People v. Stolte CA4/1

CourtListener 9502564Calctapp13 de mai. de 2024

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 5/13/24 P. v. Stolte CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D080636

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN414344)

PRESTON BERNARD STOLTE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part as
modified, remanded for resentencing.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Preston Bernard Stolte was charged with 12 counts of forcible lewd
conduct upon a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1);
counts 1 through 5 and 8 through 14) and two counts of attempt of the same
(§§ 664, 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 6 and 7). Counts 1 through 7 concerned
conduct against Grace, and counts 8 through 14 alleged acts against Sophia.
A jury found Stolte guilty of all charges except count 4 and found true several
special allegations. The court sentenced Stolte to a determinate prison term
of eight years, plus an indeterminate term of 45 years to life. Stolte raises
four main issues on appeal.
First, Stolte argues all counts must be reversed because there is no
substantial evidence he committed the alleged acts by use of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, as required
to support a conviction of forcible lewd conduct (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). He
further contends there is not sufficient evidence that he committed the acts
alleged in counts 3, 5, 6, 12, and 13 to support even the lesser-included
offense of lewd conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)). We conclude substantial evidence
supports each alleged act of lewd conduct but that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction of forcible lewd conduct.
Second, Stolte claims his rights to due process and a fair trial were
violated when the children’s mother (Mother) revealed to the jury his prior
prison commitment even though the court gave a curative instruction. Stolte
forfeited this issue by failing to move for mistrial. We decline to reach the
merits and find no ineffective assistance of counsel on this record.
Third, Stolte makes several claims of prosecutorial error. We conclude
each claim is meritless.
Finally, Stolte argues the matter must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court failed to recognize its discretion to sentence counts 9
and 10 concurrently instead of consecutively. We conclude consecutive

2
sentencing of counts 9 and 10 was required where the trial court could have
reasonably found the alleged acts occurred on separate occasions.
We reverse in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for
resentencing.
I.
Mother met Stolte in late April 2020, just a few weeks before the
alleged conduct. Grace and Sophia were respectively 8 and 11 years old.
Mother and the children had been living alone since the children’s father’s
passing in 2018. The children both had post-traumatic stress disorder from
witnessing their father verbally and physically abuse Mother. Grace was
severely autistic, was difficult to discipline, and had a mood affective disorder
and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Sophia also had ADHD
and suffered from depression. Mother had some medical issues, was
unemployed, had no help at home, and was unable to drive.
Mother’s friend, Mike, wanted her to have someone living as a tenant
on her large property to help out. When Mike learned Stolte, who he had
known for two years, needed somewhere to park his RV, he introduced
Mother and Stolte at a barbeque and they got along well. Mother and Stolte
agreed he would pay her $300 per month to park his RV and live on the
property, and he would help her care for the children. They had sexual
intercourse that night and a few more times once Stolte moved onto the
property.
Stolte moved onto the property several days after meeting Mother. He
was 27 years old. He had already become acquainted with the children at the
barbeque where he played tag with them, pushed them on a swing, and
taught them how to shoot a bow and arrow. Stolte testified that he was “just

3
as close as anybody could be, you know, knowing children for only a couple
weeks.”
By May 6, the children were spending time in Stolte’s RV late at night.
They would play video games, watch television, and have “stakeouts” to look
for coyotes. The children also slept in his RV several times, sometimes with
Mother but mostly without. Grace would sleep in the top bunk with Stolte,
facing opposite directions, and Sophia slept on the couch. Stolte enacted a
“star program” for the children to encourage good behavior. If the children
received three stars in one week, they could choose an activity. When Grace
earned three stars, she went to Stolte’s mother’s house to see farm animals.
Another day, Stolte took Grace to work with him, then to get ice cream as a
reward for behaving well.
On May 16, Mother had a scheduled colonoscopy and asked Stolte to
watch the children. He took them to the beach and drove Mother home after
her procedure. Once home, Mother took medication and “pass[ed] out” from
the pain. The next morning, Sophia told her Stolte had “‘inappropriately
touched’” her the night before. Grace told Mother Stolte had also touched her
inappropriately. Mother called Mike, who called the police. As later
instructed by a detective, Mother pretextually called Stolte to ask if he had
ever touched the children, which he vehemently denied.
Grace and Sophia were forensically interviewed on May 21 and May 28.
Grace said Stolte touched her “no-no square” or “private parts,” with his
other hand around her back rubbing her “u-bottom.” He also touched her
chest and neck, tried to kiss her, and made her touch his “no-no square.” The
following day, before she told Mother what happened, Stolte tried to grab her
hand and said, “all I need is your hand,” but Grace was reluctant to tell the

4
interviewer anything more about this exchange. Sophia disclosed that Stolte
kissed her neck and touched her leg, chest, butt, and “no no place.”
The district attorney charged Stolte with the following counts of
forcible lewd conduct and attempted lewd conduct, alleging he: (1) touched
Grace’s buttocks, over clothes; (2) touched Grace’s vagina, over clothes;
(3) touched Grace’s breasts, over clothes; (4) kissed Grace’s neck; (5) pulled
Grace’s hand on his penis; (6) attempted to pull Grace’s hand on his penis;
(7) attempted to kiss Grace’s lips; (8) touched Sophia’s leg, over clothes;
(9) touched Sophia’s vagina, over clothes; (10) touched Sophia’s breasts, over
clothes; (11) kissed Sophia’s neck; (12) touched Sophia’s buttocks, under
clothes; (13) touched Sophia’s vagina, under clothes; and (14) touched
Sophia’s breasts, under clothes.
Trial started in April 2022. The jury watched video recordings of the
interviews, which were available to watch in the deliberation room. Some of
Grace’s and Sophia’s trial testimony conflicted with their forensic interview
statements, as detailed below. Namely, Grace testified she did not remember
Stolte touching her chest. She also acknowledged saying at the preliminary
hearing that she never touched his “‘D’ word.” Sophia testified that Stolte did
not touch her butt or her vagina under her garments.
Stolte testified at trial and denied inappropriately touching either
child. Three longtime friends of Stolte testified as to his good character.
After three hours of deliberation and no substantive questions, the jury
convicted Stolte of all charges except count 4 (kissing Grace’s neck).
II.
A.
First, Stolte argues there was insufficient evidence that he:
(1) committed any lewd acts on the children “by use of force, violence, duress,

5
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury,” as section 288(b)(1)
requires; and (2) committed the lewd acts alleged in counts 3, 5, 6, 12, and 13
to support even the lesser-included offense under section 288(a). Based on
our view of the record and the applicable standard of review, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the convictions under section 288(a) but there
is insufficient evidence to support the convictions under section 288(b)(1).
1.
In assessing a claim of insufficient evidence, we “examine the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1186, 1215 [cleaned up] (Houston).) “[T]estimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th
86, 93 (Mejia).) We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility, and we presume every reasonable inference in favor of the
judgment. (Houston, at p. 1215.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the
jury’s findings, the judgment must be affirmed even if the circumstances
might also reasonably support a contrary finding. (Ibid.) Given this court’s
limited role on appeal, an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence “bears an enormous burden.” (People v. Sanchez (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
2.
Section 288(a) makes it a felony for any person to “willfully and lewdly
commit[ ] any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or
member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of

6
that person or the child.” Section 288(b)(1) increases the penalty for the
felony if the person “commits an act described in subdivision (a) by use of
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person.” On appeal, Stolte contends there
was insufficient evidence of the additional requirement for subdivision (b)(1).
The People argue there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of duress;
however, we disagree.
In the context of section 288, duress means “a direct or implied threat
of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which
otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which
one otherwise would not have submitted.” (People v. Garcia (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023 [cleaned up].) The test is objective. (People v.
Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 246.) The focus is on the perpetrator’s actions,
not the victim’s response, and the trier of fact should consider all relevant
circumstances, including the age of the victim and the victim’s relationship to
the abuser. (Id. at p. 246, fn. 9.)
The People identify no evidence that Stolte did or said anything to
threaten the children. As such, relying on People v. Cochran (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 8 (Cochran), People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40
(Veale), and People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38 (Pitmon), the People
argue Stolte used psychological coercion to impliedly threaten the children.
In Cochran, this court stated that “[t]he very nature of duress is
psychological coercion,” and the “fact that the victim testifies the defendant
did not use force or threats does not require a finding of no duress; the
victim’s testimony must be considered in light of her age and her relationship
to the defendant.” (Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14-15.) There,

7
the victim was the defendant’s daughter, “who engaged in sex acts only in
response to her father’s parental and physical authority.” (Id. at p. 15.) A
videotape showed the defendant directing his daughter to engage in various
sexual acts, and it was “clear the daughter is reluctant to engage in the
activities . . . and only continues reluctantly and as a matter of compliance
with parental authority.” (Id. at pp. 12, 15.)
In Veale, Division Two of this court concluded the totality of the
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant molested the
victim by means of duress. (Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) The
victim was the defendant’s seven-year-old stepdaughter. (Id. at pp. 44, 47.)
She was afraid something might happen to her or her mother and feared the
defendant would kill someone or hurt her if she told anyone, although the
defendant never said he would. (Id. at pp. 44-45.) During a forensic
interview, the victim could not say why she feared the defendant. (Id. at
p. 45.) At trial, she testified the defendant did not threaten her or use
physical force when committing the charged offense. (Id. at p. 46.)
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal concluded “[a] reasonable inference could be
made that defendant made an implied threat sufficient to support a finding of
duress, based on evidence that [the victim] feared defendant and was afraid
that if she told anyone about the molestation, defendant would harm or kill
[her], her mother or someone else.” (Id. at p. 47, italics added.) Additional
factors supporting a finding of duress included the victim’s young age when
molested, the disparity between the victim and the defendant’s age and size,
and the defendant’s position of authority. (Ibid.) The court recognized that
although the defendant was not the victim’s father as in Cochran, he held a
similar position of authority in the household. (Id. at p. 49.)

8
On the other end of the spectrum, the defendant in Pitmon was a
stranger whom the victim “encountered in a fairly isolated location.”
(Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 51.) The Court of Appeal also noted that
the victim was eight years old, an age at which adults are commonly viewed
as authority figures. (Ibid.)
The People contend that like these cases, the children here viewed
Stolte as an authority figure. They urge “the [children] were under
considerable duress and experienced fear when [Stolte], an adult older and
larger than them, molested and then told each of them to keep it a secret.”
The People also argue Stolte committed the acts “by means of duress based
on his physical dominance and his relationship with them as a new authority
figure.”
Stolte concedes that the disparate age and size concerns of Cochran,
Veale, and Pitmon also apply here, but he argues that those factors alone,
without relevant aggravating facts, do not support a finding of duress. We
agree. Although the children testified that they feared Stolte and viewed him
as an adult with authority, there is no evidence they feared Stolte before or at
the time of the lewd conduct, or that his relatively short-term relationship
with them had a coercive effect. As such, there is no evidence from which to
reasonably infer Stolte psychologically coerced the children to perform or
submit to acts they otherwise would not have.
There is no dispute the children feared Stolte and were afraid
something bad would happen if they told anyone what he did. Grace testified
Stolte told her to “‘keep this a secret,’” and she did not feel like she could tell
anyone because she felt “like if I told someone and he found out, like he was
going to shoot me with a gun or something.” During the forensic interview,
Grace said she was “pretty sure” if she told his secret, Stolte would say that

9
he would “have to, you know, hurt you really bad or something.” Sophia
testified she feared Stolte after the incident, because “I was afraid he might
do it again or something worse.” She did not know what “something worse”
would be but was “really scared.” However, none of this evidence shows or
supports a reasonable inference the children were afraid of Stolte before or at
the time of the incident such that their fear caused them to acquiesce to
Stolte’s conduct.
Similarly, while there is evidence the children viewed Stolte as an
adult with authority, there is no evidence his relationship with the children
had a coercive effect. This is not a case of a child being repeatedly molested
by a father or stepfather, where “duress will be present in all but the rarest
cases.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1072-1073.) Nor did
the relationship have the dynamic of a child being secluded and alone with a
stranger. (See Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 51.) Grace testified Stolte
was an adult, adults are treated with respect, and she therefore treated
Stolte with respect. During the forensic interview, Sophia explained that
Stolte did not say what could happen if she told someone, “[b]ut he was an
adult and he had the authority . . . and I knew that.” Within days of Stolte
moving onto the property, the children were sleeping in his RV, Grace slept
in the same bed with him, he took them on excursions alone, and he initiated
a reward system for good behavior: all indicators the children viewed Stolte
as an authority figure. This does not, however, reflect a coercive environment
in which the children felt they had to acquiesce to Stolte’s conduct, such as
when a father figure is living in the home so that a child has no choice but to
comply with his rules and direction.
On this record, we cannot conclude there is substantial evidence to
support a reasonable inference that Stolte used direct or implied threats to

10
coerce the children to perform or submit to acts they otherwise would not
have. Therefore, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support a
finding of duress under section 288(b).
3.
Stolte separately contends there is insufficient evidence to support even
the lesser included offense under section 288(a) for counts 3, 5, 6, 12, and 13.
Stolte argues the children’s trial testimony “made very clear” the acts alleged
in those counts did not occur. Pointing to the children’s statements during
the forensic interviews describing how the alleged acts occurred, the People
argue that while some of their trial testimony two years later contradicted
their earlier statements, there is ample evidence to support the convictions.
We agree with the People.
Count 3 charged Stolte with touching Grace’s breasts over her clothes.
Stolte challenges this conviction based on Grace testifying twice during trial
that she did not remember him doing so. At trial, she also confirmed that she
denied such acts at the preliminary hearing. However, during her first
forensic interview, when asked if “he touched you there also, on the chest,’’
Grace replied, “yeah.” Later in the interview, she again said Stolte “started
to touch my chest,” and when asked “what did he touch your chest with,” she
replied, “His hands. All of it was hands.”
In count 5, Stolte was charged with pulling Grace’s hand onto his penis,
and count 6 charged attempt of the same. Stolte contends Grace denied these
acts at trial, relying on her testimony that “I think he was going to, but no, I
didn’t. I didn’t do it.” She further testified that “he [said] like, ‘Just, I need
your hand.’ And I’m like ‘No. No, thank you.’ And then I just gave him the
coffee.” At trial, Grace explained that this was the same day she told Mother
what happened the night before, which is consistent with her second forensic

11
interview, when she stated, “The next day he said all I need is your hand.”
When asked what Stolte’s hands were doing when he said that, Grace stated,
“He pointed at me. He was about to grab my hand. That’s when he said, all I
need is your hand.” Stolte does not address why this is insufficient evidence
of attempt for count 6. Regarding count 5, Grace said during the first
interview that the night of Mother’s colonoscopy, “he also made me touch his
no-no square, like that, but not under underwear.” Grace also called it the
“D word” and said it felty “pointy” and “round.”
Count 12 charged Stolte with touching Sophia’s buttocks under her
clothes. He argues this conviction must be reversed because Sophia testified
at trial that he did not touch her buttocks. However, during the first forensic
interview, when asked, “did he touch any other parts of your body,” Sophia
responded, “My butt.” When asked during the second interview, “he touched
you where next?” Sophia responded, “On my butt.” She said his hand went
“underneath” her shorts and was “squeezing it.”
Finally, in count 13, Stolte was charged with touching Sophia’s vagina
under her clothes. He challenges this conviction because at trial, Sophia
testified he touched her vagina on top of her garments and “didn’t really
touch under the garments.” Stolte also points to Sophia’s trial testimony that
he touched her thigh below her shorts but said “no” when asked “did he try to
go any higher?” During the second forensic interview, Sophia had a difficult
time discussing the way Stolte touched her “no-no spot,” saying, among other
things, “Sorry. I cannot tell that” and “Well, I’m sorr – . . . I don’t wanna . . . I
don’t wanna think about it.” She was eventually able to tell the interviewer
that “first it was like around here on my shorts,” and “a little later on then he
started touching underneath,” “around the underwear,” “and then
underneath the underwear.”

12
Stolte claims he does not ask this court to reweigh the evidence.
However, in asserting the children’s trial testimony “established that
counts 3, 5, 6, 12, and 13 did not occur at all,” and “was entirely consistent”
“[o]n these counts alone,” he ignores their contrary statements during the
forensic interviews indicating that the alleged acts did occur. Notably, Stolte
does not argue that the children’s interview statements were not “reasonable,
credible, and of solid value” and thus not substantial evidence. The verdict
shows the jury credited those statements, as they were entitled to do.
Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence is the exclusive
providence of the trier of fact and is not reviewable on appeal. (Mejia, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 93.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
findings that Stolte committed the acts alleged in counts 3, 5, 6, 12, and 13.
B.
Second, Stolte argues the court should have declared a mistrial after
Mother revealed that he had previously been in prison. At defense counsel’s
request, the court instructed the jury to disregard that statement and
admonished Mother to not make any other statements on that subject. Stolte
claims the trial court’s admonishment was insufficient and mistrial was
required. Although his counsel did not request a mistrial, he argues we
should exercise our discretion to reach the merits of this issue; in the
alternative, he asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The People
contend Stolte cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel and that, in
any event, mistrial was not required. We decline to reach the merits of
Stolte’s claim and cannot conclude, on this record, that counsel was
ineffective.

13
During the prosecution’s case, when the prosecutor asked Mother why
she believed she should have taken more time to get to know Stolte before
allowing him to live on the property, Mother responded, “Well, because he
had told me about being in prison before —.” Defense counsel objected. At
side bar, defense counsel explained that Stolte’s criminal past was excluded
except for impeachment and acknowledged that the prosecutor “did not elicit
that specific answer from her, but I think she needs to be admonished not to
discuss that.” The court accepted the prosecutor’s representation that he had
told Mother not to discuss Stolte’s prison time, as well as his explanation that
although he did not know why she would volunteer that information, she had
been extremely nervous. Defense counsel requested that the court instruct
the jury to disregard the testimony. The court did so accordingly, stating
that Mother “made a mention that she believed that Mr. Stolte had served
time in prison. That’s something that’s not relevant at all to this case and, as
a result, I’m ordering you to disregard that statement. Don’t speculate about
it or why she might have said that.”
Because Stolte did not move for a mistrial, he forfeited his argument
that mistrial was required. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 368.)
Anticipating forfeiture, Stolte urges us to exercise discretion to review this
issue, claiming Mother’s statement and the trial court’s insufficient
admonishment constituted structural error and a violation of his right to a
fair trial. The cases that Stolte cites do not support his position and do not
involve admission of objectionable testimony but rather (1) a People v. Mello
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 511 instruction, which has been previously held to be
structural error (People v. Abbaszadeh (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 642, 649-650);
and (2) an assertion of biased questioning by the trial court during voir dire,

14
affecting the defendant’s right to an impartial jury (People v. Whalen (2013)
56 Cal.4th 1, 28).
The issue here is different. “‘Juries often hear unsolicited and
inadmissible comments[,] and in order for trials to proceed without constant
mistrial, it is axiomatic the prejudicial effect of these comments may be
corrected by judicial admonishment.’” (People v. McNally (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428-1429.) A curative instruction to disregard
improper testimony is almost always sufficient to protect a defendant from
prejudice and we presume jurors understand and follow such an instruction.
(People v. Navarrete (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 828, 834.) It is “only in the
‘exceptional case’ that any prejudice from an improperly volunteered
statement cannot be cured by appropriate admonition to the jury.” (People v.
Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 955.) Stolte has not shown that the
curative instruction in this case was insufficient to protect him from any
prejudice resulting from the brief reference to his prior prison term—much
less that it amounted to structural error. Under these circumstances, we
decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Stolte’s argument.
In the alternative, Stolte contends defense counsel’s failure to move for
mistrial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment. He argues his counsel’s performance was deficient
because there could be no tactical reason not to move for a mistrial. We
disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that (1) the “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms,” and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
was prejudicial—i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s
failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. (People

15
v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott); see also Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694.) It is “particularly difficult to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, where we are
limited to evaluating the appellate record.” (Scott, at p. 1212.) For this
reason, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the record “sheds
no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal
must be rejected.” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266
[cleaned up].)
Applying these principles, we cannot conclude on this record that
defense counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing
to move for a mistrial. The record sheds no light on why defense counsel did
not move for a mistrial. We also cannot say there could be no rational
tactical explanation. Defense counsel may have assessed the chances of
success as minimal and refrained from antagonizing the judge with a futile
gesture. Moreover, because of the discretion afforded a trial court in granting
a mistrial, it is rare that the merits of a mistrial motion are so clear that
counsel’s failure to make the motion would amount to ineffective assistance.
(People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.) Even if defense counsel
believed the chances were positive, counsel may have refrained for fear that a
second trial under less favorable circumstances would follow. Counsel could
have determined any harm from the statement was minimal and would
permit Stolte to explain that his prior prison time was for car theft almost ten
years ago, giving him an opportunity to portray himself as someone who
takes accountability, grew from his mistakes, and has since strived to be “a
productive member of society.”

16
Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that defense
counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial after Mother’s statement and the
court’s curative instruction rendered counsel’s assistance ineffective.
C.
Third, Stolte claims the prosecutor committed prejudicial prosecutorial
error by encouraging Grace’s reference to him as a “terrifying villain” and
vouching for her testimony. He also contends the prosecutor did not “stick to
the facts and the evidence” during closing arguments, and instead
encouraged the jury to speculate about his character and motivations.
Recognizing defense counsel did not object below, Stolte urges this court to
exercise its discretion to reach the merits because the misconduct violated his
constitutional rights. In the alternative, he argues ineffective assistance of
counsel. On the merits, we conclude no prosecutorial error occurred;
therefore, Stolte’s constitutional rights were not violated. We thus need not
reach the issues of prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel.
“In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.” (People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447.) It is prosecutorial error to misstate the law
or evidence, or to go beyond the record. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147,
204; see also People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 947.) A defendant
asserting misconduct based on the prosecutor’s comments before the jury
must establish a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied the
remarks objectionably. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568.)
Stolte argues that after Grace identified him as he “who should not be
named,” the prosecutor committed error by later encouraging the comparison
to a terrifying villain: Lord Voldemort who was referred to as “He-Who-Must-
Not-Be-Named” in the popular Harry Potter book series. Even if the

17
prosecutor referred to Stolte as a villain, using derogatory epithets such as
“monster,” “sociopath,” “reprehensible excuse for a human being,” or “urban
terrorist” is not prosecutorial error when warranted by the evidence. (People
v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 890.) However, contrary to Stolte’s claim,
the prosecutor did not “ma[k]e light of[ ] the Voldemort reference” or refer to
Stolte as a villain at all. Later in her testimony, Grace had difficulty
remembering what to call Stolte, asking, “I think the – what do you call him?
I was about to say delinquent. Sorry.” The prosecutor responded, “I think
you called him earlier, he who should not be named.” The prosecutor then
asked why she called him that, and Grace explained, “Because I do not like to
name him.” The prosecutor did not use “slanderous comparisons of [Stolte] to
an evil villain” or go beyond the bounds of fair commentary; rather, he helped
keep Grace on track by identifying Stolte using her own terms.
No more convincing is Stolte’s claim that the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial error by vouching for Grace’s testimony when he told her she
was “the best” as he collected exhibits from her. Impermissible vouching may
occur when prosecutors seek to bolster their case by placing the prestige of
the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the
witness’s veracity or suggesting that evidence available to the government,
but not before the jury, corroborates the witness’s testimony. (People v.
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1207.) The record here shows the prosecutor
was being polite and not commenting on any evidence, Grace’s testimony, or
her truthfulness. Rather, when collecting the exhibits, the prosecutor asked,
“Can I have that one too?” Grace responded, “Of course.” Then the
prosecutor said, “You’re the best. Thank you.” Nothing in this exchange
suggests the prosecutor sought to improperly bolster the People’s case.

18
Stolte further claims that, during closing argument, the prosecutor
encouraged the jury to assume facts about his character and motivations not
supported by any evidence. A criminal prosecutor has wide latitude when
making a closing argument. The argument can be strongly worded and
vigorous so long as it fairly comments on the evidence, including reasonable
inferences or deductions that can be drawn from that evidence. (People v.
Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215.) Here, the People’s theory of the case was
that Stolte learned of Mother’s and the children’s vulnerability and took
advantage of the opportunity to become close with the children and gain
unsupervised access to commit the lewd acts.
Stolte quotes and takes issue with the prosecutor’s argument
discussing the circumstances of him moving onto the property, including that
Mother was victimized in the past by her late husband, the children were not
disciplined or well behaved, Mother and the children wanted someone to
trust, he and Mother had an intimate relationship within the first day of
meeting, and he developed an abnormal relationship with the children,
spending one-on-one time with them and allowing them in his RV at night,
within a week. Stolte also objects to the prosecutor’s statements that the
children were not trained witnesses and it was understandable that they did
not remember everything. Finally, Stolte criticizes the prosecutor’s argument
about his credibility. Stolte, however, does not explain why these statements
were neither supported by nor could be inferred from the evidence. No part
of the argument asked the jury to make any inferences that could not
reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
We conclude no prosecutorial error occurred.

19
D.
Finally, Stolte argues the matter must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court failed to recognize it had the discretion to sentence
counts 9 and 10 concurrently instead of consecutively. He claims there was
no evidence the acts alleged in those counts were committed on separate
occasions for purpose of consecutive sentencing under sections 667.6 and
667.61. We disagree and conclude consecutive sentencing of counts 9 and 10
was required on this record.
Section 667.61 mandates consecutive sentences for each conviction of
forcible lewd conduct upon a child under section 288(b) if the offenses
“involve[d] the same victim on separate occasions as defined in
subdivision (d) of Section 667.6.” (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(4), (i); People v.
Lopez (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 287, 291.) Section 667.6(d) provides that the
court shall consider whether “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed.” The
standard is broad and does not require an obvious break in the defendant’s
behavior or control over the victim. (People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98,
104.) “Once a trial judge has found under section 667.6, subdivision (d), that
a defendant committed offenses on separate occasions, we may reverse only if
no reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity for reflection after completing an offense before resuming his
assaultive behavior.” (People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1092.)
Applying this deferential standard, we conclude the trial court could
reasonably decide that counts 9 (touching Sophia’s vagina over her clothes)
and 10 (touching Sophia’s breasts over her clothes) occurred on separate
occasions. The court agreed with Stolte’s counsel and probation that
counts 8, 9, and 14 constituted one overt act and counts 10, 11, 12, and 13

20
constituted another overt act for purposes of staying execution of sentences
under section 654, which bars multiple punishments for acts that constitute a
single course of conduct. (People v. Lopez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 268, fn. 5.)
For the counts not barred by section 654, probation recommended
consecutive sentences under section 667.6(d) because the acts alleged in those
counts demonstrated independent behaviors and Stolte had the opportunity
to stop his behavior. Stolte argues there was nothing in Sophia’s trial
testimony clearly differentiating the acts but fails to address her statements
in the second interview that, at some point, she left the RV because she did
not know what was “going on” and she “was getting really stressed.” She got
a sip of milk and went back to the RV, “then he continued.” Based on this
evidence, and as acknowledged by Stolte’s own characterization of counts 9
and 10 as separate overt acts, a reasonable trier of fact could have found
Stolte had adequate opportunity for reflection between those acts such that
they occurred on separate occasions for purposes of consecutive sentencing
under sections 667.6(d) and 667.61(i).

21
III.
We reverse in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for
resentencing. The convictions on counts 1 through 5 and 8 through 14 for
forcible lewd conduct under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1) are
reduced to the lesser included offense of nonforcible lewd conduct under
section 288, subdivision (a). The convictions on counts 6 and 7 for attempted
forcible lewd conduct under sections 288, subdivision (b)(1) and 664 are
reduced to attempted nonforcible lewd conduct under sections 288,
subdivision (a) and 664. The judgment of conviction is affirmed as modified
and in all other respects. The matter is remanded for resentencing. Upon
resentencing, the trial court is directed to prepare and forward an amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

22

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.