People v. Page CA2/7

CourtListener 9530809Calctapp11 de jun. de 2024

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Filed 6/11/24 P. v. Page CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B330517

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA489166)
v.

DAVID MARVEL PAGE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David Madeo and David A. Voet,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

David Marvel Page appeals from a judgment entered after
he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a
firearm by a felon. At sentencing, the trial court denied Page’s
motion to strike a prior strike conviction for armed robbery and
imposed the upper term on his manslaughter count. Page
contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion
and imposing the upper term sentence. We conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Page’s motion to
strike, Page forfeited his challenges to the manslaughter
sentence because he did not raise them before the trial court,
and, in any event, his forfeited challenges fail on the merits.
Thus, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Page’s Crimes

In June 2020, Page shot and killed Michael Smith.1 At the
time, Page was on probation after a conviction for possession of
cocaine base for sale in 2018. He was in his early 40s and living
in a van in Los Angeles.
Page grew up in the same area and joined a neighborhood
Crip gang when he was 14 years old. In 1996, when he was
18 years old, Page committed a robbery by walking up to a car
with a gun and threatening to kill an occupant if Page was not

1 The following facts regarding Page’s background and his
shooting of Smith are primarily drawn from Page’s trial
testimony.

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given money. Page ended up serving an extra three years
because he was found with a weapon in prison. After his release,
Page went back to prison twice for possessing a gun in violation
of his parole.
Once he was released from prison in 2010, Page worked as
a commercial painter and had a child. By June 2020, however,
Page was unemployed, using PCP daily, and no longer in touch
with his child or the child’s mother. A few months before, Page
obtained a gun after a close friend was shot and killed in the
area. Page knew he was not allowed to have a gun because of his
prior felony conviction.
Page had a previous run-in with Smith before he killed
him. Namely, two days earlier, Smith approached Page’s van and
started talking to Page’s two female friends who were inside. The
friends tried to ignore Smith, but he was persistent. When Page
got out of the van, Smith gave him a “very evil look” that
suggested he was going to get in the van whether Page wanted
him in there or not. After Smith got into the van, Page
positioned himself to be able to grab his gun if necessary. Smith
got out of the van after Page yelled at him to do so. Page found
Smith aggressive and his size intimidating.
On the night of the shooting, Page was in his van when he
recognized Smith drive up on the wrong side of the road with his
high beams shining into the van. Page felt alarmed. Smith drove
up close to Page and looked at him before driving off. Page
sensed he was in trouble when shortly thereafter Smith returned
and parked right behind his van. Fearing he would be trapped
inside the van and shot, Page grabbed his gun and got out of the
van. Smith got out of his own vehicle, talked to some people in
the car in front of Page’s van, and then looked into the van and at

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Page. Smith then went to his vehicle, grabbed “something,” and
started walking toward Page. Believing Smith was going to kill
him, Page shot at Smith’s chest when Smith was about three feet
away. Smith dropped to his knees and reached under his shirt.
Page believed Smith was going for a gun and kept firing at him
until he could walk around Smith and to his van. Page fled the
scene and later destroyed the gun.
Responding officers found Smith unresponsive on the
ground. He appeared to have been shot in the face and was lying
near a face mask that had a bullet hole and blood on it. Smith
was transported to a hospital but died soon after. An autopsy
showed Smith was shot eight times, including while his back was
turned and while he was on the ground. No gun was found on
Smith or in his vehicle.
After Page was arrested, he told an informant who was
part of a Perkins operation2 that the gun was gone and any
witnesses would not cooperate with law enforcement.

B. Page’s Prosecution and Trial

The People charged Page with one count of murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),3 and one count of possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The People alleged Page
committed the murder while personally using a firearm within
the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The People also
alleged Page had a prior serious or violent felony conviction

2 In a Perkins operation, an undercover operative, who the
suspect does not know is a police agent, is placed in a cell with
the suspect. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 294.)
3 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12).
In January 2023, Page pleaded no contest to the count of
possession of a firearm by a felon. During a trial on the murder
charge, Page testified he acted in self-defense because he believed
Smith was going to kill him. The jury found him guilty of the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)), and found true the allegation that he personally used a
firearm to commit the offense.

C. Page’s Sentencing

In a bifurcated proceeding, Page admitted the prior strike
allegation—based on the 1996 robbery conviction—but moved the
court to strike the allegation under section 1385. The court
denied Page’s motion.
Before sentencing Page, the court allowed him to present
testimony from Dr. Michelle Adams, a clinical psychologist with
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Adams
testified about Page’s previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and her opinion that that diagnosis was accurate
in light of her conversations with Page and review of his records.
Adams further testified to her opinion that Page had experienced
psychological, physical, and childhood traumas that contributed
to his manslaughter offense.
After receiving this evidence, the court found two of the
seven alleged aggravating circumstances applied: namely, that
Page had served a prior term in prison or county jail (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)) and that Page was on probation when
he committed the crimes (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)).
The court reviewed Page’s PTSD evidence, explaining it “may

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have had a bearing on his unreasonable belief in self-defense”
that led to the jury’s manslaughter verdict. But, the court
explained, “any unreasonable belief in self-defense could no
longer exist, under any circumstances, once that victim is down
and out and [Page] continued to shoot him.” To that end, the
court found the aggravating circumstances outweighed any
mitigative effect of the PTSD.
The court sentenced Page to 26 years in state prison based
on the upper term of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter
count, doubled for the prior strike, plus the middle term of four
years for the firearm enhancement. The court also imposed a
four-year concurrent sentence for the count of possession of a
firearm by a felon based on the middle term of two years, doubled
for the prior strike.
Page timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Page argues the trial court abused its discretion both in
denying his motion to strike the prior strike allegation, and in
imposing the upper term for his voluntary manslaughter
conviction. We consider these challenges in turn.

A. Page’s Motion To Strike the Prior Strike Allegation

1. Applicable law

A court has discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a),
to strike an allegation of a prior strike conviction “in the
furtherance of justice.” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 530; see People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562,
582 [three strikes law does “not restrict the power of a trial court

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acting on its own motion to dismiss a prior felony conviction
allegation in the furtherance of justice”].) In exercising this
discretion, the court may not strike a prior conviction “solely for
judicial convenience, in exchange for a guilty plea, or based on
antipathy to the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 674, 688.) Rather, the court “must look to ‘factors
intrinsic to the [Three Strikes] scheme.’ [Citation.] It ‘must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though
he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious
and/or violent felonies.’” (Id. at pp. 688-689.)
We review the trial court’s refusal to strike a prior
conviction under section 1385 for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373-374.) The party appealing
the sentence has the burden to clearly show the trial court’s
decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377; see also People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 [the abuse of discretion standard “asks
in substance whether the ruling in question ‘falls outside the
bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant
facts”].)

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Page’s motion to strike

Page asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
focusing on the nature of his manslaughter offense and not giving
“nuanced consideration” to the remoteness of his prior strike, his

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youth at the time of that offense, his PTSD, and his family
support and work history since his release from prison in 2010.
He further asserts the court was motivated to impose a harsher
sentence based on its personal disagreement with the jury’s
verdict.
We find the trial court’s ruling to be far more considered
than this argument suggests. The court first explained its
decision was based on Page’s criminal history, the facts of the
present case, and Page’s prospects for the future in relation to the
spirit of the three strikes law. The court next acknowledged the
age of Page’s 1996 strike conviction before noting that Page had
been convicted of four other felonies—in 1999, 2005, 2008, and
2018—between that strike and the current offense. Although not
the worst it had seen, the court explained Page had a “fairly
significant criminal history,” and that he “would be in a lot better
position if he had no convictions since he committed the robbery
in 1996.” The court then described the present case as
“particularly egregious,” emphasizing that Page continued to
shoot the victim after he had fallen. The court stated again that
Page “would be in a lot better position if he had just shot the
victim once or twice once the victim went down,” but that instead
Page “continued to shoot [the victim],” including several shots in
the back. The court concluded these facts established Page did
not fall outside the spirit of the three strikes law and denied his
motion.
This more complete picture shows the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Page’s motion to strike his prior
conviction. Even though that conviction was 26 years old, it was
not remote when considered in the context of Page’s overall
criminal record. (See People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at

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pp. 162-164 [abuse of discretion to strike a 13-year-old strike
where there was little or nothing favorable in the defendant’s
background, record, character, or prospects]; People v. Pearson
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 [“argument that [prior]
convictions are remote in time is without merit where, as here,
the defendant has led a continuous life of crime”]; People v.
Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906-907 [“Although
defendant points out his personal background and the
remoteness of his priors, the court could not overlook the fact
defendant consistently committed criminal offenses for the past
20 years”]; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 [“the
overwhelming majority of California appellate courts have
reversed the dismissal of, or affirmed the refusal to dismiss, a
strike of those defendants with a long and continuous criminal
career”]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 320 [abuse
of discretion to strike a 17-year-old strike in light of the
defendant’s “unrelenting record of recidivism, even while on
parole or probation from previous felony convictions”]; People v.
Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [abuse of discretion in
striking 20-year-old strike where defendant had “led a continuous
life of crime after the prior”].) The trial court denied Page’s
motion without expressly addressing the evidence showing he
suffered from PTSD as a result of past traumas. But it did so
after receiving that evidence and related argument at the
sentencing hearing, and before explaining later at the hearing
that neither Page’s mental health nor his negative childhood
mitigated his “egregious conduct” of shooting the victim eight
times, including after the victim had fallen. In other words, there
is no evidence the court disregarded Page’s PTSD evidence within
its consideration of his present offenses.

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In sum, the court denied Page’s motion after recognizing its
discretion, considering the relevant factual circumstances, and
making findings supported by the record. Thus, Page has not
met his burden of demonstrating the court’s decision was “so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)

B. Page’s Upper Term Sentence for Voluntary
Manslaughter

1. Applicable law

Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) amended section 1170, subdivision
(b). (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Before this amendment, the
trial court had discretion to choose which of the three terms of
imprisonment specified for an offense best served the interests of
justice. (§ 1170, former subd. (b).) Section 1170, subdivision (b),
now makes the middle term the presumptive sentence and states
the court “may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the
middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).)
In addition, under amended section 1170, the lower term
shall be the presumptive sentence where a defendant “has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” and
that trauma “was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A); see People v. Hilburn (2023)

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93 Cal.App.5th 189, 200.) When the presumption applies, the
court must impose the lower term unless it “‘finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.’” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e)(1).)
We review a sentencing decision under section 1170 for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 205-206.) “That ‘discretion must be exercised in a manner
that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an
“individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the
public interest.”’” (Id. at p. 206, quoting People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.)

2. Page forfeited his challenges to the trial court’s
imposition of the upper term

Page argues the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the upper term of 11 years for his manslaughter
conviction. He asserts the trial court improperly considered
aggravating circumstances based on his crime being one of great
violence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) and his use of a
gun during that crime (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)).
Page asserts these facts could not be used to impose an upper
term because they were also used to support his conviction and
gun enhancement.
A court “generally cannot use a single fact both to
aggravate the base term and to impose an enhancement, nor may
it use a fact constituting an element of the offense either to
aggravate or to enhance a sentence.” (People v. Scott (1994)

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9 Cal.4th 331, 350.) Even so, Page forfeited this argument by not
objecting to the trial court’s purported dual use of facts at
sentencing. (See id. at p. 353 [forfeiture shall apply to claims
involving the court’s failure to properly make or articulate its
discretionary sentencing choices, including “cases in which the
court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular
sentencing factor”]; see also People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th
745, 755 [failure to object to the court’s dual use of facts forfeited
the issue on appeal].)
Page also forfeited his arguments that the applicable
aggravating circumstances did not warrant an upper term and
that the trial court relied on a personal agenda to punish him
based on its disagreement with the jury verdict. Both of these
arguments boil down to whether the court properly weighed
factors or provided a valid reason for its decision. By not raising
these challenges at sentencing, Page forfeited the ability to raise
them on appeal. (See People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353
[forfeiture applies without a contemporaneous objection in “cases
in which the court purportedly erred because it . . . misweighed
the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a
sufficient number of valid reasons”].)

3. Page’s challenges to his manslaughter sentence
also fail on the merits

Even if we consider these separate challenges on the
merits, there is no abuse of discretion on which to disturb the
trial court’s decision.
First, the record does not show an improper dual use of
aggravating circumstances. At sentencing, the court found two of
the seven alleged aggravating circumstances applied, and

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explained why the other five did not. As part of this explanation,
the court stated the aggravating circumstances for a crime of
great violence and use of a firearm could not apply because they
were bases for Page’s manslaughter conviction and gun
enhancement. The court later corrected the prosecutor’s
statement that the aggravating circumstance for a crime of great
violence applied, explaining again that Page’s manslaughter was
necessarily a violent crime. While the court referred to the
nature of the offense in imposing the upper term, it did so not to
apply additional aggravating circumstances but rather to explain
the limited scope of the mitigating circumstance that Page
alleged based on his PTSD diagnosis. The court then found the
applicable aggravating circumstances outweighed that mitigating
circumstance.
Second, Page claims the applicable aggravating
circumstances—that he had served prison time and was on
probation when he committed manslaughter—were not “so
egregious” to justify an upper term. But he offers no argument to
support that claim, and fails to provide any authority
establishing the trial court abused its discretion by considering
circumstances his trial counsel agreed applied. Those
circumstances align with the court’s findings regarding Page’s
“fairly significant criminal history.” The court’s determination
that they also justified imposing the upper term for Page’s
manslaughter conviction was within its discretion under
section 1170.
Finally, nothing in the record supports Page’s assertion
that the trial court relied on a “personal agenda” of punishing
him out of disagreement with the jury’s verdict. The court’s
statement that everyone had to “accept” the jury found Page

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guilty of manslaughter based on his theory of self-defense was a
statement of fact, not evidence of improper bias.
In sum, the trial court properly exercised its discretion by
considering the mitigating evidence and determining the
applicable aggravating circumstances outweighed such evidence.
(See People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379 [in absence of
an abuse of discretion, appellate courts may not substitute their
own judgment for that of the trial court].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RAPHAEL, J.*

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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