L.G. v. S.M. CA2/4

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Filed 5/23/24 L.G. v. S.M. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

L.G., B326493

Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22VEPT00173)
v.

S.M.,
Appellant.

APPEAL from the order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marilyn M. Mordetzky, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
S.M., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
Appellant S.M. appeals from the domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) and custody order issued against him
at the request of respondent L.G. following an evidentiary
hearing. He contends substantial evidence did not support the
family court’s finding of abuse under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code, section 6200 et seq.,1 and
the family court erred in awarding physical and legal custody of
minor son to L.G. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
L.G. presented evidence of the following material facts at
the evidentiary hearing through witness testimony and her
declaration. S.M. and L.G. lived together with son2 between 2011
and 2014, and their relationship continued “on and off” until
2017. S.M. sometimes slapped and shoved L.G. When the
relationship ended, so did the physical violence, but S.M.’s verbal
and emotional abuse continued. When S.M. became angry, he
threatened to keep son away from L.G.
The parties’ dispute escalated during the summer of 2022,
when son was eleven years old. L.G. became concerned about
S.M.’s lack of consistency in seeing son and son’s report that S.M.
had asked son to move to Texas with him, with promises of his
own room, basketball, and “gadgets” if he did so. In late July,

1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references in this
opinion are to the Family Code.

2 L.G. stated in her declaration that she and S.M. are the parents
of son. However, in July 2022, she filed a petition to determine
parental relationship.

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L.G. filed requests for orders establishing paternity and for
support and custody.
Around the same time, L.G. informed S.M. that she was
seeking a custody order. S.M. became angry and told L.G. that if
she went to court, he would keep son away from her. The same
day, he went to L.G.’s home and repeated his intention to take
son and not give him back.
On August 16, 2022, S.M. picked up son from school, even
though son said he was waiting for his mother. S.M. did not tell
L.G. he would be picking up son and drove son away in a car he
did not own. Son had been speaking with L.G. on his cell phone,
but the call disconnected abruptly as son was describing his
location. For the next few hours, L.G.’s calls to son’s phone went
unanswered, and L.G. was unable to locate the phone using a
locator application. In the early evening, son called L.G. but said
he could not disclose his location or S.M. would turn his phone off
again. L.G. believed S.M. had kidnapped son.
L.G. went to S.M.’s home to retrieve son. L.G. saw S.M.
with son in a car she did not recognize. When S.M. stopped the
car and got out, L.G. leaned her head inside the open passenger-
side window and unsuccessfully attempted to unlock the door
from the inside so son could exit. S.M. drove away with son while
L.G.’s head was still inside the vehicle.
On September 2, 2022, S.M. texted L.G. while she was at
work, and she called him back. S.M. was angry that he had been
served with the family court filings. S.M. demanded that L.G.
dismiss the proceedings. S.M. said he was “going to go for the
kill,” that he was “going to take [L.G.’s] livelihood,” and this “is
not a threat, this is a promise.” The call left L.G. “panicking and
shaking,” and her work supervisor, who had listened to part of

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the conversation, described L.G. as “visibly very upset, crying.”
Fearing what S.M. might do to her and son, L.G. filed a police
report.
S.M. presented his case through his declaration and
testimony, in which he attested to the following facts. S.M. never
threatened L.G., and the relationship was not abusive. He never
“demonstrated any act of anger” with L.G. or son. S.M. initially
declared he “never threaten[ed] to take [his] son and move to
Texas,” but at the hearing, admitted he asked son, “If I move to
Texas, would you move with me?”
S.M. admitted he picked up son up from school on August
16. He deliberately did not notify L.G. he was doing so, even
though he knew custody was in dispute. S.M. did not turn off
son’s phone, and he contended a lack of cellular service caused
the missed calls. Once service resumed, S.M. told L.G. he would
be keeping son until the following Monday.
S.M. stated that when L.G. arrived at S.M.’s complex, she
“jump[ed] in the front passenger window” to unlock the door, and
when she could not, grabbed son’s arm and tried to pull him out.
S.M. contended he drove away after L.G. withdrew her head from
the window. S.M. took son to a police station and notified L.G. of
their location. When L.G. arrived, officers told her S.M. had done
nothing wrong, and S.M. departed with son.
S.M. said that on September 2, S.M. told L.G., “[G]oing [ ]to
court will affect our livelihood.” He did not threaten L.G., and he
asked respondent if she wanted to “work things out amongst
ourselves and co[-]parent” instead of “going to court, to avoid the
stress and time which in turn would not put us in a good place for
our livelihood.”

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B. Procedural Background
A week later, L.G. filed a request for a DVRO, alleging that
S.M.’s conduct and statements in the past three months
disturbed her peace. She requested the DVRO protect both her
and son. She requested legal and physical custody of son and
restrictions on S.M.’s visitation.
The family court conducted an evidentiary hearing, during
which it admitted the parties’ declarations into evidence and
heard testimony from S.M., L.G., and several witnesses called by
L.G. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued the DVRO
and custody order.
At the end of the hearing, the family court recited
provisions from section 6320 and the statutory definitions for
disturbing the peace of the other party. The court found that, in
July 2022, S.M. was on notice of custody and visitation issues.
There was no agreed-on custody or visitation schedule, and S.M.’s
parental relationship had not been established. S.M. did not
notify L.G. he was going to pick up son from school on August 16.
Because S.M. had no right to pick up son, the court found, S.M.’s
doing so “bec[ame] a question of control.”
The family court found it “hard to believe” that lack of
service rendered son’s phone unreachable for three hours. When
L.G. went to S.M.’s home, S.M. did not ask himself whether he
should stop the car, let son out, and deal with the dispute in
court. S.M.’s refusal to do so reflected his continuing to exert
control. Further, S.M. backed up the car when L.G. was trying to
extract son.
S.M.’s exertion of control continued in the parties’ early
September conversation, when S.M. told L.G. that, if she
continued with the court proceedings, “‘I promise to take your

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livelihood.’” The court found that the totality of the
circumstances established that S.M. disturbed L.G.’s peace.
The DVRO listed L.G. and son as protected people, and
included no-abuse, no-contact, and stay-away orders. The court
declined to order S.M. to a batterer intervention program. Legal
and physical custody of son were awarded to L.G. S.M. would
have unmonitored day visits, with pick-ups and drop-offs at a
police station. S.M. did not object to this arrangement when it
was announced at the hearing. S.M. was forbidden from
travelling with son outside of Los Angeles County.

DISCUSSION
S.M. contends the family court erred in issuing the DVRO
because of a “lack of substantial evidence supporting claims of
abusive behavior or a credible threat,” and he challenges the
award of custody of son to L.G.3

A. Legal Standards
“Under the DVPA, the trial court may issue an order ‘to
restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of
domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the
persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.’” (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782,
quoting Fam. Code § 6300.) “[A]buse” within the meaning of the
DVPA “is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or
assault” (§ 6203, subd. (b)), and the definition includes, “To

3 S.M. also challenges a purported order directing him to
participate in a batterer’s program. However, the DVRO included no
such order, so we do not address this claim of error.

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engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).)
Behavior that may be enjoined pursuant to section 6320
includes threatening, harassing, and “disturbing the peace of the
other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) “[D]isturbing the peace of the
other party’ refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party . . . by any method or through any means.” (§ 6320,
subd. (c).) Examples of peace-disturbing conduct include
“coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose
or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
personal liberty.” (Ibid.) Examples include “[c]ompelling the
other party by . . . intimidation . . . to abstain from conduct in
which the other party has a right to engage.” (Ibid.)
“The DVPA vests the court with discretion to issue a
restraining order ‘simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past
abuse.’ [Citation.] The burden of proof is by a preponderance of
the evidence. [Citations.] The DVPA ‘confer[s] a discretion
designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a
trial court’s discretion to restrain civil harassment generally.’”
(Curcio v. Pels (2020), 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).)
“We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for abuse
of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the
court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence
standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we
examine the entire record to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support
the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every
conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not

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determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If
substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not
warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary
finding.” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 11.)

B. S.M. Forfeited His Challenge to the Sufficiency of the
Evidence Supporting the DVRO
“‘“‘A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that
point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is
insufficient. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hen an appellant urges
the insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings it is his
duty to set forth a fair and adequate statement of the evidence
which is claimed to be insufficient. He cannot shift this burden
onto respondent, nor is a reviewing court required to undertake
an independent examination of the record when appellant has
shirked his responsibility in this respect.’” [Citation.]’” (Ashby v.
Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 512 (Ashby), quoting In re
Marriage of Marshall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 477, 487, italics in
original.) Thus, when the party against whom a DVRO was
issued “significantly downplay[s] the seriousness of his actions
and recit[es] only favorable evidence,” the reviewing court may
find that party “forfeited his sufficiency of the evidence claim.”
(Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.)
S.M. has not summarized the evidence, favorable and
unfavorable, that the family court considered when deciding the
DVRO. In his opening brief, S.M provides a short “Statement of
Fact” without any citations to the record.4 He discusses his role

4 “It is incumbent upon the parties to an appeal to cite the
particular portion of the record supporting each assertion made. It

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as a father and asserts L.G. does not want to co-parent and body
shames son. He makes only a brief reference to the August 16
incident, placing blame on L.G. He does not discuss the family
court’s findings that S.M.’s communications and actions in July,
August, and September disturbed L.G.’s peace. The balance of
S.M.’s brief consists largely of his denying he perpetrated or
threatened physical abuse, and he downplays the gravity and
effect of his verbal threats and conduct.
Because S.M. provides only a favorable version of events,
does not cite to any evidence in the record, and downplays his
actions, he has forfeited his sufficiency of the evidence claim.
(Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.)

C. The DVRO Was Supported by Substantial Evidence
Even if S.M. had not forfeited his claim of error, we would
affirm the DVRO. Substantial evidence supported the family
court’s findings that S.M. used threats and emotional abuse in an
attempt to dissuade L.G. from pursuing relief in court, thereby
disturbing her peace.
S.M. threatened L.G. with the loss of her child if she did
not dismiss the court proceedings. A few weeks later, he made
good on that threat by physically removing son from his school
without notifying L.G., driving son away in an unfamiliar car,
obscuring son’s whereabouts for hours, and causing L.G. to fear
her son had been kidnapped. Once L.G. located son, S.M. still
refused to return him, even going so far as to drive away while
L.G. was trying to free son from S.M.’s vehicle.

should be apparent that a reviewing court has no duty to search
through the record to find evidence in support of a party’s position.”
(Williams v. Williams (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 560, 565.)

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Afterwards, S.M. expressed no remorse, but instead,
augmented his threat with a promise to take L.G.’s livelihood
unless she dismissed the court proceedings. That threat left L.G.
panicking and upset. We conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by issuing the DVRO.

D. S.M. Has Forfeited His Claim of Error Arising from
the Custody Order
The family court awarded sole legal and physical custody of
son to L.G. S.M. challenges this order, contending that shared
custody serves son’s best interests.
When deciding a petition for a DVRO, “the court has broad
discretion also to ‘make an order for the custody of a child . . .
that seems necessary or proper.’” (Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 655, 661 (Celia S.), quoting § 3022.) “The guiding
principle for the court in making any custody or visitation order
is that the order must be in the child’s best interest.” (Id. at
p. 661, citing §§ 3011, 3020, 3040.)
“[S]ection 3044 establishes a rebuttable presumption that
awarding physical or legal custody to a parent who has
committed domestic violence is detrimental to a child’s best
interest.” (Celia S., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 661.)
Subdivision (a) of section 3044 provides, in pertinent part: “Upon
a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years
against the other party seeking custody of the child . . . , there is
a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical
or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated
domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the
child . . . . This presumption may only be rebutted by a

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preponderance of the evidence.” “‘This presumption is mandatory
and the trial court has no discretion in deciding whether to apply
it: “[T]he court must apply the presumption in any situation in
which a finding of domestic violence has been made.”’” (City and
County of San Francisco v. H.H. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 541,
citation omitted, italics in original.)
The section 3044 presumption “changes the burden of
persuasion, but ‘may be overcome by a preponderance of the
evidence showing that it is in the child’s best interest to grant
joint or sole custody to the offending parent.’” (Christina L. v.
Chauncey B. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 731, 736, quoting Keith R. v.
Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1055; § 3044,
subd. (a).) Thus, it was S.M.’s burden below to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that joint custody was in son’s
best interest. Whether a party has overcome a rebuttable
presumption is “a question for the trier of fact, whose decision
will not be reversed on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence.” (Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 788.)
The family court acknowledged that issuing the DVRO
would trigger the section 3044 presumption, and S.M. would have
to overcome it to obtain custody of son. Because S.M. requested
custody, we may infer from the award of sole custody to L.G. that
the court concluded that S.M. failed to carry his burden of
overcoming the section 3044 presumption.5
In contesting the trial court’s custody order, S.M. has failed
to adequately brief his claim of error and provide citations to the

5 A written or on-the-record statement of reasons is required “[i]f
the court determines that the presumption in subdivision (a) has been
overcome . . . .” (§ 3044, subd. (f)(2).) The statute does not require
such a statement when the presumption has not been overcome.

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record. “‘The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to
authority allows [a reviewing] court to treat the contentions [of
error] as’ forfeited.” (In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 244, 255, citation omitted.) Further, forfeiture may
be found when the appellant “fail[s] to support the factual
assertions in its legal argument with citations to the
evidence . . . .” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 895; see id. at p. 894 [“Rather
than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant
has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by
accurate citations to the record.”].)
Other than acknowledging the section 3044 presumption
exists, S.M. has not cited to any evidence in the record he
contends satisfied his burden of establishing that shared custody
was in son’s best interest. S.M. also fails to make any cogent
legal argument concerning why the family court erred in
awarding legal and physical custody of son to L.G., and the only
“precedent” he offers is an incomplete citation to “Johnson v.
Smith (Citation).”6 We conclude appellant has forfeited his claim
that sole custody was granted to L.G. in error.7

6 Later in the brief, S.M. cites to “the judicial pronouncement of
Doe v. Roe (Citation) . . . .”

7 Had S.M. not forfeited his claim of error, we would have
affirmed the custody order in any event, as S.M. has not cited to
evidence in the record to satisfy his burden of overcoming the section
3044 presumption.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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