Gan v. Sun CA2/5

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Filed 6/12/26 Gan v. Sun CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

LIN GAN, B348624

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21PDFL00236)
v.

FUXIN SUN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
Fuxin Sun, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Lin Gan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Defendant and appellant Fuxin Sun (father) appeals the
trial court’s June 3, 2025 order under Family Code section 6345,
subdivision (a),1 renewing a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) protecting plaintiff and respondent Lin Gan (mother)
and their minor son. Father contends the trial court erred in
granting mother’s renewal request. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background and Overview

Father and mother were previously married and had a
child; they divorced in February 2022.2 In June 2022, the trial
court entered a three-year DVRO protecting mother and the child
from father. Father appealed, and the three-year DVRO was
affirmed. (Sun v. Gan (Sep. 14, 2023, B322142) [nonpub. opn.].)
Mother later requested a renewal of the DVRO. After a contested
hearing, the trial court granted mother’s renewal request for a
period of five years. Father now appeals that renewal order.

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code
unless otherwise stated.

2 Portions of our recitation of facts and procedure are taken
from our prior opinion in Sun v. Gan (Sept. 14, 2023, B322142)
[nonpub. opn.]) and the underlying record on appeal. (Evid.
Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

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B. Initial DVRO

Mother filed a DVRO request in April 2022, accusing father
of various incidents of abuse between 2018 and 2022, including
acts of violence such as choking and slapping her, kicking in a
door in front of the child, and sexually assaulting mother. After a
hearing in June 2022, the trial court granted mother’s DVRO
request, noting that father had no explanation for some of
mother’s injuries or the broken door, and that the child had been
present for some of the incidents. The court entered a restraining
order for a period of three years, expiring June 6, 2025. Among
other things, the DVRO required father to not contact and to stay
at least 100 yards away from mother and son, their home, school,
and vehicle, except for court authorized visits. An attachment to
the court’s order provided that father’s visits with son were
limited to a Facetime call at 4 p.m. every Sunday for up to 15
minutes.3
Father appealed the order granting mother’s DVRO
request, and another panel of this appellate court affirmed the
DVRO.

C. DVRO Renewal

On March 18, 2025, mother filed a request to renew the
June 6, 2022 three-year restraining order for a period of five

3 Father also filed his own DVRO request, based on the
incident in 2022. The court denied his DVRO request.

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years.4 At a hearing on June 3, 2025, mother testified about a
number of instances when father parked near her house, or
across the street from her house, and then departed when she
saw him. Mother also testified father would often leave mail in
her mailbox with no postage, so she knew he had done so in
person. In addition, father emailed her legal documents claiming
he would sue her. Mother presented the court with a photo from
July 2022 showing father’s car 16 feet from mother’s driveway;
mother testified she was standing at her front door when she took
the photo, and she claimed that when father realized she had
seen him, he started to back out. Mother also called the police
when a friend of father’s tried to enter her house to deliver
documents. However, the court stated it would not consider such
evidence in connection with the request for renewal of the DVRO,
because it appeared to be an effort to serve legal papers. The
court asked mother’s counsel to focus on why a renewal was
needed.
Mother testified that father’s conduct caused mother to feel
scared for herself and her son, to fear father would hurt her or
her son. Mother explained that on September 8, 2024, her son
made a police report of sexual harassment against father.

4 It appears from the appellate record that father did not
designate the renewal request as a document to be included in
the clerk’s transcript. Because the reporter’s transcript makes
the basis for mother’s request apparent, we proceed to review the
merits of father’s appeal, indulging in all presumptions and
intendments in favor of the order on appeal. (See, e.g., Mac v.
Minassian (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 510, 517 [applying presumption
in favor of judgment on a silent record, presuming fourth
amended complaint was operative complaint, despite lack of
signature on stipulation for filing].)

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Because father was calling the son many times, she made a police
report. Mother’s counsel explained to the court that based on the
ongoing investigation, the police officer had instructed mother to
pause father’s 15-minute weekly Facetime visits.
The court asked to hear from father, who claimed he only
contacted his son once, and that all of mother’s testimony was
fabricated. Father denied parking outside mother’s house, and
when the court asked about mother’s photo of his car, he
explained that he lived next to her neighbor, and wasn’t sure of
the distance to mother’s property. He added that mother called
the police, who did not arrest him but accompanied him home.
Father next asked to call a witness to testify about serving a
document, but the court said it would not be considering that
incident, so there was no need to hear from the witness.5 The
court also rejected father’s attempt to address the original DVRO
and his prior appeal. Next, father explained that the only time
he communicated with his son beyond the authorized Facetime
visits was to help his son with a violin father had purchased for
the son, offering to provide the court with video evidence. The
court stated it did not need to know about the violin, and if father
wanted more interaction with son, he needed to apply to change
his visitation order. Father continued trying to explain the
impact of his limited access to son, and the court explained that it

5 On January 26, 2026, father filed a Motion to Augment to
Record on Appeal, seeking to augment the appellate record with
documents he asserts support his argument that his presence
near mother’s home was related to his older son’s efforts to serve
documents on mother. Father’s motion to augment is denied. As
the court explained, it was not considering the service incidents
as evidence in support of mother’s request.

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was not re-visiting the visitation order at this hearing, but that
was an issue father could raise before the court that regularly
handled custody matters in mother and father’s family law case.
The court found sufficient evidence that mother had a
reasonable fear of father’s behavior continuing, and that father
had violated the three-year DVRO when he sat in his car outside
mother’s residence and when he admittedly communicated with
the son outside the restrictions of the visitation orders. The court
also admonished mother’s counsel that the prior 15-minute
Facetime visitation order remained in place, and so absent a
temporary restraining order or other modification, mother lacked
authority to unilaterally end those visits.
The court granted mother’s renewal request, and father
timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Father bears the burden to show reversible error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [appellant must
demonstrate error justifying reversal].)

A. Restraining Order Renewals

Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a), authorizes a
court to extend the term of an existing DVRO “upon the request
of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since

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the issuance of the original order.”6 (Navarro v. Cervera (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 229, 237 (Navarro); G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 413, 421.)
“The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the
protected party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future
abuse. (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290
(Ritchie).) ‘[T]his does not mean the court must find it is more
likely than not that abuse will occur if the protective order is not
renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more
probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find
the protected party’s apprehension genuine and reasonable.’
(Ibid.) An imminent and present danger of abuse is not required;
there must only be a reasonable apprehension that ‘abuse will
occur at some time in the future if the protective order is allowed
to expire.’ (Id. at p. 1288.)” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 170, 179 (Michael M.).)

6 The full text of the subdivision provides: “(a) In the
discretion of the court, the personal conduct, stay-away, and
residence exclusion orders contained in a court order issued after
notice and a hearing under this article may have a duration of
not more than five years, subject to termination or modification
by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed
with the court or on the motion of a party. These orders may be
renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more
years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a
showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.
Renewals and subsequent renewals shall be subject to
termination, modification, or subsequent renewal by further
order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the
court or on the motion of a party. The request for renewal may
be brought at any time within the three months before the
expiration of the orders.” (§ 6345, subd. (a).)

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A court ruling on a renewal request considers three factors
to assess whether the requesting party has a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse: (1) “the evidence and findings on
which the initial DVRO was based” (Michael M., supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 180; Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290);
(2) changes in the circumstances surrounding the events
justifying the initial DVRO (Michael M., at p. 180; Ritchie, at p.
1291); and (3) “ ‘the seriousness and degree of risk, such as
whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the
protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as
interference with job opportunities’ ” (Michael M., at p. 180;
Ritchie, at p. 1291).
“[S]ection 6345 makes it unnecessary for the protected
party to introduce or the court to consider actual acts of abuse the
restrained party committed after the original order went into
effect. It would be anomalous to require the protected party to
prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that
original order. If this were the standard, the protected party
would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved
ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just
to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order.” (Ritchie, supra,
115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284; accord In re Marriage of Brubaker &
Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 536.)
“In challenging a renewal order, the restrained party is not
permitted ‘to challenge the truth of the evidence and findings
underlying the initial order.’ ” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 319, 333; see also Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1290.)

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B. Standard of Review

A trial court’s order granting or denying a request for
renewal of a DVRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Navarro,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.) If it is necessary to review
factual findings, we refrain from reweighing evidence and
consider whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292, 319 [reviewing
court prohibited from reweighing facts in assessing whether
substantial evidence exists]; Navarro, at p. 238 [factual findings
in DVRO renewal reviewed for substantial evidence]; M.S. v. A.S.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145 [reviewing court declines to
reweigh evidence in determining propriety of DVRO].)
“ ‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner” ’ [citation] or ‘when its
ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason” ’ [citation].” (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) The California Supreme
Court has emphasized: “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court. ” ’ [Citations.]” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) Nevertheless, “[i]f
the court’s decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an
erroneous understanding of the law, the court has not properly
exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]” (Michael M.,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.)

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C. Analysis

Father contends on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted mother’s renewal request, arguing
that there was insufficient evidence that mother had an
objectively reasonable fear, that the court’s evidentiary rulings
deprived him of due process, and that the court’s statements
coaching mother’s attorney violated judicial ethics and deprived
father of a meaningful hearing.
None of father’s arguments are convincing. The court
found father had violated the prior DVRO, and it found sufficient
evidence that mother had a reasonable fear that such behavior
would continue absent a renewal. Keeping in mind that mother
did not need to show a violation of the prior DVRO in order to
show reasonable apprehension of future abuse (Michael M.,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179), it bears emphasizing that the
court did find such a violation, and based on our review of the
record substantial evidence supports the court’s express findings
that, “[father] has violated the restraining order on different
occasions; one, by coming over with his car, sitting outside the
residence; and by admittedly communicating with his son outside
the restrictions of the other court’s orders.” More importantly,
father’s evidentiary argument amounts to a dissatisfaction with
the trial court’s credibility determination, a determination that
we have no occasion to second-guess. (See Curcio v. Pels (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [a reviewing court “must accept as true all
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings” and will “not
determine credibility or reweigh the evidence”].)
Regarding the instances when the court declined to hear
additional evidence offered by father, father’s evidence simply

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provides an alternate explanation for his presence near mother’s
home, but that information does not refute mother’s reasonable
fears, and so father cannot show that the court’s evidentiary
decision was prejudicial. Finally, we reject father’s claims that
the court’s statements suggesting that mother’s counsel focus on
the matters most relevant to its decision was evidence of bias or a
lack of ethics. Father’s appeal is premised solely upon his
dissatisfaction with the court’s credibility determinations and
findings of fact; we have reviewed the transcript of the hearing
and conclude father’s claims of due process violations or trial
court bias are unfounded.
The court had before it evidence and testimony of at least
two instances where mother reasonably believed that father had
violated the prior restraining order. Given that the initial DVRO
was issued in the context of a family law custody proceeding,
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that mother had a reasonable apprehension that, if the
restrictions of the initial DVRO were no longer in place, father
would resume his attempts to have increased contact with her
and with son. (Compare Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
550, 561–562 [focus is on evidence to support finding that
applicant’s fear of future abuse is reasonable].)

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DISPOSITION

The court’s June 3, 2025 restraining order is affirmed.
Respondent Lin Gan is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KUMAR, J.*

 Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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