CourtListener 9530196•People v. Duvall CA3
Texto completo
Filed 6/11/24 P. v. Duvall CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098576
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CRF21-
0004595)
v.
RICHARD LEE DUVALL II,
Defendant and Appellant.
In the hallway of a house in rural Shasta County, a standoff arose between
defendant Richard Lee Duvall II and N.W.1 The two had words and defendant eventually
told N.W. that he had 30 seconds to leave the house. Defendant began to count aloud.
When he reached 30, defendant stabbed N.W. in the neck, chest, and arm. N.W. bled to
death on the hallway floor.
1 To protect their privacy, we refer to the victim and witnesses by their initials.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)
1
A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, as well as a related
enhancement. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 30 years to life plus one
year determinate.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the judgment must be reversed (1) due to
instances of prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination and closing arguments,
and (2) because the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 626 on involuntary manslaughter based on unconsciousness caused by voluntary
intoxication. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
An information charged defendant with a single count of murder. (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd (a); count 1.)2 The information further alleged that, in committing the
murder, defendant used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that
he had sustained a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12).
The Trial⎯The Prosecution
L.N. lived in a house in Dana in Shasta County. L.N’s niece, K.C., occasionally
stayed at the house as well.3 K.C. and defendant had a sexual relationship, but she was
not his girlfriend.
On June 20, 2021, K.C. and defendant encountered N.W., whom they knew, in
Burney, and they all went in N.W.’s car to Fall River Mills. Defendant got out of the car
at the Fall River Lodge. N.W. agreed to take K.C. home while defendant remained at the
lodge. K.C. and N.W. arrived at the house in Dana at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., and they went
to bed at 12:30 or 1:00 a.m.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 K.C.’s preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record because she was not
available at trial.
2
Meanwhile, R.W. encountered defendant in Fall River Mills, and defendant asked
him for a ride to K.C.’s house to retrieve his backpack, which contained drugs and his
cellphone. Eventually, R.W. drove defendant to K.C.’s house, arriving between 2:00 and
3:00 a.m. During the drive, defendant told R.W. that he loved K.C. and that he hoped to
help her get her children back.
Once at the house, defendant asked L.N. if K.C. and N.W. were in the bedroom
and L.N. indicated they were. R.W. and defendant went into K.C.’s bedroom, saw K.C.
and N.W. together, and K.C. told them to “[g]et the hell out.” They returned to the living
room where L.N., R.W., and defendant drank and smoked methamphetamine and
marijuana.
K.C. woke up around 5:00 a.m. Defendant came into the bedroom and said he had
lost his bag and his cellphone. He saw his cellphone and grabbed it. K.C. came out of
the bedroom and told defendant and R.W. to “[g]et the fuck out of here” and pushed them
out of the house.
Defendant and R.W. started to leave, but defendant decided he was not leaving
without his backpack. He went back to K.C.’s bedroom. He appeared to be upset and
matters between defendant and N.W. turned confrontational. N.W. walked towards
defendant and they “h[ad] words.” K.C. saw defendant was holding a knife. She stepped
in front of N.W. trying to defuse the situation, but N.W. pushed her behind him.
Defendant told N.W. to leave and said he had 30 seconds. Defendant began a
countdown. After he finished his countdown, K.C. saw defendant throw the arm he was
holding the knife with at N.W. and then she saw “blood everywhere.” Defendant was
throwing his arm with the knife like he was hitting N.W., like he was throwing a punch.
L.N. also saw defendant flailing his arms and fist. According to K.C., defendant was the
first to attack; before defendant’s first strike, N.W. did not put his hands on defendant at
all. K.C. yelled for defendant to stop. Defendant paused, looked at K.C., and then
continued fighting with N.W. It “ended by the front door,” where N.W. collapsed,
3
holding his hands to his neck. He tried to speak, but could not. “It just sounded like he
was choking on something.”
Afterward, according to L.N., defendant “acted like he didn’t know where he was
at because he was all high and we pointed him toward the back door and he took off.”
Later, defendant came back to the house at least twice asking for directions because he
did not know the area.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., a motorist picked up defendant and dropped him off
in Fall River Mills. Defendant told the motorist that his girlfriend lived nearby and that
when his girlfriend runs out of alcohol, “she starts calling other men.” At 5:08 p.m.,
defendant called 911 from the Fall River Lodge and provided the address of the house in
Dana.
Law enforcement arrived at the house in Dana after 5:30 p.m., where they found
N.W. on the floor, deceased, and “a lot of blood.” N.W. sustained stab wounds to the left
upper neck below the earlobe, near the clavicle, to his left chest below the armpit, and in
two locations on his left arm. The stab wound to N.W.’s upper neck cut the carotid artery
and the jugular vein and penetrated his spine. A person with this wound could be
expected to survive, untreated, for a matter of minutes. The wound near the clavicle also
struck a major artery, entered the chest cavity, and punctured his lung. This wound, too,
would have been fatal. N.W. died from massive blood loss as a result of two stab wounds
to his neck. He did not have any injuries to his hands.
Law enforcement located a folding knife with a Raiders emblem on it in some
bushes behind a gas station in Fall River Mills. There was dried blood on the knife. The
parties stipulated DNA testing provided “very strong support” for the finding that the
DNA mixture found on the knife contained N.W.’s blood. In fact, one was “one point
two sextillion times more likely to obtain this mixture of DNA if [N.W.] is a contributor
than if he is not a contributor.”
4
During law enforcement’s search for defendant, an officer obtained defendant’s
Facebook records. In a June 23, 2021, Facebook conversation between defendant and
another user, defendant stated, “I’m going to prison.” He elaborated, “[s]omeone’s dead
and it’s my fault,” and later, “there’s two witnesses.” Later, defendant stated, “I’m
probably doing life . . . but you can write me.” When the other user asked whom
defendant killed and how it was his fault, defendant responded, “[h]e got stabbed in the
neck and bled to death.” When the other user asked again how it was his fault, he
responded, “I’m the one who stabbed him . . . .” Defendant later added, “[d]idn’t want to.
He was in my face. I found him randomly and he took my shit before and left me in
town. Found him sleeping with my phone and my bitch.”
When law enforcement arrested defendant on June 24, 2021, he did not have any
visible injuries on his head or hands, with the exception of small abrasions between his
right thumb and forefinger and on his knuckles.
The Trial⎯The Defense
Defendant testified he knew K.C. and wanted to help her get her children back.
They did have a sexual relationship, but he did not love her and did not want to be in a
relationship with her.
On June 20, 2021, at a gas station in Burney, K.C., and defendant met up with
N.W., got into his car, and drove to Fall River Mills. Defendant went to the Fall River
Lodge to buy drugs. While he was there, he realized N.W. and K.C. were driving away,
leaving him. Defendant’s wallet, cellphone, and backpack were in N.W.’s car. Defendant
managed to get a ride to K.C.’s house. On the way, he and his companion made several
stops during which they used methamphetamine. Defendant had been “drinking like
every day for at least a week . . . and . . . was smoking meth for awhile longer than that.”
At the house, defendant asked L.N. if K.C. and N.W. were there, and L.N. pointed
to the bedroom. Defendant knocked on the bedroom door and opened it, saw K.C. and
N.W. were sleeping, and closed the door. Defendant testified that seeing them together
5
did not upset him and that he had “seen her with people before.” He returned to the
living room and hung out with L.N., talking and using methamphetamine.
When defendant went to K.C.’s bedroom a second time, K.C. told him to get out.
Defendant saw his cellphone in the bedroom, so he grabbed it and returned to the living
room. He resumed using methamphetamine.
Defendant’s companion told him he had to go. Defendant did not want to leave
without his backpack. He returned to the bedroom and told K.C. and N.W. he needed
help finding his backpack. They both got up and walked toward the living room and
defendant followed. However, when they reached the doorway, N.W. turned around and
blocked defendant’s way. Defendant was scared. He felt like he was being set up, like
someone had purposefully taken his property and left him in Fall River Mills. Defendant
felt like he might be jumped, and he knew N.W. was a fighter.
Defendant pulled out his knife, which had a Raiders emblem on it. He told N.W.
he was going to count to 30 and then he was “going to rush him.” His goal was merely to
leave. Defendant started counting.
After defendant counted to 30, N.W. punched him in the head. Defendant
“blacked out.” He continued: “I don’t remember anything. Everything happened quick
and . . . all I remember is just [K.C.] screaming at me and I lifted my head up and opened
my eyes and he was bleeding . . . .” Asked if he stabbed N.W., defendant testified, “I
assumed that I did. Nobody else had the knife and he was bleeding.” He testified he was
sure he put the knife in N.W.’s neck. However, he also testified he did not recall stabbing
N.W., and that he thought he had stabbed N.W. only once. Defendant remembered seeing
blood squirting. Asked if he described to law enforcement blood coming out nonstop
following his first strike, defendant testified, “That’s what I remember. That’s correct.”
N.W. backed towards the front door holding his neck.
Defendant left the house and tried to call 911, but his cellphone did not have
service. After getting lost and returning to the house for directions at least twice, he
6
eventually found his way to a road. A motorist picked him up and drove him to Fall
River Mills. Defendant disposed of his knife near a pizza place because the weight of the
knife was pulling down his shorts.
Defendant called 911 from the Fall River Lodge, reported he had accidentally
killed someone, and gave the operator the address. Asked how stabbing N.W. was
accidental, defendant testified he did not plan on stabbing him, and that he “just
panicked. I put my head down and I think I just reacted” while holding a knife.
Defendant testified: “When he punched me my mind went black because . . . when he
swung at me I put my head down out of reaction and after I got hit . . . my memory just
went black. I think it was the adrenaline.” He testified that he felt like he was in danger
when N.W. punched him. He felt he was being “set up” and that he might get “jumped,”
that people were trying to take his property, and that he thought “there were other people
there.”
Detective Jeremy Ashbee testified that, during his interview, defendant said he had
blacked out, but later said he had not. At some point defendant said he had been
defending himself, and at other times he said the stabbing was accidental. Defendant
never said anything about being afraid of being jumped or robbed. Nor did he say he
believed anyone other than L.N. and K.C. were in the house. Defendant told Ashbee he
did not mind fighting people, and actually kind of liked it. He told Ashbee “the first
swing of his arm he struck [N.W.] with the knife,” but he also said he did not know where
it struck him first. Defendant stated, “blood immediately started coming up.” Ashbee
testified defendant did not appear to be intoxicated during the interview and Ashbee did
not smell alcohol on him. Defendant acknowledged he had not used drugs or alcohol on
the day of his arrest. On the drive to jail, defendant asked Ashbee to play a particular
song because it reminded him of K.C.
7
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree but guilty of
murder in the second degree, and found true the enhancing allegation that, in committing
the murder, defendant used a deadly weapon.
Defendant admitted the prior strike allegation, and the trial court denied his
motion to strike the prior strike conviction. The court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison for the murder, doubled to 30 years to life
based on his prior strike, plus one year for the use of a deadly weapon enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I
Prosecutorial Misconduct
“ ‘A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury
commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution
when they infect the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.’ ” [Citations.] Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such
methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally
unfair trial.’ ” (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 359.)
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct while cross-examining
him and in her closing arguments. He contends the prosecutor repeatedly inserted her
personal opinion and animus into the proceedings and appealed to the jury’s biases and
sympathies. The People respond that defendant’s claims are forfeited, they fail on the
merits, and any misconduct was not prejudicial.
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a “defendant must generally
object ‘in a timely fashion—and on the same ground,’ and must ‘request[ ] that the jury
be admonished to disregard the impropriety.’ ” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022)
14 Cal.5th 1, 29.) As we discussed post, defendant has forfeited each of his claims of
prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object immediately and to request an admonition.
8
During her cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor asked him about the
fact that he never said in his law enforcement interview that he was afraid and that he
feared being robbed, and defendant responded that law enforcement never asked him.
When the prosecutor sought clarification, defendant testified, “I don’t remember if I was
or not honestly.” The prosecutor retorted, “Honestly isn’t the best word for you to be
using.” Defendant neither objected nor requested an admonishment.
When the prosecutor read part of defendant’s statement to law enforcement,
suggesting it indicated that he remembered what happened, defendant testified: “I know
that I blacked out. I don’t–there’s no reason for me to lie about that. I know that when I
did come into jail, I know that there’s certain things on those papers.” The prosecutor
stated, “Hold on. There’s no question pending.” Again, defendant neither raised an
objection nor requested an admonishment.
Discussing defendant’s statements to law enforcement about discarding his knife,
defendant referred to the fact that the weight of the knife was causing his shorts to sag.
The prosecutor noted defendant had told law enforcement he felt uncomfortable with the
knife because it “just killed somebody.” Defendant acknowledged this was likely true.
The prosecutor then said, “And you were getting rid of evidence.” Defendant began,
“That’s–” and the prosecutor interjected, “How was placement of that knife in the bushes
behind a building anything other than you trying to hide it?” Defendant responded, “It
was dragging down my pants.” Defendant neither objected nor requested an
admonishment.
Later in the cross-examination, discussing N.W. being on the floor because
defendant stabbed him, the prosecutor stated: “Because you stabbed him and then you
left him there. He laid there for twelve hours in his own blood. What did you do besides
eat pizza? How angry were you that he deserved that? Did he disrespect you by sleeping
with your bitch?” Before defendant responded, the prosecutor asked, “Are you crying?”
The exchange continued:
9
“[Defendant]: I’m not trying to.
“[Prosecutor]: For yourself or for [N.W.]? For yourself, right?
“[Defendant]: I didn’t–I didn’t mean for–
“[Prosecutor]: How do you not mean to put a knife in someone’s throat after
counting to thirty and disrespect him further and come in here and make up nonsense?”
Defendant’s counsel objected on the ground that there were “multiple pending questions,”
and the trial court sustained the objection. He did not object based on prosecutorial
misconduct. Nor did he request any admonishment.
When the prosecutor asked defendant about his statement that he liked to fight,
defendant testified, “I don’t like fighting. I don’t mind sticking up for myself, but even
that I used to have a hard time doing that.” The prosecutor responded, “Apparently not
anymore.” Defense counsel objected, stating, “Testimonial. Not a question,” and the
trial court sustained the objection. Defendant did not object on the grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct. And defendant did not request any admonition.
The prosecutor showed defendant a photograph of the inside of the house and
pointed out the blood trail leading towards the front door. She then pointed out, “[H]ere’s
a way out through the kitchen, right,” implying defendant could have left without
confronting N.W., and defendant agreed. She asked, “Totally unobstructed, right?” and
defendant again agreed. She later asked defendant if he “could have left this way,” and
defendant responded that he did. He testified, “I blacked out in the hallway and when I
looked up it was–” and the prosecutor stated, “Blacked out. Blacked out. That’s crazy
talk. Come on.” The trial court sustained defense counsel’s unspecified objection.
However, counsel did not expressly object based on misconduct, and he did not request
any admonishment.
Continuing to discuss whether there was an unimpeded way defendant could have
left the house, defendant and the prosecutor had the following exchange:
10
“[Defendant]: Yes, and I left the house. I didn’t leave the house right away, but
. . . I wasn’t aware at the time between there and halfway to the door.
“[Prosecutor]: [L.N.] saw you follow him. [K.C.] saw you follow him. He had
additional marks on him after the first one.
“[Defendant]: No.
“[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Not a question.
“[The Court]: Sustained.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor]: You heard all of that testimony, correct?
“[Defendant] Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: And there was another way out of the house?
“[Defendant]: I left that way. By the time I looked up and halfway to the front
door he was walking back to the door. I wasn’t going with him. I stopped what I was
doing.
“[Prosecutor]: The blood pattern would seem to suggest something different,
wouldn’t you agree?
“[Defendant]: I don’t know, but I’m telling you what happened.
“[Prosecutor]: This version?
“[Defendant]: I guess. That’s what I remember.
“[Prosecutor]: Today?
“[Defendant]: And I remember it very clearly.
“[Prosecutor]: I thought you blacked out?
“[Defendant]: I did black out and I came back. I didn’t stay blacked out.
“[Prosecutor]: That’s good. That’s good.”
At no time during this exchange did counsel for defendant object based on
misconduct, nor did he request any admonition.
11
During his closing argument, defense counsel referred to the matter as a “tragedy.”
Beginning her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “Interesting use of the
word ‘tragedy.’ It’s interesting and tragic to stand here and try to manipulate the evidence
the way that [defendant] did. He did the right thing? There’s some idea that he did the
right thing at some point? He didn’t do the right thing at any point. At any point.”
Subsequently, the prosecutor returned to the tragedy theme: “The word ‘tragedy’ I
kind of touched on a little bit, and I think one of the things that’s most tragic is the
defendant trying to steal his sympathy that belongs to the victim. He got up on the stand
and when I was talking to him appears to cry for the first time in all of the proceedings.
Not during the autopsy pictures, not during anybody’s testimony but when he thought we
were all looking it looked like he got upset trying to draw sympathy that shouldn’t be his.
[¶] The tragedy would be if somehow he was able to come in and convince you that
things occurred that never occurred.”
Defendant did not object in either instance. Nor did he request an admonition.
In all of these instances, defendant neither objected “ ‘in a timely fashion—and on
the same ground,’ ” nor requested “ ‘that the jury be admonished to disregard the
impropriety,’ ” as required to preserve his claims for our review. (People v. Miranda-
Guerrero, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 29.) Thus, although we do not condone some of the
prosecutor’s intemperate behavior during trial, defendant has forfeited his claims of
misconduct.
Defendant notes that, even if his contentions have been forfeited, we have the
discretion to consider them. While we do have the discretion to excuse forfeiture, such
discretion is exercised sparingly. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Moreover,
the forfeiture requirement serves an important purpose. Defendants must raise the
specter of prosecutorial misconduct during trial, where the matter can be remedied in the
moment in a far more efficient and effective manner than on appeal. (See People v.
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 801 [reason for the forfeiture rule is that the trial court
12
should be given the opportunity to correct misconduct of counsel and thus, if possible,
prevent the harmful effect on the minds of the jurors].) On this basis, we decline to
address defendant’s forfeited claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
II
CALCRIM No. 626
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 626 on involuntary manslaughter based on unconsciousness
caused by voluntary intoxication. We disagree.
“ ‘ “[I]t is the ‘court’s duty to instruct the jury not only on the crime with which
the defendant is charged, but also on any lesser offense that is both included in the
offense charged and shown by the evidence to have been committed.’ [Citation.]”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] . . . ‘ “[T]he existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’
will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense . . . .” [Citation.] Rather,
substantial evidence must exist to allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendant is
guilty of a lesser but not the greater offense. [Citation.] “ ‘ “Substantial evidence is
evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury,’ that is, evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th
632, 718.) A trial court’s omission in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense is
reviewed de novo (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 463), and we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (People v. Millbrook (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137).
Generally, involuntary manslaughter is treated as a lesser included offense to
murder. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422 (Ochoa).) Evidence of voluntary
intoxication warrants an instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included
offense to a charged murder only when there is substantial evidence the defendant’s
intoxication rendered him unconscious. “ ‘Voluntary intoxication can prevent formation
of any specific intent requisite to the offense at issue, but it can never excuse homicide.’
13
[Citation.] Hence, in general at the time the defendant committed his crimes, voluntary
intoxication could reduce a criminal homicide to involuntary manslaughter only if the
defendant was rendered unconscious: ‘When a person renders himself or herself
unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing is attributed
to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary
manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1227, quoting Ochoa, supra,
at p. 423, fn. omitted.) A person may be unconscious in this context when the person acts
but is not conscious of acting. (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 981; Ochoa, at
p. 424; see also CALCRIM No. 3425 [“Someone is unconscious when he or she is not
conscious of his or her actions”].) CALCRIM No. 626 would have instructed the jury on
these principles.4
The evidence showed that, after K.C. kicked defendant out of the house, he
returned, unwilling to leave without his backpack. He went into K.C.’s room and then he
and N.W. “had words.” At this time, defendant was holding a knife. Defendant told
N.W. he had 30 seconds to leave, and then defendant began to count. He completed the
countdown, at which point K.C. saw defendant swing his arm with the knife toward N.W.
and, after defendant did so, there was blood everywhere. Defendant was throwing his
arm like he was throwing a punch with his knife hand. When K.C. yelled for defendant
to stop, he paused, looked at her, and then resumed. N.W. collapsed, holding his hands to
his neck. Afterward, according to L.N., defendant “acted like he didn’t know where he
4 CALCRIM No. 626 provides, in part: “Voluntary intoxication may cause a person
to be unconscious of his or her actions. A very intoxicated person may still be capable of
physical movement but may not be aware of his or her actions or the nature of those
actions. [¶] . . . [¶] When a person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the
point of unconsciousness, the person assumes the risk that while unconscious he or she
will commit acts inherently dangerous to human life. If someone dies as a result of the
actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is
involuntary manslaughter. . . .”
14
was at because he was all high and we pointed him toward the back door and he took
off.”
In short, although there was evidence defendant drank alcohol and smoked
methamphetamine, nothing in the evidence suggests, let alone constitutes substantial
evidence, that defendant was intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness when he stabbed
N.W.
In his testimony, defendant stated that he used methamphetamine every day for at
least a week before these events, and he used it on the way to Dana and after his arrival.
When he went to K.C.’s bedroom trying to recover his backpack, the confrontation with
N.W. arose when N.W. blocked defendant in the hallway. Defendant testified he was
scared so he took out his knife. He recalled N.W. looking mad. He also testified that he
feared there may have been other people at the house. Defendant felt like he was being
set up, like someone had purposefully taken his property and left him behind. Defendant
also remembered feeling like he might be jumped, and he knew N.W. was a fighter.
Consistent with the prosecution’s evidence, defendant testified that he told N.W. he was
going to count to 30, and when his countdown was finished, he was “going to rush him.”
Defendant counted to 30. According to defendant, N.W. then punched him in the head
and defendant “blacked out.” However, defendant also testified that he felt like he was in
danger when N.W. punched him. Defendant continued: “I don’t remember anything.
Everything happened quick and I remember–all I remember is just [K.C.] screaming at
me and I lifted my head up and opened my eyes and he was bleeding . . . .” Asked if he
stabbed N.W., defendant testified, “I assumed that I did. Nobody else had the knife and
he was bleeding.” He testified he was sure he put the knife in N.W.’s neck. However, he
also testified he did not recall stabbing N.W., and that he thought he had stabbed N.W.
only once. Defendant remembered seeing blood squirting and seeing N.W. backing
towards the front door holding his neck. Defendant characterized the stabbing as
accidental because he did not plan on stabbing N.W., he “just panicked. I put my head
15
down and I think I just reacted” while holding a knife. Defendant testified: “When he
punched me my mind went black because . . . when he swung at me I put my head down
out of reaction and after I got hit . . . my memory just went black. I think it was the
adrenaline.”
We conclude that this does not constitute substantial evidence that defendant was
unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication when he stabbed N.W. Defendant
remembered in detail virtually all the events leading up to, during, and after the
confrontation. He remembered why he went back into the house and that N.W.
supposedly prevented him from leaving. He remembered being scared there were other
people, that he was going to get jumped, and that N.W. was a fighter. Defendant
remembered who was present. He remembered pulling out his knife. He distinctly
recalled his 30-second warning countdown, which could only be described as deliberate
and methodical. In his Facebook exchange, defendant acknowledged he stabbed N.W.,
and rather than claiming he did not remember doing so, he claimed he “[d]idn’t want to”
stab N.W., but that “[h]e was in my face.” Defendant told Detective Ashbee he
remembered that “blood immediately started coming up” when he stabbed N.W. He
remembered describing to law enforcement the blood coming out nonstop following his
first strike. He remembered N.W. bleeding, backing away from him and toward the front
door. Defendant recalled leaving the house, trying to call 911 but having no cellular
service, and having difficulty finding his way to the road because he was unfamiliar with
the area.
That defendant volunteered that, in the midst of the incident, all of which he
remembered in detail, he “blacked out” at the moment he stabbed N.W. is not substantial
evidence of voluntary intoxication leading to unconsciousness. A defendant’s “professed
inability to recall the event, without more, [i]s insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness
instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888; see also People v. Heffington
(1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [there is no “ineluctable rule” that a defendant’s inability to
16
remember supplies an evidentiary foundation for an unconsciousness instruction].) “The
complicated and purposive nature of his conduct” both before and after the stabbing
“makes clear that he did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the
offenses.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418.)
The evidence could suggest that defendant blacked out briefly from being punched
in the head. Defendant also opined that perhaps his memory went black because of
adrenaline. However, in the absence of any evidence beyond defendant’s claim, there is
no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, to support the premise that defendant went
from deliberate, conscious, methodical, and aware despite his methamphetamine use, to
unconscious because of that methamphetamine use just long enough to not recall stabbing
N.W., and back to conscious and aware as he saw N.W. bleeding and stumbling back in
the hallway. In other words, substantial evidence does not support the premise that, for
one discrete moment in an otherwise uninterrupted period of consciousness, defendant’s
methamphetamine use suddenly rendered him unconscious. All of the evidence is
consistent with the conclusion that defendant was conscious, aware, and deliberate at all
relevant times.
Defendant asserts that, unlike Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, on which the trial
court relied, here there was conflicting evidence on unconsciousness for the jury to
evaluate, and Ochoa does not apply where there is some evidence of unconsciousness.
However, again, we do not find there to be substantial evidence of unconsciousness as a
result of voluntary intoxication.
After considering the entire record in a light most favorable to defendant
(People v. Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137), we conclude there is no
17
substantial evidence defendant was unconscious when he stabbed N.W. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 626.5
Lastly, we note defendant appears to raise a cumulative error argument, albeit not
under a separate heading or subheading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) We
have concluded defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct contentions have been forfeited and
that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 626.
Having found no cognizable error, there is no error to aggregate. (People v. McWhorter
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 377 [having found no guilt phase errors, there is no cumulative
effect of such errors to consider].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Earl, P. J.
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
5 Defendant does not assert that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
with CALCRIM No. 580 on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter
generally.
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