People v. Johnson CA1/4

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Filed 6/11/26 P. v. Johnson CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171513

v. (Marin County Super. Ct.
No. SC222227A;
DEVIN LAMAR JOHNSON, Mendocino County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. No. 21CR02012)

Devin Lamar Johnson started a brush fire that ultimately burned
257 acres and 30 dwellings. About a month later, a psychologist diagnosed
him with early stage schizophrenia.
A jury acquitted Johnson of aggravated arson (Penal Code, § 451.5,
subd. (a)(3) 1)—a count for which the trial court allowed mental-illness
evidence to negate the required state of mind. The jury convicted him of
arson of a dwelling (Penal Code, § 451, subd. (b))—a count for which the trial
court did not allow such evidence. The jury found true that Johnson had
caused multiple structures to burn within the meaning of section 451.1,
subdivision (a)(4). The trial court found true prior strike and aggravation
allegations.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The trial court sentenced Johnson to the midterm of 5 years, doubled
under the “Three Strikes” law (section 1170.12), plus a consecutive 5 years
for the multiple-structures enhancement, for a total of 15 years.
On appeal, Johnson challenges the arson conviction on two related
grounds. He argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to
disregard evidence of his mental illness when deciding whether he acted with
the required intent. He also argues that insufficient evidence supports the
jury’s finding that he acted with the required intent. Underpinning these
arguments is Johnson’s contention that we should classify arson as a specific
intent crime in the context of a mental illness defense, which he
acknowledges would require us to conclude that we are not bound on that
point by Supreme Court cases holding that arson is a general intent crime.
We cannot so conclude, and therefore affirm.
DISCUSSION
We first address Johnson’s specific intent contention. Then we turn to
his dependent claims of instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence.
I.
Courts categorize some crimes as requiring proof of general intent and
others as requiring proof of specific intent. (See, e.g., People v. Atkins (2001)
25 Cal.4th 76, 81–83.) These terms have been explained as follows. “When
the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act,
without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future
consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act.
This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent.” (People v. Hood
(1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456–457.) On the other hand, “[w]hen the definition
refers to [a] defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some

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additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.” (Id.
at p. 457.)
The distinction matters when, as in this case, a defendant wants to
present evidence that their mental illness precluded them from forming the
necessary mental state to commit a particular crime. Section 28,
subdivision (a), allows a defendant to offer evidence of a mental illness
assertedly precluding formation of a mental state only if they are charged
with a specific intent crime. When the crime charged is one of general intent,
the defendant may not present evidence to “negate the capacity to form [a]
mental state.” (Ibid; see also People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076,
1082 [“evidence of mental illness may be offered to show the absence of
specific intent but not to prove the absence of general intent”].)
We need not analyze how to classify arson. The California Supreme
Court has answered that question. In People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th 76,
a case involving voluntary intoxication rather than mental illness, the court
held that arson requires only a general criminal intent. (Id. at p. 84.) The
court explained that a defendant need intend only “to willfully commit the act
of setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and
highly probable consequences would be the burning the relevant structure or
property.” (Id. at p. 89.) The court rejected the argument—raised anew by
Johnson in this case—that the word “maliciously” in the arson statute
requires something more. (Id. at pp. 85–86; see § 451.) Under Atkins, arson
does not require “a specific intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned
the relevant structure or forest land . . . .” (Id. at p. 84.)
Johnson argues that Atkins did not address whether mental health
evidence was admissible in an arson prosecution and that the decision “was
based, in part, on legislative policy regarding intoxicated offenders, which are

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distinct from the policy considerations regarding mentally ill offenders.” But
Johnson identifies no authority suggesting that the categorization of a crime
as general or specific intent varies with the cause of the defendant’s
diminished capacity. Under section 28, the inadmissibility of mental health
evidence to negate the required state of mind flows directly from Atkins’s
holding that arson is a general intent crime—a categorization that the
Supreme Court reiterated in In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1027, which
did not involve a voluntary intoxication defense. We have no authority to
carve out an exception. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
II.
The trial court did not err by instructing the jury not to consider
evidence of Johnson’s mental illness when determining whether he had the
required mental state for arson. As noted, such evidence is not allowed as a
defense to a general intent crime. (§ 28; People v. Gutierrez, supra,
180 Cal.App.3d at p. 1082.) Johnson does not dispute that the instruction
was proper if arson is indeed such a crime, without any exception for a
mental illness defense.
III.
Johnson’s claim that insufficient evidence supports his conviction fails
for the same reason. His specific argument is that “the evidence is
insufficient to support the element of malice” because the jury was not
allowed to consider “his grave and complex mental health disorder of
undiagnosed and untreated schizophrenia.” As discussed, the trial court
properly instructed the jury to disregard such evidence.
Though Johnson makes no further argument regarding the sufficiency
of the evidence, we briefly address the evidence that supports the jury’s

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implicit finding that Johnson acted “maliciously” under section 451. “In
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine the
entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
judgment to determine whether there is reasonable and credible evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vasquez (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1516.)
Malice requires only “the deliberate and intentional ignition or act of
setting a fire without a legal justification, excuse or claim of right.”
(In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1028.) The perpetrator need not be
subjectively aware that a destructive fire will be the probable consequence of
their act. (Id. at p. 1030.) They need only be aware “of facts that would lead
a reasonable person to realize that the direct, natural, and highly probable
consequence” of setting the fire would be destructive burning. (Ibid.)
Sufficient evidence supports a finding that Johnson deliberately and
intentionally set the brush fire.
At trial, Johnson testified that he had started the fire accidentally by
dropping a lit cigarette that he had been smoking into dry grass. He said
that he went to look for it but that it was buried in the grass. He said it
started singeing the dead grass, and that when he tried to stomp it out it
began to flame. Video showed, and Johnson conceded, that he was at the
origin site for five minutes. During part of that time, he testified, he was
smoking the cigarette.
The jury heard testimony that contradicted Johnson’s story. A fire
chief and investigator who investigated the fire testified as follows. A
cigarette needs a minimum of 8 minutes to smolder before it will go to flame.
The average time is 12 minutes. To remain lit, a cigarette would need to land
with the tip down, facing the wind, “so that the wind keeps it going because

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no one is puffing on it . . . .” The investigation team did not find any cigarette
butts at the site. Based on this and other evidence, the investigation team
concluded that “it just didn’t add up that [accidental ignition by a dropped
cigarette] could even be a possibility . . . .”
Evidence supported a different theory—that Johnson had deliberately
started the fire with a cigarette lighter that was later found in his apartment.
The investigation team concluded that an open flame had started the fire. In
a way relevant to intent, the investigator testified that it takes a concerted
effort to make a lighter work: “[y]ou have to take it out of your pocket or
whatever it is in. You have to manipulate your lighter with your thumb to
get it to work. And you have to hold that against something that would be
combustible.” It takes some time, he further testified, for the enough heat to
transfer from a lighter flame to other material before it will catch on fire.
Sufficient evidence also supports a finding that Johnson was aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to understand that the highly
probable consequence of setting the fire was that it would spread to inhabited
buildings. The origin site was about an eighth of a mile from Johnson’s home
in the town where the buildings burned. At the origin site, Johnson noticed
that the nearby creek was dry. He testified that the grass was dry and that
there was a layer of dead grass around the area. Another witness testified
about typical September conditions in the area. He said that it was a hot, dry
time of the year. A wind usually picked up at about 2 p.m., as it did on the
day of the fire. In addition, the area had been in drought for a number of
years. Johnson testified that he had lived in the area a while before the fire
and that it was his hometown. The jury reasonably could infer that he was
aware of these conditions and the proximity of the site to buildings in the
town.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
SWEET, J. *

*Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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