CourtListener 9514044•People v. Lopez CA3
Texto completo
Filed 6/7/24 P. v. Lopez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099099
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 07F01601)
v.
JORGE LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jorge Lopez appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95) following an evidentiary
hearing.1 He argues the resentencing court erred in refusing to qualify his proposed
expert, and in excluding the proposed expert from testifying about general criminal
behavior and gangs in general. He also argues the resentencing court improperly
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive
change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we will refer to section 1172.6
throughout this opinion.
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considered evidence outside of an agreed-upon statement of facts, and erroneously relied
on testimony discredited by the original trial court’s firearm enhancement findings. We
need not reach any of these issues, as they are all rendered moot by defendant’s petition
for habeas corpus, which we will grant in a separate opinion. (In re Lopez (June 7, 2024,
C099854) [nonpub.].)
I. BACKGROUND
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder in 20082 (§ 187, subd. (a)).
(People v. Lopez (Feb. 11, 2010, C059074) [nonpub. opn.] (Lopez I); People v. Lopez
(Sep. 24, 2021, C091477) [nonpub. opn.] (Lopez II).) The jury also found true gang and
firearm enhancements, including that defendant was a principal in the murder, and a
principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death to a victim. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).)
(Lopez II, supra, C091477.)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stayed imposition of the gang
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2), and declined to impose the
firearm enhancements provided by section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) pursuant to
subdivision (f), stating, “defendant did not personally use or discharge a firearm during
the commission of this crime.”3 The trial court then sentenced defendant to 25 years to
2 A separate jury found codefendant Luis Fernando Pacheco guilty of the same first
degree murder and enhancements. (Lopez I, supra, C059074.) Another jury heard the
evidence against codefendant Luis Garcia; however, a mistrial was apparently declared in
that case due to juror misconduct.
3 We have not received a reporter’s transcript for the original trial, and thus do not know
which subdivision the original trial court relied upon. We have received a declaration
from an official certified shorthand reporter indicating the court reporter’s notes from the
original trial have been destroyed and no transcript can be produced. Nevertheless, the
resentencing court relied on the transcript, and the original trial court’s statement will
become important later in this opinion.
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life for the murder conviction, plus 25 years to life for the remaining firearm
enhancement. (Lopez II, supra, C091477.) Another panel of this court affirmed the
conviction. (Lopez I, supra, C059074; Lopez II, supra, C091477.)
Defendant filed a petition for resentencing in 2019. (Lopez II, supra, C091477.)
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. (Ibid.) Defendant appealed
the denial, and yet another panel of this court reversed and remanded with instructions to
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine defendant’s
eligibility for resentencing. (Ibid.)
An evidentiary hearing was held on April 21, 2023. The trial court denied the
petition by written order dated July 6, 2023. The trial court found defendant directly
aided and abetted Pacheco in committing implied malice murder and was therefore not
entitled to relief under section 1172.6. This appeal timely followed.
While this appeal was pending, defendant filed a habeas petition challenging his
first-degree murder conviction in light of People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu).
After informal briefing, we issued an order to show cause. The People filed a return,
conceding the petition should be granted. We agree with the parties and grant the petition
in our opinion in In re Lopez, supra, C099854. We must now determine what remains, if
anything, of the present appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) to clarify the felony-murder rule and eliminate the natural and probable
consequences doctrine “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in
the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1(f); accord § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957,
959.) Senate Bill 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6, providing a procedure for
individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
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consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief by petitioning the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
A successful resentencing petition results in vacatur of the first-degree murder
conviction, recall of the original sentence, and resentencing on any remaining counts “as
if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (d)(1) and (d)(3).)
A successful petition for writ of habeas corpus similarly results in vacatur of the
conviction. (See People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 920 [“When the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus vacates the underlying judgment of conviction, the judgment ceases
to exist for all purposes”]; and see In re Cruz (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1346 [a writ
of habeas corpus corrects an erroneous conviction by “by invalidating the conviction and
restoring the defendant to the position she or he would be in if there had been no trial and
conviction”].) The prosecution will then have the option of accepting a reduction of the
conviction to second degree murder or retrying the first-degree murder charge on a valid
theory. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 168.) Until then, defendant regains his pretrial
status, with the prior conviction vacated. (See Cruz, supra, at p. 1346 [“the conviction is
set aside but the prosecution is not ended”].)
Having granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus in In re Lopez, supra,
C099854, we have already invalidated defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and
can offer no further relief on the resentencing petition, even assuming it was denied in
error. Furthermore, the prosecution may decide to retry the first-degree murder charge,
raising the possibility that anything else we might say about the resentencing petition
would have been advisory. We therefore conclude defendant’s appeal has become moot
and must be dismissed. (Becerra v. McClatchy Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 913, 927, fn. 4
[“An appeal becomes moot when ‘ “ ‘ “the occurrence of events renders it impossible for
the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief” ’ ” ’ ”]; In re Jessica K. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315 [“When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot
and will be dismissed”].)
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III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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