CourtListener 9506424•People v. Rodas CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 5/22/24 P. v. Rodas CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B326555
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA360125)
v.
DOMINGO RODAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Aurora Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Nicholas
Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted defendant Domingo Rodas of one count of
first degree murder and two counts of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder. On appeal, Rodas contends his
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce
evidence of his mental health history. Rodas also argues the trial
court erroneously admitted testimonial hearsay relating to the
murder victim’s autopsy. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One afternoon in August 2009, Ashli Hughes was hanging
posters outside the Music Box Theater, where she worked.
Around 1:30 p.m., Hughes saw Rodas “lurking” outside the
theater. She also saw a homeless man she knew as Keith, later
identified as Keith Falin, sleeping on the ground nearby. Hughes
went inside for five or 10 minutes. Footage from a nearby
security camera showed that while Hughes was inside, Rodas
approached Falin, kneeled down, and reached his arm toward
Falin. When Hughes returned, she saw a commotion, blood on
the ground, and fire department employees assessing Falin.
Falin had been stabbed in the chest. He later died from his
injuries.
Later that afternoon, Kenneth McFetridge was taking a
nap against a wall about half a mile from the Music Box Theater.
When he awoke, he felt severe pain in his chest and had difficulty
breathing. His friend asked someone to call an ambulance.
Paramedics discovered a puncture wound in McFetridge’s chest.
2
Around 4:45 p.m., about a quarter mile from where
McFetridge had been napping, Ronald Vaughan was walking
from his storage unit to a bus stop. A man came up behind
Vaughan as he was walking. The man abruptly turned and
lunged at Vaughan’s chest, then walked away. Vaughan initially
thought the man had punched him, but then he noticed blood and
realized he had been stabbed.
Around 4:50 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Michael Kim
responded to a call about a “man down” near the Music Box
Theater. After he arrived, Kim received a description of the
suspect. Kim and his partner searched the area and soon spotted
a man, Rodas, matching the suspect’s description. They
conducted an investigative stop and found a knife in a makeshift
cardboard sheath in Rodas’s sleeve.
Falin’s DNA was found on the sheath and handle of the
knife. McFetridge’s DNA was found on the shirt Rodas was
wearing when he was arrested. Police officers later showed
Vaughan a six-pack photo lineup, and Vaughan identified Rodas
as “closest” to the man who stabbed him.
2014 trial and subsequent appeal
In February 2012, a trial court found Rodas incompetent to
stand trial based on two psychiatric assessments. (People v.
Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 224 (Rodas).) He was admitted to
Patton State Hospital for treatment in April 2012. (Id. at p. 225.)
Rodas was transferred to Atascadero State Hospital in February
2013, and in May, the hospital’s medical director certified Rodas
as mentally competent. (Id. at pp. 225–226.) The same month,
the trial court ruled Rodas was competent to stand trial. (Id. at
p. 226.)
3
In March 2014, after jury selection and before opening
statements, defense counsel informed the court she had
developed a doubt as to Rodas’s competence to stand trial.
(Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 227.) The court addressed Rodas
directly and, after a brief colloquy, determined he understood the
charges and was willing to help counsel. (Id. at p. 229.) The trial
proceeded. Rodas was convicted of both attempted murders and
of murdering Falin.1 (Id. at p. 230.)
Rodas appealed, arguing the trial court should have
suspended proceedings when defense counsel raised a doubt
about his competence. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 230.) The
Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding counsel’s doubts “ ‘did not
necessarily constitute substantial evidence of defendant’s
incompetence.’ ” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court reversed. The court’s opinion
described Rodas’s extensive mental health history. In 1974,
when he was 19 and serving in the U.S. Army, Rodas was
hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 224.) He was later medically discharged from the Army
based on a psychiatric disability. (Ibid.) Rodas was declared
incompetent to stand trial in 1984 and 1986. (Ibid.) He regained
competency and was convicted of burglary. (Ibid.) In 1988, at
the end of his prison sentence for burglary, Rodas was confined at
the Atascadero and Patton State Hospitals under a mental health
conservatorship, where he was diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder with substance abuse.
(Ibid.)
1 Rodas was also charged with and acquitted of two other
murders. (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 230.)
4
As noted above, Rodas was assessed again in 2011 and
2012, declared incompetent in 2012, and restored to competency
in 2013. However, the clinical report supporting the certificate of
mental competency cautioned that Rodas should remain on his
psychiatric medication regimen to maintain competency. (Rodas,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 226.) In March 2014, when defense counsel
expressed doubt about Rodas’s competency, Rodas told the court
he was no longer taking his medication. (Id. at p. 229.) In the
context of this history, and the specific observations of Rodas’s
counsel suggesting his condition had deteriorated, our Supreme
Court determined there was substantial evidence of mental
incompetence. The court concluded the trial court should have
suspended proceedings and conducted a new formal competency
inquiry. (Id. at p. 232.)
The 2022 trial
On remand, Rodas was retried for murdering Falin and
attempting to murder McFetridge and Vaughan.
Deputy medical examiner Dr. Lisa Scheinin had conducted
Falin’s autopsy, but she retired before Rodas’s second trial.
Deputy medical examiner Dr. Vadims Poukens testified at the
second trial regarding Falin’s cause of death based on his review
of the autopsy report. Defense counsel initially objected to Dr.
Poukens’s testimony to the extent it relied on hearsay, such as
notes, in the autopsy report. However, the prosecutor explained
the autopsy report was kept during the regular course of
business, and defense counsel stated, “based on that
representation I think that’s fine.” The court permitted Dr.
Poukens to testify, and defense counsel stated she would object as
needed.
5
The People introduced one diagram from Falin’s autopsy
report with handwritten notations describing a stab wound to his
chest, aorta, and lung, and seven photographs showing the
injury. Dr. Poukens testified that, based on his analysis of the
photographs, Falin had been stabbed once in the aorta and left
lung. He opined Falin was killed by the stab wound, and that it
was a homicide. Dr. Poukens testified that Dr. Scheinin
estimated the wound was between five and seven inches deep.
He also testified that the autopsy report indicated Dr. Scheinin
searched for other potential causes of death. According to Dr.
Poukens, the autopsy report reflected that Falin was “probably a
smoker” and his liver was “slightly enlarged and fatty,” but Dr.
Poukens opined these factors did not contribute to Falin’s death.
After the People rested, defense counsel informed the court,
outside the presence of the jury, that Rodas planned to testify,
against her recommendation. The court questioned Rodas, who
confirmed he wished to testify. Defense counsel also stated that
she recommended introducing a 44-page packet of mental health
records covering a date range of 1986 to 1988, in lieu of “live
mental health psychiatric testimony.” Counsel explained: “I
thought it would be relevant to have it admitted, and it is my
client’s desire not for me to. It is my client’s desire that it not be
admitted, and I respect that choice.” The following colloquy then
occurred:
The Court: All right. Is that correct, sir, that
you do not want your mental health records to
come before the jury?
[Rodas]: Yes. Yes, your honor.
The Court: So with that understanding or with
that request, you realize that your decision not
to have them admitted you can’t later say, well,
6
there was something in my mental health
records that could have helped me -- in the
event that you’re convicted -- that could have
helped me, but they weren’t presented because
you’re the one that’s saying don’t present them.
You understand what I’m saying?
[Rodas]: Yes, your honor.
The Court: So you can’t say the failure to
present them, your lawyer’s failure to present
them was her fault or an error in the case.
Understood?
[Rodas]: Yes, your honor.
On direct examination, defense counsel asked Rodas if he
recalled any incidents in August 2009, if he had ever been
hospitalized for any mental illness, and if he had ever taken any
medications to help with any mental illness. To each inquiry,
Rodas responded: “No comment.” The People did not cross-
examine Rodas.
The jury convicted Rodas as charged. The trial court
imposed a state prison sentence of 39 years to life, plus nine
years. Rodas timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Rodas Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
Rodas argues his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to introduce evidence of his mental health
history. He contends this evidence could have cast doubt on
whether he formed the requisite mental state for the charged
crimes. We conclude Rodas has not established that his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient or that it prejudiced the
defense.
7
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee
the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions.
The “proper standard for attorney performance is that of
reasonably effective assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Pope (1979) 23
Cal.3d 412, 424 [attorney must provide “reasonably competent
assistance”].) An ineffective assistance claim “has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” (Strickland, at p. 687.)
“Where the record contains no explanation for the
challenged representation, we will reject an ineffective assistance
claim unless counsel was asked to explain his performance and
failed to provide an explanation, or unless there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. King (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299 (King); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43
Cal.3d 171, 218 (Ledesma).) “ ‘ “In order to prevail on [an
ineffective assistance of counsel] claim on direct appeal, the
record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403
(Majors).)
8
“We review the legal question of whether defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated de novo.” (People v. Palmer
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280.)
In People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991 (Lang), abrogated on
other grounds by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, the
California Supreme Court held defense counsel’s failure to offer
mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial, in
accordance with the defendant’s wishes, was not deficient
performance and could not form the basis of an ineffective
assistance claim. Defense counsel had planned to call the
defendant’s grandmother as a witness during the penalty phase
of the capital case, but did not do so at the defendant’s request.
(Lang, at p. 1029.)
On appeal, the defendant argued that in agreeing to his
wishes, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that requiring defense
counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant’s
objection “would be inconsistent with an attorney’s paramount
duty of loyalty to the client and would undermine the trust,
essential for effective representation, existing between attorney
and client.” (Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1031.) The court
further explained that “[w]hile selection of defense witnesses is
generally a matter of trial tactics over which the attorney, rather
than the client, has ultimate control [citation], it does not
necessarily follow that an attorney acts incompetently in
honoring a client’s request not to present certain evidence for
nontactical reasons. . . . Given the attorney’s ethical duty of
loyalty to the client, it is ‘not outside the range of competent
attorney actions to fail to present mitigating evidence when the
9
defendant adamantly endorses that position.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.;
accord, People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 112–113.)
The court alternatively concluded that even if defense
counsel acted improperly, the invited error doctrine “estop[ped] a
defendant from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based
on counsel’s acts or omissions in conformance with the
defendant’s own request[s].” (Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1032.)
Similarly, in Majors, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 409, the court
applied the Lang analysis in rejecting the defendant’s argument
that defense counsel was ineffective for deferring to the
defendant’s request during the guilt phase of the trial that
counsel not request a jury instruction on a lesser related offense.
Considering the reasoning of Lang, we disagree that the
record indicates there could be no satisfactory explanation for
counsel’s failure to introduce into evidence the packet of mental
health related records, over Rodas’s objection. Defense counsel
did not state that she was merely deferring to Rodas’s wishes.
She said only that she “respect[ed]” Rodas’s choice to not present
the packet of records. While counsel indicated she believed the
documents were relevant, the record before us does not establish
how significant they would have been since they did not appear to
directly speak to Rodas’s mental health in 2009. As in People v.
Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 853, “defense counsel was aware of
defendant’s reluctance to call into question his own mental
stability, and could have concluded that [she] would have
difficulty securing defendant’s cooperation” if she proceeded with
offering the documents as evidence. The record further does not
indicate why the defense did not introduce other evidence
relevant to Rodas’s mental state in 2009. We cannot discern from
the record what other evidence was available, what the nature of
10
that evidence may have been, or whether counsel’s decision not to
introduce such evidence was erroneous.
We find the Lang court’s reasoning applicable here that,
given counsel’s ethical duty of loyalty to her client, and in light of
the absence of a record establishing the probative value of the
packet of documents, we cannot determine that it was outside the
range of competent attorney actions to fail to present the
evidence over Rodas’s objection, even if it was for a nontactical
reason. Further, as in Lang, Rodas expressly informed the court
that he was directing his attorney not to present the documents.
He is therefore estopped from now claiming ineffective assistance
on that ground.
On appeal, Rodas contends Lang is inapplicable because
the court’s analysis is limited to mitigation evidence in the
penalty phase of capital cases and the discussion of the invited
error doctrine is dicta this court should reject. (Cf. People v.
Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 311–312 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)
[suggesting Lang may be in tension with discussion in McCoy v.
Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S. 414, regarding the division of roles
between counsel and defendant].) However, even if Rodas’s trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and the invited error
doctrine does not apply, Rodas’s ineffective assistance claim still
fails because he has not established prejudice.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must
demonstrate that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.) “[P]rejudice must be
affirmatively proved. [Citations.] ‘It is not enough for the
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on
the outcome of the proceeding . . . . The defendant must show
11
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ [Citations.]” (Ledesma,
supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217–218.)
Rodas has not met this threshold. The only specific
evidence the record shows Rodas’s counsel withheld was “a 44-
page packet entitled mental health records . . . ranging in time
from 1986 to 1988.” Yet, this packet is not included in the
appellate record, and Rodas has not presented any evidence as to
what facts were reflected in it. Even if we assume the packet
described Rodas’s mental health diagnoses and history through
1988 (Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 230), Rodas fails to explain
how the packet of records, if admitted, would have conceivably
affected the outcome of the proceeding. The record suggests the
information contained in the materials ended in 1988, two
decades before Rodas was alleged to have committed the acts at
issue in this case. During those two decades, it appears Rodas
received some mental health treatment, and there is no
indication in the record that the packet included information
about the status of Rodas’s mental health in August 2009. Rodas
has not carried “his burden of proving prejudice as a
‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of
the errors or omissions of counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44
Cal.3d 883, 937.)
II. Rodas Has Not Established Reversible Error Based
on Violation of His Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Right
Rodas also contends the trial court erred in admitting
hearsay in certain autopsy materials and Dr. Poukens’s
12
testimony based on those materials. He argues this evidence
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right because the
autopsy report included Dr. Scheinin’s hearsay statements. We
disagree.2
“[A] hearsay statement is one in which a person makes a
factual assertion out of court and the proponent seeks to rely on
the statement to prove that assertion is true. Hearsay is
generally inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.”
(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674 (Sanchez).)
Separately, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused “the
‘right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him’ . . . .”
(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 54 (Crawford).)
“In light of our hearsay rules and Crawford, a court
addressing the admissibility of out-of-court statements must
engage in a two-step analysis. The first step is a traditional
hearsay inquiry: Is the statement one made out of court; is it
offered to prove the truth of the facts it asserts; and does it fall
under a hearsay exception?” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 680.) If the statement is hearsay, the second step examines
2 The People argue Rodas forfeited any such claim because
his counsel failed to expressly make a confrontation clause
objection at trial. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730.)
However, before the challenged testimony was offered, Rodas’s
counsel objected on hearsay grounds because Dr. Poukens did not
create the diagram or compile the notes in the autopsy report.
Rodas’s “challenge on appeal is merely a constitutional ‘gloss’
upon an objection raised below, and therefore is not forfeited.”
(People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1322, fn. 9.) To the
extent Rodas arguably forfeited the hearsay arguments he raises
on appeal by failing to object further during the testimony, we
exercise our discretion to consider the arguments.
13
whether it “is testimonial hearsay, as the high court defines that
term.” (Ibid.) Testimonial hearsay has “two critical components.
First, to be testimonial the statement must be made with some
degree of formality or solemnity. Second, the statement is
testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion
to a criminal prosecution.” (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th
608, 619.)
The introduction of testimonial hearsay violates a
defendant’s confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment
except under certain conditions that do not exist here. (People v.
Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 505 (Garton).)3 “Violation of the
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right requires reversal of the
judgment against a criminal defendant unless the prosecution
can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was
harmless.” (People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 661,
citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)
We begin by assessing whether the evidence Rodas
challenges constituted hearsay. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 680.) The challenged evidence is: (1) photographs from the
autopsy report depicting Falin’s injuries; (2) a diagram from the
autopsy report including Dr. Scheinin’s handwritten notes;
(3) Dr. Poukens’s testimony based on the autopsy report; and
3 Crawford “bars the introduction of testimonial out-of-court
statements offered for their truth unless (1) there is a showing
that the declarant is unavailable and either (2) the defendant had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant or (3) the
defendant has forfeited his right to object through his own
wrongdoing.” (Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 505.) The People
made no showing below, and do not argue on appeal, that Dr.
Scheinin was unavailable for the second trial.
14
(4) Dr. Poukens’s testimony conveying Dr. Scheinin’s out-of-court
statements from the autopsy report.
“ ‘It is clear that the admission of autopsy photographs . . .
does not violate the confrontation clause. Hearsay is defined as
an out-of-court “statement.” (Evid. Code, § 1200.) A statement is
defined for this purpose as an “oral or written verbal expression
or . . . nonverbal conduct of a person” intended as a substitute for
oral or written expression. (Evid. Code, § 225, italics added.)
Only people can make hearsay statements; machines cannot.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 506.) The
seven photographs from the autopsy report introduced at trial
were not hearsay.4
Dr. Poukens’s testimony relating his own opinions based on
his review of the autopsy report was also not hearsay. We agree
with the People that Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th 485, is on all fours
with this case, and Rodas fails to distinguish it in his briefing. In
Garton, as here, the coroner who conducted an autopsy retired
before trial. (Id. at p. 504.) The coroner’s successor testified and
provided opinions as to the cause of death based on the autopsy
report. (Ibid.) On appeal, our Supreme Court held that a
testifying coroner may rely on an autopsy report prepared by
another person so long as the coroner does not relate as true any
specific out-of-court statements. (Id. at p. 506.) The Garton court
concluded it was clear that the testifying coroner “was exercising
her own independent judgment to arrive at her conclusions.” (Id.
4 Rodas also argues the People did not establish an adequate
foundation for the photographs. However, his counsel failed to
object to the photographs on this basis at trial, and thereby
forfeited the issue on appeal. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th
731, 756; Evid. Code, § 353.)
15
at p. 507.) Likewise, here, Dr. Poukens permissibly relied on Dr.
Scheinin’s autopsy report, and properly formed his own
independent conclusions based on the report. As in Garton, these
statements were not hearsay. (Ibid.)
The remaining two pieces of challenged evidence contained
hearsay. The diagram from the autopsy report showed the
outline of a body and included handwritten notes stating: “2 –
LUNG [¶] 1 – TO AORTA [¶] LT-RT, FRT TO BACK, DOWN. [¶]
5” DEEP TO 7” [¶] 1 ENTRY [¶] 2 WOUNDS TO LT LUNG [¶]
TOP WOUND 3”-4” [¶] LOWER 5”-7” TWRS AORTA.” The
handwritten statements were made out of court and the People
have not identified any nonhearsay purpose for the statements.
Similarly, Dr. Poukens’s testimony about Dr. Scheinin’s estimate
of the wound depth and her examination of the body also related
hearsay statements. (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674.)
Yet, even assuming these statements were testimonial
hearsay, any error in admitting them was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Garton again provides useful guidance. There,
the testifying coroner conveyed several out-of-court statements
from the autopsy report regarding the state of the victim’s body
and the manner of death. (Garton, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 507.)
Our Supreme Court concluded that even if these out-of-court
statements were testimonial, reversal was not required. (Ibid.)
The court reasoned that the hearsay comprised a “relatively
small portion” of the coroner’s testimony, amounting to “only five
or six statements out of testimony spanning 30 transcript pages
. . . .” (Ibid.) Moreover, the hearsay was duplicative of other
evidence independently establishing how the victim was killed,
and the defense’s closing argument conceded there was no
16
dispute as to the cause of death. (Ibid.) Any error was therefore
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Likewise, here, just two of Dr. Poukens’s statements in 18
pages of testimony conveyed out-of-court statements. Only one of
the eight exhibits introduced from the autopsy report included
hearsay. Moreover, other evidence overwhelmingly established
Falin’s death was caused by a stab wound. The autopsy
photographs showed stab wounds to Falin’s chest, aorta, and
lung. Dr. Poukens testified, based on his independent
assessment of the evidence, that the cause of death was a stab
wound to the chest. He further testified Falin’s smoking and
fatty liver were not contributing factors, and that he could not
identify any other contributing factor from the autopsy file.
As in Garton, Falin’s cause of death was not disputed. In
closing argument, Rodas’s trial counsel conceded someone killed
Falin willfully and that he was stabbed. The central issue for
Rodas’s defense was not the cause of death, but whether Rodas
was the perpetrator and whether Falin was killed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation, as required for first degree
murder. Under these circumstances, hearsay statements about
the depth of the wound and whether other factors may have
contributed to Falin’s death did not “have high value in the
overall evidentiary calculus.” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th
463, 493.) Thus, even if the trial court erred in admitting this
evidence, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)5
5 For the first time in his reply brief, Rodas argues he was
prejudiced because without evidence of the depth of the wound,
one or more jurors may have questioned his “intentions.” “We do
17
Finally, Rodas argues his counsel’s failure to object during
Dr. Poukens’s testimony constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.6 We must reject this claim, as there is no evidence
explaining counsel’s rationale. (King, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1299.) Indeed, “ ‘[w]hether to object to inadmissible evidence is
a tactical decision; because trial counsel’s tactical decisions are
accorded substantial deference [citations], failure to object seldom
establishes counsel’s incompetence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Riel
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185.) “In any event where, as here and
as is typical, the appellate record has not provided counsel the
opportunity to offer an explanation for his or her tactical choice,
we affirm without prejudice to the defendant’s right to litigate his
claim in collateral proceedings in which counsel has the
opportunity to offer an explanation for his or her tactical choice.”
(People v. Arredondo (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 493, 502.)
not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”
(Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 607, 636, fn. 8.) In any case, we would reject this
argument, because other evidence, such as the fact that the knife
penetrated so deeply as to reach Falin’s lung and aorta, was
equally probative of the perpetrator’s “intentions.”
6 Rodas’s trial counsel objected just once during Dr.
Poukens’s testimony, on the basis that he had no personal
knowledge of the Los Angeles County coroner’s office’s practice of
sending a different coroner to testify when the examining coroner
has retired before trial. That practice is not at issue on appeal.
18
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
19
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