M.A. v. C.G. CA4/1

CourtListener 10875892Calctapp16 de jun. de 2026

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Filed 6/16/26 M.A. v. C.G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

M.A., D086023

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 19FL005322N)

v.

C.G.,

Respondent;

SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT SERVICES,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Deborah A. Cumba, Court Commissioner. Affirmed.
M.A., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Linda Cianciolo for Defendant and Respondent C.G.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl F. Feiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Jose Pablo Galan De La Cruz,
Deputy Attorneys General for Respondent San Diego Department of Child
Support Services.
INTRODUCTION
This case stems from an acrimonious divorce and child custody matter,
but the issue subject to this appeal is narrow. On February 26, 2025, the
superior court found M.A. was behind on his child support payments,
calculated the total arrearages, and ordered him to make payments on the
past due amount. M.A. appeals from this order. Because he has failed to
demonstrate any error on appeal, we affirm the court’s order.
BACKGROUND
M.A. and C.G. were married nine years and had two children before
their separation in 2019. In February 2021, the family court entered
judgment pursuant to the parties’ stipulated marriage settlement agreement
(MSA) to dissolve their marriage. Under the terms of the MSA, the parties
shared joint legal and physical custody of the children. The original terms of
the MSA also provided C.G. would reside with the children in the family
home, while M.A. would pay a portion of his child support obligation to C.G.
in the form of paying the home’s mortgage and related expenses.
In August 2022, C.G. and the children moved out of the family home.
The parties then entered into a stipulation and order regarding the MSA to
clarify that M.A. would no longer pay any portion of his child support
obligation toward costs of the home but, instead, would pay the entire
amount directly to C.G. M.A.’s total child support obligation did not change.
In September 2024, the San Diego Department of Child Support
Services (DCSS) filed a motion to enforce the child support order and
determine arrears. On February 26, 2025, the family court held a hearing on
the motion. The court found M.A. behind on his child support payments,
calculated the arrearages, and ordered M.A. to make monthly payments of
$450 to C.G. toward the past due amount.

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DISCUSSION
I.
Rules Governing Appellate Review
It is a “cardinal rule of appellate review that a judgment or order of the
trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively
shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 187 (Foust).) Because we must presume a trial court’s judgment or order
is correct, it is the appellant’s burden to show error. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v.
L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) If the appellant
cannot show error in the record, the presumption of correctness requires us to
affirm the order. (Foust, at p. 187.) In meeting this burden, the appellant
must comply with court rules, even if he is not represented by counsel.
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)

California Rules of Court,1 rule 8.124 sets forth the required contents
of an appellant’s appendix, M.A.’s choice of record. Relevant here, an
appendix “must not” contain “documents or portions of documents filed in
superior court that are unnecessary for proper consideration of the issues.”
(Rule 8.124(b)(3)(A), italics added.) The appellant’s appendix does not comply
with this rule. Originally, M.A.’s appendix included improper uncertified
transcripts of court hearings and documents that were not before the family
court at the time of the arrears order at issue here. On motion by C.G., we
struck these exhibits. But most of the documents still included in the

1 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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appendix are relevant only to matters not subject to this appeal, such as a

prior domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and move-away order.2
In addition to providing an appropriate record, an appellant must
present briefing that complies with rule 8.204. Rule 8.204 requires an
appellant to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible,
by citation of authority” (rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)) and to “[s]upport any reference
to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the
record where the matter appears” (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)). Also, “[m]atters not
properly raised or that are lacking in adequate legal discussion will be
deemed forfeited.” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600.) “In other words, it is not this court’s role to
construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and
defeat the presumption of correctness. Rather, an appellant is required to
present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment.
‘When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it
may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is
unnecessary.’ ” (Ibid.)
M.A.’s briefing does not comply with these requirements. He devotes
most of his arguments to matters unrelated to the child support arrears

2 M.A. has presented his appendix in the form of a notice of lodgment of
documents with exhibits attached. As stated, C.G. moved to strike many of
these exhibits. We granted the motion in part, striking many of the exhibits,
and deferred ruling with respect to the remainder of the exhibits. We now
grant respondent’s motion to strike with respect to exhibits 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5,
8, 18, 18.5, 18.6, 18.7, 19, 19.1, 19.3, 19.4, 20, 22, 23, 25.2, 26.2, 28.1, 28.4, 30,
32.2, 33, 34, 37, and 39. Those exhibits shall be stricken from the record. We
deny the motion as to exhibits 19.5 and 25.1.

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order, makes assertions without citing evidentiary support, and presents
conclusory and undeveloped arguments. In fact, much of his briefing is
devoted to rehashing the DVRO and move-away order, neither of which are
subject to this appeal.
M.A. argues he is due “special solicitude” because he is not represented
by counsel. He is mistaken. His status as a party appearing in propria

persona does not allow for preferential consideration.3 (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) “A party proceeding in propria
persona ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but
no greater[,] consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ . . . Indeed,
‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of
procedure as an attorney.” ’ ” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1 [citation omitted].)
Pursuant to these rules and principles, we disregard any asserted facts
in M.A.’s briefs that are not properly part of the appellate record. (Pulver v.
Avco Fin. Servs. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632.) And we deem waived any
undeveloped argument or contention unsupported by legal authority and
proper citation to the record. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of any decipherable, sufficiently developed argument relevant to
the order being appealed.

3 Additionally, M.A. has filed three appeals as a self-represented litigant.
In our opinion resolving his first appeal, we detailed these appellate rules of
procedure and explained how M.A. failed to comply with them and the
consequences.

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II.
M.A. Has Not Shown the Family Court Lacked Jurisdiction
M.A. asserts that the arrears order is erroneous because the family
court lacked both subject matter jurisdiction over the property at issue and
personal jurisdiction over M.A. Where the evidence is not in dispute, we
review issues of subject matter and personal jurisdiction de novo. (Corrales v.
California Gambling Control Com. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 286, 302 [subject
matter jurisdiction]; Casey v. Hill (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 937, 962 [personal
jurisdiction].)
As to subject matter jurisdiction, M.A. argues the real property
referenced in the MSA’s child support terms, i.e. the family home, is trust
property falling under the jurisdiction of the probate court. But title to, or
ownership of, the home has never been an issue with respect to the child
support and/or arrears orders. The home was only ever relevant to the child
support order to the extent M.A. was to meet his child support obligation by
paying a certain amount of that obligation in the form of the mortgage and
related expenses. And, certainly, the family court maintained subject matter

jurisdiction over issues of child support and resulting arrears. (Fam. Code,4
§ 2010, subd. (c) [family court has jurisdiction over child support]; id. at
§ 291, subd. (a) [order for child support remains enforceable until satisfied].)
As to personal jurisdiction, at the hearing regarding arrears, DCSS
stated it personally served M.A. with its motion on November 9, 2024. It
filed a proof of service indicating service took place in Escondido, California.
M.A. argues he was not personally served with DCSS’s motion, as personal
service was impossible because he was out of state at the time of service. But

4 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.

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he has not presented any evidence, either here or in the trial court, that, on
November 9, 2025, he was not in Escondido, California.
III
M.A. Has Not Shown the Family Court Erred
On appeal, orders on child support arrears are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (S.C. v. G.S. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 591, 598.) “Under an abuse of
discretion standard, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and
its factual findings for substantial evidence, and we reverse its application of
the law to the facts only if it was arbitrary and capricious.” (Swan v.
Hatchett (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1215; County of San Diego v. P.B.
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1068.)
M.A. argues the arrears order is erroneous because the underlying
MSA, through which child support was ordered, is invalid for multiple
reasons. But he did not timely move to set aside either the entire dissolution
judgment, which incorporated the MSA, or the child support order. (See
§§ 2122 [establishing grounds and time limits for moving to set aside
judgment], 3691 [establishing grounds and time limits for moving to set aside

support order].)5 Thus, the child support order remains in effect.

5 M.A. filed a motion to set aside the child support order in May 2024,
more than three years after judgment of dissolution was entered in
accordance with the original terms of the MSA and almost two years after the
parties’ stipulated to clarify the terms of the MSA with respect to the support
order. He has not shown he did not know of, or could not have discovered,
grounds for a set-aside motion earlier. We recognize that on August 29, 2022,
the same day M.A. signed the stipulation clarifying the MSA, he also signed
an affidavit indicating he signed the stipulation under duress. While a
motion to set aside a judgment based on duress may be filed within two years
of entry of judgment (§ 2122, subd. (c)), M.A.’s set-aside motion was filed
beyond this deadline. And a motion to set aside the child support order is
governed by section 3691, which does not include duress as a ground to set
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M.A. further argues he could not have been in arrears because he
actually overpaid the total he owed C.G. He identifies several expenses he
allegedly paid on C.G.’s behalf, including payments toward home, auto, and
student loans, and suggests these payments should be credited toward his
child support obligation. But he does not cite anything in the record proving
he paid these amounts or that he is entitled to credit them toward his child
support obligation.
Last, M.A. argues the arrears order violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude, debt peonage, and imprisonment
for debt. However, “[f]amily support obligations are not ordinary debts
subject to the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.” (Moss v.
Superior Ct. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396, 422.)

aside a support order.

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DISPOSITION
The February 26, 2025 order on arrears is affirmed. C.G. is entitled to
her costs on appeal. (Rules 8.278(a)(2) and (a)(5).)

DO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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