CourtListener 9507672•People v. Moriwaki CA2/4
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Filed 5/28/24 P. v. Moriwaki CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B320915
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA174739)
v.
AURELIUS DAVID MORIWAKI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Aurelius David Moriwaki appeals from the trial
court’s summary denial of a request by the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that appellant be
resentenced under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1).1 The People agree that the matter should be remanded.
We agree, reverse the order denying relief, and remand for
proceedings consistent with the requirements of section 1172.1.
BACKGROUND
On February 16, 2000, the People filed an amended
information charging appellant with the September 1998 murder
of Chrissy Ann Mendivil (§ 187, subd. (a)). The information
further alleged that appellant personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury and
death to Mendivil (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)(3)).
On March 8, 2000, a jury found appellant guilty of second
degree murder and found the enhancement allegations true. The
trial court subsequently found that appellant was legally sane at
the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced appellant to 15
years to life for the murder and 25 years to life for the section
12022.53 enhancement. It imposed and stayed a sentence of 10
years for the section 12022.5 enhancement pursuant to section
654. A different panel of this court affirmed the judgment on
direct appeal. (People v. Moriwaki (May 30, 2001, B140771)
[nonpub. opn.].)
At some point, the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court
requesting that the trial court recall appellant’s sentence and
resentence him pursuant to former section 1170, subdivision
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
(d)(1).2 On February 8, 2021, the trial court issued a minute
order stating the following:
“Defendant is not present in court, and not represented by
counsel.
“The court has read the letter from the Office of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Office of the
Secretary, requesting the defendant’s sentence be recalled and
that he be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(d)(1).
“The court has reviewed the appellate decision and the
material attached to the Secretary’s letter.
“The court notes that within the last five years he has
sustained complaints involving weapons and violence for not
taking his medications.
“At trial, his expert witness testified that if he failed to
take his medication, he was psychotic.
“The court declines to recall his sentence and resentence
him.”
On June 13, 2022, appellant filed a motion in this court
seeking relief from default. We granted the motion and appellant
filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2022.
DISCUSSION
Shortly after the trial court summarily denied the CDCR’s
request for recall of appellant’s sentence and resentencing of
appellant, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed
Assembly Bill No. 1540 (AB 1540). (Stats. 2021, ch. 719.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the bill revised the provisions of
former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and moved them to a new
section, 1170.03. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.03 was
2 The letter is not in the appellate record; the clerk filed a
certificate stating that it could not be located.
3
renumbered as section 1172.1 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
Section 1172.1 now sets forth a number of procedural
requirements that must be followed when the CDCR or other
official listed in section 1172.1 files a request for recall and
resentencing.3 When the trial court receives a petition from a
listed official, it “shall provide notice to the defendant and set a
status conference within 30 days after the date that the court
received the request,” and the “order setting the conference shall
also appoint counsel to represent the defendant.” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(b)(1).) The parties may stipulate to resentencing without a
hearing, but “[r]esentencing shall not be denied, nor a stipulation
rejected, without a hearing where the parties have an
opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or
rejection.” (Id., subd. (a)(9).)
At the hearing, the court “shall consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and
record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances
have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
3 The requirements set forth in section 1172.1, subdivision
(b) apply only where a listed entity other than the court itself
files the motion. (See § 1172.1, subd. (b).) The requirements set
forth elsewhere in the statute apply even where the court recalls
and resentences the defendant on its own motion. (See generally
§ 1172.1.) “A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking
relief from the court under this section,” and “the court is not
required to respond” if the defendant “requests consideration for
relief under this section.” (Id., subd. (c).)
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incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. Evidence that
the defendant’s incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice
includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to
the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that
undermines the integrity of the underlying conviction or
sentence. The court shall consider if the defendant has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence, if the defendant was a victim of intimate partner
violence or human trafficking prior to or at the time of the
commission of the offense, or if the defendant is a youth or was a
youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the
time of the commission of the offense, and whether those
circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.” (Id., subd. (a)(5).) There is “a presumption favoring
recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be
overcome if a court finds the defendant currently poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court “shall state
on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall
and resentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(7).) If it grants the
petition, it “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd.
(a)(2).) After the trial court makes its ruling, it “shall advise the
defendant of their right to appeal and the necessary steps and
time for taking an appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
5
It is undisputed that the trial court did not adhere to
several of these requirements, which did not exist at the time of
its February 2021 ruling. The question here is whether appellant
is entitled to the benefit of these later-enacted procedural
protections.
Appellant contends the new provisions should apply to his
case because AB 1540 “clarified the resentencing procedures in
former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), which was in effect when
the lower court made its ruling.” He alternatively contends that
the new provisions are retroactive under In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740. Respondent disputes that the changes are
retroactive under Estrada but agrees that AB 1540 includes
“indicia of legislative intent to clarify the prior amendment.”
We agree. As persuasively set forth in People v. McMurray
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1041-1042 (McMurray), “the
Legislature repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill 1540 was
intended to ‘make clarifying changes’ to former section 1170(d)(1),
including specifying the required procedure and guidelines when
the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing.” When the
Legislature enacts legislation that construes or clarifies a prior
statute while a case involving the amendment is on appeal, “the
appropriate resolution is to reverse and remand the matter for
further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation.”
(Id. at p. 1039, citing Western Security Bank v. Superior Court
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 253.)
We agree with McMurray and other decisions that have
reversed and remanded on this basis without addressing the
Estrada question. (See People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1074, 1078-1079; People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075,
1089-1090.) We accordingly reverse the trial court’s order and
6
remand for further proceedings consistent with the current
version of section 1172.1. We express no opinion whether
appellant’s sentence should be recalled or, if it is recalled,
whether he should be resentenced and what that sentence should
be.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with section 1172.1.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
MORI, J.
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