CourtListener 9511042•People v. Puentes CA1/4
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Filed 6/4/24 P. v. Puentes CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A159926
v.
RICARDO PUENTES II, (Sonoma County Super.
Defendant and Appellant. Ct. No. SCR4985671)
Ricardo Puentes II, appeals from his conviction for second degree
murder, attempted murder, and assault (Penal Code1 §§ 187, 245, subd. (b),
664), challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.
Puentes was tried 13 years after the shooting. Shortly after the trial
concluded, Omar Chavez, who had been convicted as an aider and abettor
many years earlier and had already served his sentence by the time of
Puentes’ trial, telephoned Puentes’ trial counsel, Kristine Burk, asking why
she never contacted him and explaining that he would have corroborated
Puentes’ claim that he acted in self-defense. Chavez stated that he, like
Puentes, observed one of the victims, Semere Girmai, reach for a gun in his
waistband before Puentes fired. No other witness saw Girmai do so.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Puentes’ new counsel prepared and submitted a declaration from Chavez and
moved for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which
Chavez and Burk—who had been replaced by new defense counsel—testified.
Burk stated that her failure to contact Chavez to learn his version of events
was an oversight, not a tactical choice. Chavez obtained the assistance of
counsel at the hearings and at times invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Later, after the trial court found he had waived
the privilege as to matters in his declaration or about which he had already
testified, Chavez confirmed his previous statements and provided further
detail.
The court denied the motion for a new trial. Without deciding whether
Burk’s failure to interview Chavez constituted deficient performance, the
court concluded that there was no prejudice because Puentes had not shown a
reasonable probability that (1) Burk would have called Chavez to testify;
(2) Chavez would have testified; and (3) Chavez’s testimony would have led to
a more favorable result for Puentes. We will affirm the judgment for the
reasons explained below.
BACKGROUND
I. The Trial
The shooting occurred at the apartment of Melissa F. in 2005.2 People
in the room included Melissa F., Matt M., Max R., Puentes, Chavez, and the
two victims—Girmai, who was killed, and Rafael C., who was injured by a
bullet that passed through his wrist and struck his shoulder. Because Matt
M.’s testimony largely framed the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, we
2 We refer to certain individuals by their first name and last initial in
accordance with rule 8.90 of the California Rules of Court.
2
rely primarily on his account to describe the prosecution’s case. Matt M.
noted, however, that he “was drinking a lot that night,” he had been smoking
marijuana and probably used cocaine, and he had trouble remembering the
details.
A. Matt M.’s Testimony
Matt M. left Melissa F.’s apartment with two young women and ran
into Chavez (whom he considered a friend) and Puentes near a restaurant
parking lot. In the parking lot, Puentes got into the car with the two women
and Matt M. got into Chavez’s car. Matt M. and Chavez discussed returning
to Melissa F.’s apartment to try to “squash” a disagreement that had built up
between Chavez and Girmai in the past couple of months. Matt M. did not
provide significant detail, but like Matt M. himself, Chavez and Girmai were
drug dealers, and he said that the disagreement in part concerned taking
clientele, with the dispute causing people in their group of friends to take
sides between Girmai and Chavez. Matt M. was friends with both of them,
and wanted to help them resolve their differences.
Both cars returned to Melissa F.’s apartment. The two women went
upstairs to the apartment and Puentes got back into Chavez’s car, where
Matt M. and Chavez discussed getting marijuana and continued to talk about
the rift between Girmai and Chavez. Chavez drove the three of them to a
house; Puentes went inside and returned about five minutes later. Matt M.
did not see that Puentes had any marijuana and no one smoked marijuana.
They drove back to Melissa F.’s apartment. Outside the apartment, Matt M.
said he was not sure they should go inside. Puentes said, “Let’s just go up
there.” Puentes wanted to smoke marijuana and may have said something
about the two women. Matt M.’s main concern was to have Chavez and
Girmai talk.
3
When they entered the apartment, Matt M. walked toward the living
room, near Max R. Girmai was seated with Rafael C. at the dining room
table. Chavez greeted Girmai and shook his hand. Girmai asked Matt M.,
“Why did you bring these mother fuckers here?” referring to Chavez and
Puentes. In his 2005 statement to police, Matt M. stated that Girmai also
said “these fools are gonna get clapped,” meaning that they were going to be
shot. At trial, although Matt M. was more tentative, he agreed that Girmai
“said something under his breath like that.” Within 10 or 15 seconds of
Girmai’s first statement, Matt M. observed Puentes pointing a gun at Girmai.
Matt M. did not see Girmai stand up or reach for anything; his hands were on
the table. When Matt M. saw Puentes shooting Girmai, he reached for his
own gun in the waistband of his pants, but it fell down his pant leg and got
stuck. He ran away, jumping out a second story bathroom window and
discarding his gun as he ran.
Matt M. had a gun for protection because he was in a gang, dealing
drugs, and “everybody” around him had a gun. Matt M. knew Girmai to
carry a gun and had previously seen him with one. Girmai was affiliated
with the Crips gang and “was active with that community.” Matt M. also was
affiliated with the Crips. Chavez was affiliated with the Norteños, but Matt
M. did not believe he was a gang member. Chavez’s and Girmai’s gang
associations did not impact their group of friends.
Girmai had started getting “crazy” and “a little emotional” in the recent
past; “[h]e always . . . wanted to start shit” and he never calmed down.
B. Puentes’ Testimony
Puentes testified that, after dropping the two women off at Melissa F.’s
apartment, Chavez drove him and Matt M. to his home to obtain marijuana.
He did not retrieve a gun; as a drug dealer, he already had one on him.
4
Heading back to Melissa F.’s apartment, Puentes was thinking of
“socializ[ing] and “smok[ing] some weed.” He did not hear Chavez and Matt
M. discuss Girmai. After Puentes entered the apartment, Girmai was looking
at him and Chavez, and Puentes heard him say, “Why did you bring these
mother fuckers?” Puentes felt “alarmed,” and then heard Girmai say, looking
at Puentes, “You’re dead.” Girmai reached his right hand into the right side
of his waistband and “grab[bed] a gun.” Puentes saw Girmai’s hand on the
handle and the top corner of the gun. Fearing for his safety, he then pulled
out his own gun and shot as fast as he could. Puentes did not use all his
ammunition and stopped shooting when it appeared Girmai could not shoot
him back. He did not realize at the time that he had also shot Rafael C.
On cross-examination, Puentes explained that both he and Chavez
associated with Norteño gang members. Puentes also had friends who were
Crips; Crips and Norteños at that time hung out together.
C. Other Testimony
Both in 2005 and prior to Puentes’ 2018 trial, Rafael C.—who already
had multiple felony convictions—contacted prosecutors and offered to testify
and “do whatever” in exchange for leniency in his then-pending criminal
cases. For example, in July 2017, while in custody, he left voicemails for the
district attorney, urging that it would be to the prosecution’s advantage in
the case if he were out of custody, and that “[o]therwise, like I don’t know if I
can play ball.”3 However, Rafael C. testified that no one from the District
Attorney’s office ever responded to his requests and he never received a
benefit for his testimony. With respect to the shooting, Rafael C. testified
3 At trial, Rafael C. testified that the phrase “play ball” did not refer to
his cooperation as a witness and that he meant he did not know “if I can go
through with going to prison.”
5
that Girmai turned toward Chavez when he shook his hand and said, “what
the fuck.” Rafael C. saw Puentes reach into his jacket, pull out a gun, and
start firing. He did not see Girmai with a gun that night or see him reach for
a gun or take his hands off the table. When Puentes began shooting, Rafael
C. stood up and said: “What the fuck?” Puentes shot at Girmai, then twice at
Rafael C., and then at Girmai again, and had to move his gun to shoot both of
them.
Melissa F. saw Chavez shake hands with Girmai. She turned to close
the door and heard gunshots while her back was turned. Immediately
afterward, she called a friend of Girmai named Zula, a “Crip gangster drug
dealer” who threatened to retaliate against her if she spoke to law
enforcement. Rafael C. called 911 as Chavez and Puentes ran out of the
apartment. Melissa F. first testified that she went through Girmai’s pockets
to retrieve drugs, and that she did not find a gun when she was searching
them. After a weekend break in the trial, she contacted the prosecution’s
investigator and told him that her testimony was mistaken; when re-called to
the stand, she explained that she had no recollection of searching Girmai’s
pockets, and on re-cross, she stated affirmatively that she did not go through
them and could not explain why she previously testified that she did. She did
retrieve cocaine from the kitchen table and flush it down the toilet because
either Rafael C. or Zula told her to. She was under the influence of cocaine,
alcohol, and methamphetamine that night. When law enforcement officers
interviewed her, she lied to them about the drugs in her apartment, Matt
M.’s name, and who had been present, among other things. Melissa F. did
not recall seeing Girmai with a weapon that night, which was consistent with
what she told an investigator in 2005. But a few weeks before the shooting,
6
she had seen Girmai produce a gun when he said something that caused a
conflict with the people with whom he was speaking.
D. Closing Argument and Verdict
The prosecution did not settle on a single theory of Puentes’ motive to
kill Girmai. Principally, it argued that Puentes decided to kill Girmai before
going to Melissa F.’s apartment in response to the rift between Chavez and
Girmai, which Puentes must have heard Matt M. and Chavez discussing,
notwithstanding his denials. Alternatively, it suggested that Puentes later
decided to kill Girmai because he “felt disrespected” when Girmai asked,
“why did you bring these mother fuckers?” In rebuttal, after the defense
questioned whether either of these hypotheses made sense, the prosecution
emphasized that it did not have to prove motive, observing that “[s]ometimes
we may never have that answer as to why somebody does something.”
With respect to the claim of self-defense, the prosecution emphasized
that Puentes was the only person who testified that Girmai had or reached
for a gun, and argued that his testimony on this point should be questioned
as self-serving. (The jury instructions also advised that the jury could
consider whether any witness had a personal interest in how the case was
decided.) The prosecution also contended that Puentes’ testimony was
inconsistent with the physical evidence, including the trajectory of the bullets
that killed Girmai and the shooting of Rafael C.
The jury found Puentes not guilty of first degree murder and first
degree burglary, thus rejecting the prosecution’s theory that Puentes had
formed an intent to kill Girmai before entering Melissa F.’s apartment. But
it found him guilty of the second degree murder of Girmai, guilty of the
attempted murder of Rafael C., and guilty of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm.
7
II. Motion for New Trial and Hearing
Several months after the verdict, Puentes moved for a new trial based
on his counsel’s failure to interview Chavez.4 The court heard evidence and
argument on the motion on multiple days.
A. Chavez’s Testimony
When Puentes first called Chavez to testify at the hearing, without
Chavez’s counsel present, Chavez twice asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege but on each occasion nonetheless provided responsive information.
He explained that, when he entered the apartment with Puentes, he observed
Girmai seated at the dining room table and, just before he heard gunshots,
saw him pull a gun out of his waistband. He saw enough of the gun “to be
scared” and to know he “was in danger.” Before pulling the gun out, Girmai
said to Matt M., “why did you bring these mother fuckers[?]” At that point in
Chavez’s testimony, the court stopped him and asked whether he would like
to have an attorney present. After speaking with his attorney by telephone,
Chavez was willing to resume testimony, but the court continued his
testimony until his attorney could attend.
When Chavez later returned to the stand with counsel, he invoked the
Fifth Amendment as to all questions related to the crime. On cross-
examination, Chavez testified that whether he would have invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege at Puentes’s trial would have “depend[ed] on whether I
conferred with my attorney.” While he would have followed his attorney’s
4 Chavez’s first two trials for Girmai’s murder resulted in hung juries.
On the eve of his third trial, he pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter with
an enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), that the crime was
done at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a criminal
street gang. It appears from counsel’s comments at the hearing that the trial
court was provided with certain transcripts from Chavez’s trials, and Burk
received them in discovery, but they are not part of the record on appeal.
8
advice if he spoke with him, “had I just impulsively went on the stand, I
would not have pled the Fifth.” Chavez could not say whether he would have
asked for an attorney, and whether he would have invoked his privilege at
trial would have depended on the questions asked.
After briefing, the court concluded that Chavez had waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege as to the matters in his declaration and those to which
he had already testified. Chavez then affirmed the truth of the facts in his
declaration and answered further questions. Chavez was friends with
Girmai, who “always had a firearm on him.” Matt M. and Chavez discussed
the need to “squash everything” between Chavez and Girmai. When they
went to the apartment, however, “the whole purpose . . . was to hang out with
girls,” not specifically to try to resolve things with Girmai. Shortly after
Chavez heard Girmai say “Why did you bring these mother fuckers here?” he
saw him “pulling out a gun from his waistband.” Chavez could not see
Puentes, who he believed was behind him. Chavez thought he “was about to
get shot.” The next thing Chavez “remember[ed] was seeing blood come out
of [Girmai’s] head.” Chavez was in shock. Rafael C. jumped up from the
table and yelled something. Chavez did not remember Rafael C. getting shot.
After they left the apartment, Puentes told Chavez, “I had to do what I had to
do because we were going to get shot.”
B. Burk’s Testimony
Burk testified that her investigator did not interview Chavez prior to
trial, and that she did not speak to Chavez or his counsel before the jury
verdict. She knew that Chavez was in the apartment when the shooting
occurred, and that in two trials he was charged as an aider and abettor with
the same crimes as Puentes. She did not know what he would have said
happened that night, and although she knew he was no longer incarcerated,
9
she did not have anyone try to locate him. She explained that it was an
“oversight”; it was not a tactical decision but instead a “blind spot” because
typically Chavez would have been a codefendant in the same trial, and
“codefendants are so often just hands off. We don’t get to talk to them.
They’re represented by counsel, and they’re sitting next to you.” She never
consciously decided not to interview or call Chavez as a witness.
Burk spoke to Chavez for the first time when he telephoned her shortly
after the verdict. He told her “that he would have confirmed what [] Puentes
said, that [Girmai] had a gun. That [Chavez] believed [Puentes had] saved
[his] life or something like that.” If Burk had known what Chavez told her,
and if she was determining whether to call him to testify, she “would have
had to consider a myriad of issues,” including his possible gang affiliation.
Because there was relatively little evidence of Puentes’ gang involvement, the
gang allegations against him were dismissed.5 There was evidence, however,
that Girmai and Matt M. were both affiliated with the Crips, and that fact
furnished one approach Burk could use to discredit Matt M.’s testimony.6
Burk wanted to keep evidence of Puentes’ possible gang ties out of the trial
because the jurors would not like it and it could be used against him to show
motive. Burk was also concerned that the more substantial evidence of
Chavez’s affiliation with the Norteños could have negatively impacted
5 As Burk explained, Chavez was in one respect better situated than
Puentes, in that he was not the shooter, but in another respect, he “had a
more substantial gang history that put him in some jeopardy in his trial in a
way that I didn’t believe the People had evidence as to Mr. Puentes.”
6 Burk ultimately did not rely on Matt M.’s and Girmai’s shared gang
affiliation to impugn Matt M.’s credibility. In her closing argument, she
characterized Matt M. as “the least biased, but most impaired witness from
the evening.” She added, “He is immature, he is irresponsible, but it does
appear that he tried to be mostly honest about what his memory was.”
10
Puentes. If Chavez testified, more gang evidence could have been admissible,
and the prosecution would probably have impeached him with it.
With respect to Chavez’s credibility, Burk testified that she still did not
have enough information to form an opinion about whether his account of the
shooting was truthful. Asked whether she agreed that it is helpful to have a
corroborating witness for a defendant who claims self-defense, she answered
that she did not think the question has a “black and white” answer, because
while corroboration is helpful, “you have to evaluate what other costs and
what other issues it brings up.”
III. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court declined to determine whether Burk’s oversight constituted
deficient performance, instead finding any error not prejudicial. Even had
Burk contacted Chavez, the trial court found, there was no reasonable
probability that (1) Burk would have called Chavez to testify; (2) Chavez
would have testified, rather than invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination; and (3) even if Chavez testified, the jury would have returned
a verdict more favorable to Puentes. The court identified 12 reasons that it
believed supported the latter point, including the prosecution’s ability to
undermine Chavez’s credibility; the testimony of other witnesses refuting
Puentes’ claim of self-defense; physical evidence undermining Puentes’ claim
that he shot only in Girmai’s direction; circumstantial evidence that Puentes
went to the house intending to shoot Girmai; the absence of a firearm found
on or near Girmai when the police arrived minutes after the shooting; and
11
Chavez’s and Puentes’ flight from the scene, and Puentes’ flight from the
jurisdiction for many years, as evidence of consciousness of guilt.7
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The parties disagree as to the standard we apply to review the trial
court’s denial of Puentes’ motion for a new trial. Puentes argues that we
apply independent review at least to the question whether counsel’s alleged
error prejudiced him, relying on People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582
and footnote 5 (lead opn. of George, C. J.) (Nesler), People v. Callahan (2004)
124 Cal.App.4th 198, 209 (Callahan), and In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th
230, 248–249, abrogated on other grounds, Padilla v. Kentucky (2010)
559 U.S. 356, 370. The Attorney General argues, also relying on Callahan, at
pages 209–212, along with People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1265 (Ault),
and People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 956–962 (Hoyt), that we apply a
deferential abuse of discretion standard.
Although the cases are not entirely consistent, Puentes has the better
argument. (See People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 224, fn. 7.)
The lead opinion in Nesler has been adopted in cases that have specifically
considered the standard of review for a new trial motion, including Ault and
Callahan, on which the Attorney General relies. (Ibid.; Ault, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 1255, 1260–1270; Callahan, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at
p. 209; cf. Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 158 &
7 We note, however, that the prosecution ultimately elected not to
introduce evidence of Puentes’ long absence from the jurisdiction because, in
a pretrial ruling, the court held that the defense would be permitted to
introduce evidence of certain crimes that transpired after the shooting (which
the prosecution sought to exclude) to show that Puentes may have fled
because he feared for his safety rather than because of consciousness of guilt.
12
162, fn. 3 [relying on Nesler and Callahan for standard of review in civil
appeal].) The Callahan and Ault courts agree that the Nesler rule controls
insofar as the appellate court is reviewing the trial court’s denial of a new
trial motion, particularly where the motion implicates a significant
constitutional issue. (Ault, at pp. 1266–1267; Callahan, at pp. 209–212; see
People v. Albarron, at p. 224, fn. 7; cf. People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th
1063, 1108 [applying abuse of discretion standard to denial of new trial
motion based on evidentiary issue].) In both Ault and Callahan, however, the
courts concluded that the abuse of discretion standard applies on review of a
trial court’s grant of a new trial motion, a distinction the Attorney General
elides. (Ault, at p. 1272; Callahan, at p. 209; see also, e.g., People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) And while it is true that Hoyt applied an abuse
of discretion standard to the denial of a new trial motion asserting ineffective
assistance, there is no indication that the defendant in Hoyt advocated for
independent review. (See Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 956–962.) Because
“ ‘ “[i]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered,” ’ ” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 169, fn. 5), Hoyt is not
controlling on that question. For the same reason, we decline to rely on
People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 483.
Upon review, therefore, we “accept the trial court’s credibility
determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by
substantial evidence. [Citations.] Whether prejudice arose from [counsel’s
ineffective assistance] is a mixed question of law and fact subject to [our]
independent determination.” (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 582; see also
People v. Taylor (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 720, 724–725.)
13
II. Ineffective Assistance
Criminal defendants have “ ‘the right to the effective assistance of
counsel at trial . . . . A defendant claiming ineffective representation bears
the burden of proving . . . (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e.,
that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result would have been more favorable to
defendant . . . .’ ” (In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 721; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) Burk’s admission that it
was an “oversight” not to contact Chavez, a critical witness, suggests
deficient performance, at least in failing to interview him to learn whether
and how he would testify. (In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 777; Cannedy v.
Adams (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 1148, 1159–1162.) However, we need not
resolve that question definitively because we conclude that Puentes has failed
to show prejudice in any event.
To evaluate prejudice, “[w]e examine what ‘evidence counsel failed to
discover and present in this case’ and whether there is ‘a reasonable
probability that a competent attorney . . . would have introduced it’ [citation],
and then we address whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that [the jury]
would have returned’ a different verdict if it ‘had . . . been confronted with
[that] evidence.’” (In re Long, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 778.) “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694), which is less than a preponderance of
the evidence (Cannedy, supra, 706 F.3d at p. 1162) but enough to cause “ ‘at
least one juror . . . [to strike] a different balance.’ ” (In re Lucas, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 734.)
14
A. Whether Counsel Would Have Called Chavez to Testify
Puentes must show a reasonable probability that a competent attorney
would have called Chavez to testify after learning what he would say.
(In re Long, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 782.) Although Burk was not directly
asked whether she would have done so, she acknowledged that there would
have been downsides, including Chavez’s credibility issues and the
prosecution’s ability to introduce his affiliation with the Norteños and other
gang evidence, which could have buttressed its theory of motive. She was
unable to form an opinion of the truthfulness of Chavez’s account, and agreed
that she would have had to consider his guilty plea as well as potentially
contradictory statements he reportedly made to his girlfriend about the
killing and Puentes’ role in it.
On the other hand, the key prosecution witnesses had significant
credibility issues. As the jury was aware, Matt M. and Rafael C. were drug
dealers, had gang affiliations, and possessed multiple felony convictions.
Matt M. testified under a grant of immunity. Rafael C. had a history of
trying to solicit favors from the prosecution in exchange for offering
“whatever.” Melissa F. initially lied to law enforcement, had attempted to
dispose of evidence at the crime scene, and gave inconsistent testimony about
going through Girmai’s pockets. The witnesses also made statements in 2018
that were inconsistent with their prior reports to law enforcement in 2005.
The passage of time, along with the witnesses’ use of multiple controlled
substances that night, impaired their ability to recall the events accurately.
Moreover, because Puentes’ testimony was self-serving, the jury also had
reason to doubt it. The prosecution made that very point in closing
argument, and emphasized that his testimony was not corroborated by other
15
witnesses. Chavez’s testimony could have helped Puentes address this
problem.
On balance, although we recognize the possibility that the risk calculus
might have militated against Burk calling Chavez—because arguably his
testimony could have opened the door to more gang evidence and pointed to a
possible conspiracy between Chavez and Puentes to murder Girmai—we
think a reasonably competent defense lawyer likely would have taken the
gamble and tried to call Chavez as a witness given the weaknesses of
Puentes’ case for self-defense without some corroborative evidence. For the
reasons explained below, however, with the benefit of hindsight as to how
Chavez actually testified at the motion hearing and of the trial court’s
findings with respect to that testimony, we are not persuaded that there is a
reasonable probability that putting him on the stand as a defense witness
would have resulted in a more favorable verdict for Puentes.
B. Whether Chavez Would Have Testified
The trial court found it was likely that Chavez would have invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination, as he did when he was called as a
witness at the hearings on the new trial motion—hesitatingly when he first
appeared without counsel, and in response to nearly every question when he
returned with his attorney. The trial court concluded that, if Burk had
thought to interview Chavez, she likely would not have proceeded without
contacting Chavez’s lawyer. This is a reasonable inference. Burk testified at
the new trial hearing that she considered codefendants to be “hands off.”
Consistent with this testimony, before Puentes’ trial, she moved to exclude
any statements Chavez made to Matt M., arguing that “I can’t confront and
cross-examine Chavez about what he said, what he thought, what he did.”
But regardless of what Burk would have done, we see no reason to conclude
16
that Chavez would not have contacted his attorney before testifying, since
that is what he did even though it was his decision to reach out to Burk in
the first place. And Chavez acknowledged that he would have followed his
attorney’s advice to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Puentes contends that he could have overcome any assertion of the
privilege because Chavez had already been convicted, had admitted a gang
enhancement as part of his guilty plea, and the risk that he could still face
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charges
(18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.), based on his gang involvement—which Chavez’s
counsel identified as the basis for invoking the privilege—was imaginary and
insubstantial. The trial court was not persuaded by that argument, and we
agree that Puentes’ assertion that the risk of federal prosecution was remote
is insufficient to show error. “[T]he Fifth Amendment does not allow ‘the
court to assess the likelihood of an actual prosecution in deciding whether to
permit the privilege.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1011 [quoting
People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 305].) “Ultimately, a trial court may
reject an assertion of the privilege only when it appears to the court
“ ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the
case, . . . that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency’ to
incriminate.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 267 [quoting
Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 488]; see also Evid. Code § 404
[once a witness shows that proffered evidence might tend to incriminate
them, the “evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court that
the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the
person claiming the privilege”].)
Puentes argues that the five-year statute of limitations for any RICO
conspiracy would surely have run for any crimes in 2005 by the time Chavez
17
testified in 2018. But by their nature and design, RICO prosecutions have
expansive reach. (See, e.g., United States v. Pizzonia (2d Cir. 2009) 577 F.3d
455, 460, 467 [rejecting statute of limitations challenge to RICO conspiracy
charges where indictment relied on pattern of racketeering activity beginning
18 years prior to indictment and no specific predicate offense was proven to
have occurred within limitations period]; United States v. Masters (7th Cir.
1991) 924 F.2d 1362, 1365, 1368 [RICO conspiracy charges for predicate
offenses beginning 18 years prior to indictment were not untimely, even
where last predicate offense occurred six years before indictment, because
conspiracy continued].) And given the broad protection afforded to those
invoking the privilege, the “ ‘witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather,
the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness’s answers “would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness for a
criminal offense.’ ” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 613–614.)
Applying those principles, we agree with the trial court that Chavez
had reason to fear that his testimony might provide a link in a chain of
evidence allowing various predicate crimes to be swept up in a wide-ranging
RICO conspiracy prosecution. As the court explained, the predicate crimes
could include narcotics violations, violent crimes, aiding and abetting
Puentes’ flight after the murder, and intimidating a witness, assuming any
such offenses could be connected over time via a pattern of Chavez’s asserted
gang-related activity.8 Accordingly, we conclude that Puentes has not
established a reasonable probability that Chavez would have testified at trial.
8 With respect to Chavez’s invocation of the privilege at the hearing on
the new trial motion, the trial court also believed that cross-examination
could potentially subject him to a perjury prosecution based on the sworn
declaration submitted in support of the motion, in the event his answers
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C. More Favorable Result
Even assuming that Chavez would have testified, whether voluntarily
or based on Puentes overcoming any assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination, we do not find it reasonably probable that his testimony would
have led to a more favorable result. The trial court cited 12 reasons in
support of its conclusion that it was not reasonably probable that a jury
would have reached verdicts more favorable to Puentes if Chavez’s testimony
was offered at trial. Without necessarily endorsing all of them, applying
independent review and deferring to the trial court’s factual findings where
supported by substantial evidence, we agree with the trial court’s ultimate
conclusion.
We must weigh the proposed new evidence against the strength of the
prosecution’s case. (See In re Long, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 784; e.g.,
In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 605, disapproved on other grounds,
In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6 [due to strength of
prosecution’s case, failure to uncover impeachment evidence regarding two of
prosecution’s witnesses was not prejudicial].) The only matter at issue here
is whether Puentes shot Girmai in self-defense. The prosecution presented
two witnesses, Matt M. and Rafael C., who testified that they saw Girmai at
revealed that any part of his declaration was untrue. The issue on appeal,
however, is whether Chavez would have been able to invoke the privilege if
he had been called as a witness at trial. There is no suggestion that the
declaration would have existed in that counterfactual scenario, so the
potential for a perjury charge related to it is not relevant. For the same
reason, we do not find relevant Puentes’ argument that his reported
testimony would now be available in any retrial as former testimony under
Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2). The prejudice inquiry
requires us to assess what likely would have happened had Chavez been
called as a witness at Puentes’ original trial.
19
the time of the shooting and that he did not reach for a gun before Puentes
shot him. Melissa F. did not recall seeing Girmai with a gun that evening.
No gun linked to Girmai was ever recovered. The fact that Puentes shot
Rafael C. in addition to Girmai, and that he would have had to adjust his
hand position to do so, also undermined Puentes’ claim that he shot Girmai
in self-defense. Although Puentes testified that Girmai made threatening
statements and started to pull out a gun, his testimony on the latter, critical
point was not corroborated. Considering the totality of the evidence,
Chavez’s ability to corroborate Puentes’ account would have been quite
important to the defense—were it believed. But after presiding over Puentes’
trial and the evidentiary proceedings on the new trial motion, the trial court
found that Chavez’s testimony, overall, was not credible. We defer to this
factual finding, which weighs substantially against any conclusion that a
more favorable result was probable.
In addition, the trial court and the Attorney General have highlighted
the “double-edged” nature of Chavez’s potential testimony. (In re Andrews
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234, 1257–1258.) On the one hand, Chavez would testify
in a manner consistent with Puentes’ account of self-defense. But on the
other hand, as Burk testified, with Chavez on the stand, additional evidence
regarding his and Puentes’ potential gang affiliations and activities might
very well become admissible. That evidence would not only cast Puentes and
Chavez in a generally negative light in the jury’s eyes, at least according to
Burk, but it could also tend to support the prosecution’s theory that Puentes
and Chavez planned to murder Girmai, a theory that the jury otherwise
rejected. (Cf. United States v. Harden (9th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1229, 1231–
1232 [failure to call witness with prior felonies and credibility issues, where
evidence against defendant was significant, was not prejudicial].)
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For all of these reasons, we conclude that Puentes has not established a
reasonable probability that Chavez’s testimony would have resulted in a
more favorable verdict.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
21
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