CourtListener 9502559•Wiedner v. Stevenson CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 5/13/24 Wiedner v. Stevenson CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PATTY WIEDNER, B323760
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STPB11853
v.
CHARLYNE STEVENSON,
as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded.
John A. Bunnett for Defendant and Appellant.
John Alan Cohan for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Before her death, Roberta Louise Davis established
a special needs trust—within her own inter vivos trust—to
benefit her gravely disabled adult son Daniel L. Black during
his lifetime. Daniel was under a Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS)
conservatorship. One of Roberta’s sisters, appellant Charlyne
Stevenson, was the successor trustee of Roberta’s trust, trustee
of Daniel’s special needs trust, and a contingent, remainder
beneficiary of Roberta’s trust upon Daniel’s death. Another
sister, respondent Patty Wiedner, was excluded from the trust.
She became involved in Daniel’s care after Roberta’s death in
June 2016 and, in April 2019, succeeded the public guardian
as Daniel’s conservator.1 At the heart of this appeal is a dispute
between these sisters over payments Patty asked Charlyne to
make to her from the trust. In the end, the probate court ordered
Charlyne pay Patty from the trust: her conservator fees, costs
she had advanced and incurred for Daniel’s benefit, and her
court-appointed attorney’s fees and costs.
Charlyne appeals from that order, and the court’s order
awarding $1,750 in sanctions against Charlyne and her counsel
after it denied Charlyne’s motions for new trial and to set aside
the judgment. Charlyne asserts several errors. She contends
Patty had no standing or legal basis to demand her conservator
fees and attorney fees be paid from the trust; substantial
evidence did not support the expenses, fees, and attorney fees
the court ordered to be paid; the sanctions were not justified
1 We refer to Roberta, Daniel, Charlyne, and Patty by
their first names for ease of reference. We intend no disrespect
in doing so.
2
or authorized by law; and irregularity in the proceedings and
the exclusion of relevant evidence resulted in a miscarriage
of justice requiring a new trial.
We conclude Patty had standing. We also conclude
the terms of the special needs trust allowed reimbursement
for some, but not all, of the expenditures Patty claimed and
for her conservator fees, and substantial evidence supported
the court’s findings as to those expenditures. We reverse the
court’s order in part, however, to the extent it orders Patty
be reimbursed for certain expenditures she incurred before
her conservator appointment and for her attorney fees. We also
reverse the court’s sanctions award. We find no miscarriage
of justice occurred.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The trust and conservatorship
Roberta created her living trust in September 2002.
She amended and restated it in March 2010, naming her sister
Charlyne as the successor trustee. The main asset of the trust
was a single-family residence. Roberta died on June 30, 2016.
As successor trustee, Charlyne sold the property, which netted
$335,847 to the trust on August 29, 2016.
Roberta’s trust included—as a sub-trust—a “special
needs trust”2 for the benefit of her adult son Daniel, who had
2 A special needs trust is a trust that is intended to allow
the beneficiary to continue to maintain eligibility for certain
needs-based government benefits. (Balian v. Balian (2009)
179 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1512.) Daniel’s needs-based government
benefits were his monthly supplemental security income (SSI)
and Medi-Cal benefits.
3
schizophrenia and developmental disabilities. The sub-trust
was known as the “Daniel L. Black Special Needs Trust” (SNT).
Charlyne is also the trustee for the SNT.
Around April 2009, before Roberta died, Daniel was placed
under an LPS conservatorship.3 His schizophrenia “made him
‘clinically unstable’ such that he was in and out of hospitals when
he was not housed in a facility.” He had behavioral problems,
such as “hitting himself, punching walls, disrobing in public,
impulsivity and outbursts.” The public defender represented
Daniel in the LPS conservatorship proceedings. The mental
health court appointed the public guardian (Ernest Baiden)
as the conservator of Daniel’s person and estate.4
Daniel received monthly social security and SSI; this
constituted his “estate.” From these funds, the public guardian
paid for Daniel’s clothing, room and board, and extra spending
money (known as PNI) for personal items, “like soda and other
treats.” The public guardian paid Daniel’s board and care facility
about $1,050 a month and deposited $130 a month in PNI to
3 The LPS Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) provides
for the appointment of a conservator of the person, the estate,
or both, “for a person who is gravely disabled as a result of a
mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.”
(Id., § 5350.)
4 Baiden was a deputy public conservator with the office
of the public guardian. The public guardian must serve as
conservator of any person found to be gravely disabled under the
LPS Act for whom the court has recommended a conservatorship
“if the court finds that no other person or entity is willing and
able to serve as conservator.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5354.5.)
4
Daniel’s account with the facility (or $35 a month if he were
in a skilled nursing facility). The public guardian also was
responsible for making payments for Daniel’s medical and dental
care.
Daniel’s conservatorship was renewed each year until
his death in 2020. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361, subds. (a) &
(b) [an LPS conservatorship automatically terminates one year
after the appointment of the conservator unless the conservator,
after determining the conservatorship is still required, petitions
for reappointment for a succeeding one-year period].) The public
guardian served as Daniel’s conservator until April 2019 when
Patty succeeded Baiden.
According to Roberta’s trust, on her death, the remaining
trust property was to be held in the SNT “to provide a
supplemental and emergency fund to supplement any public
benefits available to [Daniel] during his lifetime.” On Daniel’s
death, the trustee (Charlyne) was to distribute any remaining
trust property “outright” to herself, her daughter (Roberta’s
niece), and Roberta’s great nephew (presumably, the niece’s son).
Under the terms of the SNT,
“No part of the income or principal of the trust
shall be used to replace or supplant public
benefits of any county or any state, federal,
or other governmental agency that has a legal
responsibility to serve persons with disabilities
or conditions that are the same as or similar to
those of [Daniel]. For purposes of determining
[Daniel’s] eligibility for public benefits, no part
of the principal or undistributed income of
the trust estate shall be considered available
5
to him, and he shall have no right to compel
the trustee to release principal or income to
him or for his benefit or otherwise have any
access to any of the trust assets.”5
The SNT also directs that, if the trustee were asked to
release trust funds to or on behalf of Daniel to pay for needs that
public benefits “would be authorized to provide” in the absence
of the SNT,
“the trustee shall deny the request and take
whatever administrative or judicial steps
may be necessary to continue the eligibility
of [Daniel] for all available public benefits,
including obtaining a determination or
declaration from a court of competent
jurisdiction that the trust principal is
not available to [Daniel] for purposes of
determining his eligibility for any public
benefits. Any expenses of the trustee in this
regard, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,
shall be a proper charge to the trust estate.”
The SNT mandates that, during Daniel’s lifetime, “the
trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of [Daniel] as much
of the net income and as much of the principal of the trust as the
trustee, in the trustee’s sole discretion, from time to time deems
necessary or advisable for the satisfaction of his special needs,”
5 The SNT defines “public benefits” as including, but not
limited to, SSI, Medi-Cal or other state medical assistance
program authorized under Medicaid, and federal social security
disability insurance.
6
meaning, “the requisites for maintaining the good health,
comfort, safety, and welfare of [Daniel] when, in the discretion
of the trustee, those requisites are not being provided for” by
any public benefit program or person legally obligated to support
Daniel. The SNT requires the trustee to “consult with any
guardian, conservator, custodian, or other person who cares
for [Daniel] regarding his special needs.”
2. Patty’s involvement and appointment as conservator
Patty, also Daniel’s aunt, was not a named beneficiary
or successor trustee of Roberta’s trust. Patty had not visited
Daniel in the seven years before Roberta’s death, except maybe
once in 2012 or 2013. After Roberta’s death in June 2016, Patty
began to visit Daniel regularly. She made various expenditures
on his behalf, including paying for haircuts, sundries, and
clothes; taking him to lunch; and depositing cash in his
“account” with the facility where he lived to pay for extra treats.
In January 2017, Patty asked John Bunnett, as the trustee’s
counsel, to reimburse her from the SNT for the money she had
spent from July to December 2016. Bunnett refused. He told
Patty’s then-counsel that Patty was not authorized to make
expenditures, or perform duties, on behalf of the SNT, and the
listed expenses “were never communicated to or authorized by”
Charlyne, as trustee.
At some point, Daniel developed extensive problems
with his teeth. He had difficulty eating and pain, which he
complained about to Patty. She began taking him to dental
providers in December 2016. She obtained estimates for different
treatment plans from various providers. In January 2017, a
specialist at UCLA provided a $25,925 estimate for extractions,
bone grafts, and dental implants. Patty apparently appeared
7
before the mental health court in January 2017 to ask about
getting Daniel’s teeth fixed. In July, she wrote the judge in the
LPS conservatorship proceeding to ask about having Daniel’s
teeth fixed, and included the estimate.6
There was a difference of opinion as to the best course
of treatment for Daniel. In her July 2017 letter, Patty wrote
she did not believe Daniel was a “good candidate” for partial
dentures, as he likely would lose or break them. Baiden, on the
other hand, wrote in a January 2018 memorandum, “Any attempt
to have all of Mr. Black’s teeth extracted for dental implants will
be too invasive and not serve Conservatee’s best interest.”
In August 2017, Baiden responded to the mental health
court’s inquiry as to whether a family member could be appointed
as successor conservator for Daniel. He did not recommend
Patty. Baiden described Charlyne and Patty as having an
“intense sibling-rivalry.” He was concerned Daniel “could
possibly become a ‘pawn’ between his two Aunts.” He noted
Charlyne’s appointment as Roberta’s successor trustee “ha[d]
bothered” Patty “a lot,” and stated Patty was “doing everything
possible to even have [sic] an invasive procedure to have [Daniel]
go through an unnecessary and invasive dental procedure
so the Trust will be drained.” He believed Daniel’s interests
would best be served by the public guardian continuing as his
conservator.
6 In April 2017, Patty apparently filed a petition in the
Riverside County superior court asking it to monitor the SNT.
After Charlyne (through Bunnett) filed a demurrer based on
Patty’s lack of standing, Patty withdrew her petition. Patty’s
petition is not part of the appellate record.
8
In January 2018, Baiden provided an update on
recommendations he had received about Daniel’s dental needs.
Lumina Dental had identified 14 of Daniel’s teeth that should be
extracted and recommended upper and lower partial dentures.7
Baiden also noted Daniel was “clinically unstable, going in
and out of hospitals” due to behavioral problems. He “need[ed]
to remain in a locked setting at th[at] time due to his ongoing
behavioral problems.”
In November 2018, Patty asked the public guardian
to reimburse her for clothing and other items she had bought
for Daniel. Baiden made clear, as he had told her previously,
that “[a]ny purchases made for Danny by anyone, without
prior authorization from [the] [p]ublic [g]uardian cannot be
reimbursed,” as the public guardian had to make those purchases
directly. Baiden asked Patty to let him know if Daniel told her
about specific items he needed.
On April 10, 2019—on Daniel’s motion—the mental health
court relieved the public guardian as conservator and appointed
Patty as Daniel’s LPS conservator of the person. Because Patty
did not have an attorney, the court appointed one for her
(Kelli Stanford). The court noted, “If there are needs that
Mr. Black has—that need to be paid out of the special need[s]
trust, I would expect that you would make a request for that.
7 Lumina Dental, however, prepared an estimate that
focused on removing only the four worst teeth. The public
guardian paid for that treatment in advance—about $3,600—
from Daniel’s monthly benefits. Daniel was unable to have
the procedure at that time due to his instability. By the time
he was able, the public guardian no longer was conservator.
9
But if you’re making extravagant request[s], then I’m going
to be looking at the conservatorship.”
On December 6, 2019, the mental health court relieved
Stanford as Patty’s counsel. The court appointed John Cohan
to represent Patty, as Daniel’s conservator, “for all purposes”
under section 5370.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and
ordered “[a]ttorney fees to be paid by Los Angeles County.”
3. Dispute over dental treatment leading to petitions
In November 2019, Patty obtained estimates from Western
Dental, but they did not involve implants. Patty wanted Daniel
to have implants. Charlyne and attorney Bunnett did not
believe Daniel would handle the procedure well, partly because
it required anesthesia and he had apnea. In December 2019,
Patty, through attorney Cohan, sent a demand that the SNT
pay for proposed dental implant treatment, at first estimated
to cost $21,850 and then increased to $50,465. Patty sought
an order in the LPS conservatorship case authorizing her,
as Daniel’s conservator, to consent to dental treatment on
his behalf. The court entered an order on January 8, 2020,
authorizing Patty to consent on Daniel’s behalf to dental
implants or dentures, tooth extractions, bone grafts, other
procedures, and anesthesia “as needed for the procedures.”
Meanwhile, on December 20, 2019, Charlyne, as trustee,
filed a petition under Probate Code8 section 17200 et seq.,
amended on February 25, 2020, to bring the internal affairs
of Roberta’s trust and the SNT under the probate court’s
8 Statutory references are to the Probate Code, unless
otherwise stated.
10
jurisdiction.9 The petition sought, among other things, an order
that she had “sole discretion to determine what expenditures”
to make from the SNT and to deny expenditures she deemed
inappropriate; a determination of the dental treatment Daniel
required; instructions as to whether she had discretion to deny
spending the requested funds on the dental treatment if she
determined it was not in Daniel’s best interest; and an order
that she was not required to reimburse Patty for any expenses
she “purportedly made on behalf of Daniel” that Charlyne did
not authorize in advance. The petition made various factual
allegations, including that Patty was trying to drain the trust
because she felt “spurned that she had been cut out of” the trust,
and essentially had prevented Charlyne from seeing Daniel.
Patty filed a response with objections to Charlyne’s
amended petition, raising issues of Charlyne’s breach of her
trustee and fiduciary duties, alleging ethical violations by her
counsel, and asking for sanctions and damages. Patty alleged
Daniel was in poor health, “exacerbated by long-standing and
serious dental problems” that Charlyne had failed to pay for
from the SNT. Patty alleged Charlyne had refused to pay for
anything Daniel “need[ed] or . . . requested” and had “abrogated
her duties by delegating day-to-day trust[ ] administration and
decision-making” to Bunnett. Patty asked the court to order
Charlyne to pay for Daniel’s dental procedures out of the SNT.
The response also included a letter from prosthodontist
9 Patty filed a notice of related case, which Charlyne
opposed. Because the LPS conservatorship case and the
new probate case both fell within the probate division rules,
Department 1 did not relate them.
11
Dr. Alfredo Paredes, who saw Daniel in May 2020. He
recommended a full mouth reconstruction with dental implants
under general anesthesia. The estimated cost was $65,000.
At a hearing on Charlyne’s petition on July 31, 2020,
after Dr. Paredes testified about Daniel’s teeth and that he was
suffering from infection that could not be managed long-term
with antibiotics, the court ordered Charlyne to release $30,000
from the SNT to Patty by August 10, 2020, to begin Daniel’s
dental work. The court understood Daniel’s treatment “would
have to proceed in phases, including multiple stages to extract
teeth and then place [the] implants, and that Daniel would
have to be sedated with anesthesia.” The court directed Patty
to submit receipts for the use of the $30,000 to Bunnett,
and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Daniel.
Bunnett filed an ex parte application asking the court to
reconsider and/or stay its order directing Charlyne to release
the funds to Patty. He argued the health department recently
had expanded Medi-Cal dental benefits to include most of the
treatment outlined by Paredes.10 He contended the terms of
the trust thus prevented Charlyne from releasing the funds to
pay for the covered treatment. Patty opposed the application.
Cohan declared he had contacted several Medi-Cal dental
offices: they either did not provide the treatment Daniel
needed or said they never had been able to get Medi-Cal to
pay for dental implants. The court denied the application.
10 The Medi-Cal Dental Provider Handbook required
pre-authorization for dental implants and documentation
of “exceptional medical circumstances.”
12
Sadly, on August 27, 2020, Daniel had his first dental
procedure with Dr. Paredes and died.
On September 30, 2020, Charlyne filed her first and final
account and report of trustee seeking reimbursement of costs,
for her trustee’s and her attorney’s compensation, and for
distribution of the trust estate. Ultimately, Charlyne sought
$15,345.41 in trustee fees at $40 per hour; reimbursement
of $1,284.47 in out-of-pocket expenditures for Daniel; and
attorney fees for Bunnett totaling $47,318.15. Charlyne
does not challenge the court’s final order concerning these
fees and costs.
On October 8, 2020, the court convened a hearing
on Charlyne’s first amended petition. The court assumed
jurisdiction over Roberta’s trust and the SNT and confirmed
Charlyne as acting trustee of the trusts. The court ordered
“that all proceedings involving the Trust and all proceedings
arising under . . . § 17200, et seq. be commenced in the
Los Angeles Superior Court, Central District.” The court
denied Charlyne’s other requests or found them moot. The court
also gave “an OK to set any petition that should be considered
in conjunction with the [trustee’s] accounting for 2/18/2021.”11
The petition was to be filed and served by December 15, 2020.
In accordance with the court’s order, on December 10, 2020,
Patty filed a petition for the allowance of conservator’s fees,
reimbursement of costs advanced, and payment of costs incurred,
11 At the hearing, the court stated that, if Patty planned to
seek reimbursement for any expenses, “that should be something
that is brought before the court.”
13
and allowance of conservator’s attorney’s fees and costs, all
to be paid from the SNT. Patty and Cohan asserted standing
to bring the petition under sections 2640, 2641, and 2642.
The petition alleged there was no conservatorship estate.
Patty asked for reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs
totaling $33,228.36 that she made for Daniel’s benefit from
July 2016 through July 25, 2020; $56,500 for transportation costs
from July 2016 to July 15, 2020; and $8,000 in conservator fees
as compensation for performing her duties as conservator under
section 2641. Cohan asked for attorney fees from August 5, 2020
to the present. At $250 per hour they totaled $20,350, but had
increased to $38,007.26 by the end of trial. He also asked for
$1,082.26 in costs.
On May 3, 2021, the court set an evidentiary hearing
for October 20, 2021, on the petition for conservator’s fees and
on the trustee’s accounting. The minute order notes that all
counsel/parties appeared by LACourtConnect.
The court heard testimony over three days on October 20,
2021, November 3, 2021, and January 31, 2022. Patty, her
husband, Charlyne, Baiden, and Cohan testified. Bunnett
requested a statement of decision. The court filed its proposed
statement of decision on April 25, 2022. The court established
equitable liens against the trust assets for reimbursement of
monies to Patty and her conservatorship fees, and as to attorney
fees payable to Cohan (and to Daniel’s GAL). The court ordered
Patty be reimbursed from the trust $32,198.36 in out-of-pocket
expenses, $56,500 in transportation costs, and $8,000 in
conservatorship fees; and Cohan be reimbursed $28,947.26 in
attorney fees and costs. As to Charlyne’s accounting, the court
ordered her to pay from the trust $30,155.65 in attorney fees and
14
$1,231.32 in costs to Bunnett, pay herself $5,760 in trustee fees,
reimburse herself $1,284.47 in out-of-pocket costs, and pay the
GAL $11,141.88.
Charlyne objected to the proposed statement of decision.
The court overruled the objections on May 25, 2022, declared
its statement of decision final, and entered its order on Patty’s
petition on June 24, 2022 and on Charlyne’s accounting on July 1,
2022.
On July 15, 2022, Charlyne filed notices of intention
to move for a new trial and to set aside the judgment and enter
a different judgment under section 663 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. She argued the court abused its discretion in
not conducting the trial in open court and excluding evidence
relevant to her case, and awarded excessive “damages.” Charlyne
argued the judgment should be set aside because it was based
on an error of law, namely, that no legal basis existed to compel
the SNT to reimburse Patty for the expenses she claimed or
to pay her conservator or attorney fees. She also argued the
trial evidence was insufficient to support the court’s order.
The court denied the motions on September 2, 2022.
On Cohan’s request for sanctions in his joint opposition to the
motions, the court also ordered Charlyne and Bunnett to pay,
jointly and severally, sanctions of $1,750.
Charlyne appealed from the “judgment” on Patty’s petition
for conservator fees, reimbursement of costs, and attorney fees;
from the “judgment” on trustee’s first and final account—but only
to the extent it ordered Charlyne, as trustee, to pay the amounts
granted in Patty’s petition; from the court’s orders denying
Charlyne’s motions for new trial and to vacate the judgment
15
and enter a new judgment; and from the court’s order imposing
sanctions.
DISCUSSION
Charlyne contends: (1) the probate court abused its
discretion in directing Charlyne, as trustee, to pay from the trust
Patty’s conservator fees and costs allegedly expended for Daniel’s
benefit and her attorney fees allegedly incurred for Daniel’s or
the trust’s benefit;12 (2) irregularity in the proceedings and the
court’s exclusion of evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice
requiring a new trial; (3) substantial evidence does not support
the court’s awards on Patty’s petition, in any event; and (4) the
court abused its discretion in imposing $1,750 in sanctions
against Charlyne and Bunnett.
1. Standards of review
As this appeal primarily is from a judgment based on
a statement of decision after a bench trial, “we review the
trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact
for substantial evidence.” (McPherson v. EF Intercultural
Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257.) We resolve
“ ‘any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the facts . . . in support of the determination of the
trial court[’s] decision.’ ” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th
62, 75–76.) “We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound
by the trial court’s credibility determinations.” (Id. at p. 76.)
12 More specifically, Charlyne contends the court erred in
“imposing an equitable lien against the vested interest of the
[trust’s] contingent beneficiaries in contravention to the express
intentions of the settlor of [Roberta’s trust].”
16
Where the trial court’s orders are based on the exercise
of its discretion—such as the award of conservator fees, expenses,
and attorney fees here—we apply the abuse of discretion
standard of review. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of Levitt (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 544, 549 [determination of what constitutes
reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the
trial court]; § 2640, subd. (c) [court determines if compensation
requested by conservator is “just and reasonable”]; cf. In re
Fraysher’s Estate (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 136 [“In passing upon
the reasonableness and necessity of expenditures during
[estate] administration, the court below is vested ‘with a broad
discretion,’ which will not be disturbed on appeal except when
abused.”].) A court abuses its discretion if it exceeded the bounds
of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence, failed to
follow proper procedure in reaching its decision, or applied the
wrong legal standard to the determination. (Dunlap v. Mayer
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 419, 424.)
To the extent the court’s orders depend on its
interpretation of statutes or of the trust instruments at issue,
however, our review is de novo. (Pena v. Dey (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 546, 551, disapproved on other grounds by
Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729 [de novo standard
of review applies to questions of statutory interpretation and
to interpretation of trust instrument where interpretation does
not depend on extrinsic evidence]; see also Conservatorship of
Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 [on review of an award
of attorney fees after trial, normal standard of review is abuse
of discretion; however, de novo review of such a trial court order
is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for
17
an award of attorney fees and costs have been satisfied amounts
to statutory construction and a question of law].)
We review the propriety of the trial court’s ruling, not its
reasoning, and “may uphold the ruling ‘on any basis presented
by the record whether or not relied upon by the trial court.’ ”
(Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp. (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 466, 481, fn. 5.)
2. Standing
Charlyne, as she did below, first contends Patty lacked
standing to bring her petition because Patty was neither a
trustee nor a beneficiary of the trust. “The probate court has
general power and duty to supervise the administration of
trusts.” (Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427
(Schwartz).) Section 17200 authorizes a trustee or beneficiary
to petition the probate court “concerning the internal affairs
of the trust,” including to “[s]ettle the accounts and pass[ ] upon
the acts of the trustee, including the exercise of discretionary
powers.” (§ 17200, subds. (a), (b)(5); Schwartz, at p. 427
[“[p]roceedings in the probate court ‘concerning the internal
affairs of the trust’ are commenced with the filing of a petition”].)
Under section 17206, the probate court “in its discretion may
make any orders and take any other action necessary or proper
to dispose of the matters presented by the petition.”
Here, Charlyne’s section 17200 petition raised the issue
of her discretionary powers under the trust to decide when to
expend SNT funds for Daniel’s needs. She specifically asked
the court for an order that she was “not required to reimburse
Patty . . . for any of the expenses purportedly made on behalf
of Daniel . . . not authorized by the Trustee beforehand, and if
Patty . . . wishes to duplicate or supplement efforts of the Trustee
18
in providing for the needs of Daniel . . . , such expenses are
of her own choosing and not reimbursable by the [SNT].” She
also asked the court to order “any and all matters concerning
the internal affairs of the trust be brought in the Probate
Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court.” The court
so ordered after assuming jurisdiction over the trusts.
Whether Charlyne abused her discretion as trustee of
the SNT in denying reimbursement of expenditures made on
Daniel’s behalf concerned the propriety of “the acts of the trustee”
and was “a matter presented by the petition.” Having raised
the issue in her own petition, Charlyne cannot now claim Patty
had no standing to ask the court—as part of the action Charlyne
commenced—for reimbursement from the SNT of her expenses
incurred for Daniel’s benefit.
Relatedly, Charlyne contends the court had no authority
to issue an equitable lien against the trust because the trust
assets vested in the remainder beneficiaries on Daniel’s death.
The court’s broad powers under section 17200 enabled the court
to consider the acts of the trustee, including the propriety of the
trustee having withheld her discretion to release trust funds for
Daniel’s benefit—despite his untimely death. Having found the
trustee was in breach of trust, we conclude the court could impose
an equitable lien to remedy that breach in light of the unique
circumstances before it. (See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 453 [equitable liens may arise out
of general considerations of right and justice as applied to the
relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings;
they frequently are based on the equitable maxim that “equity
will deem as done that which ought to be done”].) “To preserve
[a] trust and to respond to perceived breaches of trust, the
19
probate court has wide, express powers to ‘make any orders
and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of the
matters presented’ by [a] section 17200 petition.” (Schwartz,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427.)
Moreover, Charlyne also filed a first and final account
and report of trustee, asking the court to disburse trust funds
to Charlyne and her attorney, and distribute the balance of the
trust estate to the three remaining beneficiaries. Charlyne’s
request to settle her account—which arose from the filing of
her section 17200 petition—“activated the probate court’s duty
and authority to scrutinize the appellant’s account.” (Schwartz,
supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 [“Presented with a section 17200
petition to settle an account, ‘the probate court has a duty
imposed by law to inquire into the prudence of the trustee’s
administration.’ ”].) The court could not do so without also
considering any claims for reimbursement raised by Patty.
The court had the “ ‘inherent power to decide all incidental
issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise
the administration of the trust.’ ” (Ibid.) In any event, the court
specifically told Patty—if she planned to seek reimbursement
for any expenses—“that should be something that is brought
before the court.” The court’s minute order indicated it had
given “an OK to set any petition that should be considered
in conjunction with the [trustee’s] accounting for 2/18/2021.”
Finally, we agree with Patty that, as Daniel’s conservator,13
she had standing to bring her petition under sections 2641 and
13 Charlyne contends Patty did not file her petition in her
capacity as Daniel’s conservator. By the time Patty filed her
petition, Daniel’s conservatorship had terminated due to his
20
2642. As we discuss in detail below, those sections expressly
authorize a conservator and her attorney to petition the court
for conservator and attorney fees. (Whether those sections
authorized the court to direct the trust to pay conservator fees
and appointed counsel’s fees versus whether the court could hear
Patty’s petition at all is a different question that we address
below.) And, as the court noted in denying Charlyne’s motion
to set aside the judgment, section 2623 authorizes a conservator
to seek “[t]he amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in the
exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties of the
death. (§ 1860, subd. (a).) Section 2630 allows the court to retain
jurisdiction of the conservatorship proceeding in the event of the
conservatee’s death for the purpose of settling the accounts of the
conservator “or for any other purpose incident to the enforcement
of the judgments and orders of the court.” As Charlyne notes, the
probate court did not have jurisdiction over the conservatorship
case; the mental health court did. Nevertheless, as Patty would
have been able to file her petition as Daniel’s conservator had
he not died, she did not lose standing to ask the probate court
for reimbursement from the trust in connection with Charlyne’s
petition that brought the trust under the court’s jurisdiction.
Again, Patty’s request relates to the court’s consideration
of Charlyne’s exercise of her discretionary powers and her
accounting as trustee. Moreover, the first paragraph of Patty’s
petition states she was appointed conservator of the person of
Daniel, the “deceased beneficiary of the [SNT] subject to this
proceeding,” and Cohan identifies himself as the “court-appointed
counsel for Patty Wiedner, Conservator of Daniel Lee Black,
Conservatee.” Accordingly, Patty was bringing her petition
in her capacity as Daniel’s conservator up until his death.
21
. . . conservator.” (§ 2623, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, we conclude
Patty had standing to file her petition.
3. The SNT was not part of Daniel’s “estate”
Patty brought her petition for conservator fees,
reimbursement of expenses, and attorney fees under sections
2640,14 2641, and 2642. Section 2641 allows a conservator of
the person to petition the court (in a conservatorship proceeding)
for “an order fixing and allowing compensation for services in
the best interest of the . . . conservatee rendered to that time.”
(§ 2641, subd. (a).) “The compensation allowed shall thereupon
be charged against the estate.” (Id., subd. (b).) Section 2642,
in turn, permits an attorney who has rendered legal services
to a conservator to petition the court for “an order fixing and
allowing compensation” for those legal services. (§ 2642,
subd. (a).) Again, any compensation allowed “shall . . . be
charged against the estate.” (Id., subd. (b).) Finally, section
2646 provides: “In proceedings under this chapter [governing
compensation of guardian, conservator, and attorney], the court
shall only determine fees that are payable from the estate of the
. . . conservatee and not limit fees payable from other sources.”
Patty had argued—as she does on appeal—that the SNT
was part of the conservatee’s (Daniel’s) estate and thus reachable
to pay her conservator and attorney fees under these statutes.
Charlyne contended—as she does on appeal—the SNT was not
part of the conservatee’s estate and thus there was no authority
14 Section 2640 governs petitions to the court by conservators
of the estate for an “order fixing and allowing compensation.”
(§ 2640, subd. (a).) Patty was appointed conservator of the
person only.
22
to direct the trust to pay Patty’s conservator and attorney fees.
We agree with Charlyne that the SNT is not part of Daniel’s
“estate.”
Patty relies on both section 2586 and 2400. Section 2586
states, the “ ‘estate plan of the conservatee’ includes, but is not
limited to, . . . any trust of which the conservatee is the settlor
or beneficiary.” (§ 2586, subd. (a).) But sections 2641, 2642,
and 2646 refer to the conservatee’s “estate,” not “estate plan.”
Thus, section 2586 is not relevant to our analysis. Section 2400
defines “ ‘[e]state’ ” as “all of the conservatee’s personal property,
wherever located, and real property located in this state.”
(§ 2400, subd. (b).) Section 2640.1, which also is inapplicable to
the situation before us, provides, “[i]f a conservator of the estate
is not appointed, but a conservator of the person is appointed,
the compensation and costs allowed [to the individual who was
not appointed conservator] shall be ordered by the court to be
paid from property belonging to the conservatee, whether held
outright, in trust, or otherwise.” (§ 2640.1, subd.(c).)
Patty argues the SNT was part of Daniel’s estate because,
“[a]t the time [it] was established, Daniel acquired a vested
property interest in the trust, to be disbursed according to
criteria set forth in the instrument.” She cites Anderson v.
Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 112 (Anderson) for the
proposition that, “ ‘the beneficiaries [of a trust] are the real
owners of the property.’ ” (Quoting, id. at p. 117, alteration
in respondent’s brief.)
The trust in Anderson was nothing like the trust here.
The trust there was created to sell real property and distribute
the proceeds of the sale to the beneficiaries. The trustee had no
other power over the property. (Anderson, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d
23
at p. 116.) The quotation that Patty altered from the case stated:
“Thus, the trust is a naked, dry trust, and the beneficiaries are
the real owners of the property.” (Id. at p. 117.) Although that
may have been the case in Anderson, that is not the case with
respect to a third-party special needs trust like the one at issue
here.
Daniel was not the owner of any of the assets in the SNT.
He was the beneficiary of what is known as a “third-party”
special needs trust. A third-party special needs trust—in
contrast to a “first-party” special needs trust—“is established
by one person (usually a parent) using his or her own funds
for the benefit of another, the person with a disability. It
does not involve any assets of the person with a disability.”
(See Fay Blix, The World of Special Needs Trusts (Nov. 2008)
50 Orange County Lawyer 10, *11 (Blix); see also Hook & Kefalas
Dudek, Special Needs Trust Handbook (Dec. 2023) § 5.01[B]
(Hook) [a third-party special needs trust preserves “public
benefits for the trust beneficiary while supplementing the
beneficiary’s lifestyle with private funds” and “protect[s] the
private third-party funds from the state”].)
“The purpose of a special needs trust is ‘to enhance the
beneficiary’s quality of life through the purchase of additional
goods and services that are not covered or adequately provided
by SSI . . . and Medicaid.’ ” (Gonzalez v. City National Bank
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 734, 743–744 (Gonzalez).)
On Daniel’s death, any funds remaining in the SNT would
go to the named remainder beneficiaries. More importantly,
although the purpose of the SNT was “to supplement any public
benefits available to [Daniel] during his lifetime,” he had “no
right to compel the trustee to release principal or income to him
24
or for his benefit or otherwise to have any access to any of the
trust assets.” Accordingly, the trust funds were not available
to him and thus not part of his estate.
A first-party or self-settled special needs trust, on the
other hand, is funded by the disabled person’s own assets. (Blix,
supra, at *11.) Those assets are not considered in determining
the beneficiary’s eligibility for needs-based benefits like SSI
and Medi-Cal. (Ibid.) After the beneficiary dies, however,
the government provider of the benefits, such as Medi-Cal, is
entitled to reimbursement from any funds left in the first-party
special needs trust. (See Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 744 [“so long as the state will recover for the Medicaid
services provided to the special needs trust beneficiary during
her lifetime, the beneficiary remains eligible for such services,
even if the amount in the trust otherwise would disqualify
the beneficiary from receiving such benefits”]; id. at p. 745
[“California regulations also provide that for a qualifying special
needs trust to be considered ‘not available’ when determining
Medi-Cal eligibility, the trust must be set up so that ‘[t]he State
receives all remaining funds in the trust, or respective portion
of the trust, upon the death of the individual . . . up to an
amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf
of that individual by the Medi-Cal program’ ”]; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(A) [trust containing assets of a disabled individual
under age 65 established for the individual’s benefit is not
considered in determining individual’s eligibility for state
Medicaid benefits if the state “will receive all amounts
remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual
up to an amount equal to the total” benefits paid].)
25
A third-party special needs trust, however—because it is
not funded by the beneficiary’s assets—need not include such a
“payback provision.” (Loring & Rounds, A Trustee’s Handbook—
Rounds and Rounds (2024) § 9.3, p. 1482 & fn. 25; Special Needs
Alliance, Administering a Special Needs Trust: A Handbook for
Trustees (2024) p. 5 <https://www.specialneedsalliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2024/01/SNA-2024-Handbook.pdf> [as of May 10,
2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/3GVZ-EWUL> (Handbook)
[self-settled special needs trusts, unlike third-party trusts, “must
include a provision directing the trustee, if the trust contains any
funds upon the death of the beneficiary, to pay back anything the
state Medicaid program has paid for the beneficiary”]; id. at p. 6
[third-party special needs trust is established by someone other
than the person with disabilities “with assets that never belonged
to the beneficiary” and are not required to include a “ ‘payback’
provision for Medicaid benefits upon the beneficiary’s death”].)
The California cases on which Patty relies to argue the
SNT was part of Daniel’s estate do not involve third-party special
needs trusts. Rather, in all of them, the trusts were funded with
assets belonging to the settlor.
In Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 753, the reviewing court found assets of the
revocable inter vivos trust of a deceased settlor, who also was
a conservatee and Medi-Cal recipient, constituted his estate
for purpose of Medi-Cal reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 756–757.)
Thus, the trial court should have reimbursed the state from
the trust for the Medi-Cal benefits it had provided to the
conservatee/settlor during his lifetime before distributing the
assets to the trust’s beneficiary. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Belshé v.
Hope (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 161, 163–165, 175, the court held
26
real property a Medi-Cal recipient had passed to beneficiaries
to her inter vivos trust on her death was part of the benefit
recipient’s estate—despite its transfer—from which the state
could seek reimbursement of Medi-Cal benefits it had provided
her. Under this reasoning, perhaps if Patty had been Roberta’s
conservator, Roberta’s estate would have included the assets
in the trust that were to be distributed to the remainder
beneficiaries. Belshé thus reinforces Charlyne’s point that
the assets in the SNT were part of Roberta’s—not Daniel’s—
estate.
Finally, Patty cites Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 734,
for its statement, “ ‘[u]pon the death of the beneficiary of a special
needs trust, any remaining assets in the trust are treated as part
of the beneficiary’s estate.’ ” (Id. at p. 751, quoting Shewry v.
Arnold (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 186, 197.) Patty, however, omits
the important qualifier: “ ‘for purposes of Medi-Cal
reimbursement.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 751, italics added, quoting
Shewry, at p. 197.) Moreover, the court in Gonzalez was
describing Shewry’s discussion of section 3605, which “applies
only to a special needs trust established under Section 3604.”
(§ 3605, subd. (a).) Section 3604 governs the establishment of
a special needs trust when the court has ordered that “money
of a minor or person with a disability be paid to a special needs
trust”—in other words, a first-party trust. (§ 3604, subd. (a)(1).)
In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs’ daughter was severely disabled
due to complications during her birth. After the daughter
received a multi-million-dollar settlement in a medical
malpractice lawsuit, a court placed the settlement proceeds
in a special needs trust with the daughter as the beneficiary.
(Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 739–740.) On the
27
daughter’s death, her parents argued the remainder of the trust
should be distributed to them. The court, however, found the
state was entitled to reimbursement for the Medi-Cal benefits
it had provided the daughter from the funds remaining in the
trust after her death. (Id. at pp. 739, 741–742.) The trust
included the required “ ‘payback’ provision” that—under the
applicable federal statute—on termination of the trust, the
residual shall be payable to any state or state agency that
has provided state medical benefits to the beneficiary. (Id.
at p. 763.)
Again, unlike the assets used to fund the SNT here, assets
placed in a special needs trust established under section 3604
belong to the beneficiary. Those assets—e.g., funds from an
injury settlement—otherwise would have been paid directly to
the beneficiary. Thus, absent the creation of the special needs
trust in Gonzalez, the assets would have been considered in
determining the daughter’s eligibility for public benefits and she
likely would have lost those benefits. Roberta, however, placed
her own assets—not Daniel’s assets—in the SNT created for him.
Nor is there any similar “payback” provision in the SNT, nor was
one required.
As Charlyne notes, the Law Revision Commission
Comments to section 3605 state, “On the death of the special
needs trust beneficiary or on termination of the trust, trust
property may become subject to reimbursement claims under
federal or state law. [Citations.] For this purpose and only
this purpose, the trust property is treated as the beneficiary’s
property or as property of the beneficiary’s estate.” Logically,
if trust property belonging to the beneficiary of a special needs
trust is treated as the beneficiary’s estate only for purposes of
28
government benefits reimbursement, then property placed in
Daniel’s SNT, which never was his to begin with, and cannot
be reached for reimbursement of benefits paid to him on his
death, cannot constitute his estate for purposes of reimbursing
conservator fees and attorney fees under the Probate Code.
Accordingly, we do not agree that the conservatee’s estate
included the SNT—which was funded entirely by Roberta’s
property, not monies or property owned by Daniel.15
4. Nevertheless, the terms of the trust allowed
reimbursement for some of the expenditures Patty
made on behalf of Daniel and for her conservator fees
Although we cannot construe the SNT as Daniel’s estate,
the probate court’s order directing the trustee to reimburse Patty
from the trust for her expenditures and costs incurred on Daniel’s
behalf was based on the terms of the SNT itself. “The primary
duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to the
settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822,
15 In its order denying Charlyne’s motion to set aside
the judgment, the court found section 2640.1 provided that
“the conservatorship fees and attorney’s fees may be paid from
the Living Trust as the Probate Code broadly defines ‘estate’
as a conservatee’s ‘personal property, wherever located, and
real property located in this state.’ ” (Quoting § 2400.) It’s
unclear why the court relied on section 2640.1. That section
authorizes a person who petitioned for appointment as
conservator, but who was not appointed in lieu of a different
conservator, to petition the court for compensation for “his or
her services rendered in connection with and to facilitate the
appointment of a conservator, and costs incurred in connection
therewith.” (§ 2640.1, subds. (a) & (c).)
29
826.) Here, the settlor (Roberta) stated her intention clearly.
As the court noted, the terms of the trust “clearly show[ed]
that the primary use” of the trust’s assets—the proceeds from
the sale of Roberta’s house—“was to provide a supplemental
and emergency fund for Daniel” during his lifetime to augment
any public benefits available to him.
Under the express terms of the trust, the trustee
(Charlyne) was to use the trust income and principal to satisfy
Daniel’s “special needs”—the “requisites” for maintaining his
“good health, comfort, safety, and welfare”—as the trustee in her
“sole discretion . . . deem[ed] necessary or advisable.” The terms
of the SNT expressly stated Daniel’s special needs “shall include,
but not be limited to” his medical and dental care, travel needs,
and recreation—among other delineated items—to the extent
not provided for or reimbursed by public benefits. Thus, in the
court’s view, “In a perfect world, Daniel would have lived a much
longer life and died spending the last penny of the trust doing
something that brought him joy.” As the trial court put it, the
terms of the SNT “allow[ed] for payment of those ‘extras’ for
Daniel that public benefits did not cover.”16 We agree with
the trial court’s assessment of the trust instrument.
16 Indeed, an SNT can make disbursements for many services
and items not covered by public benefits without affecting the
beneficiary’s eligibility for Medicaid and SSI—the need-based
public benefits Daniel received—such as: entertainment;
recreation; vacations; caregiving; cell phone, cable, or internet
services; electronics; clothing; hair care; hobby supplies;
magazine and newspaper subscriptions; nonfood grocery items;
over the counter medications; and many others. (See Cal. CEB,
Special Needs Trusts: Planning, Drafting, and Administration
30
The court found, “Patty clearly expended monies to
afford Daniel a better quality of life both before and after being
appointed as his conservator for which reimbursement is now
properly claimed.” Except for a few categories of expenses
that we discuss below, we agree.
Patty prepared a summary of her expenditures she had
made for Daniel—both before and after she was appointed his
conservator—and gave the court receipts for some, but not all,
of them. They included items for Daniel’s direct benefit, such as
clothing (including underwear), toiletries, dental care, a radio
and batteries, grooming services, entertainment, and meals out—
(2023) §14.67.5 [list of “generally permissible distributions”]
(CEB, Special Needs Trusts). Disbursements for food and
shelter, however, are considered income that could reduce
the amount of SSI the beneficiary receives. (Social Security
Administration, Program Operations Manual System—
Supplemental Security Income (May 2024) SI 01120.200.E.1.b.
<https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120200> [as of
May 10, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/ME6Q-GECJ>
(SSA POMS) [“[f]ood or shelter received by the trust beneficiary
as a result of disbursements from the trust to a third party
is income in the form of in-kind support and maintenance”];
Hook, supra, § 9.01[D][2] [“[a]ll distributions should be made to
third parties on behalf of the beneficiary and should be limited,
to the extent possible, to items that cannot be considered food
or shelter, or converted to use for food or shelter,” which are
considered income, citing SSA POMS, supra, SI 01120.200.E.1.a
& 01120.200.E.1.b]; see also Handbook, supra, pp. 10–12
[similar].) The occasional meal out “may be characterized
as entertainment” rather than food, however. (CEB, Special
Needs Trusts, supra, § 14.53.)
31
items and services that no public benefit program provided for
Daniel, would not affect Daniel’s eligibility for benefits, and were
for Daniel’s “good health,” “comfort,” or “welfare,” in accordance
with the trust’s terms.
Patty also testified about her contact with Daniel and the
expenditures she made on his behalf, which the court accurately
summarized in its statement of decision. The court noted Patty
was concerned Daniel “would end up in a psychiatric hospital.”
Patty thus maintained regular contact with him after his mother
died—after a several year lapse in contact—“so that Daniel
had some quality of life that kept him happy and less agitated.”
She put money on Daniel’s account at his facility for extra treats,
like “snacks and beverages.” The court also noted Patty testified
she maintained a journal of the expenses she incurred between
July 2016 and July 2020, and had receipts for most of her
expenses. And, before the evidentiary hearing, the court noted
it had “looked through” the summary of Patty’s out-of-pocket
costs, as well as the receipts. The court thus had evaluated the
documentary evidence supporting the expenses Patty claimed
she had incurred on Daniel’s behalf, as well as Patty’s testimony,
to determine Patty legitimately incurred them and they were
expended to satisfy Daniel’s special needs. Those records and
Patty’s testimony provide sufficient evidence to support the
court’s finding that Patty’s claimed out-of-pocket expenditures
(or, at least, most of them) were appropriate expenditures under
the terms of the trust.
Nevertheless, the trust terms gave Charlyne the sole
discretion to determine what was “necessary or advisable” to pay
from the SNT for Daniel’s needs. Daniel himself had no right
to compel Charlyne to release funds, nor did he have any access
32
to the trust assets. In exercising her sole discretion as trustee,
however, Charlyne was required to “act in accordance with
fiduciary principles” and could not “act in bad faith or in
disregard of the purposes of the trust.” (§ 16081, subd. (a);
see also Rest.3d Trusts, § 50, subd. (1) [“A discretionary power
conferred upon the trustee to determine the benefits of a
trust beneficiary is subject to judicial control only to prevent
misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion by the trustee.”];
Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [“California
courts have considered the Restatement of Trusts in interpreting
California trust law.”].) To determine whether evidence is
sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that the trustee has
“been guilty of an abuse of discretion requires an inquiry into
the intentions of the settlor . . . , and an examination of the
conduct of the trustee[ ] in the administration of the trust.”
(In re Ferrall’s Estate (1953) 41 Cal.2d 166, 174.) We conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Charlyne
abused her discretion in declining to reimburse (or objecting after
Daniel’s death to reimbursement of) Patty’s expenditures for
Daniel’s benefit—that were permissible disbursements under
the trust—by disregarding the purpose of the SNT.17
17 In considering what amount of trustee fees to award
Charlyne, the court also found she “breached her duties as
trustee not only as described in the trust document itself but
also within the meaning of [§] 16004,” which deals with conflicts
of interest. The court found “Charlyne had a very high duty to
make sure that her decision making and actions did not result
in deprivation of trust assets for Daniel’s use which would
necessarily result in a larger amount being distributed to her
upon his death.”
33
Charlyne testified Patty shouldn’t be reimbursed “[for] a
thing” she purchased because Charlyne—or the public guardian
when he was the conservator—already had provided Daniel with
the same things. Essentially, Charlyne’s position was that Patty
was making unnecessary, duplicative expenditures without
prior authorization.
In her declaration filed in support of her accounting and
request for trustee fees, Charlyne averred that, as part of her
trustee duties, she had provided Daniel with necessary clothing,
cable T.V. to watch sports, money for activities, and whatever
else he needed that could be funded from the trust without
jeopardizing the public benefits he received. Charlyne’s
summary of disbursements from the SNT for Daniel’s benefit
from September 2016 to July 2020 shows payments for Daniel’s
cable and cellular service, clothing and supplies, shoes, medical
care, and “Cash for Daniel Black” (presumably paid to his
housing facility for the activities and other needs Charlyne
mentioned in her declaration).
From Patty’s receipts, it appears she did buy Daniel
several apparently duplicative clothing items at times. The
court, however, credited Patty’s testimony, finding it “credible,
thoughtful and unflappable even on cross-examination.” The
court specifically noted Patty’s testimony that she bought extra
clothing for Daniel, as he “complained about items going missing
in the facility.” Patty also testified about having to buy Daniel
a new radio because he had broken the two Charlyne had bought.
Thus, we can infer the court rejected Charlyne’s position that
paying for these duplicate items Patty provided was wasteful
or unnecessary.
34
Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that
Charlyne failed to fulfill her duty under Article 5.4(e) of the trust
to “consult with any guardian, conservator, custodian, or other
person who cares for [Daniel] regarding his special needs”; and
under Article 5.4(b) to “regularly consult with [Daniel] and any
persons or entities providing care or assistance to [him] for the
purpose of determining [his] needs and resources.” As the court
noted in its statement of decision, Charlyne admitted she did not
confer with or reach out to Patty—even after she was appointed
conservator—about “any of Daniel’s needs.”
Rather, Charlyne testified she “just reached out to the
board and care homes” where Daniel lived. She had Patty
contact Bunnett.18 The reason, according to Charlyne, was Patty
called her at all hours of the night, leading Charlyne to change
her phone number.19 As a result, Charlyne gave Daniel the
number to her cell phone but, because no voicemail had been
18 The court also reasonably could find Charlyne’s delegation
to Bunnett was not effective. Patty’s former court-appointed
attorney Stanford told the court, at the July 31, 2020 hearing,
that she had written to Bunnett in July 2019 about arranging
for any court-approved dental treatment for Daniel and to
establish a budget out of the SNT for Daniel’s recreational
and entertainment needs. Bunnett apparently responded with
a letter “that was basically a treatise on special needs trusts,
and from that point,” he never responded to Stanford’s emails
or voicemails.
19 When the court directly asked Charlyne, “Why didn’t you
reach out to your sister as was your responsibility as trustee?”
Charlyne replied, “Because Danny kept telling me she didn’t
like him.”
35
set up on that phone, he could not leave her a message. Charlyne
testified that, if she saw she had missed a call from Daniel,
she would call him back.
The court thus could find that Charlyne, having failed to
consult Patty regularly about Daniel’s needs, at least when she
was conservator—and arguably beforehand as a “person[ ] . . .
providing care or assistance to [Daniel]”—could not reasonably
have refused to exercise her discretion to make payments from
the SNT to satisfy those needs, as she could not have known what
those needs were without consulting Patty. Charlyne apparently
did not know Daniel required replacement clothing or other items
despite having conferred with his housing facilities. And, Patty
testified Daniel could not reach Charlyne by phone. We can infer
the court credited this testimony. The court thus could have
concluded Charlyne was not regularly asking Daniel about his
needs, either.
Accordingly, except for a few categories of costs we discuss
below, we conclude the trial court did not err in ordering Patty
be reimbursed from the trust for her out-of-pocket expenditures
made on Daniel’s behalf.
a. Out-of-pocket attorney fees
As part of her out-of-pocket costs, Patty asked for
reimbursement of attorney fees (and costs) she incurred in
2016 and 2017 with Raxter Law, apparently in connection with
or related to the petition she filed in Riverside County that she
voluntarily dismissed due to her lack of standing. The record
does not demonstrate that Patty’s filing of the dismissed
petition benefited Daniel in any way. Similarly, she asked for
reimbursement of attorney fees incurred in 2017 with Conover
& Grebe relating to proceedings in the LPS conservatorship
36
including a hearing on the appointment of the conservator
in September 2017. The record does not demonstrate how
these attorney fees Patty incurred benefited Daniel either.
Accordingly, the court erred in directing the trustee to reimburse
Patty from the trust for those out-of-pocket attorney fees.
b. Cash deposits made before and after appointment
as conservator
Patty’s request for reimbursement also included relatively
small cash deposits she made on Daniel’s account at his
housing facility for his “snacks and beverages.” Technically,
a disbursement from the SNT for Daniel’s food could affect
his receipt of SSI, as food received by a beneficiary as a result
of a disbursement made to a third party is “income in the form
of in-kind support and maintenance.” (SSA POMS, supra,
SI 01120.200.E.1.b.)20 But Charlyne reimbursed herself from
the SNT for cash deposits she had made on Daniel’s account
for his entertainment and other needs. We thus can infer the
court found it would be an abuse of Charlyne’s discretion not
to reimburse Patty as well for those same sorts of expenditures
given they were for Daniel’s comfort.
On the other hand, Bunnett asked Patty about an ATM
withdrawal she had made on November 4, 2019, while she
20 Similarly, Patty asked for reimbursement for food she
purchased for Daniel at grocery stores, such as cereal or juice.
We can infer the court concluded either these extra treats were
more along the lines of entertainment than food—as Daniel’s
housing facility provided his food—or the value of any snacks or
beverages purchased would have been too small to make a real
difference in Daniel’s receipt of SSI had he lived.
37
was Daniel’s conservator, for $136 that she claimed for
reimbursement. Patty testified she had taken that money
out of her personal bank account and put it on Daniel’s account
at his residential care facility for his PNI money.
Patty testified that, “a few times,” Daniel’s monthly public
benefit payments—his social security and SSI—came to her and
she put the funds “in the checking account.” Patty testified about
these funds as Baiden had—that Daniel’s monthly social security
went to pay for his care at his facility, and his monthly SSI—
at either $35 or $136 a month, depending on the type of facility—
was put on Daniel’s account as his PNI money to pay for “sodas or
chips from vending machines or whatever.” There was no money
left over after making those payments.
As Daniel’s monthly SSI either was going to Patty or
directly to his facility, there would be no need for Patty to be
reimbursed for the $136 she paid for Daniel’s PNI. To the extent
Patty, as Daniel’s conservator, was the named recipient of his
SSI, any SSI payments she received, but did not pay to Daniel’s
account, should be credited back to the trust.
c. Mileage and transportation costs
Patty’s summary of expenditures for her out-of-pocket
costs also included mileage expenses for driving to visit Daniel.
Patty’s claimed $56,500 in transportation costs—which the court
awarded her—represented the cost attributed to the time Patty’s
husband took to drive Patty to visit Daniel or take Daniel to
appointments. Patty’s mileage and transportation costs included
trips she made to visit Daniel before and after she became his
conservator.
Patty’s husband Earl drove her because she did not drive
long distances. For a time, Patty did not live close to Daniel’s
38
facilities. According to her records, which the court credited,
she drove 110 to 168 miles roundtrip to see Daniel. Earl testified
it was five hours roundtrip from their residence in Lake Elsinore
to the locations of Daniel’s residence and health appointments,
which until fall 2019, were in places like Sylmar, Santa Monica,
Downey, and Los Angeles. Earl “charged” $400 per roundtrip
to these places.21 He based that figure on the $400 Charlyne
paid a third party, who also cut Daniel’s hair, to drive her to
visit Daniel. She paid her daughter $300 to drive her. (Charlyne
was about 79 years old.) Earl testified he also helped Patty with
Daniel during her visits—for example, supervising him in public
restrooms. Baiden agreed it was necessary to have more than
one person transport Daniel anywhere due to his behavior. The
court found Patty’s husband’s and Baiden’s testimony credible.
As Daniel’s conservator, Patty had a duty to visit him
and attend to and assess his needs. Had Daniel had an estate,
she would have been entitled to recover “reasonable expenses
incurred in the exercise of the powers and the performance of the
duties of . . . conservator.” (§ 2623, subd. (a)(1).) This evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that Patty’s transportation
costs—once she became Daniel’s conservator—were reasonable.22
21 Patty did not actually pay her husband for driving her.
22 As she does on appeal, Charlyne argued “travel and
mileage by a conservator is generally not reimbursable” under
rule 4.43 of the Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rules. That
rule does not allow a personal representative to claim “[l]ocal
travel and mileage” as costs, but does allow claimed costs for
long distance travel. (Rule 4.43(a)(5) & (b)(3).)
39
Moreover, Patty’s performance of her duties as conservator
were for Daniel’s direct benefit. Because she had to drive a long
distance to see Daniel, and could not transport him in the car
alone,23 she could not have performed those duties without Earl’s
services. Accordingly, the court reasonably could find it would
be an abuse of discretion for the trustee not to reimburse Patty
for these expenses incurred in the course of performing her
conservator duties for Daniel.24
Before she was appointed Daniel’s conservator, however,
Patty—and her husband—sat in the position of an aunt and
uncle visiting their disabled nephew. And, unlike the items Patty
purchased for Daniel or entertainment she provided for him,
Patty’s mileage and transportation costs did not directly benefit
23 Patty testified she had to sit in the backseat with Daniel
to prevent him from bolting from the car.
24 Nevertheless, the record does not support requiring the
SNT to pay Patty her requested “auto allowance” (mileage) at
$.55 per mile for trips where she also claimed transportation fees
for Earl’s driving “services.” Earl testified he and Patty thought
a $400 flat rate was reasonable as Charlyne paid that amount
for Michelle Higgens (a “beauty operator”) to drive her. (Earl
“charged” $100 after Daniel moved to a facility in their own
county.) Charlyne did not also reimburse herself—or her drivers
—for separate mileage fees, however. As Earl based his fees for
driving Patty on what Charlyne had paid, his $400 (and $100)
trip rates also presumably accounted for mileage. At oral
argument, Cohan could not say what the fees included.
Accordingly, any mileage expenses Patty claimed during
her tenure as conservator for trips where she also claimed
a transportation fee should be excluded as duplicative.
40
Daniel. We thus cannot conclude Charlyne can be deemed to
have abused her discretion by not reimbursing, or objecting
to reimbursing, Patty for her mileage or transportation costs
in making those voluntary, though thoughtful, visits. Paying for
Patty’s mileage and husband-driver was not necessary to Daniel’s
comfort or welfare, as was—say—buying him clothing to replace
what had “gone missing.” Thus, the court had no basis to order
the trust to pay for those expenses.
d. Other pre-conservator personal expenses
We also do not agree the SNT required Charlyne to
reimburse Patty for her other personal expenses—such as her
own (and Earl’s) meals and entertainment costs—incurred during
visits to Daniel before Patty became his conservator. Patty was
Daniel’s aunt. We cannot conclude Daniel’s mother intended the
SNT to be used to pay for her sister’s meals and entertainment
simply because she incurred those costs while visiting her
nephew. (In re Greenleaf’s Estate (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 658,
661–662 [“the basic inquiry, whenever the exercise of a trustee’s
discretion, absolute or otherwise, is challenged, is always
whether the trustee acted in the state of mind contemplated by
the trustor”].) As with her pre-conservator transportation costs,
Patty’s or Earl’s own food purchases, movie tickets, and the like
did not “supplement” Daniel’s public benefits—the SNT’s stated
purpose—unlike the items, services, and entertainment Patty
purchased for Daniel. Once Patty replaced the public guardian
as Daniel’s conservator, however, the county no longer provided
Daniel with conservator services. Accordingly, reasonable
expenses Patty incurred in discharging the duties she owed
Daniel as his court-appointed conservator—as with her
41
conservator fees discussed below—necessarily were for Daniel’s
welfare.25
e. Conservator fees
The court found Patty’s claimed conservator fees of $8,000
—billed at an hourly rate less than what Charlyne billed for her
trustee fees—was “more than reasonable and should be allowed.”
The trust allows payment of trustee fees but is silent as to
the payment of conservator fees. The court reasonably could
conclude that was the case because the public guardian was
Daniel’s conservator when Roberta executed the restated trust,
which included the SNT. As the public guardian remained
Daniel’s conservator, there would have been no reason for
Roberta to amend her trust to add a provision specifically
allowing for the payment of conservator fees. In any event,
Patty’s performance of her duties as Daniel’s court-appointed
conservator necessarily were required for Daniel’s welfare.
Accordingly, the court did not err in directing the trust to pay
Patty’s conservator fees.
5. Attorney fees
Finally, the court awarded Cohan his requested costs of
$1,097.26 from the trust, finding he incurred them “while seeking
relief that was to benefit Daniel [and] for which the trust should
be obligated to pay.” The court also found Cohan’s “attorney fees
25 Patty notes section 2641 authorizes the court to include
in an order of conservator fees compensation for a conservator’s
services “rendered before the date of the order appointing the
. . . conservator.” (§ 2641, subd. (b).) As we discussed, such
compensation must be charged against the conservatee’s estate,
and the SNT is not part of Daniel’s estate.
42
were generated in response to the litigation tactics of Charlyne
and her counsel,” including having to respond to Bunnett/
Charlyne’s opposition to releasing the funds for Daniel’s dental
work, responding to Bunnett’s lengthy discovery requests, and
apparently attending a six-hour deposition of Patty. The court,
however, was “not persuaded” that all of the $36,925 in fees
Cohan requested “went to benefit Daniel and/or the trust.”
The court found $27,850 was a reasonable amount of attorney
fees the trust should pay Cohan.
The mental health court appointed Cohan as Patty’s
counsel under section 5370.1 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code—part of the LPS Act—entitled “[a]ppointment of counsel
for private conservator with insufficient funds.” That section
provides the court “may appoint . . . a private attorney to
represent a private conservator in all proceedings connected
with the conservatorship, if it appears that the conservator has
insufficient funds to obtain the services of a private attorney.”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5370.1, italics added.) We presume
the court found Patty had insufficient funds to pay for counsel
as it ordered the county was to pay attorney fees.
Cohan represented he was appointed to represent the
conservator for all purposes—that would include representing
Patty in the probate proceeding. The probate matter
undisputedly was connected with the conservatorship matter.
The mental health court ordered that the reasonableness of
the dental treatment for Daniel, including its cost, should be
determined by the probate court where the section 17200 petition
was pending. Patty’s efforts in the probate court to obtain the
trust funds for Daniel’s dental work were in performance of
her duties as his conservator. Accordingly, it seems the mental
43
health court’s order applies to Patty’s attorney fees incurred in
the probate court to secure the $30,000 disbursement for Daniel’s
dental treatment. In other words, as the mental health court
ordered, the county should pay for that portion of Patty’s
attorney fees.
In a supplemental filing, Cohan stated he had not filed his
fee request with the mental health court for his representation
of Patty in the probate court because the presiding judge there
told him those “services . . . related to counsel’s appointment
in the non-LPS probate case . . . and therefore the fee request
should not be presented to the mental health court.”26 As
Cohan’s only court appointment comes from the mental health
court’s order, the terms of that order would seem to apply in
the probate court as well. We remand the matter for the probate
court to determine whether the county, in accordance with the
mental health court order, should pay for that portion of Patty’s
attorney fees incurred in obtaining the funding for Daniel’s
dental treatment in the probate court.
However, we do not agree that the fees Cohan generated
representing Patty in her petition for reimbursement of her costs
and fees from the trust were for Daniel’s benefit. Accordingly,
we do not see a basis for the court ordering the trust to pay
those fees.
Just as the trust is silent as to the payment of conservator
fees, it also is silent as to the payment of attorney fees for anyone
other than the trustee. Again, the public guardian was Daniel’s
conservator when Roberta executed the SNT and at her death.
26 Cohan also said he had been paid for work he had done
representing Patty in the mental health court.
44
The public guardian would not have been entitled to attorney fees
from the SNT. Patty argues Article 5.4(c) “specifically provides
. . . ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’ ‘shall be a proper charge to the
trust estate’ in the event of litigation.” That section, however,
refers only to the trustee’s attorney fees. The terms of the trust
required the trustee to deny any request to release funds to pay
for needs that public benefits would be authorized to provide,
and to “take whatever administrative or judicial steps may be
necessary to continue the eligibility of [Daniel] for all available
public benefits.” The paragraph ends, “Any expenses of the
trustee in this regard, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,
shall be a proper charge to the estate.” (Italics added.) It is
disingenuous for Patty to imply this provision of the trust
authorizes the conservator’s attorney fees.
As there is no express provision authorizing payment of
Daniel’s conservator’s attorney fees, we cannot find Charlyne’s
objection to payment of those attorney fees incurred to
recover funds for Patty is an abuse of the trustee’s discretion.
Accordingly, on remand, the court should determine what portion
of Cohan’s attorney fees were incurred in prosecuting Patty’s
petition to recover her conservator fees, expenses, and attorney
fees from the trust and exclude them.
6. There was no irregularity in the proceedings
resulting in a miscarriage of justice
Charlyne argues the irregularity in the proceedings
caused a miscarriage of justice. Charlyne’s chief complaint, as
it was in her motion for new trial, is that the trial court abused
its discretion in not conducting the bench trial in open court.
Charlyne and her counsel appeared in person on the first day of
the evidentiary hearing on October 20, 2021, but Patty, Cohan,
45
and the GAL appeared remotely through Court Connect. (Patty
appeared by phone only.) Bunnett asked for a continuance,
arguing his presentation of the evidence would be hampered as
he had been prepared to question the witnesses using exhibits
in an exhibit book. The court denied the continuance, noting the
court allows parties to appear in person or remotely, depending
on their comfort level with what then was an ongoing pandemic.
Although the minute order setting the October 20, 2021 hearing
date does not mention remote appearances, the court’s order
denying the new trial motion stated, “During the Court’s trial
setting conference, the Court authorized the parties to either
appear remotely or in person for the upcoming trial.”
Charlyne argues the court failed to give proper notice of
the remote appearance under section 367.75 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and rule 3.672 of the California Rules of Court. Even
if we assume there was no notice, Charlyne has failed to show
how she was prejudiced. The court began the hearing with
Patty’s petition. On a break, Bunnett was able to send his
exhibits to the parties and counsel through a DropBox link, and
they were able to open the exhibits and answer his questions
about them. There was no miscarriage of justice.
Charlyne contends a miscarriage of justice occurred based
on several other grounds, including that the court prejudged
the evidence; attempted to coerce Bunnett to stipulate to Patty’s
claimed costs; did not allow Bunnett to develop a defense to
Patty’s and her counsel’s accusations that Charlyne did nothing
for Daniel’s dental work; excluded exhibits Bunnett had prepared
to reorganize and categorize the receipts Patty submitted; and
there were purported inaccuracies in the statement of decision.
46
We find none of Charlyne’s contentions has merit, nor has she
demonstrated how any of them led to an unfair trial.
There is no evidence the court engaged in any misconduct.
The parties submitted written argument and evidence in advance
of the bench trial. The court did not prejudge the evidence. The
court gave the parties its tentative ruling on some of the fees and
costs claimed—after reviewing the parties’ submissions—and
noted it was inclined to grant Patty’s request for reimbursement
of about $33,200 but probably would “need some further
testimony or elaboration” on the $56,500 she claimed in
transportation costs. The court did not state it was inclined to
exclude those expenses or ask Bunnett to stipulate to the $56,500
as Charlyne asserts. As to the $33,200 in costs, the court merely
asked Bunnett if he wanted to submit on that figure. After
Bunnett argued about certain items, the court noted it would be
a “long slog” to go line-by-line, and the court would take that into
account “in terms of any fees I make for anybody.” We read the
court’s comments as trying to streamline the presentation of
evidence and letting counsel know the court would not be inclined
to find counsel’s time reasonably spent for purposes of recovering
fees if they were to go through each expenditure, line by line
over several pages. In any event, neither Bunnett nor Cohan
was awarded all the fees they requested.
As for the evidence, the court acted within its discretion
to exclude Bunnett’s duplicative exhibits of Patty’s costs. (See
Evid. Code, § 352.) And, based on our review of the record,
Charlyne was able sufficiently to develop her case. Moreover,
some of the evidence, or lack thereof, about which she complains
is more relevant to the court’s orders awarding her trustee fees
47
and attorney fees, which she does not challenge on this appeal.
We find no prejudicial error.
7. The court’s sanction award
In denying Charlyne’s motion for new trial, the court
awarded sanctions of $1,750 against Charlyne and her attorney,
jointly and severally, to be paid out of her share of the trust
directly to Cohan (for having to prepare his opposition). The
court’s September 2, 2022 minute order does not state the basis
for the sanctions.
In his joint opposition to Charlyne’s motions, Cohan invited
the court to issue an order to show cause as to why Bunnett had
not violated Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 in filing his
motions. Under section 128.7, subd. (c)(2), the court may, on its
own motion, issue an order to show cause as to why an attorney
should not be sanctioned for presenting a pleading or motion
for an improper purpose, or without basis in law or fact. There is
no such order to show cause in the appellate record. Accordingly,
we presume the court did not issue sanctions under that statute.
Appellant’s opening brief argues “[t]he fact the motion
lacks merit is not enough by itself to justify an award of Code
of Civil Procedure § 128.5 sanctions.” (Respondent’s brief
provides no legal citation regarding sanctions.) Under Code of
Civil Procedure section 128.5, a trial court may order a party and
the party’s attorney to pay “the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions
or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended
to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).)
“ ‘Frivolous’ means totally and completely without merit or for
the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.’ ” (Id., subd.
(b)(2).)
48
At the hearing on Charlyne’s motion, the court found the
remote appearance issue discussed above was not “a meritorious
basis” for bringing a motion for new trial under section 657 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for a trial irregularity. Based on our
discussion above, and the court’s comments at the motion hearing
and in its minute order, we conclude the court found the new trial
motion frivolous. We agree. Nevertheless, to award sanctions
under section 128.5, the court had to find the motion was
frivolous and in bad faith. (See, e.g., Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage
& Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1346.) The court
did not make such a finding. We thus reverse the sanctions
order.
DISPOSITION
The court’s September 2, 2022 order awarding $1,750
in sanctions against appellant and her counsel is reversed.
The court’s June 24, 2022 “order re petition for allowance of
conservator fees, reimbursement of costs advanced and incurred
and conservator’s attorney’s fees and costs” is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The matter is remanded for the court
to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion,
as follows.
The court shall recalculate the amounts ordered to be
reimbursed to Patty Wiedner from the SNT (1) to reduce the
$32,198.36 reimbursement by (a) any cash deposits Patty made
to Daniel’s facilities for his PNI to the extent those amounts were
covered by Daniel’s monthly SSI payments that Patty received
but did not pay to Daniel’s facilities; (b) “auto allowance”
(mileage) costs claimed for dates before April 10, 2019; (c) “auto
allowance” (mileage) costs for dates on or after April 10, 2019,
on which Patty also asked to be reimbursed for transportation
49
costs; (d) any out-of-pocket costs incurred before April 10, 2019
to pay for the meals or food, entertainment expenses, items,
services, etc. of anyone other than Daniel Black; and (e) attorney
fees (and any related costs) paid to Raxter Law in 2016 and 2017
and to Conover & Grebe in 2017; and (2) to reduce the $56,500
transportation costs reimbursement by the amount claimed
for dates before April 10, 2019. The $8,000 conservator fee
reimbursement is affirmed.
With respect to the $28,947.26 in attorney fees and
costs ordered to be reimbursed from the SNT to Patty’s court-
appointed attorney John Cohan: (1) the court shall determine
whether Los Angeles County should pay—under the terms
of the mental health court’s December 6, 2019 order—Patty’s
attorney fees incurred to obtain funding from the SNT for
Daniel’s dental work, and if so, order the County, rather than
the SNT, to reimburse Cohan for those fees; and (2) if the court
determines the County is not responsible to reimburse Cohan,
the court shall reduce the $28,947.26 reimbursement from
the SNT by the amount of attorney fees incurred to prosecute
Patty’s petition to recover her conservator fees, expenses,
and attorney fees from the SNT.
50
The court also shall amend paragraph (2)(a) on page two
of its July 1, 2022 order to direct the Trustee to pay the amounts
as recalculated on remand.
The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
LAVIN, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
51
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.