CourtListener 9481229•People v. Duggan CA3
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Filed 3/5/24 P. v. Duggan CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C097888
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CM041015)
v.
ROBERT DUANE DUGGAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Robert Duane Duggan appeals following resentencing after the trial
court struck a one-year enhancement for a previously imposed prior prison term and
denied his request to dismiss a gun enhancement associated with his aggravated mayhem
conviction. He raises two contentions: (1) his counsel was ineffective for failing to
present the trial court with all resentencing options; and (2) we must direct the trial court
to correct his custody credits. The People concede the custody credit error. We agree
defendant is entitled to additional custody credit and therefore remand but otherwise
affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant forced his way into the victim’s apartment, shooting him multiple
times, causing the loss of an eye and other injuries. (See People v. Duggan, (Mar. 15,
2019, C079809) [nonpub. opn.] (Duggan I).)
On April 30, 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder, aggravated
mayhem, possession of a firearm by a felon, and misdemeanor possession of cocaine.
The jury also found that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury in the commission of both the attempted murder and mayhem.
The trial court found that defendant had served a prior prison term.
On June 15, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years to life for
aggravated mayhem, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, plus a consecutive
upper term of three years for his prohibited possession of a firearm, plus one year for the
prior prison term, and a concurrent one year for the possession of cocaine. The trial court
also imposed but stayed both the upper term of nine years for attempted murder and 25
years to life for the associated firearm enhancement. We affirmed this judgment.
(Duggan I, supra, C079809.)
Defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court, and it remanded with
directions to vacate our decision and reconsider in light of People v. Lemcke (2021)
11 Cal.5th 644. We issued an opinion on transfer remanding for resentencing on issues
related to defendant’s fines and fees. (People v. Duggan (Sept. 28, 2021, C079809)
[nonpub. opn.] (Duggan II).) In that opinion, we also struck defendant’s prior prison
term enhancement in light of the statutory changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 136
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) but determined that resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 620
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was unnecessary because the trial court would not have stricken
the firearm enhancement if it had had discretion to do so at the original sentencing.
(Duggan II, supra, C079809.)
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On July 26, 2022, the trial court identified defendant’s case for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1171.1 (now § 1172.75) (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12)
and appointed counsel. (Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.)
Defendant requested the trial court strike the one-year prior prison term enhancement and
dismiss his 25-year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 1385, as amended by Senate
Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The People agreed the prior prison term
enhancement should be stricken but opposed the remaining request.
On December 28, 2022, the trial court struck defendant’s one-year prior prison
term enhancement but not his firearm enhancement. The trial court failed to address
custody credits at the resentencing hearing, and the amended abstract of judgment
reflected no change in custody credits from defendant’s original sentencing. Defendant
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance because his counsel at
resentencing failed to present the trial court with all available resentencing options that
may have resulted in a more favorable sentence. Specifically, defendant contends his
counsel: (1) failed to present all possible sentencing alternatives for his 25-to-life firearm
enhancement, and (2) failed to request the trial court exercise its newly granted discretion
under section 6541 to stay his sentence for aggravated mayhem (seven years to life) and
instead enforce the sentence for attempted murder (the upper term of nine years).
“[T]o establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered
1 Section 654 as amended allows a trial court to select which sentence to stay in contrast
to the previous language, which required the trial court to impose the longest possible
term. (People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 861-862.)
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prejudice as a result of such deficient performance.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th
181, 198; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.) To demonstrate
prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”
(Mickel, at p. 198.)
Here, defendant faults his attorney for failing to present the trial court with all
options at his resentencing. However, he has not established he was prejudiced by these
asserted failures. In Duggan II this court determined it was unnecessary to remand
defendant’s case to allow the trial court to exercise its newly found discretion to strike
defendant’s firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).
(Duggan II, supra, C079809.) The numerous sentencing factors in aggravation that were
utilized to impose an upper term determinate sentence for defendant’s firearm possession
conviction, combined with the trial court’s comment “that [the] enhancement term was
‘appropriate’ ” caused this court to conclude “that term would not have been stricken had
the trial court possessed such discretion at the time of sentencing.” (Ibid.)
That the trial court would not have imposed a lesser sentence at his December
resentencing hearing is also supported by the fact that, with the limited exception of
running the term for defendant’s misdemeanor conviction concurrent with his prison
sentence, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence allowable under law when it
originally sentenced defendant in 2015 and resentenced him in 2022.
Defendant has therefore not demonstrated it is reasonably probable the trial court
would have altered his sentence downward. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S.
at p. 694.)
II
The parties agree and so do we that this matter must be remanded for correction of
defendant’s actual custody credits and for issuance an amended abstract of judgment
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reflecting the accurate number of days served prior to the December 2022 resentencing
hearing.
Pursuant to section 2900.1, “when a sentence is modified while in progress, the
‘time’ already served ‘shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence [the defendant]
may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.’ ” (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37.) This requires the trial court to update the actual
custody credits on the amended abstract of judgment to reflect “all actual days” spent in
custody “whether in jail or prison” up until the resentencing. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter for the trial court to calculate defendant’s actual custody
credit. The trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
certified copy to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
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