People v. Uriostegui CA5

CourtListener 9505375Calctapp20 de mai. de 2024

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 5/20/24 P. v. Uriostegui CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086305
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRM005365A)
v.

DANIEL URIOSTEGUI, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. John D.
Kirihara. (Retired Judge of the Merced County Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
The Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, appellant and defendant Daniel Uriostegui (defendant) was convicted of
premeditated attempted murder and sentenced to the second strike term of 30 years to
life. In 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition and
found he failed to make a prima facie case for resentencing.
On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts and
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.
Defendant submitted a supplemental brief. We address his contentions and affirm the
trial court’s denial of his petition.
FACTS2
“Around 4:30 a.m. on June 19, 2009, [Merced Police Officer] Walker was off duty
and following his normal routine of driving to the gym in his truck. He used his regular
route and drove on Park Avenue in Merced. His driver’s door window was rolled down.
It was still dark, and the truck’s headlights were on.

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 After notice to the parties, and without objection, this court takes judicial notice of
the record from defendant’s direct appeal in People v. Uriostegui (Dec. 19, 2011,
F060232) [nonpub. opn.] (Uriostegui). The following facts are from the nonpublished
opinion in that case, which is part of the instant record on appeal.
In reviewing a section 1172.6 petition, the trial court may rely on “the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People
v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292; People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
393, 400, fn. 9.) The role of the appellate opinion is limited, however, and the court may
not rely on factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions or engage in fact
finding at the prima facie stage. (Clements, at p. 292; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 972 (Lewis).) We have quoted the factual statement from defendant’s direct appeal
to place his current arguments in context, and do not rely on that factual statement to
resolve his appeal from the trial court’s order that found his petition did not state a prima
facie case for relief.

2.
“As Walker continued on Park Avenue, he approached an alley which crossed the
street, but there was no stop sign or crosswalk in the intersection. Walker saw two males
walk out of the alley on his left side. The two men were walking together in the alley at a
fairly quick pace, and they headed toward Park Avenue.
“When the two men reached Park Avenue, they slowed down and one man stopped
on the sidewalk, about 20 to 25 feet from the left side of Walker’s truck.[3] Walker later
identified this man as codefendant [Martin] Olvera.
“Walker slowed down his truck because he was not sure if the men were going to
walk into the street. Olvera remained on the sidewalk but the second man walked into
the street in a slower gait. Walker later identified the second man as defendant. Walker
testified defendant walked into the street at an angle, and ‘purposely’ stopped in front of
the right headlight of his truck.
“Walker immediately stopped his truck to avoid hitting defendant. Defendant
remained in the street about three feet away from the front right side of his truck. Olvera
was still standing on the sidewalk on Walker’s left side, and called out to Walker, ‘ “Hey,
do you have a cigarette?” ’ Walker replied no, that he didn’t smoke. Walker testified that
Olvera called out to him within two seconds of the time that defendant stopped in front of
his truck. Defendant remained in front of Walker’s truck during this brief exchange.
“Walker testified that immediately after he responded to Olvera, defendant turned
‘completely back almost 180 degrees,’ and ‘over to his right shoulder and made a kind of
heads up, kind of a nodding affirmation’ to Olvera, who was still standing on the
sidewalk, directly across from Walker’s open driver’s door window. Defendant ‘turned
over his shoulder towards my truck and kind of did the head up … his eyebrows even
kind of raised up like a signal.’ Defendant did not nod up and down, but ‘kind of lifted
his head up … using his head and eye movement.’

3 “At trial, Walker admitted that he made a previous statement that the man on the
sidewalk was about 25 to 30 yards from the left side of his truck.”

3.
“Walker believed defendant was giving a signal to the man on the sidewalk.
Walker testified defendant’s motions caused him ‘great concern’ and ‘alarm.’ Walker
thought he was being ‘set up for an attack’ based on the manner that defendant forced
him to stop the truck and then signaled to the other man.[4] Walker did not recognize
either man, and he did not know whether they were trying to ‘kill me to get my truck or
just kill me because they recognized me’ as an officer.
“Walker quickly looked to his left. Olvera was still standing on the sidewalk, and
Walker did not see him with any weapon. Defendant remained in the street in front of the
right side of Walker’s truck. Walker turned his steering wheel to the left and attempted to
accelerate around defendant because he believed he was in a dangerous situation.
“Just as Walker started to accelerate, he heard and felt the vibration of a bullet hit
the driver’s door of his truck, directly below the open driver’s door window. Defendant
was still standing about three feet in front of the truck when the first shot was fired at the
driver’s door. Walker did not see a gun flash or the person who fired at him.
“Walker ducked down on the driver’s seat, turned the steering wheel to the left to
avoid hitting defendant, and accelerated out of the area. As he drove away, he heard
three or four more gunshots. He tried to look back through his left-side mirror, but it had
been shattered.
“Walker reached a point of safety and realized he was not wounded. He called 911
and reported the incident, and then turned around and headed back to the area to look for
the suspects. He was carrying a firearm and drove around the area, but he could not find
anyone.”

4 “[D]efense counsel objected to Walker’s interpretation and opinions about the
meaning of defendant’s motions, and the court overruled those objections and permitted
Walker’s testimony on these points.”

4.
The Initial Investigation
“Just minutes after the shooting, numerous officers responded to the scene and set
up a perimeter in the area. Walker advised the responding officers that the two suspects
were young Hispanic males. Walker said the man who stopped in front of his truck was
wearing a Raiders black or grey jersey and black and white plaid shorts. The man who
stayed on the sidewalk was wearing a white T–Shirt and dark-colored short pants.
“It was later determined that a gunshot hit the driver’s door of Walker’s truck, just
above the door handle and below the open window. The rear view mirror on the driver’s
door was shattered. Another bullet hit the left side window of the truck’s rear camper
shell, continued inside the camper shell, and hit the truck’s cab directly behind the
driver’s seat. A third bullet entered the middle section of the camper shell’s rear hatch
window.”
Apprehension of the Suspect
“Shortly after responding to the scene, Officer DeJong and Sergeant Dash saw an
individual in the perimeter area who fit the clothing description of one of the suspects.
This individual, later identified as defendant, was near an apartment building in the
3000 block of Park Avenue. DeJong and Dash attempted to speak to defendant, but he
refused to stop and ran away. DeJong and other officers chased defendant through the
neighborhood.
“Officer Padgett was heading toward the pursuit of the suspect when he came
upon another person, later identified as codefendant Olvera, who was near the swimming
pool of the same apartment building on Park Avenue. Olvera was walking away and kept
looking back. Padgett ordered Olvera to stop, and Olvera obeyed his order. Olvera
smelled of alcohol, but he was extremely calm, friendly, and cooperative. Olvera was
wearing baggie pants and a Raiders jersey, but the jersey’s colors did not match Walker’s
clothing description. He did not have a firearm.

5.
“Officer Padgett detained Olvera and escorted him to a police car. Olvera
repeatedly asked why he was being detained. Padgett replied that he believed Olvera was
involved in a shooting which had just occurred, and an officer was the intended victim.
Olvera’s demeanor changed, and he became defensive and said he did not know anything
about a shooting.
“In the meantime, DeJong and the other officers continued to chase defendant,
who ignored their repeated orders to stop running. Defendant jumped neighborhood
fences as he attempted to escape. The officers tried to use their ‘Tasers’ to stop
defendant, but they were unable to hit him. Officer Padgett, who had rejoined the pursuit,
was able to deploy his Taser and defendant fell down. Defendant was taken into custody,
and he did not have a firearm.”
Field Identifications
“About 15 to 20 minutes after the shooting, officers asked Walker to look at
defendant in the field. Walker immediately identified defendant as the person who
stopped in front of his truck.
“About 30 to 40 minutes after the shooting, Walker was asked to look at Olvera.
Walker thought Olvera looked similar to the suspect who stood on the sidewalk, but
Olvera’s clothes were not the same as that suspect. Walker asked Olvera to say
something, Olvera complied, and Walker immediately recognized Olvera’s voice as
belonging to the suspect who asked him for a cigarette. The officers discovered that
Olvera was wearing a white T–Shirt and dark-colored short pants under his baggie outer
clothing.”
The Apartment Complex
“Defendant and Olvera were apprehended in the vicinity of an apartment complex
located in the 3000 block of Park Avenue. [C.V.] lived in one of the apartments in that
complex with her boyfriend, [O.D.], and their young child.

6.
“[K.V.] lived next to [C.V.] on the second floor, and reported that [C.V.] had a
large and noisy party which began on the evening of June 18, 2009, and continued into
the early morning hours of June 19, 2009. [K.V.] watched the intoxicated party guests
through her window and repeatedly asked [C.V.] to take control of the situation. At
one point, a fight broke out between the intoxicated guests. [K.V.] never saw [C.V.’s]
boyfriend that night.
“Sometime around 4:00 a.m., [K.V.] saw three young Hispanic males leave
[C.V.’s] party; one male was so drunk that he staggered out. They were wearing white
tank tops and jeans. The three men stopped on the staircase landing, and two of them
continued downstairs and headed toward Park Avenue.
“At trial, [K.V.] identified defendant as the man who was so intoxicated that he
was staggering down the stairs. Defendant appeared so drunk that he lurched forward, as
if he was going to fall, and the other man grabbed his arm and helped him down the
stairs. [K.V.] also recognized defendant as someone who had previously visited [C.V.’s]
apartment.
“[K.V.] testified that soon after the men left the party, she heard five gunshots fired
in rapid succession. Within a minute, [K.V.] heard something like ‘a herd’ [of] people
running up the stairs and into [C.V.’s] apartment, where the party was still going on. The
door slammed, the music was turned off, and ‘you could hear a pin drop it got so quiet.’
[K.V.] heard someone dragging or moving something heavy across the floor. She heard
someone jump on the chain link fence at the back of the apartment complex, and then
heard an officer tell someone to stop.”
Search of C.V.’s Apartment
“A few hours after the shooting, the SWAT team and other officers searched
[C.V.’s] apartment pursuant to a warrant. The officers discovered a ladder in a bedroom
closet, and the ladder led to an existing opening in the attic’s crawl space. A .38-caliber

7.
revolver was found in the crawl space. The weapon contained six expended shell
casings.
“The revolver was later tested for DNA evidence, and it was determined that
Olvera could not have contributed to the DNA found on the firearm. A criminalist
explained that DNA could have been wiped off the weapon. Olvera’s hands were tested
for gunshot residue and the tests were negative.”[5]
C.V.’s Testimony
“[C.V.] testified as a prosecution witness. At the time of trial, she was in custody
for failing to appear on a subpoena, and she also faced assault charges in an unrelated
case. [C.V.] had been living in her apartment with [O.D.], who was a gang member, but
they had split up and she was planning to leave the apartment. [C.V.] admitted she
socialized with members of the Norteno gang.
“[C.V.] testified about the party at her apartment, and said her guests included
[J.L.], [R.M.], and [G.O.] (codefendant Olvera’s brother), who were members of the
Norteno gang. Everyone was drinking and became intoxicated.
“[C.V.] testified that defendant, codefendant Olvera, and a third man arrived at the
party around 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. She did not really know them. They were there for a
few hours. At one point during the party, the three men went into her daughter’s bedroom
and closed the door. [C.V.] was angry and told them to get out of the bedroom.
Defendant, Olvera, and the third man walked out of the bedroom. Defendant and Olvera
started to argue in the living room. Defendant kept yelling at Olvera to give him
something. Defendant also acted disrespectfully toward [C.V.]. [C.V.] asked [J.L.] to tell

5 “After Olvera was arrested, he agreed to answer questions and said he did not
know defendant, he did not know [C.V.] or her boyfriend, he was not at a party with
them, and he did not shoot at anyone. Olvera said he was walking through the apartment
complex to meet a girl, but she did not live in that building.”

8.
them to leave, and [J.L.] did so. Defendant, Olvera, and the third man left the apartment,
and [C.V.] locked the door behind them.
“[C.V.] testified that ‘a few seconds’ after they left, defendant kicked down the
door of her apartment, and Olvera was with him. [C.V.] told them to leave and closed the
door. She did not hear any gunshots. They never returned to her apartment, and she
thought they were arrested a few minutes later.
“[C.V.] testified the police searched her apartment several hours later. She had no
idea why a revolver was found in the attic of her daughter’s bedroom.[6] [C.V.] admitted
that when she was interviewed by the police, she said that defendant and Olvera argued
about a gun, but insisted that she never saw a firearm that night.”
The prosecution’s gang expert testified that three men, J.L., R.M., and G.O., along
with [C.V.] were at [C.V.]’s apartment when it was searched; the three men were Norteno
gang members and [C.V.] was described as a “Norteno associate.” The prosecution also
introduced evidence that defendant and Olvera were active Norteno gang members.
(Uriostegui, supra, F060232.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 25, 2009, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Merced
County charging defendant Uriostegui and codefendant Olvera with count 1, attempted
premeditated murder of Walker (§§ 664/187); count 2, discharge of a firearm at an
occupied vehicle (§ 246); and count 3, participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)). As to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged that the offenses were committed to
benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); and defendant had a prior strike
conviction (§ 667, subds.(b)–(i)).

6 “The defense called an officer who participated in the search who explained that
area of the attic could have been reached through crawl spaces from both apartment
No. 22 and No. 10, but the revolver was directly adjacent to the opening from No. 22.”

9.
As to count 1, it was further alleged that Olvera personally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and as to defendant, that a principal discharged a firearm during
the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)).
Trial and Instructions
In 2010, a joint jury trial was held for defendant and Olvera. The trial court
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 601 on the elements of attempted murder,
premeditation, and deliberation.
The trial court gave the following version of CALCRIM No. 400, aiding and
abetting.

“A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may
have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator.
Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly
committed the crime. A person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or
she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who
committed it.

“Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes
aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of
other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.”7
(Italics added.)
The court also gave CALCRIM No. 401, defining direct aiding and abetting an
intended crime:

“ ‘To prove that a defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
abetting that crime, the People must prove that, number one, the perpetrator
committed the crime. Number two, the defendant knew that the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime. Number three, before or during the
commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime, and number four, the defendant’s
words or conduct did, in fact, aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of
the crime.

7 As we explain below, the trial court erroneously included the italicized paragraph,
referring to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, when it gave CALCRIM
No. 400.

10.
“ ‘Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and he or she specifically intends to and
does, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage or instigate the
perpetrator’s commission of that crime. If all of these requirements are
proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the
crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abett[o]r.

“ ‘If you conclude that the defendant was present at the scene of the
crime or failed to prevent a crime, you may consider that fact in
determining whether the defendant was an aider and abett[o]r. However,
the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the
crime, does not by itself make him or her an aider and abett[o]r.”
(Uriostegui, supra, F060232.)
The trial court did not instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 403 on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or target/nontarget offenses.
Closing Arguments
As set forth in this court’s opinion in defendant’s direct appeal, “[i]n their closing
arguments, none of the parties argued that defendant and Olvera intended to commit a
robbery, carjacking, or some other offense, or that the attempted murder occurred in the
course of committing another target offense. Instead, the prosecutor repeatedly asserted
that defendant and Olvera were guilty of attempted murder because they committed a
‘concerted ambush’ on Walker, they planned the attack, Olvera fired the gun but he had
time to hide the gun at the apartment and clean his hands, and defendant did not fire the
weapon but was guilty of aiding and abetting counts [1] and [2]. There was the intent to
kill because all of the bullets were aimed at the passenger cab of Walker’s truck.
Defendant and Olvera ‘worked in concert with each other to put Officer Walker in a
much more dangerous position so the shooting could occur.’ Defendant walked in front
of Walker’s truck and made him stop, and then defendant gave ‘the high sign’ to Olvera
to ‘take care of business, and immediately after that starts shooting. His whole attack
was a planned ambush.’ ”
“Defendant’s attorney argued that it was just a theory that defendant walked in
front of Walker’s truck to stop it, and the prosecution had failed to present proof beyond a

11.
reasonable doubt to support the charged offenses. Defendant’s attorney argued that
defendant walked into the street at 4:30 a.m. because he was intoxicated, and not because
he was part of some type of ambush, and cited to the evidence that defendant was drunk
at [C.V.’s] party. Olvera’s attorney challenged Walker’s identification of Olvera at the
in-field showup, and noted that Walker never saw the gunman. In rebuttal, the prosecutor
asserted Walker positively identified both defendant and Olvera.” (Uriostegui, supra,
F060232.)
Verdicts and Sentences
On March 8, 2010, the jury found defendant guilty as charged in counts 1, 2, and
3, and found the special allegations true. The trial court found the prior strike conviction
true. Defendant was sentenced to the second strike term of 30 years to life for attempted
murder.
Codefendant Olvera was convicted of count 3, participation in a criminal street
gang. The jury was unable to reach unanimous verdicts as to count 1, attempted murder,
and count 2, discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and the court declared
mistrials on those counts.
Direct Appeal
In 2011, this court filed the nonpublished opinion in defendant’s direct appeal,
(Uriostegui, supra, F060232), and affirmed the judgment. We rejected his arguments that
there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions as an aider and abettor for
count 1, attempted murder, and count 2, discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle; the
trial court improperly permitted Walker to testify about his interpretation of defendants
conduct while he stood in front of Walker’s truck; the prosecution’s gang expert
improperly testified about a hypothetical which was similar to the facts of the instant
case; and his sentence was improperly calculated.
Defendant also argued that when the trial court gave CALCRIM No. 400, it
erroneously included the last paragraph of the instruction, as italicized ante. Defendant

12.
asserted that paragraph addressed the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and it
should have been deleted because the record showed that the court and the parties
decided not to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 403 about that doctrine. Defendant
argued the mistaken inclusion of that paragraph in CALCRIM No. 400 was prejudicial
because it could have triggered the jury’s consideration of his culpability under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
We reviewed the court’s discussion with the parties about the instructions, and
found there was an agreement not to instruct the jury about the natural and probable
consequences doctrine pursuant to CALCRIM No. 403. We further found the final
paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400 implicated the natural and probable cause doctrine, and
the court erroneously included that paragraph when it gave the instruction.
We concluded the trial court’s erroneous inclusion of the final paragraph of
CALCRIM No. 400 was not prejudicial under the circumstances of the case. “ ‘Because
the parties made no reference to the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine in
their arguments to the jury, it is highly unlikely that the jury relied on that rule when it
convicted defendant,’ and it appears the jury was persuaded by the prosecutor’s argument
that defendant encouraged or assisted the gunman to murder the truck’s driver, and he
was thus guilty of attempted murder as an accomplice to that crime, ‘not as an
accomplice to some other unlawful act of which the murder was a natural and probable
consequence.’ (People v. Prettyman [(1996)] 14 Cal.4th [248,] 273.)” (Uriostegui,
supra, F060232)
PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
On March 18, 2022, defendant filed, in propria persona, a petition for resentencing
and requested appointment of counsel. Defendant filed a supporting declaration that he
was eligible for resentencing because he was charged and convicted of attempted murder,
he was not the actual shooter, he was convicted as an accomplice under the natural and

13.
probable consequences doctrine, and he could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189.
The court appointed the public defender’s office to represent defendant.
The Prosecution’s Opposition
On May 12, 2022, the prosecution filed an opposition, which reviewed the facts
and argued the facts showed defendant was convicted as a direct aider and abettor who
acted with premeditation and the specific intent to kill, and there was no target offense
that would have implicated the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Defendant’s Responsive Motions8
Defendant filed, in propria persona, two replies, and argued the trial court should
hold a hearing on the prima facie issue and conduct an evidentiary hearing, because he
was not the actual shooter, the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, he was convicted as an accomplice who did not have the intent to
kill, and he could not be convicted of a more serious offense than his codefendant, who
was the actual shooter.
Further Briefing
The prosecution filed a response, again asserted defendant was not eligible for
resentencing, and submitted the record from defendant’s jury trial as a supporting exhibit.
On March 15, 2023, defendant’s counsel refiled defendant’s in propria persona reply
brief.
HEARING ON THE PETITION
On May 18, 2023, the trial court held the prima facie hearing on defendant’s
petition.

8 During briefing on the petition, defendant filed, in propria persona, a motion for
the trial court to discharge his appointed counsel, and requested appointment of a new
attorney or to represent himself. When the trial court convened a hearing on this matter,
defendant stated he was withdrawing his motion.

14.
Defense counsel conceded the trial court did not instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 403 on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Counsel argued an
evidentiary hearing should be held because the court included language in the final
paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400 that permitted the jury to rely on that doctrine.
The prosecutor replied that defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he
was charged and convicted of premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted murder,
which meant the jury found he had the specific intent to kill, and he could not have been
convicted based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The prosecutor
argued the last paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400, as given to the jury, was not prejudicial
based on People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, which held the reference to
imputed malice in CALCRIM No. 400 did not make a defendant eligible for
section 1172.6 relief.
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s arguments and denied the petition, and
stated it would file an order explaining its reasons.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
Thereafter, the trial court filed an order that denied defendant’s petition. The court
found defendant was charged and convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and
abettor, with the special allegation that the offense was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. The court held the charges “did not allow the prosecution to proceed under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine because the attempted murder, a specific
intent crime, was further charged as having been willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”
The trial court further found the jury was instructed on direct aiding and abetting,
and “[n]o one at trial argued that the facts and evidence supported a conviction under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” While the final paragraph in CALCRIM
No. 400 was erroneously given to the jury, the court found the error was not prejudicial
because that paragraph cited a correct legal principal “with no application to the case,”
CALCRIM No. 403 was not given, “no party argued that [defendant] and Olvera intended

15.
to commit some other offense, or that the attempted murder occurred in the course of
committing a different target offense,” and “[n]o one argued the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for conviction or acquittal.”
On May 18, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As explained above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to
Delgadillo. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that defendant was advised he
could file his own brief with this court. This court advised defendant that he could file a
supplemental letter brief. Defendant filed a letter brief and raises several issues.
I. Defendant’s Conviction for Attempted Premeditated Murder
Defendant asserts his petition stated a prima facie case and the trial court should
have held an evidentiary hearing because the jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the jury was not instructed on malice aforethought for
an aider and abettor to attempted murder, and he could not be convicted of a more serious
crime than the codefendant and actual shooter. Defendant argues the trial court
improperly made factual findings when it determined he failed to state a prima facie case.
A. Section 1172.6
In making the prima facie determination, a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
“as a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,” that the petitioner could
still be convicted after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 972.)
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential

16.
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The
record of conviction includes the jury instructions, verdicts, and closing arguments of the
attorneys. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14; People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251–1252; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50, 54–55;
People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 99; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
924, 935; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599.)
To demonstrate prejudice from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition before the
issuance of an order to show cause, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable
that, absent error, his or her petition would not have been summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 974–975; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
B. Attempted Murder and Premeditation
The elements of attempted murder are the specific intent to kill (express malice)
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act towards accomplishing the intended
killing. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th
643, 653, 664; People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 642.) Implied malice
cannot support a conviction of attempted murder. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th
313, 327.)
“[U]nlike murder, attempted murder is not divided into degrees. The prosecution,
though, can seek a special finding that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, for purposes of a sentencing enhancement.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 586, 605.) “ ‘Willful’ is synonymous with ‘express malice’: in other words,
a specific intent to kill. [Citation.] Premeditation occurs when the [attempted] killing is
‘ “considered beforehand,” ’ and deliberation occurs when the decision to kill is
‘ “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at
p. 604.)

17.
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), a person who knowingly aided and abetted a crime (the target offense), the
natural and probable consequences of which was attempted murder or murder (the
nontarget offense), could be convicted of not only the target crime but also of the
resulting nontarget offense of attempted murder or murder. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843, 845; People v. Chiu
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161, 166; People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 259, 262.)
Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to eliminate natural and probable
consequences liability for first and second degree murder. (People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 742.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which became
effective in 2022, “clarified Senate Bill 1437 by amending [former] section 1170.95 to
make clear the natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer supplies accomplice
liability to attempted murder.” (People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 193.)
“Because section 188, subdivision (a)(3), prohibits imputing malice based solely on
participation in a crime, the natural and probable consequences doctrine cannot prove an
accomplice committed attempted murder. Accordingly, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine theory … is now invalid.” (Id. at p. 196; People v. Coley, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.)
C. Analysis
As this court extensively discussed in defendant’s direct appeal, the trial court
erroneously included the final paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400, implicating the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, when it instructed the jury. As we also explained,
the jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 403 that would have defined the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or on any target and/or nontarget offenses.
Moreover, the parties did not address the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
their closing arguments. The prosecution argued defendant was guilty as a direct aider

18.
and abettor, consistent with CALCRIM No. 401, and defense counsel questioned whether
there was evidence to show defendant was acting with intent and premeditation.
The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder, and also found true the
special allegation that he committed the offense willfully, deliberatively, and with
premeditation. The jury’s verdict and premeditation finding refutes any possibility that it
relied on the last paragraph of CALCRIM No. 400, or on some aspect of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Instead, the jury’s finding establishes that it found
defendant “acted with actual malice sufficient to sustain the murder conviction under the
law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 .… (See People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th
653, 662 … [‘[W]hen malice is express because the defendant possessed a specific intent
to kill, first degree murder liability may be proper if the charged defendant personally
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.’]; People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1123 … [‘Absent some circumstance negating malice one cannot
knowingly and intentionally help another commit an unlawful killing without acting with
malice.’]; People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 … [to prove a defendant
premeditated and deliberated the consequences of his action, there must be ‘substantially
more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill’].)”
(People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145, 153; see also People v. Estrada, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–949.)
Finally, when the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing, it made
factual findings from the trial record, and concluded that the evidence showed defendant
aided and abetted the attempted murder with the intent to kill. The court improperly
made these factual findings in ruling upon the prima facie issue. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 972.) To the extent the court erroneously relied on those factual findings,
any error is not prejudicial because, based upon the jury instructions and verdict, it is not
reasonably probable that an evidentiary hearing would have been held in the absence of
the error.

19.
II. Defendant’s Other Contentions
In his letter brief, defendant asserts his codefendant was the lone shooter who
eventually pleaded guilty to assault with a firearm, and he cannot receive a harsher
sentence than the actual shooter. Defendant also asserts this court must vacate the gang
conviction and enhancements because of the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), and the sentences for the gang offenses and the firearm enhancements
were improperly imposed.
Defendant’s claims are solely related to his jury trial and convictions. “The mere
filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to
raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of section [1172.6] suggests it was
intended to provide redress for allegedly erroneous prior factfinding.… The purpose of
section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual disputes
that have already been resolved.’ ” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947;
People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
As for defendant’s arguments about Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), the amended legislation applies to all cases that are not yet final as of its effective
date of January 1, 2022. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207.)
Defendant’s case has long been final and he is not subject to resentencing. (See, e.g.,
People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162.)
DISPOSITION
The court’s order of May 18, 2023, denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing, is affirmed.

20.

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.