CourtListener 9477143•People v. Parigi CA2/6
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Filed 2/21/24 P. v. Parigi CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. Nos. B321153, B322247
(Super. Ct. Nos. 20F-06567,
Plaintiff and Appellant, 21F-00172)
(San Luis Obispo County)
v.
MEGAN PARIGI,
Defendant and Respondent.
Megan Parigi appeals a judgment following conviction of
first degree burglary, with a finding that a non-accomplice was
present in the residence at the time of the burglary, and unlawful
driving or taking of a vehicle. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd.
(c)(21)1; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The trial court separately
found that Parigi suffered a previous felony strike conviction.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
Parigi raises two claims of instructional error and one
claim of sentencing error. We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2021, seven roommates lived in a large
residence on Longview Lane in San Luis Obispo. In the early
morning of January 19, 2021, an intruder entered the bedroom of
two of the female roommates, and said, “[O]h, no wonder.” The
two roommates closed their bedroom door and telephoned 911.
Soon after, police officers arrived but did not find any intruder
inside the residence.
Roommate Anton Schuh owned a 2019 Toyota 4Runner
that he parked in a distinctive manner to avoid passing bicyclists
in a dedicated parking space close to the residence. Schuh placed
the ignition key to the vehicle atop a stereo speaker inside the
residence. As reflected in a video recording from a passing police
patrol vehicle, Schuh’s vehicle was parked in the same spot
shortly after midnight.
At approximately 4:15 a.m., San Luis Obispo Polce Officer
Joseph Cox drove past the Longview residence and noticed Parigi
sitting in the driver’s seat of Schuh’s vehicle. The vehicle was not
parked in the same spot that Schuh had parked it earlier that
evening.
Cox spoke with Parigi who acknowledged that the vehicle
did not belong to her. She later admitted that she entered the
residence and took the keys from the stereo speaker area. Their
conversation was captured on Cox’s bodycam video and played at
trial. On the floorboard lay an empty Amazon envelope reflecting
the Longview Lane address. Schuh did not know Parigi and had
not given her the vehicle keys or permission to be inside his
vehicle.
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The jury convicted Parigi of first degree burglary and
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. (§ 459; Veh. Code,
§ 10851, subd. (a).) It also found that a non-accomplice was
present in the residence at the time of the burglary. (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(21).) In a separate proceeding, the trial court found that
Parigi suffered a previous felony strike conviction. (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)
The trial court sentenced Parigi to an aggregate term of
eight years in prison, consisting of a four-year middle term that
was doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law. The court
stayed sentence on the Vehicle Code count pursuant to section
654. The court imposed restitution fines and awarded Parigi 591
days of presentence custody credit. The court also dismissed the
previous felony enhancement that Parigi had admitted.
Parigi appeals and contends that the trial court erred by:
1) instructing with CALCRIM No. 376 regarding possession of
recently stolen property; 2) instructing regarding the requisite
intent for burglary; and 3) not sentencing her pursuant to section
1385, subdivision (c).
DISCUSSION
I.
Parigi argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by
instructing with CALCRIM No. 376 (“Possession of Recently
Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime”). She asserts that only
slight and insufficient evidence supports the instruction. We
reject this contention and conclude that substantial evidence
supports the inference that Parigi was in possession of recently
stolen property.
CALCRIM No. 376 provides: “If you conclude the that
defendant knew she possessed property and you conclude that
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the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not convict
the defendant of burglary or unlawful taking or driving a vehicle
based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that
supporting evidence tends to prove her guilt, then you may
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove she committed
burglary or unlawful taking or driving a vehicle. The supporting
evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to
prove guilt. . . .”
The trial court properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 376
because Parigi was in possession of recently stolen property.
Schuh testified that he left his vehicle keys on or near the stereo
speaker and that he did not give them to Parigi. Parigi was
found in possession of the keys a few hours later. She also
admitted to Cox that she entered the Longview residence and
took the keys from the stereo speaker. As well, Parigi was in
possession of the Amazon envelope that was addressed to the
Longview residence. Parigi was found sitting in Schuh’s vehicle
with the Amazon envelope mixed with her possessions. This
evidence supports the reasonable inference that the vehicle keys
and Amazon envelope were recently stolen by Parigi.
Moreover, the prosecution proceeded on the burglary
charge that Parigi intended to commit theft, an intent to steal
property and permanently deprive the owner of its possession,
when she entered the residence.
II.
Parigi claims that the trial court committed prejudicial
instructional error because the instructions permitted the jury to
convict her of burglary without finding that she had the intent to
commit theft or any felony upon entering the residence. She
asserts that the jury received instructions that the requisite
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intent for burglary could rest upon the non-theft misdemeanor of
unlawful taking of a vehicle.
An intent to commit unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle
can establish the requisite intent for a burglary conviction. Here
the jury received instruction regarding the specific intent
required for burglary as well as unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle. (CALCRIM Nos. 251, 1700.) Each count was charged as
a felony. The intent to commit theft, any felony, or the wobbler
offense of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle can support a
burglary conviction. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053,
1112-1113.) “That a judge ultimately may impose a sentence
other than state prison, making the crime a misdemeanor, does
not remove [a wobbler offense] from the class of crimes that may
form the basis for a burglary conviction.” (Ibid.) Thus, the trial
court properly instructed that the jury could determine Parigi
guilty of burglary based on the intent to commit the offense of
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle – the intent to
permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession or
ownership of a vehicle.
III.
Parigi asserts that the trial court erred by not applying
recently amended section 1385, subdivision (c), when ruling upon
her motion to dismiss her prior felony strike conviction. She
points out that the prior strike conviction was more than five
years old and that she suffers from mental illness. We reject this
claim because the amendment does not apply to the Three
Strikes law.
Section 1385, subdivision (c), now provides: “(1)
Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
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if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the presence of one or
more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” Section 1385 does
not apply to the Three Strikes law, which is an alternative
sentencing scheme, not a sentence enhancement. (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243 [section 1385, subdivision
(c), clearly and unambiguously applies only to enhancements, not
the alternative sentencing scheme of the Three Strikes law].)
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
CODY, J.
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Timothy S. Covello, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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