CourtListener 10872665•Shaw v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 6/9/26 Shaw v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JASON SHAW, B339462
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCP03062)
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Gregory G. Yacoubian and Gregory G.
Yacoubian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs and Michael Walsh, Deputy City
Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
Jason Shaw (appellant) appeals from a trial court judgment
denying his verified petition for peremptory writ of mandate and
claim for ancillary damages filed following administrative
proceedings culminating in termination of Shaw’s employment
with the Los Angeles Police Department. (LAPD).
We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant’s relationship with his former wife
Appellant and his former wife, Elizabeth Shaw,1 met in
2003. They began a romantic relationship in 2010 and married
in 2014. They had one child born in December 2011 and a second
child born in February 2014, just after their January 2014
marriage. Appellant and Elizabeth separated in 2021 and
commenced divorce proceedings.
Elizabeth suffers from a mental health disorder and was
diagnosed by the Veterans Administration (VA) as having
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She receives $4,000 per
month from the VA for her disability.
When appellant and Elizabeth began their romantic
relationship, appellant was married to Katie Archuleta.
Elizabeth was unaware they were still married. Elizabeth
e-mailed Archuleta on September 2, 2014, to apologize for
breaking up her family, adding she and appellant planned to
divorce, and she would move out. Elizabeth expressed hope that
Archuleta would adopt her two children and treat them as her
own. Elizabeth testified that when she wrote the e-mail,
1 Because appellant and Elizabeth Shaw share the same last
name, we refer to Elizabeth Shaw by her first name to avoid
confusion. No disrespect is intended.
2
appellant was mentally abusing her but had not yet started to
physically abuse her.
Family law proceedings
On September 3, 2021, Elizabeth filed a petition for
dissolution against appellant, and on September 9, 2021, she filed
a request for custody of their children and spousal support. At
that time she made no allegations of domestic abuse.
On October 5, 2021, the Murrieta Police Department (MPD)
was informed by Child Protective Services (CPS) of a referral
received from Elizabeth’s therapist. Elizabeth had told the
therapist appellant threatened their daughter when she walked
in front of the television while appellant was watching Monday
Night Football. Elizabeth claimed appellant told their daughter
if she did not move, he was going to “get his gun and blow her
head off.” Elizabeth did not believe the threat was credible but
told her therapist it was the last straw in her decision to divorce
appellant.
When MPD interviewed Elizabeth, she told the officers
there had been unreported incidents of domestic violence since
she and appellant had married. The last incident occurred two or
three months earlier. Appellant would hold her down for a few
seconds and yell at her. She never suffered any serious injuries
requiring medical attention or lasting overnight. Elizabeth
informed MPD appellant was an alcoholic and was taking
steroids.
After investigating the allegations of abuse, MPD declined
to file criminal charges due to lack of sufficient evidence. MPD
did report the incident to LAPD, where it came to the attention of
Lieutenant James Canales on October 7, 2021. Due to the
allegation of steroid use, Lieutenant Canales ordered appellant to
3
provide a urine sample to LAPD’s medical services division,
which appellant did on October 19, 2021.
MPD obtained a one-week emergency protective order
(EPO) for Elizabeth on October 6, 2021. Appellant was required
to move out of the family home immediately and stay at least 100
yards away from Elizabeth. When MPD advised appellant of the
EPO, appellant told them Elizabeth had filed false police reports
against her previous husband.
LAPD served the EPO on appellant at work on October 7,
2021. The same day, appellant surrendered all his firearms to
MPD and removed his personal property from the family home.
On October 12, 2021, Elizabeth filed a request for domestic
violence restraining order and request for child custody. On
November 2, 2021, appellant appeared in court to contest the
restraining order that had been imposed. With Elizabeth’s
consent, the court dismissed the complaint she had filed and
dissolved the “Temporary Restraining Order as to Domestic
Violence with Children.”
On December 13, 2021, appellant submitted to a forensic
substance evaluation for the purposes of the family law
proceeding. After interviewing appellant, his mother, his sister,
a family friend and two neighbors, as well as administering two
alcohol and drug assessment tests, it was determined appellant
had no substance use disorder.
On February 15, 2022, the family law court issued an order
limiting appellant’s active parenting to 24 hours per week.
On May 16, 2022, Elizabeth filed an ex parte request to
amend appellant’s parenting time, alleging child abuse. The
court ordered CPS to investigate Elizabeth’s claim that appellant
was physically and emotionally abusing their children.
4
On October 26, 2022, Elizabeth filed another request for
order alleging child abuse, seeking sole legal and physical
custody, and seeking to limit appellant’s visitation to 24 hours
per week, professionally supervised at appellant’s expense. She
also asked the court to order appellant to pay child support and
spousal support, including arrears and sanctions, and filed a
Pitchess motion, requesting an order compelling LAPD to disclose
appellant’s employment records.2
On March 15, 2023, the court allowed appellant to have
unsupervised child visitation. The court required appellant to
“enroll in Soberlink” and give notice to the city attorney
regarding the Pitchess motion.
LAPD Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation
On May 23, 2022, Elizabeth was interviewed by LAPD IAD
investigator Sergeant Mark Wright. She informed Sergeant
Wright that appellant told her he had started taking steroids in
2016 or 2017.
Elizabeth said appellant had committed acts of domestic
violence against her two to three times per month during the first
year of their relationship, then it slowed to once every six
months. In the most recent year, the domestic violence had
increased to once per month. Approximately 85 percent of the
time, the incidents occurred when appellant had been drinking.
Elizabeth reported some incidents of domestic violence to MPD
but had not reported all incidents in the past because appellant
told her he would lose his job if his employer found out and they
would have no money to survive.
2 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
5
The last incident occurred two or three months prior to
Elizabeth’s report to MPD. She and appellant had been drinking
and arguing and later fell asleep. In bed, appellant got up on his
hands and knees and urinated on Elizabeth. She “smacked” him
to wake him up. He laughed, got up, and urinated on a dresser.
Though Elizabeth had photographs of prior injuries
inflicted by appellant, she had deleted them. She had an eight-
minute recording she made on September 17, 2019, in which
appellant admitted grabbing her face and pulling her hair.
On July 29, 2022, 10 months after the October 2021
urinalysis test ordered by Lieutenant Canales, the laboratory
reported the presence of a steroid in appellant’s urine known as
boldenone.3 On the same date, appellant signed a release
allowing the laboratory results to be released to IAD Sergeant
Wright.
Charges and Board of Rights (Board) hearing
On August 18, 2022, IAD completed its investigation. On
October 6, 2022, LAPD charged appellant with misconduct, as
follows:
“Count 1: On or before September 17, 2019, you, while off
duty, pulled [Elizabeth’s] hair and grabbed her face during a
domestic altercation.
“Count 2: Between January 1, 2016, and October 7, 2021,
on one or more occasions, you, while on or off duty, improperly
used anabolic steroids.”
3 Boldenone is illegal for human use. We reject appellant’s
suggestion made for the first time in his reply brief that
boldenone is not an illegal steroid. His own expert testified
otherwise.
6
Appellant received a Skelly package containing a letter of
transmittal with the investigation report and attachments.4
The Board hearing began on May 22, 2023. Appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Sergeant Wright testified that after he prepared his
investigation report, when Elizabeth learned she would testify at
the hearing, for the first time she provided several photographs
and screenshots of her text messages with appellant. She also
provided the audio recording in which appellant admitted to
grabbing her face and pulling her hair.5 She had not reported the
incident to MPD.
Photographs provided by Elizabeth showed vials, syringes,
and other medications that appellant kept either in the
refrigerator or in a box in his closet. The vials were labeled
“Boldenone” and “Equipoise.” Elizabeth testified that around the
beginning of 2017, appellant told her he had been using steroids
for six months. He told her he wanted to look younger and
wanted to be stronger so he could “take down the ‘meth heads’ he
encountered in his work ‘because they were strong when they
were on meth.’” Elizabeth provided a photograph which she
described as “a box of steroids, the alcohol prep pads, extra
needles.” Elizabeth testified appellant would receive these boxes
every six months. Appellant instructed Elizabeth to pay for the
boxes with her Venmo account. Elizabeth provided screenshots of
Venmo payments and text messages discussing specific
4 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly).
5 During the investigation, appellant’s attorney had objected
to use of the audio recording since it had been recorded
surreptitiously. LAPD acknowledged appellant had been
unaware he was being recorded.
7
payments. Elizabeth also provided screen shots of text messages
between appellant and her in which appellant referenced “man
juice” and “steroids.”
Elizabeth testified she was physically, verbally,
emotionally, and mentally abused during her marriage to
appellant. He would grab her and force her to do things she did
not want to do. He would also constantly “put her down.”
Elizabeth testified to the incident during which appellant
urinated on her in bed. She said there were about 10 incidents of
physical abuse.
On September 17, 2019, Elizabeth recorded appellant
admitting to pulling her hair and grabbing her face. She made
the audio recording while they were riding in appellant’s truck
having an argument about what happened the night before. In
the audio recording, appellant denied that it was abuse or that he
was hurting her. Appellant said, “Yea, I pulled your hair. Yea. I
pulled it. I grabbed your face like that because I want you to look
at me. That’s not abuse. That’s not hurting you. Is it? You
won’t look at me. That’s disrespectful. When I ask you to look at
me, then you look at me.”
Elizabeth had not reported the incident to police because
appellant told her he would lose his job. She had also previously
requested the court dissolve a restraining order because she had
been told appellant would never be able to work again with a
restraining order against him.
Appellant testified he worked for LAPD for 19 years. He
denied any domestic altercations during his relationship with
Elizabeth. He denied pulling her hair or grabbing her face,
saying he gently touched her face so she would look at him, and
she slapped his hand away. He admitted pulling her hair in the
8
audio because he was frustrated by their conversation about
possible divorce and was being sarcastic.
Appellant testified he did not know why his urine tests
showed up positive for boldenone. He denied taking it or
knowing what it was before the investigation. He denied ever
having it in the house. He denied knowledge of the needles,
alcohol prep pads, and other items shown in the photographs.
Appellant testified he had a prescription for testosterone
cypionate, which he took by injection and was prescribed by a
board-certified practitioner.
Brianna Peterson, a forensic toxicologist at NMS
Laboratories, testified appellant’s urine tested positive for
boldenone. Boldenone is a steroid that was legally used in
animals for weight gain and illegally used by humans to build
muscle mass. Boldenone is an illegal steroid and not for human
consumption. Peterson testified the tests provided by the
laboratory were sufficient to show accurate results.
Appellant’s expert, Marvin Pietruszka, a board-certified
pathologist and forensic toxicologist, stated boldenone is now
illegal for human as well as animal use. In his opinion, the test
used by NMS Laboratories did not reveal whether the boldenone
in appellant’s system was exogenous or endogenous.6 There is a
test, not used by NMS Laboratories, that would determine
whether the substance originated from within the body or outside
of the body. The test NMS used was valid as a screening test, but
not as a confirmatory test. Dr. Pietruszka admitted he did not
test the urine sample, and he was unfamiliar with boldenone.
6 According to Pietruszka, “there is some endogenous,
meaning ‘within the body itself,’ production of … a drug similar
chemically to Boldenone.”
9
Carla Hogan lived with appellant’s father for 14 years but
they never married. In August 2021, Elizabeth told her she had
retained divorce counsel and planned to tell the attorney
appellant was abusive. Hogan told Elizabeth that was a lie, but
Elizabeth told her “they” will take her side because she is a
woman and her lying could not be proven. Elizabeth never told
Hogan she had been abused or had her hair pulled. Hogan said
Elizabeth told her she had been diagnosed with a mental health
disorder, and some of it was PTSD from being in the service.
Elizabeth told her it would be a good thing if appellant lost his
job and that she hoped appellant would get killed in an accident.
Elizabeth told Hogan about the audio recording and said she was
baiting appellant.
In the penalty phase, the officer in charge of the civil
litigation section for the risk management/legal affairs division of
the LAPD, Lieutenant Gomez, testified the charges against
appellant constituted “serious misconduct.” The first charge of
domestic violence violated the LAPD code of conduct, code of
ethics, and created a bias concern for the LAPD whenever
appellant responded to a domestic violence call. In addition,
appellant could be placed on a Brady list, which would
undermine testimony appellant might provide in future cases.7
An officer having a history of domestic violence injures the
public’s perception of the LAPD, as well as the internal
perception of other officers knowing that the LAPD tolerates such
conduct.
As to the second charge of improper drug use, Lieutenant
Gomez testified the public should be confident that when an
7 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
10
officer responds to a call for service, the responding officer is not
using drugs or is a drug user. Steroid use alters behavior, and
LAPD may be exposed to litigation if appellant were involved in a
use of force or use of excessive force incident regarding the public
or a coworker.
The Board’s decision
On May 25, 2023, the Board found appellant guilty of both
counts of misconduct.
As to count one, the Board noted it focused on the audio
recording of the conversation that took place on September 17,
2019. Although appellant said he merely turned Elizabeth’s face
towards his and his hand got tangled in her hair, appellant’s
“tone of voice and word choices were demonstrably abusive.” The
Board found Elizabeth’s testimony on count one credible.
Regarding count two, the Board noted LAPD presented test
results showing the presence of boldenone, an illegal anabolic
steroid, in appellant’s urine sample. Peterson testified as to the
accuracy of the test. While Dr. Pietruszka’s testimony might
have been sufficient to create doubt in a criminal proceeding, the
standard was preponderance of the evidence. Other factors
suggested appellant injected boldenone, including
Dr. Pietruszka’s admitted unfamiliarity with boldenone,
appellant’s references to steroids in text messages with
Elizabeth, and Elizabeth’s photographs of boldenone vials. The
Board noted Elizabeth’s photographs of the boldenone vials were
taken before the LAPD’s receipt of the laboratory results showing
boldenone in appellant’s urine.
LAPD’s penalty guide had only one recommended penalty
for illegal steroid use, which was termination. For a first-time
domestic violence count, the penalty guide had several
11
recommendations, including termination. The Board considered
appellant’s employment record, which included 38 minor
commendations and a disciplinary history including one
admonishment, one official reprimand, and two suspensions of
seven and 10 days, respectively. The Board recommended LAPD
Chief Michel Moore terminate appellant’s employment.
Termination
On May 31, 2023, Chief Moore adopted the Board’s
recommendation and removed appellant from his position as a
police officer, retroactive to November 4, 2022.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant filed his initial petition for peremptory writ of
mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5
against the City of Los Angeles and Moore (collectively, city) on
August 23, 2023. Appellant argued (1) the city violated
appellant’s right to due process by using evidence the city did not
provide (text messages and photographs) until after scheduling
his Board hearing; (2) the Board improperly admitted into
evidence the audio recording, because the recording had been
made surreptitiously; and (3) insufficient evidence supported the
guilty verdict on count two.
The city opposed the petition, arguing (1) the city was
permitted to rely on the photographs and text messages under
Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194; (2) the audio recording was
admissible under the Board manual and state law; and (3) the
weight of the evidence supported the Board’s finding on count
two. Appellant replied, arguing the law relied upon by the city
was inapplicable, the court should reject the city’s argument as to
12
the late-provided evidence, and the guilty finding on count two
was based on a flawed analysis.
The trial court heard oral argument on April 18, 2024.
After considering the administrative record, the moving papers,
and argument of counsel, the trial court denied appellant’s
petition.
The court provided a 19-page written decision. As to the
photographs and text messages, the court noted due process
entitles public employees certain procedural safeguards,
including notice of the proposed action, a statement of the
reasons therefor, and “a copy of the charges and materials upon
which the action is based.” (Underscoring omitted and citing
Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 215–216.) Because the LAPD did
not withhold the text messages and photographs and provided
them to appellant as soon as they were provided by Elizabeth,
appellant’s due process rights were not violated.
As to the audio recording, the court cited Penal Code
section 633.5, which allows a party to a confidential
communication to record that communication for the purpose of
obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to the
commission of domestic violence.
Finally, the court noted the weight of the evidence
supported the Board’s finding on count two. The test conducted
by NMS Laboratories reported the presence of boldenone. There
was also testimony from Elizabeth that appellant told her at the
beginning of 2017 he had been using steroids for about six
months. Screenshots of text messages between appellant and
Elizabeth referenced appellant’s use of steroids. Photographs
showed vials, syringes, and other medications, including a vial
labeled “Boldenone.” Elizabeth testified packages containing
13
these drugs arrived every six months. There was evidence of
Venmo payments made for the steroids. Further, the court noted,
Elizabeth would not have known about the positive urine test for
boldenone at the time she took the photograph of the vial of
boldenone.
The trial court judgment was filed on April 29, 2024.
On June 20, 2024, appellant filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standards of review
“Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the
basic framework by which an aggrieved party to an
administrative proceeding may seek judicial review of any final
order or decision rendered by a state or local agency.” (Bixby v.
Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 137, fn. omitted.) If the decision of
the administrative agency affects an individual’s right to practice
a trade or profession, “the trial court not only examines the
administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its
independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited
trial de novo.” (Id. at p. 143.) However, in applying its
independent judgment, the trial court “must accord a ‘“strong
presumption of … correctness”’ to administrative findings, and
that the ‘burden rests’ upon the complaining party to show that
the administrative ‘“decision is contrary to the weight of the
evidence.”’” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817
(Fukuda).)
“Even when, as here, the trial court is required to review
an administrative decision under the independent judgment
standard of review, the standard of review on appeal of the trial
court’s determination is the substantial evidence test.” (Fukuda,
14
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “Applying the substantial evidence
test on appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider
that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court,
indulging in every reasonable inference in favor of the trial
court’s findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor.” (Breslin v.
City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064,
1078.) “We must uphold the court’s findings unless they are so
lacking in evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.”
(Lozano v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 723.)
On questions of law, we apply a de novo standard of review.
(Ibid.)
II. Count two
Appellant’s first argument is that the administrative
decision is invalid because the Board failed to make a required
finding on a necessary element of the charged misconduct.
Count two alleged as follows: “Between January 1, 2016
and October 7, 2021, on one or more occasions, you, while on or
off duty, improperly used anabolic steroids.”
Count two was based on the LAPD policy, which states:
“Drug abuse is the wrong or improper use of chemical
substances. It includes the use of any illegal drug or controlled
substance, along with the misuse of other chemical substances
such as alcohol, anabolic steroids, and prescription or over-the-
counter medications.”
The LAPD policy does not define “misuse.”8 Appellant
points out “anabolic steroids” are grouped with “other chemical
8 We decline to find LAPD’s drug abuse policy
unconstitutionally vague due to the LAPD’s failure to define the
terms “misuse,” and “wrong and improper.” This argument is
raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief, and we need
15
substances,” as distinguished from “illegal drug[s] or controlled
substance[s].” Thus, appellant argues, per LAPD’s policy, LAPD
was required to prove more than just use of anabolic steroids.
Instead, LAPD was required to prove “misuse.”
Appellant asserts the LAPD failed to prove, and the Board
failed to find, the key element of “misuse” or that appellant
“improperly used” the substance, as required. Appellant argues
the lack of such a finding renders judicial review impossible and
deprives the employee of a meaningful opportunity to challenge
the decision.9
We disagree with appellant’s characterization of the record.
Count two charged: “Between January 1, 2016, and October 7,
2021, on one or more occasions, you, while on or off duty,
improperly used anabolic steroids.” (Italics added.) The Board
found appellant guilty of this count, as charged. Thus, the
not address it for that reason. (Prince v. United Nat. Ins. Co.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 233, 238.) Further, “‘“The requirement of
reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms
to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common
usage, and understanding.”’” (People v. Ervin (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 1323, 1329.) The terms appellant complains of are
commonly used and understood.
9 Appellant argues he may properly raise this purely legal
issue for the first time on appeal. (Citing Ramirez v. Department
of Motor Vehicles (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1313; Sweeney v.
California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 1093.) While we disagree with appellant’s
characterization of this issue as purely legal, the city does not
challenge appellant’s ability to raise the argument, therefore it is
addressed.
16
Board’s decision necessarily included a finding that appellant
improperly used anabolic steroids.
The LAPD policy bans the “wrong or improper use of
chemical substances.” Such “wrong or improper use” includes
two things: (1) “the use of any illegal drug or controlled
substance,” and (2) “the misuse of other chemical substances such
as alcohol, anabolic steroids, and prescription or over-the-counter
medications.”
The Board’s finding that appellant improperly used
boldenone necessarily includes a finding that appellant either (1)
used an illegal drug or controlled substance or (2) misused
another chemical substance, such as anabolic steroids. Thus, we
decline to find that the Board failed to make a finding on a
necessary element of the charge.
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination
that appellant improperly used boldenone, because the evidence
shows appellant engaged in both activities that can constitute
“wrong or improper use.” He used an illegal substance, and he
also misused an anabolic steroid.
Appellant’s own expert admitted boldenone is illegal for
human use. Thus, any use of the drug violated the LAPD policy.
As stated in the policy, “Drug abuse is the wrong or improper use
of chemical substances. It includes the use of any illegal drug or
controlled substance ….” Because boldenone is an illegal drug,
the LAPD policy banned all use of boldenone. The evidence,
including the urine test, Elizabeth’s testimony, and the
photographic evidence, supported the Board’s conclusion that
appellant used this illegal drug, thus he was guilty of violating
the LAPD policy.
17
The evidence also showed appellant misused boldenone.
Despite boldenone being illegal for human use, there was
evidence appellant began injecting it into his body in 2016 or
2017. Elizabeth testified appellant told her he started using the
drug in 2016 or 2017. Elizabeth also provided photographs
showing vials labeled “Boldenone” as well as syringes. Elizabeth
testified boxes of the drug would arrive every six months and
provided evidence of payments for the drug. She provided screen
shots of text messages in which appellant referenced “man juice,”
which Elizabeth believed meant steroids. This evidence supports
a finding that appellant was injecting boldenone on a regular
basis, which constitutes misuse of the drug, as it is not legal for
humans to inject it.
As the trial court noted, the weight of the evidence supports
the Board’s finding that appellant was guilty of improper use of
boldenone as charged in count two.10
III. Admission of evidence
Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to exclude
evidence that was illegally obtained or produced in an untimely
manner. We discuss each claim separately below and conclude
the trial court did not err in considering the challenged evidence.
10 For the first time in his reply brief, appellant argues there
was no evidence appellant used boldenone on the dates alleged in
count two, which accused appellant of use between January 1,
2016, and October 7, 2021. Appellant argues for the first time
the urine sample provided on October 19, 2021, did not provide
evidence of drug use between the dates alleged. Because
appellant failed to raise this argument below, we find it is
forfeited and decline to address it. (Transcontinental Ins. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
1296, 1309.)
18
A. The audio recording
Appellant argues it was a violation of due process for a
government employer to consider evidence obtained in violation
of Penal Code section 632 in an administrative disciplinary
hearing.11 Section 632 provides that evidence obtained through
the surreptitious recording of a confidential communication is
generally inadmissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative,
or other proceeding. (See also In re L.J. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
741.)
The Board indicated it paid particular attention to an audio
recording when finding appellant guilty on count one. The
recording was surreptitiously made by Elizabeth during a private
conversation between them in which appellant admitted to
pulling her hair and grabbing her face. Appellant argues the
recording was obtained in violation of section 632.
However, as the trial court noted, section 633.5 provides an
exception to section 632. Specifically, section 633.5 provides that
section 632 does not apply if the recording was surreptitiously
made “for the purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably believed
to relate to the commission … of the crime of … domestic violence
as defined in Section 13700.” The trial court specifically found
that Elizabeth “recorded [appellant] to capture his admission
about his domestic abuse.” Thus, the exception found in section
633.5 applies.
Appellant argues the alleged conduct does not rise to the
level of a felony or a crime of violence that would justify the use
of such evidence under section 633.5. He argues the alleged
11 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
19
incident involved no serious bodily harm or criminal prosecution.
Appellant argues the absence of such felony-level conduct
undermines the justification for the use of the recording in the
administrative proceedings. Appellant fails to cite any law
limiting the application of section 633.5 to incidents of serious
bodily harm or criminal prosecution. Thus, these factors do not
affect the admissibility of the audio recording. It was not error
for the trial court to consider the recording.
The Board properly considered the audio recording for
other reasons. First, appellant’s attorney did not object to the
audio recording being admitted as evidence at the Board hearing.
When LAPD offered the audio recording as evidence, appellant’s
attorney stated: “There’s no objection to it being admitted, there
is an issue, a hearsay issue, but I have no objection to the
admission.” Because appellant did not object to the admission of
the audio recording into evidence at the Board hearing, he
forfeited any admissibility argument. (Cassidy v. California Bd.
of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 629, fn. 5.)
Further, the rules of evidence do not strictly apply in
administrative hearings. As set forth in Government Code
section 11513, subdivision (c), “The hearing need not be
conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and
witnesses …. Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the
sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence
of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper
the admission of the evidence over objection in civil actions.”
However, hearsay evidence “over timely objection shall not be
sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be
20
admissible over objection in civil actions.” (Gov. Code, § 11513,
subd. (d).)
At the hearing, appellant’s counsel properly objected that
the Board could not rely solely on the recording to find appellant
guilty. While the Board noted it paid particular attention to the
recording, the record shows the Board did not rely exclusively on
the recording in rendering its decision as the Board also noted it
found Elizabeth’s testimony credible, and the evidence as a whole
showed appellant engaged in a pattern of abusive conduct.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in considering
the audio recording Elizabeth surreptitiously made on
September 17, 2019.
B. Photos, text messages, and expert report
Appellant next argues the trial court erred by failing to
exclude evidence not produced prior to the LAPD’s initiation of
discipline against appellant. Appellant cites Skelly, supra, 15
Cal.3d 194, and Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
(1985) 470 U.S. 532, in support of his position. However, neither
case requires that all evidence be provided to the employee prior
to the initiation of discipline. (See Skelly, supra, at p. 215
[“preremoval safeguards must include notice of the proposed
action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials
upon which the action is based, and the right to respond”];
Cleveland Board. of Education, supra, at p. 546 [“The … public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an
opportunity to present his side of the story. [Citations.] To
require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an
unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in quickly
removing an unsatisfactory employee.”].)
21
Appellant complains LAPD failed to produce photographs
and text messages provided by Elizabeth prior to the
administrative hearing. However, the record reveals otherwise.
First, at the time appellant was charged with misconduct, the
LAPD provided appellant with a Skelly package, including a
“Letter of Transmittal” along with the investigation report and
attachments. Sometime later, when the matter was already set
for hearing before the Board, Elizabeth provided LAPD with the
additional evidence, including photos and text messages showing
appellant’s improper steroid use. This evidence was provided to
appellant prior to the administrative hearing. Appellant objected
to the use of these materials at the Board hearing on the ground
they were not provided as part of the original Skelly package.
The Board overruled his objection.
While a public employee is entitled to disclosure of the
evidence supporting the disciplinary grounds (see, e.g., Burrell v.
City of Los Angeles (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 568, 577), there is no
requirement that a public employee be provided with every
document available that supports the charges. (Gilbert v. City of
Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280 [“We reject
appellant’s contention that the word ‘materials’ as used in Skelly
means each and every document identified in the Chief’s Case
was required to be produced prior to his pretermination hearing
in order to satisfy due process.”].) “Constitutional principles of
due process do not create general rights of discovery.” (Ibid.)
Instead, what is required is “‘unambiguous warning that matters
have come to a head, coupled with an explicit notice to the
employee that he or she now has the opportunity to engage the
issue and present the reasons opposing such a disposition.’”
(Ibid.) There is no indication in the case law that the employer
22
may not later provide additional materials following the initial
Skelly disclosure.
Appellant was provided with the photographs and text
messages prior to the hearing before the Board. Appellant did
not request any additional time to review the evidence, nor did
the evidence alter the fundamental charges against him. Under
the circumstances, appellant’s objection to this evidence is not
well taken.
Appellant also points out he objected at the Board hearing
to the LAPD’s failure to produce an expert report regarding the
testing the LAPD’s expert had done. Appellant’s attorney stated,
“Not only did I not get a report, I didn’t even get an indicator or
summary of what her testimony might be, so I had [to] attempt
cross-examination in the blind on the fly. [That’s] called ‘Trial by
Ambush.’”
However, early in the proceedings, appellant’s attorney was
informed LAPD was not required to provide an expert report.
Appellant’s attorney agreed, stating, “I never said [LAPD] was
required to give me a written report from her. I do recognize the
Board of Rights maintains they are not under the strict rules of
discovery ….” Because there was no requirement the LAPD
provide an expert report, there was no error.
Appellant objected to Peterson’s testimony because he could
not adequately prepare for cross-examination until he heard her
opinions in testimony. The Board overruled appellant’s objection
but specifically asked Peterson if she could be available to return
should appellant’s attorney need her for further cross-
examination. After Peterson completed her testimony,
appellant’s attorney stated he had no further questions and
23
specified he did not need further re-cross-examination. Peterson
was told she need not “worr[y] about reappearing.”
Thus, there is no indication appellant was prejudiced by
LAPD’s failure to provide an expert report. Appellant’s attorney
was given the opportunity to have Peterson return for further
cross-examination at a later date and expressly declined the offer.
No error occurred.
IV. Penalty
Lastly, appellant argues even if no due process violation
occurred, the penalty of termination was an abuse of discretion
where LAPD failed to establish a nexus between appellant’s off-
duty anabolic steroid use and his on-duty job performance.
Appellant cites Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d
822, 834–835, for the proposition that “the basis for the discharge
must be rationally related to qualifications for the job.”
Additionally, “There must be a sufficient ‘nexus’ between the
asserted grounds for dismissal and the fitness to carry out the
responsibilities of employment.” (Id. at p. 835.) As set forth in
Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 50,
“the essential test is whether the conduct harms the public
service.” Appellant argues the absence of individualized findings
or evidence showing how appellant’s conduct harmed public
service or impaired his fitness for duty makes the punishment
constitutionally excessive.
In evaluating the penalty imposed on a public employee by
a public agency, the trial court must defer to the agency’s
discretion. “The propriety of a penalty imposed by an
administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the
agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has
been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Lake v. Civil Service
24
Comm. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 224, 228; see also Deegan v. City of
Mountain View, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 45 [“Neither the trial
court nor the appellate court is entitled to substitute its
discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the
degree of punishment imposed.”].)
Preliminarily, the city argues appellant forfeited this issue
by failing to raise it below. (Transcontinental Ins. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, supra, 148
Cal.App.4th at p. 1309.) Appellant fails to address this
argument. Therefore, we consider the argument forfeited.
Even if it were not forfeited, we would not find the agency
abused its discretion in recommending the penalty of
termination. Given that appellant was found to have engaged in
use of an illegal drug, his penalty was consistent with the LAPD
penalty guide. The only recommended penalty for illegal drug
use is termination. The conclusion that appellant also physically
abused his wife further supported this recommendation.12
Appellant provides no legal authority permitting a court to find
an abuse of discretion at the penalty phase when the Board
followed the agency’s penalty guide.
Further, Lieutenant Gomez testified to the seriousness of
the charges against appellant and the reasons LAPD could not
tolerate such conduct. LAPD’s policy was to maintain a
workplace free from any drug use or drug abuse, including
steroids. The domestic violence charge also violated LAPD code
of conduct and code of ethics. Tolerating the conduct involved in
either charge would expose the city to litigation and liability
12 For a first-time sustained domestic violence count, the
penalty guide has several recommendations, including
termination.
25
because “it could appear [LAPD] ignored the behaviors and …
allowed it and accepted it as an organization.” Lieutenant Gomez
explained there is no acceptable position in the LAPD for a
person with a failed drug test or domestic violence finding
against him, therefore termination was appropriate.
Appellant has failed to meet his burden on appeal of
showing the Board abused its discretion by following the penalty
guide.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs of appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
26
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