CourtListener 9509157•People v. Proman CA2/1
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Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Proman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B326435
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA481238)
v.
MATTHEW B. PROMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark K. Hanasono, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Michael G. Raab and Michael G. Raab for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon, and Christopher G.
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
After Matthew Proman (Proman) discovered that Colby
Cyburt (Cyburt) was dating his ex-girlfriend, he created hundreds
of internet posts falsely claiming that Cyburt was a sex offender
engaged in a real estate Ponzi scheme.
Cyburt expended significant resources to remove the
posts and mitigate the damage to his reputation. The real estate
investment firm that employed Cyburt nevertheless remained
concerned about the posts and prohibited him from working on new
deals. Cyburt therefore left the firm mid-year, forfeiting a portion
of his $100,000 annual salary and a substantial year-end bonus.
Proman’s posts also prompted Cyburt’s partners in the purchase
of an $8 million investment property to back out of the transaction,
depriving Cyburt of both an upfront commission and longer-term
investment profits.
Proman pleaded no contest to cyberstalking, and Cyburt
requested $413,178 in victim restitution consisting of $58,178 in
expenses incurred to remove the posts, $190,000 in lost wages, and
$170,000 in lost profits from the cancelled $8 million transaction.
Proman stipulated to pay the requested $58,178, but objected to the
amounts Cyburt sought for lost wages and profits. The trial court
granted Cyburt’s restitution request in full.
On appeal, Proman asks us to vacate the court’s restitution
order, arguing (1) insufficient evidence supports the amounts
awarded to compensate Cyburt for lost wages and profits,
(2) Cyburt’s lost wages and profits are impermissibly speculative,
(3) the order provides Cyburt with an inappropriate windfall, and
(4) the award improperly includes compensation for noneconomic
damage to Cyburt’s reputation.
We conclude, however, that the record does not support
Proman’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
2
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Between June and September 2019, Proman created
hundreds of online posts falsely accusing Cyburt of orchestrating
a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. Proman also posted
untrue allegations that Cyburt had been arrested for possession of
child pornography.
Cyburt first learned of the libelous posts from the compliance
department of the real estate investment firm where he worked
as an associate. He then spent hundreds of hours and tens
of thousands of dollars working with attorneys and private
investigators to remove the posts. Notwithstanding Cyburt’s
efforts, the firm remained “very concerned” about its name being
associated with the allegations in the posts, and it prevented
Cyburt from working on new real estate transactions. He therefore
left the firm in November 2019, forfeiting a year-end bonus that
he anticipated would have totaled more than $90,000. Proman’s
conduct also caused Cyburt’s co-investors in the purchase of an
$8 million multifamily building in Los Angeles, California to
cancel the transaction. As a result, Cyburt lost an $80,000 upfront
commission, as well as the longer-term profits his share of the
investment in the building would have generated.
In 2021, Proman pleaded no contest to one count of
cyberstalking Cyburt and three other victims, in violation of Penal
Code section 646.9.2 The trial court sentenced Proman to two years
1 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. We draw our summary
of Proman’s conduct primarily from Cyburt’s testimony at the
restitution hearings. On appeal, Proman does not dispute the
veracity of this portion of Cyburt’s testimony.
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
of formal probation and conducted evidentiary hearings on July 12
and October 18, 2022 to determine the appropriate amount of victim
restitution.
At the hearings, the prosecution presented testimony from
Cyburt, as well as an expense log he prepared, in support of his
request for three categories of restitution: (1) $53,178 in fees and
costs for investigators, attorneys, and an improved home security
system; (2) $190,000 in lost wages; and (3) $170,000 in lost profits
resulting from the cancelled $8 million transaction. Proman cross-
examined Cyburt, but introduced no evidence of his own. Following
the hearings, Proman agreed to pay the $53,178 in restitution
Cyburt requested to cover his investigator, attorney, and security
system fees. Proman objected, however, to the two remaining
categories of restitution Cyburt sought.
The trial court granted Cyburt’s requests for restitution in
full, explaining in relevant part:
“So I do find that Mr. Cyburt did testify credibly. His
testimony is sufficient to provide and demonstrate the adequate
factual basis for his claims by a preponderance of the evidence . . .
and, ultimately, it is up to the defense to—if the defense wants to
dispute or rebut any of the claims, the defense must put forward
additional information to rebut the amount claimed, and there was
nothing sufficient to do that.
“The outstanding two items requested by Mr. Cyburt are,
first, the request for $190,000. This is the amount for time that
Mr. Cyburt was forced to miss work to meet with the district
attorney and other commitments relating to the case. This also
includes the loss of future earnings and damage to his reputation,
which forced him to leave his job. Third, the loss of a $90,000
bonus, which he was unable to collect because he left his job. And,
fourth, the time while unemployed after leaving his job.
4
“Mr. Cyburt was forced to miss 18 days of work and meetings
and spent 60 hours per week during a two-month period for security
procedures and speaking with the district attorney and other
attorneys. He is entitled to wages or profits lost due to time spent
as a witness or in assisting the police or the prosecution.
“Because of the defamatory content about Mr. Cyburt posted
online by [Proman], Mr. Cyburt’s employer and business associates
did not utilize his services. Mr. Cyburt was forced to leave his job
and not receive the bonus and future salary. He would not have left
the job early had he not been victimized by [Proman]. He remained
unemployed for two months after leaving his job.
“Mr. Cyburt has limited his requests for restitution for these
events based on a one-year salary of $100,000. The time missed
from work and time spent with the district attorney and other
attorneys and for the security procedures alone constitutes nearly
four months or one-third of the year. The remaining amount would
constitute eight months of salary. This requested amount is far
from unreasonable for damage to his professional reputation and
loss of earnings.
“The remaining $90,000 represents the bonus which
Mr. Cyburt did not collect because he left the job early. Mr. Cyburt
had every expectation to receive this amount had [Proman] not
damaged his business reputation. . . .
“Mr. Cyburt has demonstrated an adequate factual basis for
the entire amount of $190,000 by a preponderance, and [Proman]
has not disproved this amount.
“With regard to the second outstanding item of [$]170,000
for lost income from a property investment that failed due to
[Proman’s] conduct against Mr. Cyburt, this amount represents
an upfront gain or commission and long term profit—a long term
profit share of the property. The former was to be $80,000 and the
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remaining amount was the profit projected by Mr. Cyburt. He did,
at one point, characterize it—or the defense characterized it as
speculation, and Mr. Cyburt did not disagree with that term at the
time; however, Mr. Cyburt has demonstrated an adequate factual
basis for this claim by a preponderance . . . . The court will order
the entire $170,000 as part of the restitution.
“The total amount awarded to Mr. Cyburt is $413,178[.] This
includes the [$]360,000 that I discussed with these two items and
the previously stipulated amount of $53,178.”
Proman timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Law Governing Restitution Orders
Pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f), “[w]here a
victim of crime has suffered economic loss because of a defendant’s
conduct, the court must require [the] defendant to pay restitution
to the victim in an amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim.”
(People v. Valle (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1329, 1332 (Valle); § 1202.4,
subd. (f).) Although a restitution order “should not overcompensate
the victim with a windfall” (Valle, supra, at p. 1332), “ ‘ “[a]
victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.”
[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26
(Millard).)
“At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for
restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s
testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or
her economic loss. [Citations.] ‘Once the victim has [i.e., the People
have] made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the burden
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss
is other than that claimed by the victim. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
6
“ ‘[T]he court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution
is broad, and it may use any rational method of fixing the amount
of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the
victim whole. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘There is no requirement
the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in
which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any
requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might
be recoverable in a civil action. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Millard,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 26–27.)
We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion, and
we will not find any such abuse “ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen there is a factual and
rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial
court.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
“ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual
finding], the “ ‘power of the appellate court begins and ends
with a determination as to whether there is any substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the trial
court’s findings.” [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at
a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] “If the circumstances
reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,” the judgment
may not be overturned when the circumstances might also
reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not
reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the
trier of fact. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Ordering $413,178 in Restitution to Cyburt
In fashioning the restitution order, the trial court applied
a rational method reasonably calculated to make Cyburt whole.
(Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 26–27.) The court
7
ordered Proman to pay restitution falling into three categories—
(1) attorney, investigator, and security system costs, (2) lost
wages, and (3) lost profits—each tethered to specific economic
losses Cyburt sustained as a direct result of Proman’s conduct. The
prosecution supported each category of claimed loss with testimony
and documentary evidence from Cyburt. And Proman failed to offer
any evidence of his own to rebut Cyburt’s prima facie showing of
loss. (See Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) We therefore
conclude the court acted within its discretion in ordering $413,178
in restitution to Cyburt.
None of Proman’s arguments persuades us otherwise.
First, Proman faults the prosecution for presenting only Cyburt’s
testimony and an expense log Cyburt himself prepared to
substantiate his claims of lost wages and profits. Proman insists
that this “uncorroborated” evidence is insufficient to support
the restitution order—particularly because Cyburt purportedly
promised and failed to produce additional documentation
supporting his claimed losses.3
Section 1202.4, however, “does not, by its terms, require
any particular kind of proof.” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543.) Indeed, Proman concedes that the
“evidentiary requirements to establish [a] victim’s economic loss
are minimal and that a victim can give his opinion of the value”
of the loss. And here, the trial court determined that Cyburt
provided credible testimony substantiating his losses. (People v.
Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 [at a restitution hearing,
3 For example, during the July 12, 2022 restitution hearing,
the deputy district attorney asked whether “sometime in the near
future, [Cyburt would] be able to find [additional] documentation
and supply it to the court.” Cyburt responded, “Yes, I’ll try to do
that.”
8
“ ‘ “ ‘ “[s]entencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as
to the kind of information they can consider and the source from
whence it comes” ’ ” ’ ”].)
Second, Proman contends that Cyburt’s claimed losses arising
from the forfeited year-end bonus and the cancelled $8 million real
estate transaction are impermissibly speculative. Proman urges
that Cyburt “mere[ly] anticipat[ed]” he would receive the bonus,
and notes that Cyburt “recognized at the initial restitution hearing
that, ‘it’s very tough to quantify’ ” the profits he lost on the
cancelled real estate deal.
Proman does not dispute, however, that Cyburt received a
$90,000 year-end bonus in 2018, and Proman offered no evidence
at the restitution hearings challenging Cyburt’s testimony that
he reasonably expected an even larger bonus in 2019. Similarly,
Proman does not dispute that Cyburt stood to earn an $80,000
upfront commission in connection with the cancelled real estate
deal, nor did Proman present any evidence indicating that
Cyburt had overestimated the long-term profits he anticipated
the $8 million transaction would generate.
Moreover, we note that Cyburt was forced to estimate the
bonus and profits he might have earned only because Proman’s
conduct deprived him of those gains. (See People v. Harvest (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653 [“[a]s for defendant’s argument that the
[restitution] award was predicated on the speculative assumption
that [the victim’s] financial status would not change, all that need
be said is that this speculation was necessitated by defendant’s
murder of [the victim]”].)
Third, Proman argues the court erred in including a full year
of Cyburt’s salary in the restitution award because Cyburt “was
unemployed for only a couple of months prior to securing a higher
paying job.” But “ ‘[t]here is no requirement the restitution order
9
be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is
actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order
reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil
action. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 26–27; see also People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666
[no abuse of discretion notwithstanding trial court’s “methodological
imprecision” in calculating amount of restitution].) In addition,
the court explained it was awarding Cyburt a year’s salary
to compensate him not only for his two-month period of
unemployment, but for opportunities he lost even while he
remained employed. (Factual Summary and Procedural History
ante, p. 5 [“[b]ecause of the defamatory content about Mr. Cyburt
posted online by [Proman], Mr. Cyburt’s employer and business
associates did not utilize his services”].)
Fourth, and finally, Proman insists that the restitution
order improperly compensates Cyburt for noneconomic harm
to his professional reputation. Although Proman is correct that
a court generally may not order restitution to compensate a victim
for noneconomic loss (People v. Jennings (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
42, 57), we are not persuaded that the court did so here. In
explaining the rationale underlying its restitution order, the
court made clear that it considered harm to Cyburt’s reputation
only insofar as that harm resulted in economic loss to Cyburt in
the form of lost wages and profits. (See Factual Summary and
Procedural History ante, p. 5 [the restitution amount “includes
the loss of future earning and damage to [Cyburt’s] reputation,
which forced him to leave his job”]; ibid. [“Cyburt had every
expectation to receive th[e $90,000 bonus] amount had [Proman]
not damaged his business reputation”].)
10
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
WEINGART, J.
11
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