People v. Arroyo CA6

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Filed 6/6/24 P. v. Arroyo CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H049202
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19CR000624)

v.

RAUL GONZALEZ ARROYO,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Raul Gonzalez Arroyo of several sex offenses
involving his granddaughter, Jane Doe.1 The trial court sentenced him to a term of nine
years and eight months in prison.
On appeal, Gonzalez Arroyo argues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding
evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual conduct and DNA evidence from one of the stains
on her bedding, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misleading the trial court
during the hearing on in limine motions, (3) the trial court improperly admitted expert
testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS),2 (4) the trial

1
The victim was identified as Jane Doe throughout the trial and we will continue
that designation to protect her privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
2
Consistent with language used in California case authority, we refer to this
testimony as CSAAS evidence or CSAAS testimony in this opinion, despite the parties’
(continued)
court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 which explains how they
should evaluate CSAAS testimony, and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors warrants
reversal. Gonzalez Arroyo also raises two claims regarding his sentencing: (1) he is
entitled to resentencing because the trial court no longer has the authority to impose an
upper term sentence unless a jury has found true the aggravating circumstances, and (2)
he is entitled to an additional 16 days of presentence conduct credits.
As we explain below, we reject Gonzalez Arroyo’s arguments relating to alleged
evidentiary, prosecutorial misconduct, and jury instruction errors in their entirety. We
agree, however, that he is entitled to resentencing under the current version of Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)3 and that he is entitled to additional presentence conduct
credits. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand for the limited purpose of
resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedure
On October 9, 2019, the Monterey County District Attorney filed an information
charging Gonzalez Arroyo with two counts of committing a lewd act on a child (§ 288,
subd. (c)(1); counts 1, 2); contact with a minor for a sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a);
count 3); and rape of an unconscious person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4); count 4). At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Gonzalez Arroyo on all four counts.
On June 16, 2021, the trial court sentenced Gonzalez Arroyo to a total term of nine
years and eight months, consisting of the upper term of eight years on count 4 plus two
consecutive eight-month terms (one-third of the middle term of two years) on counts 1
and 2 plus a consecutive four-month term (one-third of the middle term of one year) on

pre-trial agreement not to use the term CSAAS at trial. (See People v. Lapenias (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 169 (Lapenias) [summarizing the five components of CSAAS].)
3
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
count 3. The trial court awarded 47 custody credits plus 7 days of conduct credits,
calculated at 15 percent pursuant to section 2933.1, for a total of 54 days.
The trial court imposed a $3,000 restitution fund fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a
parole violation restitution fund fine of $3,000 (§ 1202.45) (stayed pending successful
completion of parole), a $1,310 sex offender fine (§ 290.3), a $160 court operations
assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $120 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code,
§ 70373).
Gonzalez Arroyo timely appealed.
B. Facts
1. Prosecution case
a. Doe’s testimony
Doe testified that, when she was 13 years old, she lived with her parents and three
of her siblings.4 At the end of seventh grade, Doe and her siblings went into foster care
when her older sister reported being sexually molested by their parents.
In eighth grade, Doe and four of her siblings went to live with her grandfather,
Gonzalez Arroyo, and step-grandmother, L.A.5 At first, Doe enjoyed living with her
grandparents because they allowed her to be involved in school activities whereas her
parents would not allow her to do much of anything. Doe had her own bedroom in the
house.
During Doe’s freshman year,6 however, Gonzalez Arroyo started treating her
differently. Doe had joined the Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (NJROTC)

4
Doe had a total of eight siblings, including half-siblings and adopted siblings.
5
We refer to this person by her initials as use of her name would defeat the
objective of anonymity for the victim. (Rule 8.90(b)(11).)
6
Doe was born in 2001 and was a high school freshman in 2015 and 2016.
3
and she began dating a boy, A.C.,7 in that program. Doe told Gonzalez Arroyo that she
was dating A.C. toward the end of her Christmas break and he expressed his disapproval.
Gonzalez Arroyo started to touch Doe and say things that made her
uncomfortable. He would touch her lower back, tap her on the rear end, grab her waist,
and say she was looking “very cute.”
In January 2016,8 Doe woke up in the middle of the night and saw Gonzalez
Arroyo in her room. Gonzalez Arroyo was naked, and Doe noticed that her sweatpants
had been pulled down to her knees. Gonzalez Arroyo asked for a “chance with [her.]”
Doe “felt very uncomfortable and violated,” moved as far from Gonzalez Arroyo as she
could, and asked him to get out of her room. Gonzalez Arroyo left. After that, Doe
began to regularly lock her door and, at one point, would secure it further using a chair.
Within a day or two, Doe told A.C. what happened, and he told her she should
report it. Doe did not do so because she feared being separated from her siblings again.
Gonzalez Arroyo became much stricter with Doe and would not allow her to stay
for NJROTC practices in the morning or after school, “regulating when [she] was
allowed to go out.” Whenever Gonzalez Arroyo was alone with Doe he would touch her
and “ask [her] for [] a chance.” Gonzalez Arroyo would say that Doe was “a woman
now.”
In February, Doe woke up again in the middle of the night. Gonzalez Arroyo was
on top of her, naked. Doe was still wearing her pajama top but her pajama bottoms had
been removed. Doe told Gonzalez Arroyo to get off. Gonzalez Arroyo got off of Doe
and, after a little while, left the room.

7
To protect their privacy interests, as well as that of the victim, we refer to the
witnesses by their initials. (rules 8.90(b)(10), (11).)
8
Unless otherwise specified, all dates are in 2016.
4
In May, as Doe’s birthday was approaching, Gonzalez Arroyo told her that she
needed to have sex with him if she wanted a party. Doe felt “hopeless” and did not know
what to do. She felt as if she “had to give [her]self up just to be able to have a normal
thing, like a birthday party.” Doe did not report Gonzalez Arroyo to anyone as she was
still afraid of being separated from her siblings.
Doe was allowed to have a party after her actual birthday. The day before the
party, Gonzalez Arroyo told Doe he “was going to come into [her] room whether [she]
like[d] it or not.” Doe smoked marijuana and ate an edible on the way home in order to
not “feel anything” and to be out of her own body. When Doe got home, she was still
feeling the effects of the marijuana. Doe went to her bedroom and fell asleep around
8:00 p.m.
Doe woke up with Gonzalez Arroyo, who was naked, on top of her. Doe’s pajama
bottoms had been pulled down and Gonzalez Arroyo was thrusting his penis into her
vagina. Doe said it took her around 45 seconds to comprehend what was happening. She
was initially frozen in shock but then was able to move and get Gonzalez Arroyo off of
her. Doe felt wetness in her vagina and on her sheets. Gonzalez Arroyo eventually left
her bedroom.
Doe waited 10 to 15 minutes until she thought Gonzalez Arroyo was asleep in his
bed, then she went to the bathroom to clean herself. Doe noticed some blood from her
vagina, and her bedsheets had a “sticky wet feeling.”
Later that month, Doe came home from school and Gonzalez Arroyo came up to
her in the hallway. Gonzalez Arroyo said that he wanted “another chance because the
first time wasn’t as enjoyable for him.” Doe refused.
A couple of days after the May incident, Doe told her friend S.R. and her (former)
boyfriend, A.C., about what Gonzalez Arroyo had done. A.C. said he would talk to their
NJROTC captain about it. Although Doe still feared being separated from her siblings,
5
she wanted A.C.’s advice as to how to proceed. S.R. told Doe that she and her siblings
could stay with her if necessary.
Doe then told her NJROTC captain, P.G., because she was afraid that Gonzalez
Arroyo would molest, or perhaps already had molested, one or more of Doe’s siblings.
Doe did not tell L.A. what Gonzalez Arroyo had done because she felt like “[L.A.] could
have known maybe, and … chose to disregard it.” After speaking with P.G., Doe went to
the school office, and then spoke with the police.
b. A.C.’s testimony
A.C. and Doe met in their high school’s NJROTC program and began dating.
A.C. was a sophomore and Doe was a freshman. Doe introduced A.C. to Gonzalez
Arroyo but Gonzalez Arroyo “was not friendly towards” him.
In February or March, Doe told A.C. that Gonzalez Arroyo would “try to come on
to her, … would try to touch her, and also would say things to her to get her to do certain
things.” A.C. suggested that Doe tell L.A. or “someone that can take her to the police[,]”
but Doe was afraid that no one would believe her and that, in the worst case, she would
be separated from her siblings.
In May, Doe told A.C. that Gonzalez Arroyo “did [] something to her” when she
was asleep. Doe was upset and crying during this conversation. A.C. said that Doe had
to tell someone about this, but she was still reluctant to do so. A.C. advised Doe to tell
their NJROTC captain, P.G., as he was “kind of like a father figure” to them.
c. P.G.’s testimony
P.G. testified that he was the school district’s program manager for the NJROTC
and in May, Doe and A.C. came to his office. A.C. said that, because it was hard for Doe
to talk about what they were reporting, he would speak for her. A.C. told P.G. that,
the night before, a family member had gone into Doe’s room and asked,

6
“ ‘Let me have you.’ ” P.G. looked at Doe and asked her to confirm that this is what
happened, and she nodded her head. Doe was very emotional and teary-eyed.
Even after P.G. told Doe that she was in a safe place, she was unable to talk
without crying. P.G. and school officials contacted the police and police officers came to
the school that day.
d. Officer David Garcia’s testimony
On May 23, Soledad police officer David Garcia responded to Doe’s high school.
In the presence of a social worker, Garcia interviewed Doe at the school for 30 to 45
minutes. A recording of that interview was played for the jury.
In that interview, Doe said Gonzalez Arroyo began calling her “cute” and touching
her in December 2015 after Doe had introduced A.C. as her boyfriend. After Christmas
break, Doe woke up one night with Gonzalez Arroyo on top of her. Doe told him to get
out, but Gonzalez Arroyo said to her “just let me.” Gonzalez Arroyo was naked, but Doe
had her sweats on. Gonzalez Arroyo said “ ‘just this one time’ ” but Doe refused and
again told him to get out. Gonzalez Arroyo left the room.
Gonzalez Arroyo continued to compliment Doe and touch her, but also started
“taking away things like the Wi-Fi” which Doe needed for her homework. Doe asked
him to turn the Wi-Fi back on, but Gonzalez Arroyo said, “ ‘okay but you have to give
me a chance.’ ”
Doe next told Garcia that Gonzalez Arroyo came into her room again while she
was sleeping in late February or early March. Although she had locked her door, the lock
could be turned from the outside with a screwdriver. Doe heard the door open and
pretended to be asleep. As she heard him getting closer to her bed, Doe told him to get
out. Gonzalez Arroyo was naked and said, “ ‘just one time, just one time.’ ” Doe
replied, “ ‘no, get out’ ” and after repeating herself once or twice, Gonzalez Arroyo left

7
her room. Doe said that Gonzalez Arroyo had managed to pull her sweatpants and
underwear down to around her knees.
Doe described the May 13 incident, which took place before her birthday party.
Around midnight, Doe woke up and Gonzalez Arroyo was on top of her. Her sweatpants
and underwear had been pulled off and Gonzalez Arroyo’s penis was in her vagina. Doe
pushed him off. Gonzalez Arroyo did not have an erection and went to his bedroom.
Doe waited around 10 minutes to get out of bed and, using her phone’s flashlight, saw a
“clearish, creamish thing on [her] bed.” She went to the bathroom and, after wiping
herself, noticed some red from her hymen. Two or three days later, Gonzalez Arroyo
asked Doe for “another chance” because the first time “didn’t come out right.”
e. Recorded forensic interview
That same day (May 23), Doe was interviewed by a forensic interviewer, Lauren
McFarland, at the Bates-Eldredge Child Sexual Abuse Clinic. A recording of “virtually
all” of that interview was played for the jury.
Doe told McFarland that Gonzalez Arroyo had been sexually inappropriate with
her “multiple times.” Doe had been afraid to report his conduct the first time it happened
but was doing so now because her friends had encouraged her.
Doe said that it started to happen after she introduced her boyfriend to Gonzalez
Arroyo in December 2015. After meeting her boyfriend, Gonzalez Arroyo started
complimenting Doe on how she looked, touching or tapping her lightly on her thigh and
buttocks, and rubbing her back. Gonzalez Arroyo’s compliments gave Doe “bad vibes”
and made her uncomfortable.
In January, the day Doe got home from her Christmas break, she woke up
sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. Gonzalez Arroyo was on top of her, naked.
Gonzalez Arroyo was tugging on the waistband of her sweatpants, which is what caused
her to wake up. Doe asked Gonzalez Arroyo what he was doing, and he said, “let me.”
8
Doe was frightened, thinking she might get in trouble, so she did not speak loudly, but
she told him no. Doe pulled away from him, and Gonzalez Arroyo eventually left her
room.
The following day, Doe told A.C. about what happened. A.C. was “really pissed
off” and wanted Doe to report Gonzalez Arroyo right away. Doe did not want to as she
was frightened about what would happen and that she might be “put with someone
worse.” A.C. said that if it happened again, he would call the police if Doe did not.
Doe told McFarland she thought the next incident occurred a week after
Valentine’s Day. Doe woke up in the middle of the night with her sweatpants pulled off.
Doe was not certain of the details of this incident and was worried it would “look like
[she was] lying.” Doe explained to McFarland that her older sister’s reporting of sexual
abuse by their father led to them moving in with Gonzalez Arroyo and now she was being
abused. In addition, Doe said she was sexually assaulted by another student at the
beginning of her freshman year and “people made up rumors about it.” If Doe’s report
about Gonzalez Arroyo came out, people might say she was lying.
As to the third incident, Doe said that it took place on May 13, a day before her
birthday party. The night before, Gonzalez Arroyo told Doe that he was going to come
into her room “whether [she] liked it or not.” Because she knew Gonzalez Arroyo would
be coming into her room, Doe decided to smoke marijuana with friends, both before and
after school.9
Doe went to bed around 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. and was “knocked out.” She woke
up around midnight or 1:00 a.m. with her shorts and underwear off and Gonzalez Arroyo
thrusting on top of her, with his penis in her vagina. Doe got scared and pushed him off.
Gonzalez Arroyo’s “fluids” were on her thigh and on her bed. Gonzalez Arroyo gave her

9
Doe did not say anything to McFarland about also eating a marijuana edible that
day.
9
a mean look and came toward her again. Doe told him “ ‘No. Get away.’ ” Gonzalez
Arroyo asked her why and Doe said she did not want it happening. Gonzalez Arroyo left
and went to his room. Doe waited a few minutes until she thought he was asleep then
went to the bathroom to clean herself. Doe also cleaned her bed somewhat and went
back to sleep.
A few days later, Gonzalez Arroyo came up to Doe and asked for “another
chance” because the previous time “didn’t come out right.” Doe refused.
f. DNA evidence
After interviewing Doe, Garcia and another officer went to Gonzalez Arroyo’s
house to collect evidence. They took two blankets and a mattress cover from Doe’s bed
for DNA analysis.10 The other officer collected DNA swabs from Gonzalez Arroyo and
L.A., while another officer collected a DNA swab from Doe.
Dr. Zinaida Brameier, a criminalist with the California Department of Justice
(DoJ), testified that she received two blankets and a mattress cover to analyze. One of
the stains she analyzed, labeled “Stain A”, contained a large quantity of nucleated
epithelial cells,11 but no sperm cells. Two other stains, B and D, returned positive results
for sperm cells, with D’s result stronger than B’s. Dr. Brameier sent cuttings of stains B
and D to a different laboratory for DNA testing.12
Nan Nguyen, a senior criminalist at the DoJ, testified that she performed the DNA
analysis on the swabs collected from Doe, Gonzalez Arroyo, and L.A., as well as the

10
Doe testified that she had not washed her bedding since the incident.
Dr. Brameier explained that nucleated epithelial cells are found in a person’s
11

mucous membranes, and thus would come from the inside of one’s mouth, vagina, or
anus.
12
Dr. Brameier confirmed that the DoJ retained cuttings and samples from such
evidence in the event either party wanted to conduct additional testing. Neither the
prosecution nor the defense requested further testing of the bedding.
10
cuttings provided by Dr. Brameier. In stains B and D, Nguyen found sperm that matched
Gonzalez Arroyo’s DNA sample. Nguyen determined that Doe was the major
contributor of the non-sperm cells that were found in stain B. L.A. was excluded as the
minor contributor to stain B, and both Doe and L.A. were excluded as contributors to
stain D.
g. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)
testimony
Dr. Anna Washington, a psychologist with the University of California Davis
Child and Adolescent Abuse Resource and Evaluation Center (CAARE) testified about
common myths or misconceptions relating to child sexual abuse. Dr. Washington did not
know any of the parties involved in the case, had not read any police reports or
interviews, and did not know what charges or allegations had been made in the case.
Dr. Washington identified several common myths or misconceptions that lay
people have about child sexual abuse, specifically: (1) the perpetrator is often a stranger
to the child; (2) a child will physically fight, scream, or attempt to run away when they
are being abused; (3) immediately afterward, a child will report the abuse to someone
they know; (4) a child who reports abuse will provide many details about it; and (5) those
details are shared consistently each time the child reports the abuse.
According to Dr. Washington, children are often abused by someone they know
and trust and with whom they previously enjoyed spending time. Once the abuse begins,
the child may not like it, but they may be conflicted because they enjoy the other aspects
of their relationship with the abuser. The child will find it difficult to report what has
happened because they are worried about getting the abuser in trouble.
In addition, the abuser may threaten, intimidate, or use other means of
manipulation or grooming to convince the child something bad will happen if they tell
anyone. The abuser may threaten to harm the child or someone else they care about. The

11
abuser may tell the child no one will believe them, that the child will be taken from their
family and placed in foster care, or other frightening things will happen if they report the
abuse. The child may also fear that other family members will not believe them, will
blame them, or will be upset that the child got the abuser in trouble, especially where the
abuser is someone they also love and trust.
Dr. Washington testified to certain factors that may ultimately lead to a child
reporting the abuse. Very young children may accidentally disclose the abuse due to not
understanding that the conduct they are relating is wrong. Other children may disclose
the abuse to a friend who then tells an adult.
Dr. Washington also explained why an initial report of abuse may lack all of the
details or why details may vary on retelling. A person’s memory does not function like a
recorded video that can be replayed. When a particular event happens frequently, such as
in cases of chronic abuse, a person will be able to recall core details but not peripheral
details. For a child, the core details would be things that are “emotionally salient [to] a
child[,]” such as who is abusing them or the “general behaviors.” Peripheral details
would be things with less emotional significance, such as what the abuser was wearing,
or where and when the abuse occurred on each occasion.
Abused children commonly have symptoms of trauma, including avoidance and
disassociation, which make it more difficult for them to report the abuse. The children do
not like to think about the abuse let alone talk about it with someone else. Disclosure is
often done in increments, where a small amount is shared at first and, depending on
whether they get a supportive response, they will disclose more. Conversely, if the
response is negative or angry, the child may not share anything further.
Finally, Dr. Washington explained that there is no profile that can be used to
identify a person as a child abuser. Abusers are more likely to be known to the victim

12
and more likely to be male, but otherwise there is “no set of personality characteristics”
that could be used to suggest a person is committing sexual abuse.
2. Defense case
a. Gonzalez Arroyo’s testimony
Gonzalez Arroyo testified on his own behalf. At the time of trial, he was 63 years
old and had been married to L.A. since 2001, though they had no children together.
Gonzalez Arroyo had four daughters and “around 16” grandchildren from his first
marriage. In 2014, five of his grandchildren came to live with him and L.A. Gonzalez
Arroyo worked in the fields, from January until the beginning of October. In January, he
would work four or five days a week, but that would increase in February and March and
“[s]tarting from April,” he would work nearly every day. Gonzalez Arroyo would
typically wake up around 5:00 a.m. for work and go to sleep around 8:30 p.m. or
9:00 p.m. He did not work in December but would normally travel to Mexico with L.A.
returning in early January. Gonzalez Arroyo testified that he, L.A., and the two youngest
grandchildren were in Mexico from December 10, 2015 to January 10, 2016.
Gonzalez Arroyo would see Doe when he got home from work and on weekends
but they did not talk to each other because he did not speak English and Doe did not
speak Spanish. L.A. was responsible for taking care of Doe and the other grandchildren.
Gonzalez Arroyo did not argue with Doe or physically punish her, and L.A. was the one
who disciplined the grandchildren.
Doe had her own bedroom and Gonzalez Arroyo never entered it except to paint
the walls one time while Doe was at school. Doe slept on a futon in her room. The futon
had previously been in a different room and used by others. Gonzalez Arroyo said that
he did not clean the futon before it was moved into Doe’s room for her to sleep on.
Before Doe moved in, Gonzalez Arroyo sometimes slept on the futon and he and L.A.

13
would have sex on it once or twice a month.13 Around once a month, Gonzalez Arroyo
would masturbate while lying on the futon. When he did so, Gonzalez Arroyo would
sometimes ejaculate on the futon but would only occasionally wipe it afterwards.
Gonzalez Arroyo denied ever touching or grabbing Doe’s thighs or buttocks, or
making sexual comments to her in Spanish, trying to take off her sweatpants, or touching
her in a sexual manner. Gonzalez Arroyo said he never walked around the house naked
and did not go to sleep naked. Gonzalez Arroyo denied having any sexual interest in Doe
and denied ever trying to have sex with her or asking her to “give [him] a chance to have
sex with her.”
b. Other defense witnesses
Three of Gonzalez Arroyo’s daughters and two of his granddaughters testified as
character witnesses. All five testified Gonzalez Arroyo was not the kind of person who
would rape or molest a girl, nor did he have a reputation as someone who would sexually
assault anyone. On cross-examination, three of the five witnesses admitted they did not
know what the character traits were of a person who would commit rape or sexual
assault. One of Gonzalez Arroyo’s daughters testified that she did not “get the vibe that
[Gonzalez Arroyo] is [] a pervert or a rapist.” One of Gonzalez Arroyo’s granddaughters
testified that she believed the character traits of a rapist or molester were that they were
“more pervert[ed]” and “more touchy … towards one person.”

13
On cross-examination, Gonzalez Arroyo said he and L.A. did not have sex on
the futon after Doe moved in. In rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced a portion of L.A’s
preliminary examination testimony in which she said that she and Gonzalez Arroyo had
sex on Doe’s bed on one occasion before May 25, 2016.
14
II. DISCUSSION
A. Exclusion of evidence
Gonzalez Arroyo argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense, confront adverse witnesses,
and to due process, when it granted the prosecution’s in limine motion to exclude
evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual conduct and DNA results from an additional stain
(stain C) discovered on Doe’s bedding.14
1. Additional background
The prosecutor moved in limine to exclude evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual
conduct as well as evidence of DNA testing of stain C which revealed sperm cells from
an unidentified male. The prosecution argued that the evidence was irrelevant and should
also be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code sections 352, 782 and 1103.
At the hearing on the motion, Gonzalez Arroyo argued that the evidence of Doe’s
possible prior sexual activity would be relevant to the issue of her credibility. Gonzalez
Arroyo also argued that evidence was relevant to her motive to lie as she was breaking
her grandparents’ rules by sneaking her boyfriend into the house and having sex with him
in her room.
The trial court determined that evidence of Doe’s sexual conduct with her
boyfriend “has [no] relevance to her credibility” and found that there was no basis for
holding a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 782 at which Doe could be
questioned about that conduct. The defense would be able to “introduce evidence of and
cross-examine [Doe] regarding … whether or not she obeyed” the house rules and

14
Gonzalez Arroyo also argues that, to the extent the court finds he has forfeited
these claims due to trial counsel’s failure to preserve them below, his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance. The Attorney General does not raise forfeiture and
because we will address Arroyo’s arguments on the merits, we need not and do not
address his ineffective assistance claim.
15
whether Gonzalez Arroyo disciplined her. The court also found that the presence of
Doe’s nucleated epithelial cells had minimal relevance since those cells could be
deposited on her bedding in multiple ways aside from her engaging in sex with her
boyfriend.
The court also found that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, that any
probative value of evidence of Doe’s prior sexual activity or the presence of her
nucleated epithelial cells was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact. The
trial court indicated that introducing the DNA evidence “would necessitate an undue
consumption of time” given it would require testimony “about all of the various ways that
[] Doe’s epithelial cells, i.e., her saliva, sweat, and vaginal fluid in various amounts
would or could end up on her bedding.” The trial court was also concerned that DNA
evidence regarding Doe’s epithelial cells and an unknown contributor of DNA would
create “a substantial danger of confusing” or misleading the jury.
The court indicated that the defense was not precluded from introducing evidence
that Doe had a boyfriend, that she was defiant toward Gonzalez Arroyo, or that she might
otherwise have shown some bias that would suggest a motive to lie about Gonzalez
Arroyo’s conduct.
As to evidence relating to the DNA contained in stain C, the trial court found that
it was not relevant as the “question is how [Gonzalez Arroyo]’s sperm ended up on the
bed.” Evidence of another person’s sperm “is going to necessitate an undue consumption
of time and create an undue danger of undue prejudice to [] Doe for the reasons the Court
previously stated, create a substantial danger of confusing the issues by creating an
impression in the jury that now they’re supposed to focus on somebody else’s semen, and
create a substantial danger of misleading the jury.” The trial court also found that the
evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 782 as it sought to introduce
Doe’s prior sexual conduct.
16
2. Applicable legal principles and standard of review
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”
(Evid. Code, § 351.) Under California’s rape shield law, however, “[e]vidence of the
sexual conduct of a complaining witness is admissible in a prosecution for a sex-related
offense only under very strict conditions,” and it is not admissible for certain purposes.
(People v. Fontana (2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 362 (Fontana); Evid. Code, § 1103, subd.
(c).) Such evidence may be admissible “when offered to attack the credibility of the
complaining witness and when presented in accordance with the procedures under
[Evidence Code] section 782.” (Fontana, supra, at p. 362.)
“Evidence Code section 782 is designed to protect victims of molestation from
‘embarrassing personal disclosures’ unless the defense is able to show in advance that the
victim’s sexual conduct is relevant to the victim’s credibility. [Citation.]” (People v.
Bautista (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 762, 782 (Bautista).) The statute authorizes a procedure
by which a defendant seeking to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct
files a written motion accompanied by an affidavit containing an offer of proof
concerning the relevance of the proffered evidence to attack the credibility of the
victim. (Evid. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1), (a)(2); People v. Mestas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
1509, 1514; see generally Fontana, supra, at p. 354.) If the court finds the offer of proof
sufficient, it orders a hearing outside the presence of the jury to allow questioning of the
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof. (Evid. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(3);
Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 354.) At that hearing, if the trial court concludes the
evidence is relevant and not inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 352,15 the

15
Evidence that is otherwise relevant and admissible may nonetheless be excluded
under Evidence Code section 352 if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)
(continued)
17
trial court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced and the nature of
the questions permitted. (Evid. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(4); Fontana, supra, at p. 354.)
On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence
under Evidence Code sections 352 and 782 for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 408; Bautista, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.)
3. Analysis
a. Doe’s alleged prior sexual conduct
Gonzalez Arroyo asserts that evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual conduct was
relevant to disprove that Doe’s nucleated epithelial cells were deposited on the bedliner
when Gonzalez Arroyo had intercourse with her. He also argues that evidence of Doe’s
prior sexual conduct was relevant to her credibility because it was inconsistent with her
claim that Gonzalez Arroyo took her virginity. We conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding the evidence. Even assuming it had some relevance to the
case, “its probative value [was] substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission [would] … create substantial danger of undue prejudice … .” (Evid. Code,
§ 352.)
The need for an alternative explanation for how Doe’s nucleated epithelial cells
came to be deposited on her bedding was minimal. Dr. Brameier testified that such cells
are present in a person’s mouth, vagina, and anus, and there was no way to determine the
origin of the cells found on Doe’s bedding. The prosecution told the jury in final
argument that it was not possible to prove that Doe’s cells came from her vagina and that
they were deposited at the same time as Gonzalez Arroyo’s sperm cells. Even if the jury
had been told that Doe and another male previously had sex on her bed, the jury could

creates substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury.”

18
have still reasonably found that the presence of Doe’s cells and Gonzalez Arroyo’s sperm
cells established that he had intercourse with Doe.
Against that minimal relevance, the potential prejudice was significant. As the
California Supreme Court explained in Fontana, “[f]or some jurors, the fact that the
victim has engaged in sexual conduct outside of marriage automatically suggests a
receptivity to the activity or is proof that the victim got what she deserved—neither of
which is a rational or permissible inference. [Citation.]” (Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 370.)
Turning to the relevance of Doe’s prior sexual conduct in relation to her telling
McFarland during her forensic interview that Gonzalez Arroyo had taken her “virginity,”
we agree with the Attorney General that this evidence would have some relevance.
Again, however, Doe’s (possibly) false statement to McFarland that she was a
virgin when Gonzalez Arroyo had sex with her had minimal probative value as to
whether she lied about Gonzalez Arroyo having sex with her against her will. The
prejudicial impact of this evidence would far outweigh that limited probative value. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this evidence was inadmissible
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
b. DNA evidence on stain C
Gonzalez Arroyo next argues the evidence of an unidentified male’s sperm was
relevant because it supported his claim that the futon itself had been used by many
people, including Gonzalez Arroyo, before it became Doe’s bed. We disagree.
DNA testing of stain C revealed the presence of sperm cells from an unidentified
male. Gonzalez Arroyo fails to explain, however, how the presence of this sperm has any
bearing on the principal issue to be decided in this case: whether Gonzalez Arroyo raped
Doe on her futon. Doe testified that Gonzalez Arroyo did so, and Gonzalez Arroyo
testified that he did not. According to the DNA analysis, Gonzalez Arroyo’s sperm cells
19
and Doe’s nucleated epithelial cells were both found in stain B. Although Gonzalez
Arroyo testified that, before Doe moved in, he and L.A. sometimes had sex on the futon
and he would occasionally ejaculate on it after masturbating, that testimony does not
support a theory that some unidentified man also ejaculated on the futon, nor does it
make the presence of that unknown person’s DNA relevant to the question of Gonzalez
Arroyo’s guilt. The jury could still believe that Gonzalez Arroyo was testifying truthfully
regarding his use of the futon before Doe moved in without also hearing that someone
else’s sperm cells were found on that bedding.
In addition, the probative value of this evidence was minimal especially when
compared to its potential to create a substantial danger of undue prejudice as it would
lead the jury to speculate whether Doe was engaging in consensual sexual activity, a fact
which has no bearing on whether Gonzalez Arroyo sexually assaulted her. As a result,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the DNA evidence relating to stain C
was inadmissible because it was not relevant or appropriate for admission pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352.
c. No prejudice
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Doe’s
alleged prior sexual history or the DNA evidence discovered on stain C, Gonzalez Arroyo
cannot show that he was prejudiced thereby. Error in admitting or excluding evidence at
the guilt phase of a trial is reviewed under the standard set forth in People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson).16 Under Watson, we ask whether there is a

16
Gonzalez Arroyo also argues that exclusion of this evidence violated his due
process rights and that the error is therefore subject to review under the stricter standard
set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) pursuant to which
the burden is on the Attorney General to show the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We disagree that the exclusion of this evidence violated Gonzalez
Arroyo’s due process rights or deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
20
reasonable chance—more than an abstract possibility but not necessarily “ ‘more likely
than not’ ”—that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached absent
the assumed error. (People v. Vasquez (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1041.)
In this case, given that Gonzalez Arroyo’s sperm cells were found on Doe’s
bedding along with her cells—a fact Doe would have no way of knowing was true at the
time she reported Gonzalez Arroyo’s conduct—it is not reasonably probable that the
admission of evidence that Doe may have engaged in sexual activity with her boyfriend
on her bed would lead a jury to acquit Gonzalez Arroyo. Likewise, the evidence from
stain C that another unidentified male ejaculated on Doe’s bedding would not reasonably
have led to Gonzalez Arroyo’s acquittal. Even if we assumed Doe misrepresented to
McFarland in her forensic interview that she was a virgin before Gonzalez Arroyo raped
her, it is unlikely a jury would have found Gonzalez Arroyo not guilty on the charges had
the evidence from stain C been admitted. Defense counsel cross-examined Doe and
highlighted the inconsistencies in her testimony to the jury, yet the jury found her story
more credible than Gonzalez Arroyo’s.
B. Prosecutorial misconduct
Gonzalez Arroyo next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the
hearing on the in limine motions by misrepresenting that Doe’s epithelial cells could have
come from sweat, thereby causing the trial court to exclude the evidence of Doe’s prior
sexual conduct. In addition to contesting this claim on the merits, the Attorney General
argues that Gonzalez Arroyo has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it at the in
limine hearing. We need not reach the Attorney General’s forfeiture argument and
ultimately conclude that Gonzalez Arroyo’s claim has no merit.17

17
Since we address Gonzalez Arroyo’s contention on the merits, we need not and
do not consider his alternative argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object on this ground at the hearing on in limine motions.
21
1. Additional background
At the hearing on the in limine motion to exclude evidence of Doe’s alleged prior
sexual conduct and the DNA results from stain C, the prosecutor stated that Dr. Brameier
would testify that it was not possible to precisely determine the source of Doe’s epithelial
cells as those cells could have come “from drool, snot, sweat, or sexual activity.” The
trial court asked the prosecutor if it was his position, based on his conversations with the
experts, “even sweat can leave the nucleated epithelial cells?” The prosecutor responded,
“[i]n smaller amounts, [] yes.” The trial court concluded that the evidence in question
had little to no relevance given the multiple ways in which Doe’s cells could have been
deposited on her bedding, such as sweat, saliva, or vaginal discharge. The court also
determined that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352.
At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Brameier on whether nucleated
epithelial cells could be deposited from sweat. Dr. Brameier responded that a “different
type of nucleated epithelial cell[]” comes through a person’s sweat glands, but her
examination of the sweat stains on the bedding did not show any. Dr. Brameier clarified
that she was not saying, “they do not exist there” but she would expect to find “a lot more
[nucleated epithelial cells] from saliva or vaginal fluid.”
2. Applicable legal principles and standard of review
A prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct under state law if he or she uses
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the
jury. (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) “ ‘Improper comments violate the
federal Constitution when they constitute a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ”
(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 111.) “A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed
for prosecutorial misconduct, however, unless it is reasonably probable that a result more

22
favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct.” (People v.
Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)
3. Analysis
a. No misconduct
While the prosecutor stated during the in limine hearing that nucleated epithelial
cells can be deposited from sweat, this statement was not entirely untrue nor does it
appear that the statement was made in order to deceive the trial court. Dr. Brameier
testified at trial that such cells can come from sweat, though in much smaller amounts
than would be deposited by saliva or vaginal fluids. This is mostly consistent with the
prosecutor’s representation to the court that sweat can produce such cells “in smaller
amounts.”
In addition, the transcript of the in limine hearing does not support Gonzalez
Arroyo’s claim that the prosecutor’s arguably misleading statement was a significant
factor behind the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual
conduct and the DNA evidence from stain C. Instead, the trial court found that this
evidence had little to no relevance to the case, and even more importantly, that its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice. Assuming the
court was under the false impression that Doe’s sweat was a possible source of the cells
on her bedding, it was nonetheless true that there was more than one source of those cells.
We are also not persuaded that the prosecutor committed misconduct by informing
the court at the in limine hearing that he would not argue “where exactly these … cells
came from” but then, in final argument, stating that Doe’s cells came from vaginal
discharge. Gonzalez Arroyo’s characterization of the prosecutor’s final argument is not
supported by the record. The prosecutor expressly admitted that the mixture of Doe’s
cells and Gonzalez Arroyo’s sperm cells in stain B was “not conclusive evidence” and
that “[s]cience itself cannot tell you how his DNA and her DNA came together.” The
23
prosecutor then argued that, due to the positioning of stain B in the center of the bedding
where a person’s torso would normally be during sexual intercourse, it was a more
reasonable inference that Doe’s cells were from vaginal fluids as opposed to saliva. The
prosecutor’s argument to the jury was entirely consistent with its representations at the in
limine hearing. As a result, we conclude there was no prosecutorial misconduct.
b. Assuming misconduct, there was no prejudice
Even assuming that the prosecutor’s statements about sweat as a source of
nucleated epithelial cells amounted to misconduct, Gonzalez Arroyo cannot show a
reasonable probability of a different result had the trial court not considered those
statements in ruling on the in limine motion. The trial court’s decision to exclude
evidence of Doe’s alleged prior sexual conduct and the DNA evidence from stain C was
based on its independent conclusions about both the relevance of that evidence and, under
Evidence Code section 352, that its significant prejudicial impact outweighed its
probative value.
Furthermore, at trial the jury was presented with the DNA evidence and heard both
Doe’s and Gonzalez Arroyo’s testimony about what happened. Although DNA evidence
is not required to prove guilt in a sexual assault case, such evidence corroborated Doe’s
testimony. There is no reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a more
favorable result for Gonzalez Arroyo had it also been presented with the excluded
evidence.
C. CSAAS testimony
Gonzalez Arroyo argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his in
limine motion to exclude Dr. Washington’s testimony on CSAAS. First, he claims that
CSAAS testimony is unreliable and unduly prejudicial. Second, Gonzalez Arroyo
contends that Dr. Washington’s testimony exceeded the bounds of permissible CSAAS
evidence because she testified about “common character traits, or the lack thereof, of a
24
stereotypical child molester.” Gonzalez Arroyo therefore concludes that his
constitutional rights to due process were violated because the CSAAS evidence was used
to unfairly corroborate and bolster Doe’s allegations against him.
As we explain below, we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the
CSAAS testimony and reject Gonzalez Arroyo’s arguments in their entirety.
1. Additional background
Before trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to admit Dr. Washington’s testimony
regarding CSAAS, arguing that her testimony would educate the jury about “myths and
misconceptions regarding victim behavior” as well as common misconceptions regarding
child molesters. He indicated that the evidence was necessary in part because the defense
planned to call a number of character witnesses who would testify that, in their opinion,
Gonzalez Arroyo did not “have the character” of a child molester. The prosecutor
represented that Dr. Washington would testify about “victims generally,” would not refer
to the evidence as a “syndrome,” and would not offer statistical evidence relating to the
truthfulness or falsity of allegations of abuse. The prosecutor also suggested that the
court provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding this testimony.
Gonzalez Arroyo moved in limine to exclude Dr. Washington’s testimony arguing
that such testimony is unreliable, unduly prejudicial, and improperly vouches for the
credibility of the complaining witness. In the event the court was inclined to admit the
testimony, Gonzalez Arroyo argued it should be limited to “CSAAS syndrome attributes
and to dispelling purported myths about victim behavior.” Gonzalez Arroyo also argued
that Dr. Washington should not be allowed to testify that a “typical molester [is] someone
well known to the victim.”
The trial court ruled that it would admit the evidence, subject to the limitations
identified by the prosecutor. The prosecutor reiterated that, because the defense intended
to call character witnesses who would give their opinion about whether Gonzalez Arroyo
25
was the kind of person who could be a child molester, he intended to have Dr.
Washington testify that “there is no profile that joins all the types of people that commit
these kinds of acts.” Defense counsel made no further argument on that issue. The trial
court also noted that the parties had jointly drafted a jury instruction on the matter.
2. Applicable law and standard of review
Expert opinion testimony is admissible when the subject matter is “beyond
common experience” and the opinion would assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a).) “ ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court’s
discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.)
“Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of five commonly
held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. [Citation.] While CSAAS
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established
in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th 162, 171; see also In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 418; People v.
Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737,
1744–1745 (Patino); People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955–956; People v.
Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449–450; People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
107, 116–117.) CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that
the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having
been molested.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394.) “For instance,
where a child delays a significant period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of
abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the
26
secretive environment often created by an abuser who occupies a position of trust.”
(Ibid.) CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove that the complaining witness has in
fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when
the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in
reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.]
‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions
about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1300–1301, fn. omitted (McAlpin).)
3. Analysis
a. No abuse of discretion in admitting CSAAS evidence
Gonzalez Arroyo initially objects to Dr. Washington’s testimony on the grounds
that it may improperly be used as evidence of guilt and there is no reason to believe that
the “ ‘commonly held misconceptions’ ” about how a child victim may respond to sexual
abuse are still commonly believed. We are not persuaded.18
The California Supreme Court ruled in McAlpin that CSAAS testimony is
admissible to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse
victims’ behavior and to explain seemingly contradictory behavior of a child sexual abuse
victim. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1302.) As this court is bound by
decisions of the California Supreme Court, Gonzalez Arroyo’s citations to decisions from
other jurisdictions that reached different outcomes on the admissibility of CSAAS
testimony have no effect on the binding nature of McAlpin. (See People v. Ramirez

18
Because we will address Gonzalez Arroyo’s arguments on the merits, we need
not and do not address his alternative claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.

27
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 216 (Ramirez).) Based on this binding precedent, as well as
the substantial precedent set forth above regarding admissibility of CSAAS evidence, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the prosecution’s
proposed expert testimony on CSAAS was relevant and admissible for the limited
purpose for which it was admitted in the instant case. (See Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744–1745; People v.
Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245.)
b. The testimony did not exceed the permissible bounds
Gonzalez Arroyo next argues that Dr. Washington’s testimony went beyond her
expertise and the permissible scope of CSAAS evidence when she improperly testified
that aside from generally being male and a person known to the victim, there is no other
profile or set of common traits for persons who sexually abuse children. We disagree.
After detailing her academic credentials as well as her work experience in the field
of child sexual abuse, Dr. Washington testified that there had been multiple unsuccessful
studies conducted to try to “identify people who are sexual abuse[rs]” but that
“perpetrators are more likely to be known to the victim … [and] are more likely to be
male.” Defense counsel did not challenge this testimony on cross-examination.
Gonzalez Arroyo acknowledges that similar testimony, at least as to the question
of whether perpetrators are more likely to be known to the victim, was recently approved
in People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474 (Sedano) and was also approved in
McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289. He argues that these cases are distinguishable. In his
view, Sedano failed to explain how testimony that an abuser is usually known to the
victim fits within the rubric of CSAAS evidence, which is designed to explain how the
victims may behave. As for McAlpin, the testimony was not CSAAS evidence and was
presented by a police officer not an expert in treating victims of child abuse. We see no
basis for distinguishing these cases.
28
In McAlpin, while the testimony was offered by a police officer not a psychologist,
the basis for admitting the testimony was the same: there is a common misperception that
child abusers are often strangers. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1302–1304.) Sedano
is more directly on point, as the CSAAS expert in that case testified that, not only are
most abusers known to the victim but went so far as to assert that “ ‘94 percent of these
kids in his study had a pre-existing relationship with the molester.’ ” (Sedano, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) In this case, Dr. Washington offered no specific statistical
evidence, stating only that the abuser is “more likely” to not be a stranger and more likely
to be male but otherwise there was no typical set of characteristics that would identify
someone as an abuser. Her testimony did not exceed the bounds set by the trial court nor
the bounds approved by either McAlpin or Sedano and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting it.
c. No due process violation
Finally, Gonzalez Arroyo contends that the admission of the CSAAS evidence
violated his due process rights to a fair trial because it “allowed the jury to make the
unreasonable inference that, because Doe acted in ways” consistent with that described
by Dr. Washinton, Doe “was a credible witness.”
Generally, a court’s compliance with the rules of evidence does not violate a
defendant’s right to due process. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174, citing
People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834–835.) Reviewing courts have also routinely
held the admission of CSAAS evidence does not violate due process. (See, e.g., Patino,
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744–1745 [trial court’s admission of CSAAS evidence did
not violate due process].) For the same reasons, we conclude that Dr. Washington’s
testimony about CSAAS did not violate Gonzalez Arroyo’s constitutional right to due
process.

29
Further, we have already rejected Gonzalez Arroyo’s contentions that (1) the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence; and (2) the expert testimony
exceeded the permissible bounds of CSAAS evidence. The “rejection of a claim on the
merits necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or ‘gloss’ raised” on
appeal. (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 487, fn. 29.) Having rejected each of the
underlying claims of error in admitting the CSAAS evidence, we accordingly reject
Gonzalez Arroyo’s associated due process claim.
d. No prejudice
Even if we were to assume that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Dr. Washington’s testimony, Gonzalez Arroyo cannot show that he was prejudiced by
that error. As discussed ante (pt. II.A.3.c.), error in admitting or excluding evidence at
the guilt phase of a trial is reviewed under the standard set forth in Watson, supra, 46
Cal.2d at p. 837.
The evidence implicating Gonzalez Arroyo, both direct and circumstantial, was
significant. His sperm was found on Doe’s bedding, mixed with cells that most likely
came from her vaginal fluids, corroborating her testimony about Gonzalez Arroyo raping
her. In addition, contrary to Gonzalez Arroyo’s contention, the prosecutor did not refer
to Dr. Washington’s testimony in refuting the defense’s character witnesses’ testimony
that Gonzalez Arroyo did not have the characteristics of a child molester. The prosecutor
simply asked those witnesses if they could identify what those characteristics might be.
Their inability to answer that question was sufficient in and of itself to undercut the
credibility of their opinions on the matter. Accordingly, there is no reasonable
probability that, absent Dr. Washington’s testimony, a more favorable result would have
been reached for Gonzalez Arroyo.

30
D. Instructional error
Gonzalez Arroyo next argues that the court erred in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193, related to CSAAS expert testimony, because the instruction creates
a reasonable likelihood the jurors would use the expert testimony to determine whether
Doe’s testimony was true. We disagree.
1. Additional background
Before trial, Gonzalez Arroyo argued that CALCRIM No. 1193 did not adequately
cure the prejudice inherent in CSAAS testimony because the jury would be tempted to
use the evidence to conclude that he was guilty of the charged offenses. As an
alternative, Gonzalez Arroyo requested that the court instruct the jury with CALJIC No.
10.64 instead.
However, at the hearing on in limine motions, the trial court stated that the parties
had jointly drafted a jury instruction regarding Dr. Washington’s testimony. After the
close of evidence, as the court went over the jury instructions with the parties, they
agreed without further comment that the court would instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1193.
The court instructed the jury, as follows: “You have heard testimony from
Dr. Anna Washington regarding the behaviors of victims of juvenile sexual assault
victims [sic]. Dr. Anna Washington’s testimony regarding behaviors of victims of
juvenile sexual victims [sic] is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding
whether or not Jane Doe’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone
who has been molested and in evaluating the believability of that testimony.”
2. Applicable law and standard of review
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
31
1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider
“ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1028.) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are
intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions
which are given.’ ” (Ibid.)
3. No error in instructing with CALCRIM No. 1193
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1193 because it is not reasonably likely that jurors understood the instruction as
permitting the use of Dr. Washington’s testimony for the improper purpose of proving
that Gonzalez Arroyo sexually abused Doe. “CALCRIM No. 1193 informs jurors that
they may use CSAAS evidence to evaluate whether the alleged victim's behavior, which
may appear inconsistent with being molested, was actually not inconsistent with the
behavior of a child sexual abuse victim.” (Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) As
our court noted in Ramirez, “CSAAS evidence is relevant and admissible when an
alleged victim’s credibility has been attacked. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The instruction
expressly tells the jurors that they must not consider the CSAAS evidence as
determinative of the defendant’s guilt.
Gonzalez Arroyo acknowledges that multiple courts “have rejected similar
challenges to CALCRIM 1193,” such as People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, and Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 162.
This court did as well in Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 220 and we see no reason
to depart from the reasoning employed in those cases. “Because the instruction correctly
informed the jury of the permissible and impermissible uses of [the CSAAS expert]’s
testimony, and because there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or
misapplied the instruction in the manner asserted by defendant, the trial court did not err
32
in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193, and defendant’s due process right was
not denied.” (Ramirez, supra, at p. 220.)
Even were we to assume that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193, and even if that error implicated his federal constitutional rights,
we conclude that any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24. As discussed above, the jury was expressly
instructed not to use Dr. Washington’s testimony as evidence that Gonzalez Arroyo
committed the charged offenses. The jury was also instructed that they were the sole
judge of a witness’s credibility and were not required to accept an expert’s opinion as
true. The prosecutor did not mention Dr. Washington’s testimony in his final argument,
instead directing the jury to evaluate Doe’s credibility using her demeanor, her
consistency in describing what occurred, as well as her lack of any motive to lie. In
addition, the CSAAS expert testified that she was not familiar with any of the facts of the
case or any of the parties and was not proffering an opinion as to whether any molestation
took place. While the physical evidence in this case was circumstantial, it corroborated
Doe’s testimony and supports a conclusion that Gonzalez Arroyo would have been
convicted of the same offenses regardless of any alleged error in the instruction.
E. Cumulative error
Gonzalez Arroyo next contends that the cumulative effect of the purported errors
discussed above warrants reversal of the judgment. “In theory, the aggregate prejudice
from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single
error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483.) Here, we have
found no errors, and where we assumed error, we also found no prejudice. Consequently,
we reject Gonzalez Arroyo’s cumulative error argument.

33
F. Amendments to section 1170
After Gonzalez Arroyo was sentenced, the Legislature amended section 1170 to
allow an aggravated prison term to be imposed only if the aggravating factors supporting
it are admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. (Sen. Bill No. 567 (2020–2021
Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) As an ameliorative change, that legislation
applies retroactively to this case that is not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740, 747.) Gonzalez Arroyo argues that, under the new standards, the court could
not impose an upper term sentence on any of the substantive offenses because he did not
admit any of the aggravating facts relied on by the court nor did a jury find them true.
While the parties agree that the amendments to section 1170 have retroactive
application, they disagree on the question of prejudice. We need not reach this question
however, because we are unable to determine, on this record, what the trial court would
have done had it been aware of the limitations imposed by these amendments. Therefore,
we will remand for resentencing for the trial court to apply the current version of section
1170, subdivision (b)(2).
The published opinions are in conflict on the standard to be applied when the court
relies on multiple factors, some of which were not found by the jury or stipulated to by
the defendant.19 (Compare People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500 [remand not
required if appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found at least one aggravating factor true] with People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 466 (Lopez) [all aggravating factors must have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt; if only some factors would have been found true, it must be reasonably probable
the same sentence would have been imposed based on those] and People v. Dunn (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 394 (Dunn), review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 [if at least one

19
The issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court. (See People v. Lynch
(May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.)
34
aggravating factor would have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt and it is
reasonably probable any remaining aggravating factors relied on in imposing sentence
would have been found true, assess likelihood of same sentence being imposed absent
factors not meeting that standard].)
Gonzalez Arroyo contends that, regardless of the analysis this court may apply,
“remand is required because it cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have found even one of the aggravating circumstances true.” The Attorney
General contends that we should apply the test from Dunn, which described the standard
for assessing prejudice as follows: “The reviewing court determines (1)(a) beyond a
reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found one aggravating circumstance true
beyond a reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have found any remaining aggravating circumstance(s) true beyond a
reasonable doubt. If all aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court would
have been proved to the respective standards, any error was harmless. If not, the
reviewing court moves to the second step of Lopez, (2) whether there is a reasonable
probability that the trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the upper term
in light of the aggravating circumstances provable from the record as determined in the
prior steps. If the answer is no, the error was harmless. If the answer is yes, the
reviewing court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing.” (Dunn, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410, fn. omitted.)
Lopez requires the reviewing court to evaluate every factor on which the court
relied, and we read Dunn to require at least one aggravating factor that the trial court
actually relied upon to withstand Chapman scrutiny. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 466; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.) Where the record ‘ “clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had
been aware that it had such discretion[,]” ’ [citation] [¶] . . . remand would be an idle
35
act.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.) In People v. Salazar (2023) 15
Cal.5th 416 (Salazar), the California Supreme Court recently reemphasized and expanded
on this principle, stating “unless there is a clear indication from the sentencing court that
it would be idle to do so, remand for resentencing is required. When the applicable law
governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is
almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would
have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of
sentencing.”20 (Id. at p. 431, italics added.)
At sentencing, the trial court found two mitigating circumstances: (1) Gonzalez
Arroyo’s insignificant criminal history (rule 4.423(b)(1)), and (2) his prior satisfactory
performance on probation (rule 4.423(b)(6)). The trial court also found three aggravating
circumstances, specifically that the crimes “involve[d] a high degree of callousness …
and cruelty” (rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim “[was] particularly vulnerable” (rule
4.421(a)(3)); and Gonzalez Arroyo took “advantage of a position of trust and confidence”
in committing the offenses (rule 4.421(a)(11)). Following the guidance from the
California Supreme Court and considering this record, “ ‘we cannot say with confidence
what sentence [the court] would have imposed’ if it were applying Senate Bill 567 in the
first instance. [Citation.]” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 432.)
As a result, we will remand the matter for resentencing under section 1170, as
amended by Senate Bill No. 567.

20
We recognize that Salazar was specifically addressing the amendments to
section 1170, subd. (b)(6) which now mandate that the trial court impose a lower term
where a qualifying trauma is found to be a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense unless it makes specified findings. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 426.)
36
G. Additional conduct credit
Gonzalez Arroyo argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that he is entitled to
an additional 16 days of presentence conduct credits. We agree that the concession is
well taken.
The trial court limited Gonzalez Arroyo’s presentence conduct credits to 15
percent pursuant to section 2933.1. This was error. The 15 percent credit limitation of
section 2933.1 applies to defendants who are convicted of violent felonies listed in
section 667.5, subdivision (c). (§ 2933.1, subd. (a).) Gonzalez Arroyo was not convicted
of any qualifying felony and he is thus entitled to an additional 16 days of presentence
conduct credits.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing. On
remand, the prosecution may elect to proceed by meeting the requirements of Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) regarding aggravating circumstances or may elect to
proceed on the current record. After the prosecution makes that election, the trial court
shall resentence Gonzalez Arroyo according to current law, including a recalculation of
Gonzalez Arroyo’s credits.

37
____________________________
WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

_____________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

H049202
People v. Raul Gonzalez Arroyo

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