People v. Sanchez CA6

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Filed 9/11/23 P. v. Sanchez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H049940
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20CR04169)

v.

LOUIS EDWARD SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Louis Edward Sanchez was convicted by jury of three felonies
involving the same victim: rape of an unconscious person, oral copulation of an
unconscious person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person. Defendant argues
on appeal that the prosecution did not establish the corpus delicti of sexual penetration of
an unconscious person. He also contends insufficient evidence supports the sexual
penetration and rape convictions. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the
judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant was charged by information with rape of an unconscious person (Pen.
Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)); oral copulation of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 287,
subd. (f)); and sexual penetration of an unconscious person by foreign object (Pen. Code,
§ 289, subd. (d)). (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.) All counts
involved the same victim, whom we will refer to as Jane Doe, consistent with the trial
court proceedings and in the interest of privacy. The following is a summary of the
relevant evidence presented at defendant’s jury trial.
A. JANE DOE’S TESTIMONY
Jane Doe was 28 years old at the time of trial in 2022. In September 2020 she
lived in a house in Watsonville with her young son. The house was split into two sides,
with a shared kitchen and laundry rooms. Doe lived on one side with her son, and Doe’s
brother lived with his wife and son on the other side.
Doe and her family entertained at the Watsonville house one night in September
2020. Doe’s son was not staying at her home that night. People began to arrive around
8:00 p.m. They sat in Doe’s brother’s dining room, listened to music, took shots of
tequila, and sang. Doe drank three or four shots, and part of a hard seltzer drink.
Doe’s brother arrived home around 10:00 p.m. and asked everyone to move
outside to the back yard. Five or six additional men arrived around the same time,
including defendant. Doe knew some of the men, but had not met defendant before that
night. Doe continued drinking alcohol while outside, consuming about seven hard
seltzers and one mixed drink over the course of the night. She danced with a group of
people, which included her friends and defendant. Doe testified that she had friendly
interactions with defendant while in the back yard, but she denied flirting with defendant
or touching him in a sexual way.
The party wound down, some people left, and others went inside the two sides of
the house. Doe decided to cook food for anyone who was hungry. Defendant came into
the kitchen and tried to help her cook, but Doe told him to sit down. She asked defendant
why he had not left with the person he arrived with, and defendant did not answer the
question. Doe offered food to defendant and the others who remained in her side of the
house. Doe ate her food in the living room and defendant sat at the same table without
eating.

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Doe told defendant he could sleep in her nephew’s room on her brother’s side of
the house. Doe then went to her bedroom, closed the door, and got ready for bed. She
wore a hooded sweatshirt and “[b]ootie short” underwear to bed. At one point Doe
retrieved water and a phone charger from the kitchen. Doe’s female friend was in the
living room; the friend told Doe she found it strange that defendant was sitting in the
room watching the female friend and another man. Doe repeated the offer for defendant
to sleep in the nephew’s room; defendant did not respond. Doe returned to her bedroom,
closed the door, and fell asleep. When she woke up coughing she went to the kitchen for
water and found defendant there, which surprised her. She did not invite him to her room
when she returned to bed.
Doe’s next memory was “dreaming, like having a sex dream.” She awoke and
noticed defendant “standing there with his penis inside [her] vagina.” Doe noticed she
had been moved so that her feet were on the floor. Defendant was standing between her
legs. She was still wearing underwear, but the crotch of the underwear “was off to the
side.” Doe said, “ ‘what the fuck,’ ” pushed him away, and ran out of the room.
Defendant “looked shocked like, wow, she woke up.” She also told him to “get the fuck
out of [her] house.” Doe huddled into a ball in the corner of the hallway and felt “[d]ead
inside.” She felt wetness in her vagina and underwear. Doe never gave defendant
permission to kiss, cuddle, or do anything sexual with her. Someone called the police,
and an officer interviewed Doe at her house. Doe agreed to undergo a sexual assault
forensic exam.
B. FORENSIC EVIDENCE
A registered nurse testified as an expert in sexual assault forensic exams. She
completed a sexual assault exam of Doe within hours after Doe contacted the police. Doe
was very anxious. Doe had some redness on the front of her neck, bruising on the front
of her legs, and abrasions on the back of her neck and upper back. There was an abrasion
and tenderness at the entrance of the vagina (fossa navicularis), redness on the labia
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minora, and a laceration in the area between the vaginal opening and anus (perineum).
The nurse testified that the exam was consistent with Doe’s description of the incident,
but noted that she could not “speak to the matter of consent versus nonconsent.” The
examining nurse testified Doe had “vaginal injury that could be caused by penetration,”
and that the injury was consistent with “vaginal penetration with a penis.” The nurse
acknowledged on cross-examination that marks of the sort she observed on Doe could
result from consensual sex.
The court read the jury a stipulation about DNA testing: Swabs were “collected
from [Doe’s] sexual assault exam.” Testing on those swabs “detected male DNA on the
perianal [sic] swab on the non-sperm fraction of the vaginal swab, and on the mons
swab.” “DNA analysis performed on the mons swab ... provides very strong support that
[defendant] is a contributor to the DNA mixture detected for the mons swab.”
C. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
A Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Sergeant testified that defendant called him later
that day, wanting an opportunity to describe what happened. Defendant ultimately met
with law enforcement twice before being arrested. Both interviews were recorded, and
the recordings were admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial. The deputy
testified that because defendant volunteered to be interviewed and was not under arrest,
the deputy did not read defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
384 U.S. 436. At both interviews, the deputy showed defendant the door was unlocked
and told defendant he was free to leave at any time.
At the first interview, defendant confirmed that he went to the party at Doe’s
house. He drank more than 10 beers that day and also drank mixed alcoholic drinks. He
talked to Doe periodically during the party, including in the kitchen while she prepared
food. As the party wound down, defendant decided to sleep in his truck. He walked
through Doe’s room to leave the house and noticed she was still awake. She agreed to let

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defendant sit down and talk with her. She also agreed to let him sleep in the room with
her, and agreed to cuddle with him. They fell asleep cuddling.
Defendant provided several summaries of what happened when he woke up, which
were largely consistent with one another. He “started touching her, rubbing it a little bit.”
They kissed. He kissed her breasts and then gave “her the oral sex.” She moaned and
moved her body in a way that made defendant think she was enjoying herself. Then he
“barely sticked it in and she just ... ran out of the room.” He later confirmed he was
referring to his penis. Doe yelled “ ‘Get the fuck outta my house. Get the fuck outta my
house.’ ”
During the second interview, defendant repeated that he never forced himself on
her. He stated, “if she was asleep then that was my mistake thinking she was awake.”
An officer told defendant the results of Doe’s medical exam indicated “it wasn’t just the
tip like you explained it.” Defendant stated that he “was playing with her for a while.”
The officer asked, “So with your fingers?” Defendant responded, “That’s what I said,
probably touch- I was touching her at the beginning. And that’s why I thought it was
okay, ‘cause I was touching her and I was feeling her.” Defendant was arrested at the
end of the second interview.
D. DEFENDANT’S TRIAL TESTIMONY
Defendant confirmed at trial that he attended the party in September 2020. He
drank beer before the party, and continued drinking beer at the party. He also drank
mixed whiskey drinks offered to him by Doe. He smoked cigarettes with Doe. He also
danced and talked with Doe during the party. The party eventually died down, and the
remaining guests moved inside.
Defendant testified that he kept Doe company in the kitchen while she cooked for
the remaining guests. She made him a gordita, but he did not eat it because eating while
drinking alcohol gives him nausea. He sat with her while she ate, and Doe eventually
went to her bedroom.
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Defendant testified that he decided to leave, and walked to Doe’s bedroom
because “that’s the only exit [he] could remember coming in through.” Defendant also
acknowledged he “was going to see if maybe [he] can hookup with [Doe].” Doe was
looking at her phone, and she agreed to let defendant sit next to her. Defendant asked if
he could spend the night, and Doe agreed. Defendant then asked Doe if she wanted to
cuddle, she again agreed, and they fell asleep while cuddling.
Defendant woke up later and noticed “a little bit of light” outside. He kissed Doe
and she kissed him back. They started “feeling each other.” He was “grabbing her butt
and she grabbed me a little bit, you know, my penis and stuff like that and we were just
making out.” Defendant kissed Doe’s neck and breasts, and gave her oral sex. She was
moaning and moving her body. Defendant then put his penis into Doe’s vagina. He
“barely start[ed]” inserting his penis and Doe said, “what the fuck,” backed away, and ran
out of the room. Doe became “really angry” and screamed at defendant to leave.
Defendant left the house.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor summarized defendant’s testimony and then
stated, “You left out when you penetrated her with your fingers. When did that happen?”
Defendant responded, “Maybe after a little bit of awhile that we were making out and I
was kissing her and kissing her breasts and started touching her. Probably a little bit
before I started giving her oral sex.” The prosecutor asked, “When you put your fingers
inside of her vagina, did you move her underwear?” Defendant responded, “I think I just
put my hand under her underwear.” When the prosecutor asked, “So it wasn’t through
her underwear?” defendant responded, “No.” Defendant acknowledged that he never
received affirmative consent to engage in any sex acts with Doe.
E. VERDICT AND SENTENCING
The jury found defendant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to the low term of
three years in prison for the rape count (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)). The court imposed
concurrent terms for the other two counts.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. THE CORPUS DELICTI OF SEXUAL PENETRATION BY A FOREIGN OBJECT
WAS ESTABLISHED

Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1) near the end of the
prosecution’s case, arguing the prosecution had not established the corpus delicti of
sexual penetration by a foreign object. The court denied the motion based on the “strong
corroborating evidence as to two of the three acts.”
“The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements, the fact of the injury, loss
or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.” (People v. Hamilton (1989)
48 Cal.3d 1142, 1175.) The prosecution must establish the corpus delicti independent of
any extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant. (People v.
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.) The “amount of independent proof of a crime
required for this purpose is quite small,” and may consist of circumstantial evidence. Our
Supreme Court has described the quantum of evidence as “ ‘slight’ ” or “ ‘minimal.’ ”
The prosecution must make a prima facie showing to permit a reasonable inference that a
crime has been committed. (Ibid.)
Doe’s forensic exam showed an abrasion and tenderness at the entrance of the
vagina and redness on the labia minora. The examining nurse opined that Doe’s vaginal
injury “could be caused by penetration.” There was “very strong support” that defendant
was a contributor to the DNA mixture found on Doe’s mons swab. The foregoing
circumstantial evidence permits a reasonable inference of digital penetration, and
therefore established the corpus delicti of sexual penetration by a foreign object.
Defendant argues his “admission to digital penetration was, in stark contrast to his
admission to intercourse and oral copulation, instigated by the Government, both during
his police interview and at trial.” During his first police interview defendant said he
“started touching her, rubbing it a little bit;” during the second interview, defendant
stated he “was playing with her for a while” in response to the officer suggesting Doe’s

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medical exam showed that “it wasn’t just the tip like you explained it.” We acknowledge
that defendant did not specifically refer to his fingers in either interview, but that can be
fairly inferred from his statements. Indeed, when the officer asked the clarifying
question, “So with your fingers?” defendant confirmed, “That’s what I said, probably
touch- I was touching her at the beginning. And that’s why I thought it was okay, ‘cause
I was touching her and I was feeling her.” (Italics added.) We do not view defendant’s
admission to digital penetration as having been initiated by the interviewing officer.
Defendant contends “the examining nurse explicitly testified the vaginal injuries
were consistent with consensual sexual intercourse, not digital penetration.” Although
the nurse testified the injuries were consistent with “vaginal penetration with a penis,”
she did not testify that the injury was consistent only with penile penetration. Nothing in
her testimony forecloses an inference of penetration by something other than defendant’s
penis.
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT SEXUAL PENETRATION BY A
FOREIGN OBJECT
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for
sexual penetration of an unconscious person by a foreign object. Consistent with
section 289, subdivision (d), the jury was instructed that the People were required to
prove: “1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person; [¶]
2. The penetration was accomplished by using a foreign object; [¶] 3. The other person
was unable to resist because she was unconscious of the nature of the act; AND [¶] 4. The
defendant knew that the other person was unable to resist because she was unconscious of
the nature of the act.”
“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,

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331.) We do not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility determinations. (People
v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) We presume the existence of every fact that the
trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. (Ibid.)
To overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence, “it must clearly appear that upon
no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” (People v.
Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
Considered with our previous summary of the forensic evidence that was
consistent with sexual penetration by a foreign object, defendant’s admissions during the
police interviews and at trial provide sufficient evidence to support the sexual penetration
conviction. At defendant’s second police interview, an officer told him the results of
Doe’s medical exam indicated “it wasn’t just the tip like you explained it.” Defendant
stated that he “was playing with her for a while.” The officer asked, “So with your
fingers?” Defendant responded, “That’s what I said, probably touch- I was touching her
at the beginning. And that’s why I thought it was okay, ‘cause I was touching her and I
was feeling her.” During defendant’s cross-examination at trial, the prosecutor asked,
“You left out when you penetrated her with your fingers. When did that happen?”
Defendant responded, “Maybe after a little bit of awhile that we were making out and I
was kissing her and kissing her breasts and started touching her. Probably a little bit
before I started giving her oral sex.” The prosecutor then asked, “When you put your
fingers inside of her vagina, did you move her underwear?” Defendant responded, “I
think I just put my hand under her underwear.”
Defendant attempts to minimize the significance of his responses by arguing that
his “feeble admission to digital penetration was, unlike his admission to intercourse and
oral copulation, suggested by the Government.” As we have discussed, we disagree with
that characterization. Moreover, in this context the distinction is of no consequence to
our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. Defendant did not

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deny the conduct when asked in the interviews and at trial about digital penetration. His
own statements provide substantial evidence to support the conviction.
C. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT UNCONSCIOUSNESS
Defendant was convicted of raping an unconscious person. (§ 261, subd. (a)(4).)
He contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Doe was
unconscious when he penetrated her with his penis. We apply the same standard of
review as summarized in the preceding section of this opinion.
Consistent with section 261’s definition of unconsciousness, the jury was
instructed that a “woman is unconscious of the nature of the act if she is unconscious or
asleep or not aware that the act is occurring.” Doe testified that she fell asleep in her
bedroom alone. Her next memory was “dreaming, like having a sex dream.” She awoke
to defendant “standing there with his penis inside [her] vagina.” Under section 263,
“[a]ny sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime” of rape.
The crime was therefore complete as soon as defendant penetrated Doe’s vagina with his
penis. The jury was entitled to credit Doe’s testimony, which provides substantial
evidence that she was “unconscious or asleep” (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)(A)) when defendant
penetrated her vagina.
Unlike the massage client in People v. Lyu (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1293 who was
awake throughout her encounter with Lyu, Doe testified that she was asleep and awoke
only after defendant penetrated her with his penis. Lyu was a masseur who “twice
inserted one or two fingers inside [a female client’s] vagina” during a massage. (Id. at
pp. 1295–1296.) The female client immediately hit Lyu and told him to stop. (Ibid.) On
appeal from a conviction for sexual penetration of an unconscious person, Lyu argued
there was insufficient evidence the female client was “ ‘not aware, knowing, perceiving,
or cognizant that the act occurred.’ ” (Id. at p. 1299, quoting § 289, subd. (d)(2).) The
appellate court agreed, finding the female client “instantly knew, perceived, and was
cognizant that the act occurred.” (Id. at p. 1301.) In contrast, based on Doe’s description
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of the events, the record here contains substantial evidence to support defendant’s
conviction for rape of an unconscious person.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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____________________________________
Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H049940
People v. Sanchez

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