Tarin v. Tarin CA2/8

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Filed 5/16/24 Tarin v. Tarin CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DOLORES TARIN, B330854

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BQ052232)
v.

JESSE TARIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Dennis F. Hernandez, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Barbaro, Chinen, Pitzer & Duke and Raimund Freihube for
Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

_________________________
In February 2023, appellant Dolores Tarin sought to renew
a domestic violence restraining order first obtained in 2016
against her brother, respondent Jesse Tarin, after he engaged in
physical violence against her. The trial court found that Dolores1
maintained a genuine but not objectively reasonable
apprehension that Jesse would engage in future abuse. The court
denied her petition, concluding Dolores had failed to meet her
burden to present sufficient evidence to justify renewal of the
restraining order. After independent review of the record, we
find the trial court applied the correct legal standard and did not
abuse its discretion in denying renewal of the restraining order.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2016, long estranged siblings Dolores and
Jesse were together at the home of their mother, who was gravely
ill. Jesse’s daughter was also present. Jesse became “provoked
and angry” after his daughter tearfully informed him Dolores had
orally attacked her. Jesse angrily told Dolores “not [to] treat [his]
daughter like that,” and physically assaulted her, hitting or
slapping Dolores multiple times on her head and face, even after
she fell to the ground. Police were summoned and Dolores
obtained a two-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
against Jesse. Based on her ongoing fear of Jesse, Dolores sought
and received a five-year renewal of the DVRO in February 2018.
The DVRO was set to expire February 24, 2023.

1 The parties share a surname so we refer to them by their
first names to ensure clarity.

2
On February 21, 2023, Dolores filed a request to renew the
DVRO. In her request, Dolores stated she remained afraid Jesse
would abuse her in the future because “[t]he original attack was
completely unexpected and unprovoked. Thereafter Jesse
. . . admitted to the battery. Then there was an on-going civil
case for damages between Jesse . . . and [Dolores]. After [that
case] was dismissed, Jesse . . . sued [Dolores] for malicious
prosecution, which [was] still on-going. Unless Jesse . . . [was]
further restrained, [Dolores] remain[ed] very fearful that he
[would] hit [her] again. He is unpredictable. He did not take any
meaningful anger management courses after the [DVRO was
issued] in 2016.”
Jesse denied the allegations and asked the court not to
renew the DVRO. Jesse said there had been no contact between
himself and Dolores since the DVRO was issued in 2016 (except
through their litigation against each other) and there was no
basis upon which to renew the order. The court held a hearing on
April 20, 2023, at which Dolores, her husband, and Jesse
testified.
Dolores testified about the events and physical violence
that prompted her to obtain the DVRO in 2016 and to seek
renewal of that order in 2018 due to ongoing litigation, family
tension and her continued fear of violence by her brother. At the
hearing Dolores testified that, although she had not seen them
herself, Jesse had “been known to own firearms.”2 She testified

2 Dolores said her mother told her she took Jesse’s firearms
away at some unspecified time because she feared he would hurt
himself. Jesse testified he relinquished his firearms as a
condition of the DVRO.

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that “things” remained unsettled, and that she remained afraid of
future harm and felt “like [Jesse] would come around or look for
[her] or do something to [her] in retaliation.” Dolores
acknowledged that she and her brother were estranged for many
years before 2016 and that, apart from court proceedings, there
had been no contact of any kind between the siblings since
February 2016. Dolores testified she had apprehension of future
harm because her brother had “hostility towards [her],” was
“short tempered,” and she “fear[ed] that he [would] at some point
track [her] down and do harm to [her].” She conceded Jesse
never engaged in physical violence against her before 2016, and
her belief that he had “unpredictable violent behavior tendencies”
was based on her own experience and on information gleaned
from the mothers of Jesse’s children, with whom Jesse was
purported to have had “altercations.” Dolores said she and her
brother lived about 15 miles apart from one another.
Dolores’s husband testified that Dolores became nervous
and apprehensive after Jesse’s assault in 2016 and feared he
might come to their house. She installed security cameras and
locks for that reason, plus she had a general apprehension about
security. Dolores remained anxious and afraid and attended
counseling. Her husband believed that her fear of Jesse “might
be part of” the reason Dolores attended counseling, but he felt
there was “more involved.” Dolores’s husband knew of no contact
between Dolores and Jesse since 2016, but Dolores had remained
afraid her brother would come to their house.
Jesse testified Dolores had no contact with him and was
also estranged from their mother (with whom Jesse spent a great
deal of time) for about 35 years before the incident in 2016. Jesse
admitted he felt provoked and angry after his daughter tearfully

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told him about Dolores’s hostile conduct in February 2016. He
pointed his finger at his sister telling her “not [to] treat [his]
daughter like that,” and was physically violent with Dolores.
After a criminal case had been filed against him, Jesse “complied
with all the terms” of that case, including undergoing counseling.
He said he relinquished his firearms as a condition of the 2016
DVRO. Jesse testified he had been “categorized with PTSD” after
his military service in Vietnam and took psychotropic medication.
Jesse conceded he had been and remained angry at Dolores but
had done nothing to express his anger against her. Jesse
informed the court that, apart from the fact that Dolores had
“forc[ed him] to use [his] retirement money to defend” himself in
ongoing litigation, he suffered no adverse consequences as a
result of the issuance of the DVRO. When asked by the court
whether he had done anything since 2016 to ensure he would not
take any action against his sister in the future, Jesse said he had
“added security devices to prevent [Dolores] from coming to
assault [him].”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court observed
the evidence had been sufficient to warrant the initial DVRO.
Now the relevant inquiry was whether Dolores’s apprehension of
future harm was both genuine and reasonable under the
circumstances, that is, whether she had presented evidence to
carry her burden to show a “sufficient risk of future abuse.” Part
of that determination involved ascertaining “[w]hether there’s
been any significant change in circumstances surrounding the
events [that] justif[ied] the initial restraining order, and
. . . whether there’s any burdens on the restrained party that the
court should consider.” The court noted the parties had virtually
no contact for 35 years before the emotionally fraught

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confrontation in 2016 and found “no evidence . . . that [Jesse had]
made any . . . threats since the initial incident in 2016,” nor had
Jesse had “any sort of contact with [Dolores] sufficient . . . to
justify the renewal of the restraining order.” The court found
Dolores’s “apprehension [was] not reasonable under the
circumstances,” and denied her request for renewal. Dolores filed
this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The gist of Dolores’s argument on appeal is that reversal is
in order because in determining whether her apprehension of
future harm was objectively reasonable, the court applied the
wrong legal standard by “show[ing] significant disinterest . . . in
the facts underlying the issuance of the original restraining
order,” and denied the request for renewal “based solely on the
factual finding . . . that ‘[it had not found] any recent incidents.’ ”
She asserts that the trial court failed to analyze the
reasonableness of her apprehension of future violence, the
severity of the violence that gave rise to the 2016 DVRO, any
changed circumstances, or any burden on Jesse. The record
reflects otherwise.
1. Controlling Legal Principles
Family Code section 6345 provides that a trial court may
renew a restraining order “upon the request of a party, either for
five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court,
without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the
original order. Renewals and subsequent renewals shall be
subject to termination, modification or subsequent renewal by
further order of the court . . . on the motion of a party.” (Fam.
Code, § 6345, subd. (a).)

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According to longstanding law, a request to renew a DVRO,
if contested, should not be granted simply because the party
requesting renewal has “a subjective fear the party to be
restrained will commit abusive acts in the future.” (Ritchie v.
Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 (Ritchie).) The
apprehension of future abusive acts must be reasonable. That is,
the court must find that a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would have a reasonable apprehension such abuse
will occur unless the court issues a protective order. (Ibid.)
Under this objective test, a trial court should renew the
protective order, “if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the protected party entertains a ‘reasonable
apprehension’ of future abuse . . . . [T]his does not mean the
court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur
if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence
demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient
risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s apprehension is
genuine and reasonable.” (Id. at p. 1290.)
In Ritchie, as a matter of first impression, the court
articulated three general factors for courts to consider in
evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse: (1) “the evidence and findings on
which [the] initial [protective] order was based” (Ritchie, supra,
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290); (2) “any significant changes in the
circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial
protective order” (id. at p. 1291); and (3) “the ‘burdens’ the
protective order imposes on the restrained party.” (Ibid.; see also
Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 332–333 (Lister).)

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2. The Standard of Review
The standard of review for an order granting or denying a
request to renew a DVRO is abuse of discretion. (Eneaji v. Ubboe
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 (Eneaji).) However, the
exercise of judicial discretion must be guided by applicable legal
principles, derived from the statute under which discretion is
conferred. Thus, “ ‘a discretionary order based on an application
of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an
exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.’ ” (Ibid.)
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in
exercising its discretion to decide the underlying issue is a
question of law subject to de novo review. (Ibid.) If the trial
court’s discretionary decision is grounded in the correct legal
principles, we review for abuse of discretion. If more than one
inference may reasonably be deduced from the facts, we lack the
authority to substitute our decision for that of the trial court.
(Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) It is a fundamental
rule of appellate review that an appealed judgment or order is
presumed to be correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) The appellant bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption of correctness. (Id. at p. 609.) This rule governs
even when, as here, the respondent does not appear on appeal.
(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110,
fn. 1.)
3. No Abuse of Discretion
Dolores insists the trial court erred in analyzing the
request to renew the restraining order, because it denied renewal
“based solely on [its] factual finding . . . that ‘the Court does not
find any recent incidents.’ ” (Italics added.) To assess this

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contention, we consider both whether the court recognized the
appropriate standard for assessing renewal of the DVRO and its
application of that standard.
First, our independent review of the record reflects that the
trial court applied the correct standard for determining whether
to renew the DVRO. The court reiterated and applied the legal
standard articulated in leading cases such as Ritchie and Lister
in considering the parties’ arguments. Without permitting the
parties to relitigate the basis for the initial order, the court
considered “the evidence and findings on which [the] initial
[protective] order was based” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1290) by reviewing the parties’ written submissions and
argument, and permitting both sides to testify about the
circumstances surrounding issuance of the initial DVRO and,
what, if any, events or contact had occurred since February 2016.
The court correctly noted it had the authority to renew the DVRO
“without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the
order,” but that it “should renew [the DVRO] if and only if it
[found] by a preponderance of the evidence that” Dolores’s
apprehension of future abuse by Jesse was both “genuine and
reasonable.” (Italics added.)
Second, the court noted that, under Ritchie, it was required
“to determine [if] there’s been a change of circumstances as [it]
relates to either party” since the initial order was issued. (See
Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [in considering
whether renewal is warranted, the trial court must assess
whether there had been “any significant changes in the
circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial
protective order”]. To that end, the court noted Dolores and her
husband had testified that Dolores “installed security devices

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. . . in part [because of] her apprehension of [Jesse].” The court
also asked Jesse what if “anything [he had] done since 2016 to
change [his] environment or change the situation such that
. . . it’s no longer possible that [he] could take any action against
[his] sister.” Jesse informed the court only that he also installed
security devices.
Finally, the court inquired what “ ‘burdens’ the protective
order [had] impose[d] on the restrained party” (Ritchie, supra,
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291), by asking Jesse if he had suffered
any negative “consequence as a result of the issuance of the
restraining order.” (See ibid; see also Lister, supra, 215 Cal.4th
at pp. 332–333.)
In sum, the record reveals that Dolores’s contention that
the trial court “applied the wrong legal standard” when it denied
her request to renew the 2016 DVRO is not well taken. The trial
court clearly articulated and applied the appropriate legal test to
determine whether the circumstances warranted renewal. To the
extent Dolores suggests the court abused its discretion by placing
excessive emphasis on the lack of contact after the original
restraining order, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion
standard. (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.) Under
that standard, we will reverse only upon a showing that the
court's ruling “exceed[ed] the bounds of reason.” (Ibid.) Dolores
has demonstrated no abuse of discretion.
Dolores is correct that the only specific facts cited by the
court in support of its order denying renewal involved the
absence of threats or contact by Jesse since 2016. Without more,
we would agree that the trial court’s inquiries about additional
instances of contact or abuse after February 2016 could support
an inference that its analysis centered improperly on the absence

10
of “further abuse,” in contravention of the statute. (Cf. Fam.
Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) However, as detailed above, our
independent review of the record reveals the court applied the
correct legal standard by considering not just whether Jesse had
violated the DVRO or engaged in abusive conduct after 2016, but
also detailed testimony regarding the emotionally wrought
circumstances that led up to the original DVRO (the parties’
prolonged estrangement and Jesse’s aversion to Dolores’s belated
contact with their dying mother), and Dolores’s testimony about
the basis for her continuing fear. On this record there is no merit
to Dolores’s claim that the trial court “misapplied the law” by
“requiring a showing of more recent abuse and failing to analyze
whether the original abuse was sufficient.” (Michael M. v. Robin
J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 181.)
Reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness of
Dolores’s apprehension of future abuse, particularly in light of
the parties’ testimony of no contact or physical abuse during or
since the filings of Dolores’s civil action against Jesse and his
retaliatory lawsuit against her. From this, the trial court may
reasonably have inferred that Dolores’s fear of future abuse was
most closely connected to the vicious abuse in 2016 rather than
the siblings’ ongoing litigation. An abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of reason.
“ ‘ “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from
the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its
decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (Lister, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)
There is no indication in the record, express or implied, to
suggest the trial court disregarded the expansive range of
testimony or failed to fairly consider the factors relevant to

11
Dolores’s apprehension of future abuse. To the contrary, the trial
court evaluated both the factual predicate for the initial DVRO
and the basis for Dolores’s continuing apprehension. “[T]he mere
existence of a protective order, typically issued several years
earlier, seldom if ever will provide conclusive evidence the
requesting party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future
abuse of any kind should that order expire.” (Ritchie, supra,
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, italics omitted.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying renewal of the restraining order is
affirmed. Neither party is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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