People v. Griffis CA2/4

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Filed 6/9/26 P. v. Griffis CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B341637

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA445708)
v.

CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Michael C. Keller and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, a jury found defendant Christopher Griffis guilty of first
degree murder. In 2022, Griffis filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the petition on two grounds, one of which was that defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a direct aider and abettor who harbored
express malice. On appeal, Griffis contends there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction, the trial court failed to consider his youthfulness at
the time of the offense, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct.
We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
I. The Killing of Bradford Smith
The Rolling 20’s Bloods and Rolling 30’s Harlem Crips were rival gangs
in South Los Angeles. Bradford Smith, known as “Baby Slick,” was a
member of the Rolling 20’s. In the early evening of March 14, 2016, during a
wave of violence between the two gangs, Smith was shot and killed in front of
1801 West Adams Boulevard. That location was within territory claimed by
the Rolling 20’s. Later that evening, a large group of people gathered near
where Smith was killed to conduct a candlelight vigil. Griffis attended and
identified himself as a member of the Rolling 20’s to a police officer.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.

2The facts are taken from our opinion in Griffis’s direct appeal (People v.
Griffis, B284781) [nonpub. opn.]) and are not disputed by the parties.

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II. The Killing of Lorenzo Ambrosio
After the vigil, surveillance showed a white Malibu passing by Sammy’s
Liquor Store on Jefferson Boulevard at Ninth Avenue three times within a
short time. The liquor store was located in Rolling 30’s claimed territory.
First, the Malibu drove west on Jefferson Boulevard and turned north onto
Ninth Avenue. About three minutes later, the Malibu traveled the same
route, passing the liquor store again. After the second drive past the store,
the video showed two people in a parking lot running toward, and shooting
at, the Malibu. A few minutes later, the Malibu passed by the store a third
time but eastbound and there were “sparks” (apparently muzzle flashes). A
man riding a bicycle outside the store, later identified as Lorenzo Ambrosio,
was fatally shot and fell to the ground. The shooting occurred at
approximately 10:43 p.m.
About a month prior to the Ambrosio shooting, Officer Brian Schneider
had stopped a white Malibu driven by Kayveon Livingston, in which Griffis
and two other men were passengers. Livingston and Griffis both identified
themselves as members of the Rolling 20’s.

III. The Police Interview
On June 22, 2016, Griffis and Livingston were arrested for the
Ambrosio murder. They were taken to the police station and placed in the
same cell. Detective Rene Castro and Officer Christopher Courtney
interrogated Griffis. Griffis acknowledged being a Rolling 20’s gang member
but stated he was no longer frequenting the neighborhood. Griffis admitted
to seeing Livingston around but did not know his name. He was evasive
about his familiarity with Livingston’s car.

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In the interrogation, Griffis said Smith was like an older brother to him
and he was upset about his murder. Griffis stated that he went to the vigil
on the evening of Smith’s death, but he denied seeing Livingston there. He
also said he had not heard about the Ambrosio murder as he spent most of
the evening at a girlfriend’s home. When the officers stated people had
placed him in Livingston’s car that night, Griffis denied being in the car. At
first, Griffis denied having a cell phone in March 2016, but later admitted he
did have one. After further questioning, Griffis told the officers that about a
week after Smith was killed, Livingston told him that he had gone to Rolling
30’s territory alone and shot someone. Griffis then changed the story, stating
that Livingston said there was someone else in the car with him who did the
shooting. Griffis further stated that someone in Livingston’s car was the
shooter and he was in another car “trailing” behind the Malibu. He first said
the second car was a gray truck, but later said it was a gray Hyundai, and
the driver was an “older homie.” The police asked Griffis, “what was the
plan?” Griffis stated, “[t]rying to go find something,” and that “[w]e was
gonna just try to let—just let—let anger out.”
The officers told Griffis that he kept changing his story, which led them
to believe he was the shooter. Griffis denied that he was the shooter. The
interrogation continued:
Officer Courtney: “Then what happened?”
Griffis: “That they went to go shoot. I was in another vehicle.”
Officer Courtney: “There wasn’t another vehicle.”
Griffis: “It was. If you look at that tape, I know there’s a gray Hyundai
and that vehicle.”3

3 Officer Courtney subsequently reviewed all the surveillance videos. He did
not see a car following the Malibu, did not see any other car appear more
4
Detective Castro: “Okay. And when you guys left, they were gonna go
look for [Rolling] 30’s. Is that what happened?”
Griffis: “That’s what that car was doing.”
Detective Castro: “But you took off with that car. You guys took off
following that car.”
Griffis: “Yeah, but the older homie didn’t tell me, because I asked him,
‘what’s going on?’ He said, ‘Just look and watch.’”
Detective Castro: “What did that mean to you?”
Griffis: “Look and watch. Now, I—I’m thinking, oh, yeah, they finna go
shoot something or they finna go do something that they not supposed to.”
Detective Castro: “When you got in the car, did you know—in your head
without anyone telling—telling you anything, you knew what was gonna
happen?”
Griffis: “No. I knew it start happening when we started going in the
area, not just, okay, we at the candlelight. Everybody get in they cars. We
already know what—what up. We got a plan. No.”
“Everybody in motion. People still crying. Like, it was more so, like,
the older homie he, like, that car finna—yeah. Like they finna do they thing.
They finna do their job. And we just trailer.”
The officers asked Griffis to identify the driver of the trail car and the
people in the lead car. They showed him pictures of several individuals.
Griffis identified some of the participants but said he did not see everyone
who got in the lead car.

than once in the videos, and did not see a gray truck or Hyundai. However,
surveillance footage from Oasis Laundromat, which was located next door to
Sammy’s Liquor Store, depicted a gray car following a white Malibu just prior
to the shooting.
5
The officers took a break. When they returned, Officer Castro said they
were puzzled about some of the missing details. He told Griffis they were
leaning towards the conclusion Griffis was leaving out details because he was
the shooter. Griffis said he was not the shooter. Griffis later identified Tiny
M as the shooter and said Tiny M was riding in the Malibu with an “AK.”
Griffis also said he met with some others at a laundromat on the night of the
vigil. When asked how he knew Tiny M was the shooter, Griffis said Tiny M
was the last person who had the AK and “the only one talking about it.”
Griffis said when he saw Tiny M walking to the car “he had [the AK] in his
pants.”

IV. The Jail Conversation
After interrogating both Griffis and Livingston, the police placed them
back together in the same jail cell with a hidden recording device.
Griffis said, “Police know your car. And they trying to catch us for that
hot one.” Livingston said, “You didn’t say nothing, right?” Griffis assured
Livingston he said nothing. Griffis said the police were talking about “the
phone” and “our phones” showing the two men at the same location. Griffis
said, “How the [f***] is our phones in the same location, fool?” He stated,
“And then they said that our phone[s] w[ere] in the area. How is that
possible? Yeah, we left it at DM house. That day.” The conversation
continued:
Griffis: “Man, that [sh*t] coming—my [sh*t] online, fool. Remember all
them the phone calls, yeah, this bitch is like, ‘The shats in here.’ ”
Livingston: “Man, it was supposed to be the airplane mode, shats.”
Griffis: “Those calls—”
Livingston: “The shats was supposed to be off. The shats was off.”

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Griffis: “It was on. Remember?”
Livingston: “Whatever they got, they got it, bro.”
Griffis: “Uh-huh.”
Livingston: “Just don’t give them nothing else. That’s it.”
Livingston said, “I wasn’t there. I wasn’t driving. The car, I guess, was
there. They saying it was, but, [sh*t], I don’t remember. I wasn’t there. I
wasn’t driving.” He said, “Just because it’s my car, don’t mean I’m in the
[mother*****].”
Griffis said the police had seen his Facebook records.

V. The Cell Phone Evidence
Cell phone records indicated that on March 14, 2016, from 8:59 p.m. to
9:15 p.m., Livingston’s cell phone moved from west to east toward the area of
1801 West Adams Boulevard, the location of the Smith shooting. From 9:34
p.m. to 9:55 p.m. the phone moved south from that area, and then west
towards the area of Jefferson Boulevard and Ninth Avenue, the location of
the Ambrosio shooting. From 10:01 p.m. to 10:29 p.m., the phone moved back
east toward the area of 1801 West Adams Boulevard. From 10:32 p.m. to
10:40 p.m., Livingston’s phone was in the general vicinity of 1801 West
Adams Boulevard. At 10:47 p.m. and 10:55 p.m., the phone connected with
cell phone towers in the general vicinity of 1801 West Adams Boulevard.
Cell phone records for Griffis’s cell phone showed activity from 9:20
p.m. to 9:23 p.m. on March 14, 2016, indicating the phone was in the general
vicinity of 1801 West Adams Boulevard. From 9:21 p.m. until 10:55 p.m. that
evening, the phone did not connect with any cell tower in the area, indicating
the phone was either turned off, in airplane mode, or in an area with no cell
tower coverage.

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According to the cell phone records, at 10:55 p.m. that evening both
Griffis’s and Livingston’s cell phones connected with cell towers in the 1801
West Adams Boulevard area, indicating both phones were in the area at that
time.

VI. The Gang and Social Media Evidence
A gang expert testified that the Rolling 20’s Bloods and Rolling 30’s
Harlem Crips are rival gangs in adjacent neighborhoods, with Jefferson
Boulevard forming a boundary between the two gangs. At the time of the
Smith and Ambrosio murders in March 2016, the number of shootings of
gang members was particularly high. In such an environment, when a gang
member is shot his fellow gang members assume the shooting was committed
by the rival gang. The expert further testified that to mislead law
enforcement and witnesses gang members often use a “trail” car to attract
attention away from the car carrying the shooter. By riding in a trail car, a
gang member can assist in the commission of a crime and enhance his status
within the gang.
The prosecution presented records from a Facebook account under the
name “Gt da Mess.” Griffis had acknowledged in his police interview that he
had a Facebook account under that name. “RTB.I.P baby Slick” appeared on
the Facebook account, which the gang expert interpreted to mean “Rolling 20
Blood in peace” and a reference to Smith, as a tribute to a fallen gang
member. Under that language there were several emojis depicting a crying
face, hands praying, thumbs down, and a gun. Records from Griffis’s
Facebook account included messages between him and a Kyra Pearson.
Referring to Smith’s death, Pearson stated shortly after midnight on March
15, 2016, “Yeah, this shit ain’t no joke? I’m really finna cry.” Griffis

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responded, “Man to[o] late for that. we did that. we going back. we already
went for bl[oo]d.” A status update posted on the account shortly after
midnight stated, “Body for body.”

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and Sentence
A jury convicted Griffis of first degree murder of Lorenzo Ambrosio
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied building (§ 246).4 The jury
found true the gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C),
(b)(4), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Griffis to 50
years to life in state prison.
On appeal, this court remanded the matter to allow the trial court to
decide whether to strike the firearm enhancements but otherwise affirmed
the judgment. On remand, the trial court struck the firearm enhancements
and Griffis was resentenced to 25 years to life in state prison.

II. Petition for Resentencing
In 2022, Griffis filed, in pro. per., a section 1172.6 resentencing
petition. Griffis was appointed counsel. The trial court found Griffis had
made a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding
that Griffis was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder under the
current law on two theories: (1) he was an aider and abettor who acted with
express malice; and (2) he was a conspirator to the murder.
Griffis timely appealed.

4 Griffis and Livingston were tried together before separate juries.
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DISCUSSION
I. Overview of Sentencing Procedure
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, effective
January 1, 2019, “‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did
not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition to amending the Penal
Code, Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), “which
provides a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted
under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
Upon the filing of a facially sufficient resentencing petition, the
superior court must conduct a prima facie analysis to determine the
petitioner’s eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie showing is
made, issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869 (Wilson); People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
458, 469–470.) At the evidentiary hearing following issuance of an order to
show cause, the superior court acts as an independent fact finder, and the
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner is guilty of murder under current California law. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3); Wilson, supra, at p. 869.)

II. Standard of Review
“On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an
evidentiary hearing, we review the superior court’s factual findings for

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substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de
novo. (People v. Wilson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 903, 916.) In conducting our
review, we consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the
superior court’s findings (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 323), and we
presume ‘“every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have
reasonably deduced from the evidence.”’ (Id. at p. 331.) We ask ‘whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence of solid
value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.) And based
on this whole record review, we ‘“determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt.”’ (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.) Finally, our
Supreme Court has held that whether the prosecutor relied upon direct or
circumstantial evidence, if the trier of fact’s determination is supported,
reversal is not warranted, even where ‘“‘the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’”’ (Vargas, at p. 820,
quoting Rivera, at p. 331.)” (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1066.)

III. Analysis
Griffis contends there was insufficient evidence to support his murder
conviction under the current law. We disagree.
The trial court found that defendant was guilty of murder as a direct
aider and abettor who acted with express malice. Murder is “the unlawful
killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).)
Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188.) Express malice is “the intent to
kill.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 192.)

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To establish a defendant aided and abetted the crime of murder, there
must be sufficient evidence he or she, “(i) with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing,
facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice,
aid[ed], promote[d], encourage[d] or instigate[d] the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) Contrary to Griffis’s
assertion, aiding and abetting may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
(People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 273.) Factors to consider when
determining whether a person aided and abetted include presence at the
scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.
(People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.)
Here, Griffis points out what evidence is not in the record, such as
direct evidence linking him to the murder. He also draws inferences from the
available facts contrary to those supporting the trial court’s decision and
concludes the evidence was insufficient to prove he shared the perpetrator’s
intent to kill. However, a defendant “does not show the evidence is
insufficient by citing only his own evidence, or by arguing about what
evidence is not in the record, or by portraying the evidence that is in the
record in the light most favorable to himself.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see also People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261
[“The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence
presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence” ’ ”].)
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s
determination, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s reasonable

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inferences that Griffis shared the perpetrator’s intent to kill and that he
aided and abetted the murder.5
There was evidence Griffis knew his fellow gang members intended to
commit the revenge killing and shared in the intent to kill. Griffis was
present at the laundromat with his fellow gang members when they decided
to go into Rolling 30’s territory to seek revenge. They planned to find
“something” to “let [their] anger out” over Smith’s death. Griffis knew that
Tiny M left the laundromat armed with an AK-47 and believed him to be the
shooter because he was “the only one talking about it.” He acknowledged the
lead car was going to look for Rolling 30’s members and understood that
meant “they finna go shoot something or they finna go do something that
they not supposed to.” Griffis helped facilitate the killing by stationing
himself in the “trail” car with an older gang member. As opined by the gang
expert, the trail car was used to divert attention away from the car with the
shooter in addition to assisting his fellow gang members in carrying out the
crime.
Griffis had a strong motive to aid and abet in the murder, which was to
avenge the murder of his close friend and fellow gang member who was like a
brother to him. Given the escalating territorial battle at the time, aiding in a
retaliatory murder would also raise Griffis’s status in the gang. (People v.
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 [evidence of gang affiliation is
relevant to motive or intent].) Griffis’s social media posts on Facebook
shortly after the murder further demonstrated that he was an active
participant in the killing and shared the perpetrator’s intent to kill. For
example, he posted “Body for body” and a tribute to Smith with a gun emoji,

5 Because we conclude there was substantial evidence of express malice, we
do not address the trial court’s alternative grounds.
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which all suggested the killing was an act of revenge. The statement “we
already went for bl[oo]d” in another post shortly after the murder also tends
to show Griffis’s knowledge and participation. Furthermore, Griffis’s
contradicting and false statements to police showed his consciousness of guilt.
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 335.) When interrogated by police,
Griffis provided misleading and false statements to evade his responsibility
in the murder. These statements included that he did not know Livingston,
he was visiting his girlfriend at the time of the murder, he did not own a cell
phone in March 2016, and that Livingston said he committed the shooting
himself.
Griffis contends that the trial court should have considered his youth at
the time of the offense in determining whether he had the requisite mental
state. We note that the record reflects that the trial court did in fact consider
his youth, at length, but ultimately did not find it a “decisive factor when
determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for
first degree murder.” More importantly, the recent appellate authorities to
which Griffis points discuss the relevance of a defendant’s youth in section
1172.6 proceedings only with respect to whether the defendant acted with
(1) reckless indifference to human life, or (2) implied malice (i.e., with
disregard for life and with knowledge that the conduct endangers the life of
another). (See People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, and People v.
Jiminez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994.) These cases reason that a trial court
should consider a defendant’s youthfulness in determining whether the
defendant harbored one of the aforementioned mental states because, “youth
is relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive [the] risk[s] and
consequences” of his or her conduct. (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p.
417; see Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1003–1004.)

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Here, the trial court found Griffis acted with express malice (i.e., the
intent to kill). Because a defendant who acts with express malice intends
that his or her conduct result in death, a finding of express malice does not
implicate concerns about a youthful defendant’s perception of risk. Griffis
fails to cite any authority requiring a court to consider youth when
determining whether a defendant acted with express malice. In the absence
of such authority, we decline to do so here.6
Accordingly, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that Griffis was guilty of murder as a direct aider and
abettor who acted with express malice.

DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Griffis’s section 1172.6
petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MORI, J. TAMZARIAN, J.

6 Because youth is not a relevant factor here, we reject Griffis’s arguments
that (1) it was prosecutorial misconduct for the district attorney to “disrupt”
the evidentiary hearing by asserting youth was not a relevant factor; and (2)
the trial court failed to properly “deal” with this disruption.
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