People v. Eaves CA2/6

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Filed 5/15/24 P. v. Eaves CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328323
(Super. Ct. No. 2022022285)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

MICHAEL ALLEN EAVES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Allen Eaves appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of one count of displaying a deadly weapon to
avoid arrest (Pen. Code,1 § 417.8; count 1) and three counts of
resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); counts 2-4). The trial court
sentenced him to three years in state prison on count 1 and
concurrent one-year terms on counts 2 through 4. Eaves
contends: (1) the sentences on counts 2 through 4 should have
been stayed pursuant to section 654, (2) the matter should be
remanded for resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 518

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), and (3) the judgment should be reversed
because the prosecutor committed misconduct. We agree with
Eaves’s first contention, but reject his others. The judgment is
modified to stay the execution of the sentences imposed on counts
2 through 4, but is otherwise affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2022, several sheriff’s deputies and police officers
attempted to serve Eaves with an eviction notice. Eaves said
that he was armed with a knife and would not come out of his
house. He barricaded the front door, and the deputies and
officers were unable to enter.
Eight days later, police officers attempted to execute an
arrest warrant on Eaves. Eaves again refused to leave his house.
He threatened to shoot the officers if they did not leave his
property, and called 911 to report intruders in his backyard.
Six officers entered Eaves’s house and told him he was
under arrest. Eaves retreated to a bedroom and lay down on a
bed while holding a knife. The officers followed. When Eaves
refused to drop the knife, one of the officers fired two rubber
bullets and knocked it from his hand.
Several of the officers involved in Eaves’s arrest testified at
trial. Video footage from their body cameras was played for the
jury.
The trial court instructed jurors that they must follow the
law and defer to the court’s instructions should there be a conflict
with any of the attorneys’ comments. (See CALCRIM No. 200.)
The court also defined reasonable doubt for the jurors. (See
CALCRIM No. 220.)
During her closing argument, the prosecutor countered
Eaves’s assertion that he did not know that the people who

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entered his house were police officers. Referring to CALCRIM
No. 226, she said:

“[I]f there are two reasonable interpretations, [and]
one goes towards guilt and one goes towards
innocen[ce], you must adopt the one towards
innocence. They are equal. The benefit of the doubt
goes to the defendant. But the second portion of that
is, [i]f one interpretation is reasonable and the other
interpretation is unreasonable, the instruction says
you must accept the reasonable interpretation and
you must reject the unreasonable interpretation. So
you can look at the interpretation of the evidence that
shows that the defendant actually knew that they
were police officers and why they were there.”

The prosecutor went on to say that jurors “must consider all of
the evidence” and must “accept reasonable interpretations of the
evidence” and “reject all unreasonable interpretations.”
The prosecutor continued: “[T]he [c]ourt ha[s] told you that
reasonable doubt simply means that the prosecution interpretation
is reasonable and the defense interpretation is unreasonable. [¶]
So the reasonable doubt is defined in the instruction by the judge,
and it is the [prosecution’s] burden in this case to prove all of
these charges beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Italics added.) She
also said that “there is no reason based on all of the evidence for
you to acquit the defendant in this case.” Eaves did not object to
the prosecutor’s argument.
DISCUSSION
The sentences on the resisting convictions
Eaves first contends the trial court should have stayed the
sentences on counts 2 through 4 instead of running them
concurrently with his sentence on count 1. We agree.

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“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) Section 654
applies where a defendant’s criminal conduct consists of a single
act or omission, and in instances where a defendant’s course of
conduct violates more than one statute but nevertheless
constitutes an indivisible transaction. (People v. Butler (1986)
184 Cal.App.3d 469, 472.) It does not apply if the defendant
commits a crime of violence against multiple victims. (People v.
Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.)
Here, Eaves was convicted of displaying a deadly weapon to
avoid arrest and three counts of resisting arrest based on a single
act: lying on his bed while displaying a knife. But resisting
arrest is not a crime of violence (People v. Smith (2013) 57
Cal.4th 232, 245 [section 148 involves the act of resisting arrest
without the use of force or violence]), so section 654’s multiple
victim exception does not apply. The trial court accordingly erred
when it imposed concurrent terms on counts 2 through 4.
Assembly Bill No. 518
“Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill [No.] 518
amended section 654, subdivision (a) to permit an act or omission
punishable under two or more provisions of law to ‘be punished
under either of such provisions.’ [Citations.] Thus, under newly
amended section 654, a trial court is no longer required to punish
under the longest possible term of imprisonment when multiple
offenses are based on the same act or omission. [Citation.]”
(People v. White (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1236.) Instead, the
court now has the “ ‘discretion to impose and execute the
sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court

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imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the
longer sentence.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Eaves contends we should remand the matter for the trial
court to exercise its discretion under Assembly Bill No. 518. We
decline to do so. “ ‘The duty of this court . . . is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment [that] can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions [on] moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law [that] cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’ [Citation.]” (In re Miranda
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 757, 762.) Here, the remedy we can
provide (remanding for a resentencing hearing) cannot provide
the remedy Eaves seeks (the possibility of a shorter sentence)
because he has already served the sentence imposed in this case.
His contention is moot.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Finally, Eaves contends the prosecutor committed
misconduct by misstating the burden of proof during closing
argument when she told jurors that “reasonable doubt simply
means that the prosecution interpretation is reasonable and the
defense interpretation is unreasonable.” (Cf. People v. Cowan
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1159 [prosecutor commits misconduct
by attempting to reduce their burden of proof].) But Eaves did
not object during this portion of the prosecutor’s argument. His
contention is forfeited. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447.)
Alternatively, Eaves contends counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument. This
contention requires him to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that counsel performed deficiently and that that
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) These showings are “particularly difficult”

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to make on direct appeal. (Ibid.) As to the first, we “defer to
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions” and indulge “a ‘strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.’ ” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12
Cal.4th 415, 436-437.) We will not find deficient performance
unless no conceivable reason for counsel’s actions appears on the
record. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.) As
to the second, Eaves can establish prejudice by showing “ ‘a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”
(Ibid.) He must “prov[e] prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not
simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of
counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)
Here, Eaves’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
because he has not shown prejudice. The trial court instructed
the jurors on reasonable doubt. It told them to follow its
instructions if any of the attorneys’ arguments were in conflict.
We presume the jury did so. (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th
839, 864.)
Additionally, the evidence against Eaves was
overwhelming. Multiple officers testified about his arrest and the
knife he was wielding. Videos of the arrest were shown. No
witness challenged these accounts. We thus cannot say that, on
this record, Eaves has undermined our confidence in the jury’s
verdicts. (People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 920
[no prejudice where allegedly improper comments were brief and
evidence of guilt was strong].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the execution of the
sentences imposed on counts 2 through 4. The clerk of the
superior court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment,

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and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Peter S. Westacott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte and Kenneth C. Byrne, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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