CourtListener 9509093•People v. McNeill CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 5/30/24 P. v. McNeill CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B328153
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A039828)
v.
JACK B. McNEILL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under the appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1992, the jury found Jack B. McNeill guilty of first
degree murder (Pen. Code1, § 187), burglary (§ 459), and robbery
(§ 211). The jury found true the special circumstances that
McNeill committed the murder while he was engaged in the
commission of a robbery and a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)
and (vii)), and the allegation that the victim was over the age of
60 years old. (§ 1203.09, subd. (f).) McNeill was 18 years old at
the time he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to life
without parole (LWOP).
In 2022, McNeill moved for a hearing to preserve evidence
for use at a future youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
section 1203.1. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261; In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.) The trial court denied the motion on
the ground that youth offender parole hearings are not available
for people, like McNeill, serving LWOP sentences for an offense
committed after the offender attained 18 years of age. (§ 3051,
subd. (h).)
On appeal, McNeill contends that excluding from youth
offender parole consideration defendants like himself, who were
between the ages of 18 and 26 years old at the time of the
offenses for which they were sentenced to LWOP, violates the
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTS2
“The decedent, Thelma Sterling, lived at 5239 Arbor Road
in Long Beach. In August 1986, when defendant, who was a
friend of her grandson, had problems at home, the decedent
allowed him to move into her home. Defendant moved out of the
decedent’s home in February 1987. On Friday, March 18, 1988,
the decedent went shopping with her friend Dorothy Condit
(Condit). The decedent bought toilet paper. Condit took the
decedent home and then went to her own residence.
“The following Monday, March 21, 1988, Condit went to the
decedent’s residence. Condit saw the toilet paper on the floor in
the shopping bag where she had seen it the preceding Friday.
Inside the residence, Condit saw the decedent on the bedroom
floor. The decedent’s head was covered with her pajamas which
had been pulled over her head. The pajamas were saturated with
a large amount of blood. The decedent had died from multiple
blunt force injuries to her head, back of her neck, chest, knees,
and hands. Her spine and ribs had been broken and there were
several bruises and cuts on her body.
“Condit also observed that the residence had been
ransacked. Drawers had been opened and items were dumped
onto the floor from the inside of the drawers. Condit knew that
the decedent kept money in a file cabinet in the house. On March
18, 1988, the last time they were together, the decedent had $680
in a file box in the file cabinet in her bedroom. The file cabinet
had been broken open. Other portions of the residence looked as
though they had been searched.
2 The facts are taken from the prior appellate opinion in
People v. McNeill (Jun. 15, 1992, B040728 [nonpub. opn.] ).
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“Defendant’s left thumb print was found on the inside
frame of a broken dining room window in the front of the house.
A portion of defendant’s palm print was found on the outside of
the northwest bedroom door frame, near where the body was
found. A pane near the locking thumb latch of the window on the
north side of the front porch had been broken. The thumb
portion had been bent but did not open because it had been
sealed shut with paint. A bathroom window at the rear of the
house had been opened and the screen left on the grass. The
wood frame of the window had indentations or pry marks in it.
The marks on both of the windows had been made in an effort to
gain entry into the house.
“Defendant was arrested in Arizona on April 1, 1988, where
he was interviewed by Detective Bill Robbins of the Yavapai
County Sheriff’s Office. During the trial, People’s exhibit 19, a
tape recording of two interviews . . . was played for the jury. In
the first interview, defendant stated that he knew that a murder
had been committed on the weekend he was in California; denied
involvement with any of the charged crimes; but admitted that he
had previously stolen $1,500 from the decedent approximately a
year before the homicide. Defendant claimed he had arranged
with his father to pay the money back to the decedent. When he
returned to Arizona after the homicide, he told some people that
he had gotten into trouble because he thought that he would be a
suspect because of the previous theft. He knew that the decedent
kept her money in a file cabinet in her bedroom.
“During the second interview, defendant admitted that he
committed the burglary, but denied he murdered the decedent.
Defendant stated that on the night in question, his friend, Chris
Manriquez (Manriquez) dropped him off at defendant’s mother’s
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house. Defendant decided that he would break into the
decedent’s house to take money. He knew that this was ‘an easy
way to get money’ because defendant had taken money from her
on another occasion. Defendant considered it safe to break into
the house and take the money out of the file cabinet in the
bedroom because the decedent was deaf. At about 3:00 a.m., he
tried to break into a window by the front door and when the latch
would not turn, he entered the house through the bathroom
window and went into the decedent’s bedroom to obtain the
money from the file cabinet. The decedent was asleep.
Defendant pulled the handle off of a drawer to the file cabinet
and took about $400 in cash. Defendant claimed that when he
left she was still sleeping. Defendant also stated that he had not
been drinking nor had he taken drugs on the night that he went
into the house.”
DISCUSSION
“California’s youth offender parole statute offers
opportunities for early release to certain persons who are
incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. (§§ 3051,
4801.) When it was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied
only to individuals who committed their crimes before the age of
18; the purpose of the statute was to align California law with
then-recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment
limitations on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.
In more recent years, however, the Legislature has expanded the
statute to include certain young adult offenders as well. Under
the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for a
crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole
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hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.
(§ 3051, subd. (b).) But not all youthful offenders are eligible for
parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others, offenders
who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility
of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. (Id., subd.
(h).)” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838–839
(Hardin).)
Due Process
McNeill first contends, as he did in the trial court, that
section 3051 violates federal and state constitutional guaranties
of equal protection by excluding from eligibility for youth offender
parole hearings persons serving LWOP sentences for crimes
committed when they were between 18 and 25 years of age. The
issue is one that had divided the Courts of Appeal, but after
briefing in this case was complete, the California Supreme Court
resolved the conflict by holding that section 3051 does not violate
equal protection. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839 [“Hardin
has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in
declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult
offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has
granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of
other offenses”].) Although the court left open the possibility of
“other challenges to the distinctions drawn by the special
circumstances statute based on a more robust record or a more
focused as-applied inquiry” (id. at p. 862), here McNeill has not
made an as-applied challenge based on the special circumstances
found true by the jury against him. Hardin is controlling, and
McNeill’s contention necessarily fails.
6
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
McNeill next contends that the amendments to section
3051 that provide youth offender parole hearings for persons
serving non-LWOP sentences who committed their controlling
offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 years old rendered his
LWOP sentence cruel and unusual punishment under article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution. We reject this
contention as well.
“A punishment may violate article I, section 17 of the
California Constitution if ‘it is so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.’ (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted [(Lynch)].) It requires that we
‘examine the circumstances of the offense’ and the defendant in
determining whether the ‘the penalty imposed is “grossly
disproportionate to the defendant’s culpability.” ’ [Citation.] We
assess three factors in making this determination: (1) the nature
of the offense and the offender, and the degree of danger posed to
society; (2) a comparison with sentences for more serious offenses
under California law; and (3) a comparison with sentences
imposed by other states for the same offense. (Lynch, at pp. 425–
427.)” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 191.)
Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of
the California Constitution under the legal principles set forth in
Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 through 427, “presents a
question of law subject to independent review; it is ‘not a
discretionary decision to which the appellate court must defer.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994, 1000.)
7
The reduction of a sentence based on the determination it is cruel
or unusual under the California Constitution “ ‘is a solemn power
to be exercised sparingly only when, as a matter of law, the
Constitution forbids what the sentencing law compels.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Furthermore, such a reduction “ ‘ “must be
viewed as representing an exception rather than a general
rule” ’ ” and “ ‘[i]n such cases the punishment is reduced because
the Constitution compels reduction, not because a trial court in
its discretion believes the punishment too severe.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
McNeill acknowledges that his sentence “may not meet the
three-part test set forth in In re Lynch, supra,” and does not
attempt to argue any of the factors set forth above. Instead, he
asserts that, because he was 18 years old at the time he
committed the offenses, he—like any other person under the age
of 26—was immature and less culpable than a person 26 years
old or older, regardless of the crimes he committed. McNeill
argues that his reduced culpability essentially renders the
circumstances of the crimes and the fact that he committed the
murder while committing a burglary and a robbery irrelevant.
This is simply incorrect. That McNeill committed the murder in
the course of committing two other felonies cannot be ignored—
article I, section 17 requires that we “ ‘examine the circumstances
of the offense’ and the defendant.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.)
In this case, McNeill broke into the home of an elderly
woman who had previously taken him in, and over-powered and
murdered her before stealing from her. McNeill inflicted multiple
blunt force injuries on the victim’s head, the back of her neck, her
chest, knees, and hands. He broke the victim’s spine and ribs.
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Even taking into account his diminished culpability as a 18 year
old, McNeill’s crimes are such that the sentence does not exceed
the constitutional limit.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying McNeill’s motion
for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1203.1.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting, P. J.
LEE, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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