People v. Pritchett

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Filed 5/8/24; Certified for Publication 5/28/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168411
v.
TARA SHAWNEE PRITCHETT, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR7557621)
Defendant and Appellant.

The People appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendant Tara
Shawnee Pritchett’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless
search of her room in September 2021. The detective conducting the search
believed she was on searchable probation.
In August 2018, Pritchett was placed on two years’ probation for a
misdemeanor offense, which was later extended another year. In May 2019,
she was placed on three years’ probation for another misdemeanor offense. -
However, effective January 1, 2021, Penal Code section 1203a was amended
by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, §§ 1,
2) (AB 1950) to limit the maximum term of probation a trial court is allowed
to impose for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.1 (§ 1203a, subd. (a).)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The People argue the trial court erred in concluding that as a result of
AB 1950, Pritchett’s probation terminated by operation of law after one year,
and thus terminated upon the effective date of AB 1950, several months
before the search. The People further contend the “good faith” exception to
the exclusionary rule applies because the detective leading the search made
objectively reasonable efforts to determine Pritchett was on searchable
probation. We agree with the latter contention and therefore reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the following facts from the evidence elicited at the hearing on
Pritchett’s motion to suppress.
In September 2021, Nick Vlahandreas, a narcotics detective for Santa
Rosa, conducted a search of Pritchett’s hotel room. Prior to the search,
Vlahandreas checked Crimnet, which is a database of information “straight”
from Sonoma County courts. “[T]here is no one at the police agency . . . that
enters [the information].” Crimnet lists a person’s “pending court cases, prior
arrests, probation status, things of that nature.” It also noted if someone’s
probation had been terminated. In this case, Crimnet showed that Pritchett
was on active probation with a condition that she “submit to warrantless
search and seizure of person, property, residence, vehicles.”
In conducting the probation search, Vlahandreas and the officers
accompanying him knocked on Pritchett’s door and detained her after she
answered. A search of her room located U.S. currency and what Vlahandreas
believed was fentanyl.
Pritchett was charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a
controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) She subsequently
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of her room. In her
motion, she argued that AB 1950 applied retroactively to her probation

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grants, and as a result they were terminated when AB 1950 became effective.
Therefore, she argued, the warrantless search of her room was unlawful, and
the evidence seized from the search must be suppressed. She acknowledged
that law enforcement was not “directly” at fault for Crimnet’s erroneous
information about her probation status but contended the evidence should be
excluded anyway since that information was the only basis for the search.
In opposition, the People argued the search was a lawful probation
search because AB 1950 did not “automatically” reduce the length of
Pritchett’s probation grants, and she did not petition the court to terminate
her probation. The People acknowledged that some courts have held that AB
1950 applied retroactively, but argued that no case held that AB 1950
“operate[d] automatically” without any judicial action. The People further
contended that even if AB 1950 terminated Pritchett’s probation,
Vlahandreas reasonably relied on court-maintained information, and thus
the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule applied.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress at which
Vlahandreas was the only witness. He testified that he had been a narcotics
detective for three years and that “[e]very single person that we investigate
we try and look them up in Crimnet.” He found Crimnet “reliable” and
“accurate” and could not recall “any incidents where it was incorrect that [he]
noted someone in Crimnet as searchable.” He relied on Crimnet in
conducting the search of Pritchett’s room. He said that Crimnet showed
Pritchett had been placed on probation in August 2018 and again in May
2019. When asked about AB 1950 and its potential effect on the length of
probation in misdemeanor cases, he said he was unaware of AB 1950.
After the matter was submitted, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress, concluding Pritchett’s probation grants automatically terminated

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when AB 1950 became effective on January 1, 2021, and the good faith
exception did not apply. The court thereafter dismissed the charge against
Pritchett.
II. DISCUSSION
The People argue the trial court erred in granting Pritchett’s motion to
suppress for two reasons. First, her probation grants were valid at the time
of the search because AB 1950 did not automatically terminate them.
Second, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case.
We find the latter contention dispositive and therefore do not reach the
People’s first argument.
A. Legal Standards
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. “When a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of a
warrantless search or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof
sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell
within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
[Citations.] A probation search is one of those exceptions.” (People v. Romeo
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.)
As noted, by May 2019, Pritchett had been placed on two three-year
probation terms for misdemeanor violations. Effective January 1, 2021, AB
1950 amended section 1203a to limit probation terms to a maximum of one
year for most misdemeanors. (§ 1203a, subds. (a), (b).) Several courts have
since held that AB 1950 applies retroactively to defendants who were serving
a term of probation when the amendment became effective. (See People v.
Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738, 743, review granted May 18, 2022, S273840
[collecting cases].) Assuming without deciding that AB 1950 automatically

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terminated Pritchett’s probation on its effective date because she had been on
probation for more than one year at that time, the subsequent probation
search of her hotel room was presumptively invalid.
Where a search is found to be invalid, “a Fourth Amendment violation
is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation
is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created
exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence
obtained during the unlawful search.” (People v. Downing (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650–1651 (Downing), citing United States v. Leon (1984)
468 U.S. 897, 906 (Leon).) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled “only where
it ‘ “result[s] in appreciable deterrence.” ’ ” (Herring v. United States (2009)
555 U.S. 135, 141 (Herring).) The Supreme Court has recognized that
“exclusion ‘has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,’ [citation]
and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application
of the exclusionary rule.” (Id. at p. 140.)
“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. . . . [T]he
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”
(Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 144.) “[W]hen police mistakes are the result of
negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’
[Citation.] In such a case, the criminal should not ‘go free because the
constable has blundered.” (Id. at pp. 147–148.)
The Supreme Court has clarified that, in applying the good faith
exception, “[t]he pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective,

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not an ‘inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers.’ ” (Herring,
supra, 555 U.S. at p. 145.) The “ ‘good-faith inquiry is confined to the
objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the
circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
We independently determine the legality of a challenged search or
seizure where the facts are undisputed. (People v. Holiman (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 825, 831; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205.) The
only facts relevant to the search of Pritchett’s room are those stated in
Vlahandreas’s testimony; no other evidence concerning the search was
introduced at the hearing on the suppression motion. The trial court’s
application of the law to those facts thus presents a purely legal question
subject to our de novo review. (See Downing, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p.
1650.)
B. Analysis
The People argue the trial court erred in concluding the good faith
exception was inapplicable, as Vlahandreas acted reasonably in relying on
court records to verify Pritchett’s probation status prior to conducting the
search. We agree.
The trial court based its ruling in part on Vlahandreas’s testimony that
he was unaware of AB 1950 and the absence of evidence of any training he
received, reasoning that “[b]eing a reasonably well-trained officer is a
prerequisite to applying the good faith exception.” The court further stated
that while it did not expect law enforcement to “understand or know the
intricacies or nuances of AB 1950,” it nonetheless expected a reasonably well-
trained officer to “at least have heard of a sweeping change to the law such as
AB 1950 which significantly affected probation lengths.” “The fact that

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[Vlahandreas] may have relied on a database containing information from
the court would likely have entitled him to the good faith exception had he
been reasonably well-trained.” The court appears to have misunderstood the
objective good faith test.
“The objectively ascertainable question is not whether [the officer] was
well-trained or experienced, but whether a reasonably well-trained officer in
his position would have known that” the search was illegal. (People v.
Maestas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1217; see also People v. Lange (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 1114, 1124 [rejecting the defendant’s assertion that he should
have had an opportunity to investigate the officer’s familiarity with the
applicable law]; Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 145.) The question thus is
whether Vlahandreas “may properly be charged with knowledge that the
search was unconstitutional” based on the information provided to him.2
(Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919; Herring, at p. 142.)

2 The cases the trial court relied on do not hold otherwise. (See People
v. Rosas (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 17, 25; United States v. Fencl (S.D. Cal., Jan.
5, 2023, No. 21-CR-3101 JLS) 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2231 (Fencl).) Fencl
involved a situation like this case. An officer conducted a probation search of
the defendant’s car several months after AB 1950 became effective. (Id. at
*1–2.) Prior to the search, the officer checked a law enforcement database
and called court officials. (Id. at *3.) He also received a bulletin from the
probation department regarding AB 1950 that directed law enforcement to
contact the probation office, which the officer did. (Id. at *3.) All sources
incorrectly informed him the defendant was still on searchable probation.
(Id. at *3.) The court found the officer had acted objectively reasonably. (Id.
at *18.) Of significance here, it rejected the defendant’s arguments that the
police department’s “ ‘barebones’ ” training—i.e., the bulletin—warranted
suppression and that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known to
consult sources other than the probation office. (Id. at *13-14.) The court
also pointed out that the bulletin “originated from the Probation Department,
not the police department.” (Id. at *14.) “The Probation Department’s failure

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On this record, we cannot conclude that Vlahandreas would or should
have known that the information on Crimnet regarding Pritchett’s probation
status was incorrect. Crimnet contains information directly from the judicial
system, including whether a person’s probation had terminated.
Vlahandreas found Crimnet accurate and could not recall an instance where
he had incorrectly noted someone in the system was on searchable probation.
He had been a detective for three years and used Crimnet extensively in his
investigations. He used it to check Pritchett’s probation status the morning
of the search, and it showed that her probation was still active and included a
condition that she submit to warrantless searches of her residence. The
record reveals no reason for Vlahandreas to believe Crimnet provided
erroneous information in this instance. Based on these facts, he was acting
objectively reasonably when he relied on Crimnet. (See Downing, supra, 33
Cal.App.4th at p. 1657 [reversing order granting motion to suppress where
officer relied on court-maintained data]; Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1,
15–16 [reversing judgment where there was “no indication that the arresting
officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon” incorrect
information provided by court clerk].)
Even presuming Vlahandreas should have been aware that AB 1950
made changes to the length of some probation terms, this does not change our
conclusion. Police officers are not legal experts. “[W]hat would be reasonable
for a well-trained officer is not necessarily the same as what would be
reasonable for a jurist.” (United States v. Workman (2017) 863 F.3d 1313,
1321; see Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 67–68 [officer’s error of
law was reasonable where statute was ambiguous].) Considering the

to identify the appropriate agency to contact for information . . . is not a
concern of the exclusionary rule.” (Ibid.)

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language of AB 1950 and the limited legal authority interpreting it, we do not
expect a reasonable officer to know that AB 1950 may have terminated
existing probation sentences automatically without a judicial determination.
Section 1203a, as amended by AB 1950, does not indicate this on its face. It
simply states that “[t]he court may . . . make and enforce the terms of
probation for a period not to exceed one year” (§ 1203a, subd. (a)), with a
limited exception (id., subd. (b)). Moreover, no court has decided this precise
issue, though one practice guide observed that “[s]everal cases support the
argument that absent a judicial determination terminating probation, the
defendant is still subject to ongoing probation terms.” (Bensinger,
Preliminary Hearing Handbook (The Rutter Group 2023) § 8:63, fn. 16; see,
e.g., People v. Fields (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 386, 390–391 [despite reversal of
defendant’s conviction, his consent to warrantless search as a probationer is
“operative until that status is terminated by its terms or through judicial
action”].) Given the complexity of the issue, Vlahandreas’s failure to
recognize Pritchett’s probation terms may have terminated without a court
order or to conduct his own legal analysis of her probation status prior to the
search does not undermine the conclusion that he acted reasonably based on
the information he had.
In urging affirmance, Pritchett points to the trial court’s conclusion
that had Vlahandreas been aware of AB 1950, he would “not have simply
relied upon CRIMNET.” But in checking Crimnet, Vlahandreas “went
beyond a ‘bare bones’ investigation of relying only on police department in-
house computer data.” (Downing, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1657.) “[I]t is
absurd to require a police officer to exhaust all avenues of investigation and
corroboration when he has no objective reason to question facially valid
computer data produced by other than the collective law enforcement in front

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of him.” (Ibid.) For the reasons discussed, we cannot conclude that AB 1950
alone would have put a reasonable officer on notice that the information in
Crimnet was inaccurate such that further investigation was required. (See
People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 606.) Though it appears that
several other agencies were in fact charged with implementing AB 1950,
“[t]he test is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known
that the search was illegal; not whether a reasonably well-trained officer
would have known which public agency was tasked with implementing a
statute.” (Fencl, supra, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2231, at *13.)
We acknowledge the concerns raised by the trial court that law
enforcement in this case was “completely unaware” of a change in law
affecting the legality of some probation searches. However, as Pritchett’s
counsel noted at the suppression hearing, AB 1950 has presented a unique
situation. Its “passage was an isolated event that affected numerous
probationers in the State of California, and its implementation required the
efforts of multiple public agencies, as well as interpretation by California
courts.” (Fencl, supra, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2231, at *14–15.) It had been
in effect for just over nine months at the time of the September 2021 search.
Further, no judicial action had been taken to terminate Pritchett’s probation.
Looking only at the objective facts—the historical accuracy of Crimnet and
the lack of any clear direction to law enforcement regarding the status of
Pritchett’s probation grants—compels the conclusion that Vlahandreas did
not act deliberately, recklessly, or grossly negligent in violating Pritchett’s
Fourth Amendment rights. (See Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 144.)
In sum, we conclude Vlahandreas acted in objectively reasonably good
faith, and applying the exclusionary rule in this case would not serve to

10
promote its purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. The trial court
therefore erred in granting the motion to suppress.
II. DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the criminal information against Pritchett is
reversed. The trial court is directed to set aside the order granting Pritchett’s
motion to suppress and to enter a new order denying the motion.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

People v. Pritchett; A168411

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Filed 5/28/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168411
v.
TARA SHAWNEE PRITCHETT, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR7557621)
Defendant and Appellant.
ORDER GRANTING
PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on May 8,
2024, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
After the court’s review of a request under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1120, and good cause established under rule 8.1105,
it is hereby ordered that the opinion should be published in the
Official Reports.

Dated:
_______________________________
Humes, Presiding Justice

1
Sonoma County Superior Court

Hon. Karlene Navarro

Carla C. Rodriguez, District Attorney, Anne C. Masterson,
Chief Deputy District Attorney, Sarah A. Brooks, Deputy District
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment for the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

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