CourtListener 9502449•People v. Palacios
Texto completo
Filed 5/3/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B324572
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA057753-02
v.
OSCAR ANTONIO PALACIOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Under California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110,
this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of
part 3 of the Discussion section.
A jury convicted Oscar Antonio Palacios of special
circumstance murder, robbery, and burglary. Palacios confessed
to the crimes, and his confession was admitted at his trial.
Some two decades later, Palacios filed a petition for resentencing
under the provisions now found in Penal Code section 1172.6.1
In connection with the petition, Palacios argued his confession
was involuntary and urged the court to exclude it. The court
declined to consider the issue, noting Palacios had not raised
it at his trial. The court admitted the confession and found
Palacios was a major participant in the underlying offenses
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Accordingly,
the court denied the petition.
On appeal, Palacios primarily argues the superior court
erred by refusing to consider excluding his confession on the
ground it was involuntary, despite his failure to raise the issue
at his trial. We disagree. A resentencing hearing under section
1172.6 is not a new trial. Nor does it provide the petitioner
a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error. Instead, it is
a limited proceeding at which the superior court must decide
one issue: could the petitioner “not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
To decide that issue, the statute expressly allows the court
to consider “evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. Palacios filed
his petition under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30,
2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2 (Strong).)
2
or trial that is admissible under current law.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Palacios’s confession falls within that category, as it was
admitted at his trial and remains admissible under current law.
The time to litigate whether the confession should have been
admitted at trial has long passed, and the superior court properly
refused to consider the issue for the first time. We therefore
affirm the order denying Palacios’s petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The crimes2
On January 3, 2000, police found Ricardo Rios dead inside
his Bellflower apartment. Rios was lying on the living room floor;
his head was bloody and his body was cold to the touch. Various
items were missing from his apartment, including a CD player,
a DVD player, a VCR, and a receiver for a television satellite
dish. There were two sets of bloody shoe prints, neither of which
matched any of Rios’s shoes. A set of brass knuckles was on
the floor. A semi-automatic pistol was lying under a tipped-over
stereo speaker. A plastic knife handle missing its blade was
found under the living room couch. A backpack containing CDs
and a DVD was sitting on a staircase. A Sunbeam clothes iron
was on the floor of an upstairs bedroom; the iron was missing
its electric cord. Bloody clothes—a sweatshirt and a T-shirt—
were found in the garage.
The medical examiner testified Rios had an electric cord
wrapped around his neck and he could have been strangled
2 Palacios’s arguments on appeal do not concern the facts
of his crimes. Therefore, we take those facts from the opinion
on direct appeal by another panel of this court. (See People v.
Palacios (Apr. 10, 2002, B148544) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
to death. Rios also had suffered blunt force injuries to his face
and both sides of his head; these injuries too could have caused
his death. There were two nonfatal stab wounds in his left side.
He did not have any defensive wounds. Marks found on his arms
suggested he had been restrained.
On January 1, 2000, two days before Rios’s body was found,
Compton Police Officer Michael Verlich had responded to a
disturbing the peace call at El Rancho Mobile Homes trailer park.
Verlich saw a group of people standing around a red Honda Civic.
When the Honda took off, Verlich activated his lights and
pursued it. The Honda stopped and the driver fled, leaving
the keys in the ignition. It turned out the red Honda had
belonged to Rios.
Palacios, who was 18 years old, was living with his mother
at El Rancho Mobile Homes. His mother testified that a pair of
black tennis shoes found by police belonged to Palacios. One of
the shoes had a unique accidental mark in the sole that exactly
matched one set of the bloody shoe prints in Rios’s apartment.
Police also discovered Palacios’s fingerprints on the Sunbeam
iron that had the missing electric cord.
2. Palacios’s confession3
The police interrogated Palacios several times while he
was in custody. During the first interrogation, a detective told
3 The parties refer to Palacios’s statements to police as a
confession, although it might be more accurate to classify them
as admissions. (See People v. Maynarich (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d
476, 481 [discussing the differences between confessions and
admissions].) The distinction is not important for our purposes,
so we also refer to the statements as a confession.
4
Palacios his name had “come up” in a murder investigation, and
police had discovered his fingerprints on an iron. The detectives
told Palacios they planned to charge him with murder and he
faced a long prison sentence. They suggested Palacios might be
better off if he told them his side of the story. Palacios started
crying at one point, but he steadfastly denied any knowledge
of the crimes. The detectives ended the interview after Palacios
asked for an attorney.
About eight hours later, Palacios contacted the detectives
and said he wanted to talk. At the start of the second
interrogation, Palacios denied having been threatened or
receiving any promises about the case. Palacios then confessed
his involvement in the crimes.
According to Palacios, two friends—Oso and Pee-Wee—
picked him up at the trailer park the night of the murder.
Both men were members of the Tiny Gangsters gang. Oso said
he needed to “tax this fool” who owed him money. Palacios
suggested they “break in and . . . let’s take some stuff and
that’s it.” Oso showed Palacios his gun and let Palacios hold it.
Oso also mentioned he had brass knuckles.
Palacios, Oso, and Pee-Wee drove to Rios’s apartment
and went inside. The three men went upstairs, trying not
to wake Rios, who was asleep on the sofa. Oso and Pee-Wee
suggested they might need to kill Rios, and they started looking
for a rope. Palacios was not paying attention and did not think
about killing Rios.
Palacios found a steam iron he wanted to take with him
because he needed an iron. While he was holding the iron,
Palacios heard a noise outside and decided to check on it. He
wrapped up the cord on the iron and put it away in a cabinet.
5
At some point, Palacios decided to go back inside the
apartment to tell Oso and Pee-Wee he planned to take the iron
with him. He saw Oso and Pee-Wee hitting Rios with brass
knuckles and choking him with a rope. Although not entirely
clear, it seems Rios tried to escape and was “half ways” out the
door, but Palacios pushed him back inside. Oso and Pee-Wee
grabbed Rios and “beat [him] up.” Rios was knocked unconscious,
and Palacios suggested they leave.
Palacios continued loading Rios’s belongings into Oso’s car.
Pee-Wee and Oso came outside and they left with Palacios.
Palacios kept Rios’s VCR.
3. The verdict and sentence
Based on this evidence a jury convicted Palacios of
special circumstance first degree murder, robbery, and burglary.
(§§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 211, 459.) The court sentenced
Palacios to life without the possibility of parole for the murder.
The court imposed and stayed the sentences on the other counts.
4. Palacios’s petition for resentencing
In May 2021, Palacios filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95. The court found Palacios had
established a prima facie case and it issued an order to show
cause. The People filed an opposition, arguing Palacios is
ineligible for relief because he was a major participant in the
underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The People relied heavily on Palacios’s confession,
which was the only direct evidence of his role in the crimes.
After reviewing the opposition, the superior court told
the parties it “believe[d] there is a potential issue regarding
whether [Palacios’s] confession to the police was made
voluntarily; more specifically, whether [Palacios] confessed
6
in response to threats or promises of leniency which rendered
his confession inadmissible.” The court asked the parties
to submit briefs answering three questions: (1) Was the
voluntariness issue litigated in the trial court? (2) May a court
consider the voluntariness of a confession when deciding whether
to admit evidence in connection with a section 1172.6 petition?
(3) If so, do the parties have additional evidence to present
on the issue?
Palacios and the People agreed the voluntariness issue
had not been litigated at trial.4 However, they disagreed about
whether the court could consider the issue for the first time
in connection with Palacios’s petition. Palacios urged the court
to consider the issue and exclude his confession on the ground
it was involuntary. The People argued if the confession had been
“admitted at trial and the rules of admissibility have not changed
since the trial was held, then the Court may consider” the
evidence in connection with the petition.
The court issued a tentative decision that it would not
consider the admissibility of the confession. The court reasoned
that, because a resentencing hearing is a postconviction
proceeding rather than a trial de novo, the petitioner does not
have the same rights guaranteed to criminal defendants under
the due process clause of the federal Constitution. The court
noted the parties could still address the reliability of the
confession by way of argument or new evidence.
4 According to Palacios, he raised an objection under
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) at the
preliminary hearing, which the court overruled.
7
The court held an evidentiary hearing in September 2022.
Neither party presented live testimony. At the People’s request,
the court admitted into evidence the reporter’s transcript from
the trial, as well as a transcript of Palacios’s interrogations.
The court took judicial notice of the court file from the trial,
which also included Palacios’s interrogations. The court noted
the interrogations had been admitted into evidence at trial.
Palacios again urged the court not to admit his confession,
arguing his “statements were taken in clear violation of his
Miranda rights” and should have been excluded at trial on
that basis. Without his confession, Palacios argued, the People
could not prove he was a major participant in the offenses.
The court said it continued to stand by its tentative ruling
and would not consider the admissibility of the confession on
the ground it was involuntary. The court pointed to a recent
appellate decision—People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575
—holding there is no right to be free from self-incrimination at
a resentencing hearing. The court went on to determine Palacios
was a major participant in the robbery and burglary and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. On that basis, the court
found him ineligible for relief and denied his petition.
Palacios timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant law
“In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . , the
Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder
rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants who had
previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory
but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant
8
neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[Penal Code] section 190.2’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e); see id.,
§ 1172.6; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 3–4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.)
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which a person
convicted of murder under the former law may be resentenced if
he could no longer be convicted of murder because of the changes
to section 188. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; see generally
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843; People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960.) Once a petitioner establishes
a prima facie case for relief and the superior court issues an order
to show cause, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing at
which it is the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (Strong,
at pp. 708–709; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)
If the superior court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner is guilty of murder notwithstanding the amendments
to sections 188 and 189, the petitioner is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6. (Strong, at pp. 708–709; Vargas, at p. 951.)
2. The superior court properly admitted Palacios’s
confession
Palacios argues the superior court erred by admitting his
confession into evidence without first determining whether it
was voluntary. According to Palacios, an involuntary confession
is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1204 because its
use violates the due process clauses of the United States and
9
California Constitutions.5 (See People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d
754, 778 (Benson).) Palacios asserts the superior court committed
reversible error by refusing even to consider excluding his
confession on this basis.
Palacios’s argument rests on the premise that the Evidence
Code governs the admission of all evidence offered at a section
1172.6 resentencing hearing. In support of that premise,
Palacios points to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) (section
1172.6(d)(3)). It states the “admission of evidence in the
[resentencing] hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code,
except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted
at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) As we understand
his argument, Palacios contends the phrase “shall be governed
by the Evidence Code” requires a court to exclude all evidence
it determines to be inadmissible under the Evidence Code,
even if the evidence was admitted at a prior trial.
Resolution of Palacios’s argument requires us to interpret
section 1172.6. “When interpreting a statute, a court’s role ‘is
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin as always with the statute’s
actual words, the “most reliable indicator” of legislative intent,
“assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and
5 Evidence Code section 1204 provides a “statement that is
otherwise admissible as hearsay evidence is inadmissible against
the defendant in a criminal action if the statement was made . . .
under such circumstances that it is inadmissible against the
defendant under the Constitution of the United States or the
State of California.”
10
construing them in context. If the words themselves are not
ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said,
and the statute’s plain meaning governs. On the other hand,
if the language allows more than one reasonable construction,
we may look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure
and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of uncertain
meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular
interpretation, including its impact on public policy.” ’ ” (People
v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 101 (Cody).) We presume the
Legislature intended the entire statute to have effect, and we
aim to avoid interpretations that render any part meaningless.
(People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 180.)
With these principles in mind, we reject Palacios’s
interpretation of section 1172.6. Contrary to his suggestions,
section 1172.6(d)(3) plainly creates more than one standard
for the admission of evidence at a resentencing hearing. First,
it provides a general rule that admissibility is “governed by the
Evidence Code.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) It then exempts from
the general rule “evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law.” (Ibid.)
This language would be meaningless if—as Palacios suggests—
the admissibility of evidence admitted at a prior trial remained
subject to the Evidence Code. Indeed, as one court recently put
it, if section 1172.6(d)(3) “means that properly admitted former
witness testimony must once again be run through the rigorous
filter of the rules of evidence—but at a different time, under
different circumstances—the exception for previously admitted
testimony would be superfluous.” (People v. Davenport (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159 (Davenport).)
11
In this case, the People sought to admit Palacios’s
confession under section 1172.6(d)(3)’s exception for previously
admitted evidence. Under the exception, the confession was
admissible if the People established (1) the confession had been
admitted at a prior trial or hearing, and (2) the confession
remained “admissible under current law.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The parties do not dispute Palacios’s confession had been
admitted at his trial. Therefore, the only issue is whether
the evidence remained “admissible under current law.”
On that issue, Palacios does not directly address the
meaning of the phrase “admissible under current law.” To
the extent he suggests it requires a court to determine whether
the evidence is admissible under the current Evidence Code,
we disagree. That interpretation would, once again, effectively
render meaningless section 1172.6(d)(3)’s exception for previously
admitted evidence.
Instead, we agree with the interpretation proposed in
Davenport, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1150. The court in Davenport
explained, “[t]o the extent the phrase ‘is admissible under current
law’ creates ambiguity, we think the most natural reading of
those words is that the basis for admission of testimony at the
hearing or trial in which it was previously admitted must remain
a valid basis for admitting the testimony ‘under current law.’
The statute ‘contemplate[s] that there may be some evidence that
was admitted at a former trial that would not be admissible [in
such a proceeding] under current law.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1158–1159.)
Here, Palacios has never sought to exclude his confession
on the basis it was admitted at trial on a ground that is no
longer valid. Nor could he, as there have been no changes in
the law since his trial that would affect the admissibility of the
12
confession. If the trial were to take place today, the confession
could be admitted for the same reasons it was admitted at trial:
it is highly probative of Palacios’s guilt and is exempt from
the hearsay rule. (See Evid. Code, §§ 351 [as a general rule,
“all relevant evidence is admissible”], 1220 [evidence of a
“statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule
when offered against the declarant in an action to which he
is a party”].) Palacios suggests no grounds for excluding the
confession today that were not available at the time of his trial.
Accordingly, the confession is “admissible under current law”
for purposes of section 1172.6(d)(3), and the court properly
admitted it into evidence.
Palacios alternatively suggests, regardless of the statutory
requirements, due process guaranteed him the right to challenge
his confession as involuntary.
“Notice and an opportunity to be heard are the
fundamental hallmarks of due process whenever ‘life, liberty,
or property’ is put in jeopardy.” (People v. Silva (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 505, 523.) Here, despite the superior court’s refusal
to consider excluding the confession on voluntariness grounds,
Palacios had ample notice and opportunity to be heard on the
issue. At the time of his trial, it was already well established
that involuntary confessions are inadmissible. (See, e.g., Benson,
supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 778 [“[a]n involuntary confession, of course,
is inadmissible under the due process clauses of both” the federal
and state Constitutions].) Palacios was represented by counsel
and had every incentive to seek to exclude his confession at
that time. Indeed, it appears he attempted to do so, albeit on
Miranda grounds. For whatever reason, Palacios failed to raise
the voluntariness issue at his trial. He also declined to raise
13
the issue on appeal or indirectly through a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Due process does not require the
Legislature or the courts to grant Palacios yet another
opportunity to raise the issue.
Our conclusion finds further support in the fact the court’s
refusal to consider the admissibility of Palacios’s confession
did not meaningfully undermine the justifications for excluding
involuntary confessions at trial. The California Supreme Court
has articulated three reasons why due process requires the
exclusion of involuntary confessions: “[1] because they are
untrustworthy, [2] because it offends ‘the community’s sense of
fair play and decency’ to convict a defendant by evidence extorted
from him, and [3] because exclusion serves to discourage the use
of physical brutality and other undue pressures in questioning
those suspected of crime.” (People v. Atchley (1959) 53 Cal.2d
160, 170 (Atchley).)
As to the first justification, although the superior court
refused to consider excluding the confession as involuntary,
the court did not refuse to consider how the confession’s
voluntariness—or lack thereof—affected its trustworthiness.
To the contrary, the court expressly invited the parties to present
evidence and argument on the issue. Moreover, because the
resentencing hearing was before a court, rather than a jury,
there was less risk the admission of an untrustworthy confession
would cause undue prejudice. (See In re Jose M. (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481 [court trials minimize the danger of
undue prejudice].)
Nor did the court’s refusal to consider the voluntariness
issue significantly undermine the other justifications for the
exclusionary rule. By failing to object to the confession on
14
voluntariness grounds at trial, Palacios implicitly conceded
it had not been extorted from him. Given this concession,
the court’s admission of the confession without revisiting the
voluntariness issue is neither unfair nor “indecent.” We also
suspect any deterrent effect from excluding an involuntary
confession at a resentencing hearing is minimal, especially when
compared to the deterrent effect of the general rule excluding
involuntary confessions at trial. (See Atchley, supra, 53 Cal.2d
at p. 170.)
Finally, we reject Palacios’s suggestion that due process
guarantees him the right to challenge his confession on
voluntariness grounds at any time. Contrary to his suggestion,
the right to object to a confession as involuntary is not absolute.
As relevant here, the claim is subject to the general forfeiture
rule, meaning a defendant ordinarily must raise the issue
at trial in order to preserve it. (See People v. Williams (2010)
49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements
of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument
that his statements to police were involuntary].)
By exempting from general admissibility determinations
evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively
extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.
Just as a defendant may not raise a new evidentiary objection
on appeal, a petitioner who failed to make a specific evidentiary
objection at trial may not raise the issue for the first time at a
resentencing hearing. This is consistent with the limited nature
of section 1172.6 proceedings and reflects a reasonable legislative
determination that resentencing hearings are not the proper
forum to litigate issues that could have been raised at trial. (See
15
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [a resentencing
hearing does not afford the petitioner “a new opportunity to raise
claims of trial error”]; Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 104
[noting the Legislature plainly did not intend for resentencing
hearings to become new court trials]; see also People v. Njoku
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 44–45 [a “petitioner under section
1172.6 does not possess many of the constitutional rights afforded
to a criminal defendant at trial”]; People v. Howard (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 727, 740 [retroactive relief afforded by former section
1170.95 “reflects an act of lenity by the Legislature” that does
not implicate all the defendant’s constitutional rights].)
For all these reasons, we conclude the superior court
did not err by declining to consider whether Palacios’s confession
was voluntary before admitting it into evidence. By establishing
the evidence had been admitted at a prior trial and remained
admissible under current law, the People satisfied all the
requirements for admission under section 1172.6(d)(3). Neither
the statutory text nor due process required the court to conduct
additional analysis.
3. We presume the court considered Palacios’s youth
[[Begin nonpublished portion.]]
Palacios argues the superior court erred by failing to
consider his youth at the time of the offenses when determining
whether he was a major participant and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
See footnote, ante, page 1.
16
We agree with the Attorney General that Palacios forfeited
this issue by failing to raise it in the superior court. Generally,
an appellant may not raise an issue on appeal unless he raised
it below. (See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653
[defendant “forfeited this claim by failing to raise this issue
below, when the trial court could have remedied the alleged
shortcoming”]; Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
651, 670 [“ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the
trial court are forfeited on appeal.’ ”].) As Palacios seems to
concede, he never argued—in his papers in support of his petition
or orally before the superior court—his youth was relevant
to whether he was a major participant or acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Nor did Palacios mention the issue
after the court announced its ruling and asked if he had anything
to add to the record. By failing to raise the issue below, Palacios
has forfeited it on appeal.
Palacios argues his failure to raise the issue below is
excusable because, at the time of his resentencing hearing, it
was not yet established that resentencing courts may consider
a petitioner’s youth. Palacios is mistaken. The court held the
resentencing hearing in September 2022. By that time, at least
four cases had been issued in which courts stated an offender’s
youth is relevant to whether he was an active participant in a
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See
People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 (Harris); In re
Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 (Moore); People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 986–987 (Ramirez); In re Harper
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470 (Harper).)
In Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, for example, the
court reversed a summary denial of a resentencing petition,
17
noting “given [the petitioner’s] youth at the time of the crime,
particularly in light of subsequent case law’s recognition of the
science relating to adolescent brain development [citations],
it is far from clear that [the petitioner] was actually aware ‘of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 944–945, 960.) About six months later, in August
2021, the court in Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, went
“one step further” and explicitly held “a defendant’s youth
is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 454.)
Two more cases followed—Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970,
in November 2021 and Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 450, in
March 2022—that discussed the relevance of an offender’s youth
in the context of resentencing petitions. (See Ramirez, at p. 987;
Harper, at p. 470.) Given the state of the law at the time of
Palacios’s resentencing hearing, we decline to excuse his failure
to raise the issue in the superior court.
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject
Palacios’s argument on the merits. Generally, we presume the
lower court was aware of, and followed, the law while performing
its duties. (People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092.)
Given this presumption, in “the usual case, the fact that a court
did not specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that
the court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (Ibid.) Instead, we presume
the lower court “duly considered the evidence presented to it.”
(Ibid.) That presumption applies here. (Cf. People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488–490 [noting it was unlikely
the superior court knew to consider the petitioner’s youth
where the resentencing hearing was held before Harris, Moore,
18
Ramirez, and Harper were decided]; Jones, at pp. 1091–1092
[declining to presume superior court considered the petitioner’s
youth where the resentencing hearing was held before Moore,
Ramirez, and Harper were decided].)
Palacios suggests the record affirmatively demonstrates
the court believed his youth was not relevant to his resentencing
petition. At the hearing, the court noted it was concerned about
the voluntariness of Palacios’s confession. In that context, the
court stated, “I didn’t decide the issue because we didn’t brief it,
but the court notes that at the time Mr. Palacios made his
statement, he was 18 years old, and evidently the record contains
some indication that he suffered from a learning disability, and
those are factors that would be considered if this court were
to consider the voluntariness of his statement, but the state
of the law at this time is that a defendant does not have a right
[against] self-incrimination or to be free from self-incrimination
at an evidentiary hearing.”
Palacios suggests the above comments indicate the court
erroneously believed his youth was relevant only if it were to
consider the voluntariness of his confession. We disagree. It is
apparent from the context the court was simply noting Palacios’s
youth was relevant to the voluntariness issue; it was not stating
his youth was relevant only to that issue. Because the record
does not refute the presumption the superior court followed the
law and considered all relevant evidence, Palacios has not met
his burden to show error affirmatively. (See People v. Lee (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866–867.)
[[End nonpublished portion.]]
19
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
20
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.