CourtListener 10875218•People v. Barela CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 6/15/26 P. v. Barela CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B345004
(Super. Ct. No. KA081140)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
ARMANDO JAMES BARELA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Armando James Barela appeals from the judgment
following his resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.75.1 We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal.
After an examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief
raising no issues and requesting that we follow the procedures
set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Appellant filed a supplemental brief raising no
arguable issues. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Procedural Background2
In 2008, a jury found appellant guilty of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and possession of a firearm by a
felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1),
count 2). The jury also found true several firearm enhancement
allegations, including that appellant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, which proximately caused the death of the
victim. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) In a separate proceeding, the
trial court found the alleged serious felony and strike true and
that appellant served two prior prison terms.
The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of
61 years to life, comprised of 30 years to life for second degree
murder (15 years to life doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes
law), a consecutive 25 years to life for the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) finding, a consecutive five years for the serious
felony enhancement (case no. FRE04750), and a consecutive one-
year prior prison term enhancement. It imposed a four-year
concurrent sentence for appellant’s conviction of possession of a
firearm by a felon. The trial court then stayed a prior prison
term enhancement pursuant to section 654 for the conviction in
case no. FRE04750.
We affirmed the judgment but ordered the one-year prior
prison term enhancement for case no. FRE04750 stricken.
(Barela, supra, B212882.)
2 A recitation of the facts can be found in our prior opinion
People v. Barela (Mar. 25, 2010, B212882) [nonpub. opn.]
(Barela).
2
Resentencing Proceedings
In March 2025, the trial court conducted a full resentencing
hearing pursuant to section 1172.75. After briefing and
argument, the trial court denied appellant’s Romero3 motion as to
count 1 but granted it as to count 2. It struck the remaining one-
year prior prison term enhancement and the five-year serious
felony enhancement, but declined to strike the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement.
The trial court resentenced appellant to an aggregate term
of 55 years to life, comprised of 30 years to life for second degree
murder (15 years to life doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes
law) with a consecutive 25 years to life for the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement.4 As to count 2, the trial court
imposed the midterm sentence of two years but stayed that term
pursuant to section 654.
The trial court ordered appellant to pay victim restitution
in the amount of $6,134.53 plus interest, as was previously
ordered, and struck all other fines and fees.
Discussion
Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues
in an appeal that is not from the first appeal after conviction,
appellant is not entitled to our independent review of the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, or its federal
constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) He is, however,
3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
4 The trial court stayed the remaining firearm
enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)), pursuant to section
654.
3
entitled to appellate consideration of any contentions raised in
his supplemental brief. (Id. at p. 232.)
In his supplemental brief, appellant contends remand is
required because the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
authority pursuant to newly amended section 1385 whether to
dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. The
record is to the contrary.
In declining to dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
firearm enhancement, the trial court expressly stated: “And,
again, I want the record to be abundantly clear that the court
continues to acknowledge this discretion to stay, strike, and
dismiss even gun use enhancements under these provisions but
[is] electing not to do so given the gravity of the offense for which
the defendant stands convicted, his pre-conviction history in
terms of felonious conduct, and his postconviction history in
terms of continuous felonious conduct. He doesn’t earn that
consideration to strike a gun use enhancement.” Given the trial
court’s unequivocal statements, we reject appellant’s contention
that the trial court misunderstood its “sentencing authority.”
Appellant also contends the trial court’s judgment imposing
the “restitution fine” should be “vacated” because a “new statute
requires that a criminal defendant’s restitution fine becomes
uncollectable 10 years after imposition.” (Bold and capitalization
omitted.) (Citing § 1465.9, subd. (d) [“Upon the expiration of 10
years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to
Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be
unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment
imposing those fines shall be vacated”], italics added.)
Appellant confuses the trial court’s order of “victim
restitution” with a “restitution fine.” (See People v. Kopp (2025)
4
19 Cal.5th 1, 16 [“A victim restitution order is neither a fine nor
an ancillary cost. It is different from an order to pay a restitution
fine . . . .”].) Because section 1465.9, subdivision (d) applies to a
restitution fine, the $6,134.53 victim restitution order need not be
vacated.
Lastly, appellant contends appellate counsel was
“ineffective” because counsel could have raised the issues
appellant raised in his supplemental brief. This contention fails
because appellant has not identified any arguable issues that
counsel should have raised on appeal.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
5
Mike Camacho, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Respondent.
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