Casanova v. Patriot Holdings CA2/5

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Filed 6/11/26 Casanova v. Patriot Holdings CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DAVID CASANOVA, as B342032
Trustee, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. Nos.
17STPB02712, BC643445)
v.

PATRIOT HOLDINGS, LLC,

Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jessica A. Uzcategui, Judge. Affirmed.

The DLJ Law Firm and Dorian L. Jackson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Law Office of Alan S. Yockelson, Alan S. Yockelson,
Stephen M. Vasil; Jeffer Mangels & Mitchell and John S. Cha for
Defendant and Respondent.
******
In this appeal, a trust that was awarded $330,000 in double
damages under Probate Code section 8591 due to financial elder
abuse committed against its trustor asks us to raise that award
to more than $3 million. Specifically, the trust argues that (1)
the probate court was obligated to value the “property recovered”
as the full fair market value of the property, even though the
trustor retained all of the property except for the right to alienate
it; and (2) section 859’s double penalty must be further trebled
under Civil Code section 3345. We reject both arguments, and
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On November 3, 2016, Corrine Casanova (Corrine) called
the phone number on a flyer left at her house in Baldwin Park,
California, from a company offering to buy houses “as is.” The
next day, Cory Evans—a co-owner and representative of Patriot
Holdings, LLC (Patriot Holdings)—arrived at the property with a
residential purchase agreement and joint escrow instructions (the
contract). Evans examined the property and offered to purchase
it for $275,000. At the time, the property was valued at
$440,000. After meeting with Evans for a little over an hour,
Corrine2 signed the contract.

1 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Because more than one individual shares the same last
name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.
No disrespect is intended.

2
At that time, the property was held by the Corrine
Casanova Living Trust (the trust), and Corrine was the trustee.
Also by that time in her life, Corrine had started exhibiting
symptoms “consistent with Alzheimer’s disease” and her family
had made the decision to move her into an elder care facility.
Corrine passed away on November 23, 2016, less than three
weeks after signing the contract with Patriot Holdings. Her son,
David Casanova (David), became the successor trustee of the
trust; he was unaware that his mother had agreed to sell the
property until a few weeks later, when he received a packet of
paperwork at the property and a phone call from an attorney
representing Patriot Holdings. The attorney demanded that
David perform the contract, and David refused.
II. Procedural History
A. Litigation commences
On December 12, 2016, Patriot Holdings sued Corrine,
individually and as trustee of the trust, for breach of contract (the
civil case). The same day, Patriot Holdings recorded a lis
pendens on the property.
On March 28, 2017, David, as successor trustee of the trust,
filed a cross-complaint in the civil case, and filed a petition
pursuant to Probate Code section 850 (the probate case). Among
other claims, David alleged that the contract was the product of
undue influence and that Patriot Holdings had committed
financial elder abuse.
The superior court found the civil and probate cases to be
related and assigned both to the probate division.

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B. The probate court expunges the lis pendens,
Patriot Holdings dismisses its complaint, and the property
is sold to a third party
On December 3, 2019, David filed a motion to expunge the
lis pendens. The probate court granted the motion over Patriot
Holdings’ objection, and ordered the lis pendens expunged on
January 9, 2020, just over three years after it was recorded.
Patriot Holdings ultimately dismissed its complaint in July
2020 without re-recording a lis pendens.
In August 2020, David sold the property to a third party for
$510,000.
C. The probate court holds a bench trial on David’s
claims and awards the trust $330,000
The probate court held a bench trial on David’s cross-
complaint and probate petition over a period of nine days in June,
July, August, September, and October 2023. After hearing
testimony from eleven witnesses and considering the parties’
closing briefs,3 the probate court issued a tentative statement of
decision, entertained objections, and then issued a final
statement of decision.
In the final statement of decision, the probate court
rejected David’s claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
unfair competition, but found that section 21380(a)(1)’s
presumption of undue influence applied and that Patriot
Holdings had committed financial elder abuse by means of undue
influence pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
15610.30, subdivision (a)(3) because it had “deprived [Corrine] of

3 On April 2, 2026, David filed a motion to augment the
record with the parties’ closing briefs and the first amended
probate petition. That motion is granted.

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her right to dispose of the Property during the period of time
between the filing of the Complaint [and Lis Pendens] in
December 2016 and the expungement of the Lis Pendens in
January 2020.” The court then ruled that the “value of the
property” taken (and hence the “value of the property recovered”)
was “the difference between the $440,000 appraised value of the
Property at the time of the Contract . . . and the $275,000
purchase price of the Contract . . . , or $165,000.” Pursuant to
section 859, the court awarded David double that amount—
namely, $330,000. The court declined to award punitive damages
under Civil Code section 3294 due to a lack of evidence of fraud,
oppression, or malice; it also declined to award treble damages
under Civil Code section 3345 on forfeiture grounds because
David only made a “brief argument” on the issue in his closing
brief.
The probate court entered judgment on August 30, 2024.
D. David appeals
David filed a timely notice of appeal on October 25, 2024.
Patriot Holdings did not cross-appeal.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, David argues that the probate court erred in
(1) not treating the “value of the property recovered” under
section 859 as the full fair market value of the property (that is,
$510,000), and (2) not trebling the section 859 award of
$1,020,000 to $3,060,000 under Civil Code section 3345. Because
the resolution of these arguments turns on the interpretation of
these statutes, our review is de novo. (Segal v. ASICS America
Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 658.)

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I. Section 859 Award
As pertinent here, section 859 provides that, after a court
“finds that a person has . . . taken . . . property . . . through the
commission of elder . . . financial abuse,” that person “shall be
liable for twice the value of the property recovered by an action
under this part [namely, sections 850 through 857].” (§ 859,
italics added.) Because Patriot Holdings did not file a cross-
appeal, the sole issue before us is the one posed by David’s
appeal—namely, whether the probate court was obligated to use
the full value of the property recovered (namely, the sales price of
$510,000) in calculating the double damages award under section
859.
We conclude that the probate court did not err in declining
to use $510,000 as the “value of the property recovered.” Had
Corrine quitclaimed the entire property to Patriot Holdings, then
David would be correct because the entire property would have
been taken, and the value of the entire property—namely, the
$510,000 sale price—would have been recovered. But that is not
what happened. Corrine agreed to sell the property for $165,000
less than it was worth at the time. Had that transaction been
consummated, Patriot Holdings would have taken $165,000 from
Corrine, and the value of the property subsequently recovered
would have been that same $165,000 amount. Yet the
transaction was never consummated, and Patriot Holdings never
acquired (or took) the property; instead, it recorded a lis pendens
that clouded title to that property for a little over three years.
Because the right to alienate property is one of the many “sticks”
in the “bundle” of rights attendant to property ownership, Patriot
Holdings took that particular species of property right from
Corrine, which was recovered when the lis pendens was

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expunged. (Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
468, 479-480.) But the value of the right to alienate that Patriot
Holdings clouded for three years is not the value of the entire
property; put differently, the value of the stick is not the same as
the value of the entire bundle that would have come with the sale
of the property. The probate court did not err in declining to
equate the value of the stick with the value of the whole bundle of
sticks; doing so would have overvalued the property actually
recovered from Patriot Holdings.
David responds with what boils down to three arguments.
First, David argues that “[t]he real property’s sales price
conclusively established its fair market value, and the court had
no discretion to substitute a lesser figure.” We disagree. As
explained above, David would be correct if Patriot Holdings had
acquired the property from Corrine without having a concurrent
duty to pay her $275,000. But that is not what happened here.
In declining to award the full fair market value of the property,
the probate court did not, as David decries, “impermissibly
rewr[i]te the statute”; the court merely applied the statutory
language and gave effect to the word “recovered.” (See Garcia v.
McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476 [court is required “to give
effect and significance to every word and phrase of a statute”].)
Second, David argues that the probate court “incorrectly
valued” the property by considering its value at the time of the
taking rather than at “the time it was recovered,” thus ostensibly
erred by looking at the amount Patriot Holdings was to pay
Corrine in November 2016 and the value of the property in
November 2016. Regardless of whether the value of the right to
alienate that was taken and recovered equals that difference or
some other value, it most certainly does not on the facts of this

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case equate to the whole value of the property at the time of the
sale in 2020.
Third and finally, David argues that our interpretation
“undermines the statute’s core purpose: to punish and deter the
looting of estates” belonging to elders. To be sure, section 859’s
penalty is “punitive in nature” (Estate of Kraus (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 103, 112) and is therefore designed “‘to motivate
compliance with the law and punish wrongdoers’” (Moramarco v.
Nowakoski (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 739, 745 (Moramarco)). But
that purpose does not empower us to ignore the plain text of the
statute, which looks to the value of what was actually taken and
ultimately recovered.
II. Trebling of Award Under Civil Code Section 3345
Civil Code section 3345 (hereafter “section 3345”) applies in
actions brought on behalf of or for the benefit of senior citizens in
certain circumstances and provides that, “[w]henever a trier of
fact is authorized by a statute to impose either a fine, or a civil
penalty or other penalty, or any other remedy the purpose or
effect of which is to punish or deter, and the amount of the fine,
penalty, or other remedy is subject to the trier of fact’s discretion,
the trier of fact shall consider” three enumerated factors “in
determining the amount of fine, civil penalty or other penalty, or
other remedy to impose.” (Civ. Code, § 3345, subds. (a) & (b),
italics added.) Where the trier of fact “makes an affirmative
finding in regard to one or more of the factors,” section 3345
authorizes imposition of the fine or penalty “in an amount up to
three times greater than authorized by the statute.” (Ibid.)
David argues that the probate court erred in not trebling
the section 859 penalty (thereby resulting in a sextupling of the
value recovered). We conclude there was no error. By its plain

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language, section 3345 only operates to treble a fine or penalty
where “the amount of the fine, penalty, or other remedy is subject
to the trier of fact’s discretion.” (Civ. Code, § 3345, subd. (b).)
But section 859 “imposes a strict and mandatory penalty
structure” where “[t]he probate court has no discretion regarding
the calculation of the amount of the statutory penalty.”
(Moramarco, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) Because the
amount of section 859’s penalty is not “subject to the trier of fact’s
discretion,” it is not subject to trebling under section 3345. (Civ.
Code, § 3345, subd. (b).)
David’s only argument to the contrary is that section 859
“is precisely the type of statute contemplated by” section 3345
because it “‘is designed to punish and deter specific misconduct.’”
(Quoting Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1076.)
This argument ignores that section 3345 has two prerequisites:
(1) that the remedy be designed to punish or deter; and (2) that
the amount of the remedy be “subject to the trier of fact’s
discretion.” (Civ. Code, § 3345, subd. (b).) We cannot ignore the
second prerequisite, which is not met by section 859. (See Clark
v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 614 [statutory
interpretations should not render a phrase “meaningless
surplusage”].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
MOOR

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