowledged that it had discretion to choose a less restrictive
alternative, such as placing L.L. in his home with probation, or
sending him to a camp, but concluded that these less restrictive
alternatives were inappropriate in light of the severity of the
crimes. The court stated that, despite the absence of prior
offenses, the evidence showed that L.L. was “entrenched
in . . . gang glorification.” The court found that a SYTF had
resources to educate and rehabilitate L.L. and was “also a secure
location, because the court has to be concerned both for the safety
of the community and the safety of the minor.” The court

8
instructed that L.L. should be involved in anger management
classes, violence prevention classes, gang intervention
programming, and continued educational services, including
college-level courses when appropriate at a SYTF.3
Our Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal have
consistently recognized that juvenile courts are not required to
attempt a less restrictive placement before ordering a more
restrictive one.4 (See In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183
[“there is no absolute rule that a [CYA] commitment should never
be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been
attempted”]; In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 27 [rejecting
assertion that less restrictive placement must first be attempted;
“[t]o the contrary, circumstances in a particular case may well
suggest the desirability of a [CYA] commitment despite the

3 The probation report, which the court reviewed, argued that less

restrictive alternatives would be inadequate because none had a
sufficiently long duration to ensure public safety while allowing an
opportunity for rehabilitation. It also identified “mental health[] and
substance abuse services” and “provisional assistance and guidance for
humanity classes involving religion, arts and written expressions for
continuous engagement with the youth.”
4 “ ‘Effective July 1, 2005, the correctional agency formerly known as

the California Youth Authority (CYA) became known as [DJF]. DJF is
part of the Division of Juvenile Justice [DJJ], which in turn is part of
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. [Citations.]
Statutes that formerly referred to CYA . . . now refer to DJF.’
[Citations.]” (In re Albert W. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 411, 413, fn. 1.)
“[I]n 2020 the Legislature passed ‘juvenile justice realignment’ through
Senate Bill No. 823 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337).
‘Effective July 1, 2021, newly enacted section 736.5 shift[ed]
responsibility for convicted youth offenders from DJJ to the county
level. [Citation.]’ ” (In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413, fn. 3.)

9
availability of such alternative dispositions as placement in a
county camp or ranch”]; In re Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1159 [“there is no rule that such a placement cannot be
ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted”];
In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [same]; In re Asean
D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473 [“it is clear that a commitment
to the [CYA] may be made in the first instance, without previous
resort to less restrictive placements”].)
The cases cited by L.L. do not compel the conclusion that
the court abused its discretion in ordering a commitment to a
SYTF. Like the cases cited above, the court in In re James H.
(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911, 922, recognized that “there is no
absolute rule barring [CYA] placement until less restrictive
placements have been attempted.” Likewise, the court in In re
Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 433, observed that “[i]t is . . .
clear . . . [citation], that a commitment to CYA ‘may be made in
the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive
placements.’ ” Moreover, none of the cases L.L. cites involved
appellants who had committed murder or attempted murder.
(See James H., at p. 915 [minor was charged with burglary]; In re
Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 553 [minor admitted that he
committed lewd acts on a minor under 14 years and burglary];
Carl N., at p. 425 [minor admitted to violating probation
following “long history of juvenile delinquency (including
vandalism, gang activity, drug abuse, a felony assault, and
multiple violations of probation)”].) Section 875, subdivision (a), is
clear that the decision whether to commit a ward to a SYTF must
be based on the consideration of the specific circumstances of the
juvenile before the court, not by reference to other juveniles. The
fact that the juvenile courts in those cases had attempted less

10
restrictive alternatives (Pedro M., at pp. 555–556), or that the
appellants had less restrictive placements in the past (James H.,
at p. 923; Carl N., at pp. 433–435), does not demonstrate that the
court here abused its discretion in ordering L.L. to a SYTF even
though he had no prior juvenile record. The court could
reasonably conclude, as the probation report indicated, that no
shorter and less restrictive program would be sufficient to
address the circumstances, including gang entrenchment, that
led L.L. to kill one person and attempt to kill another.
In sum, even if the record indicates the presence of factors
that could support a less restrictive disposition, nothing in the
record compels such a result. (See In re Reynaldo R. (1978) 86
Cal.App.3d 250, 256 [DJJ commitment was not an abuse of
discretion even if minor’s record justified less restrictive
disposition].) There was substantial evidence that L.L. could
benefit from a SYTF commitment and the court reasonably
believed a less restrictive disposition would not be adequate to
hold L.L. accountable for the serious offenses he committed or to
provide for the safety and protection of the public. The court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering L.L. committed to a SYTF.
2. The court did not err in applying L.L.’s custody credits
to the maximum term of confinement.
2.1. Ernesto L. does not compel the conclusion that
custody credits must be applied against the
baseline term.
L.L. argues that his 279 days of precommitment custody
credits should apply against his baseline term of seven years
rather than against his 17 years four months to life maximum
term of confinement. He relies on authority regarding
commitments to the DJJ holding that a minor’s precommitment

11
credits should be applied against a ward’s actual maximum
custodial term imposed under section 731, subdivision (b) rather
than against the theoretical maximum calculated under section
726, subdivision (d). (Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 40–
43.) Specifically, he contends that there was no practical
distinction between the question facing the court in Ernesto L.
and the question facing the juvenile court in this case and that
the reasoning and holding of Ernesto L. should govern. We
disagree.
In Ernesto L., Division One of the First District held that
when a minor is committed to the DJJ, the juvenile court must
apply any precommitment custody credits against the maximum
custodial term under section 731 rather than against the
maximum exposure term of confinement set under section 726.
(Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) The court disagreed
with the Fourth Appellate District’s holding in In re A.R. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1076, that precommitment credits can be applied
to the maximum exposure term instead of to the lower maximum
custodial term. The court in Ernesto L. recognized that the reach
of its holding was limited because of statutory amendments
providing for the closure of the DJJ on June 30, 2023, but
published the decision because of its disagreement with the
holding of A.R. (Ernesto L., at p. 34, fn. 2; § 736.5, subds. (b)–(c),
(e).)
As explained in Ernesto L., section 726 applies to minors
removed from the physical custody of their parents or guardians
due to a section 602 wardship petition, and section 731 governed
confinement of minors committed to the DJJ. (Ernesto L., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 34–35.) Section 726 states that an order
removing a minor from a parent or guardian’s physical custody,

12
“shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical
confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of
imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of
the offense . . . which brought . . . the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 726, subd. (d)(1).)
Section 731 states that a minor committed to the DJJ “shall not
be confined in excess of the term of confinement set by the
committing court. The court shall set a maximum term based
upon the facts and circumstances of the matter . . . that
brought . . . the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as
deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The court shall not
commit a ward to the [DJJ] for a period that exceeds the middle
term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult
convicted of the same offense.” (§ 731, subd. (b).) Section 731 thus
provides the juvenile court with discretion to impose a maximum
term of confinement to the DJJ that is less than the middle term
of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult. (Ernesto L.,
at pp. 39, 41.) Ernesto L. found that custody credits must be
applied against the section 731 term because that was the “actual
maximum custodial term” imposed by the court. (Ernesto L., at
p. 41.)
L.L. was committed to a SYTF pursuant to section 875, not
to the DJJ pursuant to sections 726 and 731. Section 875,
subdivision (b), provides that the juvenile court “shall set a
baseline term of confinement,” which “shall represent the time in
custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment
needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a
period of probation supervision in the community.”
Subdivision (c) requires that “the court shall additionally set a
maximum term of confinement for the ward,” which “shall

13
represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the
ward may serve,” and which “shall not exceed the middle term of
imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the
same offense[.]” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1) & (2).) Notably, as amended in
2022 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 41), section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C),
provides that “[p]recommitment credits for time served must be
applied against the maximum term of confinement as set
pursuant to this subdivision.” Because this statutory language is
clear, we must follow it “ ‘ “ ‘ “unless a literal interpretation
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend.” ’ ” ’ ” (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190.)
We do not find persuasive L.L.’s argument that section 875,
subdivision (c)(2)’s definition of “maximum term of confinement”
by reference to section 726, subdivision (c)(2), “directly
contradicts subdivision (c)(1),” which “expressly contemplate[s]
the maximum custodial term set forth by section 731.” “[I]n
interpreting legislation, we first look to the plain or ordinary
meaning of the language used to determine the Legislature’s
intent, unless the language is uncertain. Every word and clause
is given effect so that no part or provision is useless, deprived of
meaning, or contradictory.” (Green v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435, fns. omitted.) Section 875,
subdivision (c)(2) defines the “maximum term of confinement” by
reference to the definition of “maximum term of imprisonment” in
section 726, subdivision (d)(2). Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)
states that “[t]he maximum term of confinement shall represent
the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward may
serve subject to” the limitations set forth in paragraphs (A) and
(B). (Italics added.) Giving effect to the plain language of the
statute so that no portion is deprived of meaning or rendered

14
contradictory, “the maximum term of confinement as set
pursuant to this subdivision” in subdivision (c)(1)(C) means
“maximum term of confinement” as defined in subdivision (c)(2)
and limited by subdivision (c)(1)(A) and (B).
We agree with the parties that there are significant
parallels between section 875, subdivision (c)(1), and section 731,
subdivision (b). However, this does not bolster L.L.’s argument
that the reference to section 726 in section 875, subdivision (c)(2),
creates a contradiction. Section 726, subdivision (d)(2), states
that its definition of “maximum term of imprisonment” also
applies to section 731. Thus, both section 731, subdivision (b),
and section 875, subdivision (c), define the relevant maximum
terms by reference to section 726, subdivision (d), but impose
additional limitations. In both section 731 and section 875, the
term is a maximum to be set by the court “based upon the facts
and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or
continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as
deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation.” (§§ 731, subd. (b),
875, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, as the Attorney General contends, the
maximum custodial term under section 731 and addressed in
Ernesto L. corresponds to the maximum term of confinement
under section 875, subdivision (c), rather than to the baseline
term.
Section 875, subdivision (e), explains how the SYTF
baseline term is subject to change at six-month review hearings,
at which the court may order either that the ward remain in
custody for the remainder of the baseline term, modify the term
downward, or order that the ward be assigned to a less restrictive
program. (§ 875, subd. (e)(1).) At the conclusion of the baseline
confinement term, the court is required to hold a probation

15
discharge hearing, at which the court reviews the ward’s progress
toward meeting his or her rehabilitation goals. The court “shall
order that the ward be discharged to a period of probation
supervision . . . , unless the court finds that the ward constitutes
a substantial risk of imminent harm to others in the community
if released,” in which case the court may retain the ward in
custody for an additional year. (Id., subd. (e)(3).) The baseline
term set by the juvenile court under section 875 is subject to
change to address the ward’s needs at each six-month review
hearing and may be extended at the probation discharge hearing.
(Id., subd. (e).) There are no comparable provisions in section 731.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there is nothing
absurd about applying precommitment custody credits to the
maximum term of confinement such that we may disregard the
plain language of the statute. These credits have nothing to do
with a ward’s rehabilitative progress. Applying them to the
baseline confinement term would be inconsistent with the
Legislature’s intent that the baseline term of confinement be
tailored to the ward’s “developmental and treatment needs” and
preparation for discharge from custody. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
L.L. argues that Ernesto L. “firmly established that
predisposition custody credits are to be applied to the imposed
term and not to a ‘theoretical maximum.’ ” We are not persuaded.
“Ernesto L. did not announce a general rule that precommitment
credits must be applied to any term that may be said . . . to be
‘akin to a fixed release date.’ ” (In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
435, 469 (M.B.).) Citing People v. Riolo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 223, 227,
L.L. also contends that the baseline term is the actual physical
term imposed. Riolo rejected the argument that presentence
custody credits “should be deducted from the hypothetical term

16
that would have been imposed if the sentence had not been
consecutive to another prison term—i.e., from the full base term
for the offense plus any relevant enhancements—rather than
from the sentence actually imposed.” (Id. at p. 226.) Our high
court held that this argument was refuted by the definition of
“term of imprisonment” in the relevant Penal Code provision and
by the use of the term in other sections of the Penal Code, which
supported that it meant the actual sentence imposed by the
court. (Id. at pp. 227–228.) Here, the plain language of section
875 refutes L.L.’s position that precommitment custody credits
should be applied to the baseline term. Moreover, the baseline
term is not equivalent to a determinate sentence. As discussed, it
is subject to change at regular intervals depending on the ward’s
progress.
In sum, neither Ernesto L. nor the language of section 875
supports applying precommitment custody credits to the baseline
terms for SYTF commitments. The court properly deducted the
credits from L.L.’s maximum term of commitment.
2.2. The court’s deduction of L.L.’s precommitment
custody credits to the maximum term of
confinement was not a violation of his equal
protection rights.
L.L. argues that equal protection principles require the
application of his precommitment custody credits against the
seven-year baseline term of confinement that the court set under
section 875, subdivision (b). He contends a failure to apply the
credits against the baseline term would treat wards committed to
a county SYTF unequally in comparison to wards committed to
the DJJ even though SYTFs are the functional equivalent of the
DJJ. We again disagree.

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“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no state may
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’ [Citation.] This provision is ‘essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.]
‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the
government does not treat a group of people unequally without
some justification.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15
Cal.5th 834, 847, fn. omitted.) “The degree of justification
required to satisfy equal protection depends on the type of
unequal treatment at issue. Courts apply heightened scrutiny
when a challenged statute or other regulation involves a suspect
classification such as race, or a fundamental right such as the
right to vote, and accordingly will demand greater justification
for the differential treatment. [Citations.] But when a statute
involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right,
the ‘general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ [Citations.] A
court applying this standard finds ‘a denial of equal protection
only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in
treatment and some legitimate government purpose.’ [Citation].”
(Ibid.) Both parties agree that rational basis review applies here.
“Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given
statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows that
no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 852.)
We need not address whether there is a rational basis for
disparity in treatment as we are not persuaded that a disparity
exists. In M.B., Division Four of the First District concluded that

18
“the statutes governing SYTF commitments and the application
of precommitment credits in that context already do operate in
the way Ernesto L. determined the statutes should operate in the
DJJ context” and, therefore, “there is no disparate treatment that
could give rise to an equal protection problem.” (M.B., supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467.) It observed that the maximum
custodial term for DJJ commitments under section 731,
subdivision (b), is the functional equivalent of the maximum term
of confinement set by section 875, subdivision (c), and that
precommitment custody credits must be applied against those
analogous maximum terms. (M.B., at p. 468.) The M.B. court also
noted that “the baseline term under section 875, subdivision (b),
is not a maximum term,” but instead “ ‘represent[s] the time in
custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment
needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to a
period of probation supervision in the community.’ ” (M.B., at
p. 468, quoting § 875, subd. (b)(1).) The baseline term’s closest
analogue in the DJJ context would be the set of DJJ discharge
consideration date guidelines that are temporarily to be borrowed
in setting the baseline term under section 875. (M.B., at p. 468;
see also § 875, subd. (b)(1) [pending the development of offense-
based classifications by the Judicial Council, the baseline term is
to be set using the “ ‘discharge consideration date guidelines’ ”
applied by the DJJ prior to its closure].) “Those guidelines existed
alongside the court’s duty to set a maximum term for a ward
committed to the DJJ under section 731, subdivision (b), just as a
court that now commits a ward to an SYTF must set both a
baseline term and a maximum term of confinement under section
875, subdivisions (b) and (c).” (M.B., at p. 468.)

19
We find the court’s reasoning in M.B. persuasive. Although
L.L. acknowledges M.B., he does not meaningfully address or
refute its reasoning.5

5 Even if there were disparate treatment, we agree with the Attorney

General that there is a rational basis for applying precommitment
credits to the maximum term of confinement rather than the baseline
term. As discussed, the baseline term is tailored to the ward’s
“developmental and treatment needs” and preparation for discharge
from custody. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) As the Attorney General contends,
“if a ward’s baseline term could be consumed by precommitment
custody credit[s] before he has had a meaningful opportunity to engage
in treatment, the stated purpose of setting the baseline term would
rarely be achieved.”

20
DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

21

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