CourtListener 10874375•Marriage of Hunt CA2/6
Texto completo
Filed 6/12/26 Marriage of Hunt CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Marriage of NICOLE and 2d Civ. No. B347754
KEVIN HUNT. (Super. Ct. No. D406920)
(Ventura County)
NICOLE HUNT,
Respondent,
v.
KEVIN ANTHONY HUNT,
Appellant.
This is the second appeal regarding the dissolution of
marriage between appellant Kevin Anthony Hunt and
respondent Nicole Hunt.1 Kevin contends the trial court erred in
1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid
confusion. No disrespect is intended.
dividing their community property. We affirm.2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2024, the trial court held a two-day trial with
Judge Randy Rhodes presiding. Nicole’s real estate expert Ben
Horowitz testified that the estimated fair market rental value of
the family residence was $4,000 a month. The sale of the
residence was pending at the time of trial, and as a result, the
trial court reserved issues regarding the division of the family
property, charges and credits under In re Marriage of Watts
(1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366 (Watts) and In re Marriage of Epstein
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 (Epstein), receiver fees, and attorney fees and
costs. The trial court granted dissolution of the marriage and
decided custody, visitation, and child/spousal support. Kevin
appealed that decision, and we affirmed. (In re Marriage of Hunt
(Jul. 17, 2025, B340666) [nonpub. opn.].)
In May 2025, Judge Amy Van Sickle presided over the
reserved issues. Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Van
Sickle entered a judgment on the reserved issues. Kevin did not
request a statement of decision. The court’s ruling provided that
the sale of the residence resulted in $123,026.78, and each party
would be entitled to one-half, $61,513.39.
As to Watts charges, the court imposed a $49,000 Watts
charge against Kevin based on the fair market rental value of
$4,000 per month for the 24.5 months when Kevin had exclusive
use and possession of the home. The total amount was $98,000,
and one-half of that amount was $49,000. As to Epstein credits,
the court credited Kevin with $10,516.25 for three months of
mortgage payments he made on the family residence. Nicole was
2 We grant Kevin’s request that we take judicial notice of
the trial court’s tentative ruling dated October 16, 2024.
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to reimburse Kevin for one-half of that amount, which would be
$5,258.13.
As to the receiver fees, the court ordered Kevin to
reimburse Nicole $15,393 from his community share.
With respect to attorney fees, the court found that Kevin
had not paid Nicole’s prior attorney fees as ordered by a previous
July 24, 2023, order. The court ordered Kevin to reimburse
$2,305 to Nicole from his community share for these unpaid
attorney fees. The court also ordered Kevin to reimburse Nicole
for one-half of an advance Kevin had received for attorney fees
and costs. He owed $3,250.
The total after applying all offsets, credits, and attorney
fees was as follows: Nicole was to receive $122,953.26 and Kevin
was to receive $73.52 from the sale of the residence. The court
further deducted $3,250 from the advanced attorney fees owed by
Kevin to Nicole. As a result, the total amount owed to Nicole was
$126,203.26.
DISCUSSION
1. Watts charges and Epstein credits
Kevin contends the $49,000 Watts charge is not supported
by substantial evidence and the trial court ignored his evidence of
mortgage payments to support Epstein credits. We disagree.
“ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community
asset during the period between separation and trial, that spouse
may be required to compensate the community for the reasonable
value of that use.’ [Citation.] The right to such compensation is
commonly known as a ‘Watts charge.’ ” (In re Marriage of Falcone
& Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 978, citing Watts, supra, 171
Cal.App.3d at p. 374.) “Where the Watts rule applies, the court is
‘obligated either to order reimbursement to the community or to
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offer an explanation for not doing so.’ ” (Falcone & Fyke, at p.
978.)
Watts charges can be offset by Epstein credits, or
reimbursements to a party who uses their separate property to
pay down a preexisting community debt, such as a mortgage on a
house acquired during marriage. (Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at
pp. 84–85.) “Epstein does not mandate full reimbursement in all
cases, but allows the trial court discretion to order
reimbursement in an amount that is equitable.” (In re Marriage
of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272 (Hebbring).)
The trial court’s ruling on Watts charges and Epstein
credits is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Hebbring, supra, 207
Cal.App.3d at p. 1272.) “ ‘ “As long as the court exercised its
discretion along legal lines, its decision will be affirmed on appeal
if there is substantial evidence to support it.” ’ ” (In re Marriage
of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 318–319.)
As to the Watts charges, the trial court found Kevin vacated
the family residence around July 11, 2024, and was in “exclusive
use and possession of the residence” for a period of 24.5 months.
The court found the fair market rental value of the residence was
$4,000 per month, resulting in a total of $98,000. He owed
$49,000, which was one-half of the total to compensate the
community.
Kevin contends the $49,000 is not supported by substantial
evidence. On a review for substantial evidence, we accept all
evidence that supports the judgment, disregard contrary
evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the
judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, redetermine the
credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony.
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We will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support
it. (In re Marriage of Nelson (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914.)
Here, substantial evidence supports that Kevin exclusively
used and possessed the residence for 24.5 months. At trial, Kevin
admitted he was the only person living in the home from July 1,
2022, through approximately July 11, 2024. The receiver did not
have control over the property during this time frame.
Substantial evidence also supports the fair market rental value of
$4,000 for the property. Nicole retained Horowitz as a real estate
expert who testified and prepared a report regarding the value of
the home based on Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from
comparable properties. Kevin did not present any contrary
evidence.
Kevin also contests the trial court’s basis for the Watts
ruling, contending there was no competent evidence to support
the rental value and that the judgment ignored offsets. But
Kevin did not request a statement of decision as to the court’s
ruling on reserved issues. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) “The
failure to request a statement of decision on the valuation of the
community property interest . . . is fatal to [an] appellate attack
on the trial court’s valuation.” (Hebbring, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1274.) “ ‘If the statement [of decision] was waived, all
intendments will favor the lower court’s ruling and, thus, it will
be presumed on appeal that the trial court found all facts
necessary to support the judgment (doctrine of “implied
findings”). The remaining issue on appeal is then whether there
is “substantial evidence” to support the lower court’s “implied
findings.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Because substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s ruling on the Watts charge, we uphold the ruling.
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As to the Epstein credits, there was evidence that Kevin
paid three mortgage payments on the residence postseparation.
As Kevin acknowledges, the court granted him “$10,516.26 in
Epstein credits one-half ($5,258.13) owed by [Nicole].” Kevin
nevertheless asserts the court “[u]ndercut or eliminated the
credits.” We are not persuaded. The record reflects the court
awarded the credits and the total calculation of the division of
community property reflects that $5,258.13 was reimbursed to
Kevin from Nicole’s community share. Kevin does not
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
2. Allocation of fees
Kevin contends the trial court improperly allocated certain
community debts, including the entirety of the receiver fees
($15,393) and previously ordered attorney fees ($2,305) from his
community share. We conclude there was no error.
A trial court has broad discretion in determining the
amount of fees awarded to a receiver and has considerable
discretion to determine who ultimately bears the cost of the
receivership. (City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 648, 657; Melikian v. Aquila (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368.) Similarly, the trial court has broad
discretion in awarding attorney fees in a marriage dissolution
proceeding. (In re Marriage of Ward (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 618,
628.) Kevin does not show the appointment of a receiver was
unnecessary. The register of actions reflects that Nicole
requested appointment of a receiver and the receiver
subsequently requested an instruction and move out order.
Kevin does not contest that his actions necessitated appointment
of a receiver. Thus, he has not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion.
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Nor has Kevin shown an abuse of discretion when the court
ordered him to pay Nicole’s unpaid attorney fees, which he had
been previously ordered to pay. Because Kevin has not requested
a statement of decision and the record before us does not
otherwise demonstrate error, we presume the trial court’s orders
are correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564
[appellant has the duty to affirmatively show error].) We will not
disturb the trial court’s orders.
3. Family Code section 2550
Kevin contends the judgment violated Family Code section
2550 because it divided property unequally. We conclude
otherwise.
Family Code section 2550 provides that the trial court shall
“divide the community estate of the parties equally.” The trial
court possesses “broad discretion to determine the manner in
which marital property is divided in order to accomplish an equal
division.” (In re Marriage of Cream (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 81,
88.) In dividing community property, the court must consider
and balance assets and debts, as well as credits and
reimbursements. (See ibid.; Jensen v. Jensen (1961) 196
Cal.App.2d 643, 647; In re Marriage of Barnert (1978) 85
Cal.App.3d 413, 420.)
Here, the trial court equally divided the community estate.
The court began its calculations with the equal division of the
proceeds from the sale of the family residence. After applying
Epstein credits and Watts charges, the court then factored in the
receiver fees and unpaid attorney fees that Kevin owed. The
court then factored in Kevin’s attorney fees of $6,500 that were
advanced from the community share. The court divided that
amount in half ($3,250) for reimbursement to Nicole. In sum, the
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resulting calculation reflected an equal division of the community
property once all credits, charges, reimbursements, and
obligations were factored. There was no violation of Family Code
section 2550.
4. Due process
Kevin contends he was denied due process because a new
judge, Judge Van Sickle, ruled on the reserved issues without
reviewing the evidence from the August 2024 trial. Kevin also
asserts that the trial court did not conduct a full evidentiary
hearing before ruling on the reserved issues. We reject these
contentions.
Here, the reporter’s transcripts from the August trial were
lodged with the court. We presume Judge Van Sickle considered
all relevant evidence. “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in
the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action
will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Kevin also forfeited any argument on
appeal regarding the new trial judge by failing to raise the
objection at or before the May 2025 evidentiary hearing. Lastly,
the record contradicts Kevin’s assertion that Judge Van Sickle
did not conduct a full evidentiary hearing. The record reflects
that the court held an evidentiary hearing in which it considered
testimony and exhibits, conducted its own examination, and
heard arguments. Kevin does not demonstrate a due process
violation.
5. Miscarriage of justice
Kevin contends the judgment must be reversed because the
errors in the proceedings below resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We disagree. Kevin has not
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demonstrated prejudicial error in the trial court’s division of
property.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Nicole shall recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Amy E. Van Sickle, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Kevin Hunt, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Nelson Comis Kettle & Kinney and Brian Horan for
Respondent.
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