People v. Silver Bird Auto Leasing CA2/8

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Filed 6/5/26 P. v. Silver Bird Auto Leasing CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF B342847
CALIFORNIA EX REL. HEATH &
YUEN, APC, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV36715)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SILVER BIRD AUTO LEASING, LLC
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kerry Bensinger, Judge. Affirmed.
Heath & Yuen, Stephen B. Heath, Steven W. Yuen, and
Joshua G. Wong, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Worthington Law, Brian P. Worthington, for Defendants
and Respondents.
__________________________
Appellant Heath & Yuen, APC defended a van driver and
related parties in an auto collision suit. The law firm then
brought this action against those who pressed the auto collision
suit as litigants and lawyers, namely respondents Silver Bird
Auto Leasing, LLC, the X-Law Group, PC, and Filippo Marchino.
According to the law firm, respondents violated the Insurance
Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) by defrauding its clients’ insurers.
(Ins. Code, § 1871 et seq.) IFPA “allows qui tam plaintiffs to file
lawsuits on the government’s behalf and seek monetary penalties
against perpetrators of insurance fraud.” (People ex rel. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rubin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
753, 760–761; Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (e).) The California
Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA), which ultimately paid
to settle the underlying auto collision suit on behalf of the driver
and his insolvent insurance company, did not “condone or
authorize” this IFPA action and disclaims being defrauded.
Heath & Yuen nevertheless persisted. The trial court granted
summary judgment to respondents because their alleged
misrepresentations were immaterial. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. Underlying Litigation
The underlying suit arose from a December 2017 slow-
speed collision in Beverly Hills between a McLaren luxury sports
car, driven by Marchino, and a tour van. As the McLaren
attempted a U-turn, the two vehicles collided. Silver Bird, as
owner of the McLaren, filed a complaint in early 2018 for
negligence against the tour company, its owner, and the van’s
driver. The complaint sought damages for the McLaren’s repair,
loss of use, and diminution in value. According to the complaint,
Marchino had made “a legal turn” prior to the collision.

2
Discovery purportedly revealed several things about the collision:
(1) Marchino’s U-turn occurred, as can be seen in a post-collision
photograph, over a certain configuration of double yellow lines,
(2) the brightly colored McLaren may have been stationary at
impact, and (3) the tour van driver may have been distracted
immediately before the collision.
Eagan Avenatti LLP represented Silver Bird when it first
filed this suit. Two-and-a-half years later, X-Law and Marchino
took over Silver Bird’s representation. Defendants’ insurer,
Gateway, retained Heath & Yuen to represent the defendants.
After Gateway became insolvent, CIGA took over the defense.
Ultimately, the case settled in early 2021 with a $25,000
payment to Silver Bird.
2. The IFPA Complaint
After settlement, Heath & Yuen filed a verified complaint
against respondents — Silver Bird, X-Law, and Marchino —
alleging a violation of IFPA. Heath & Yuen alleged a single IFPA
cause of action premised on three acts in the underlying
litigation: First, the allegation in the underlying complaint that
the McLaren “was making a legal turn” when the turn was
actually an unlawful U-turn over double yellow lines, making
Marchino “solely at fault” for the collision. Second, the
production of a fraudulent repair bill for the McLaren during
discovery. And third, the failure to disclose in discovery
Marchino’s GEICO insurance and its payment of repairs for the
McLaren.
The complaint asserts these three acts violated IFPA
because they violated Penal Code section 550. (See Ins. Code, §
1871.7, subd. (b) [“Every person who violates any provision of this
section or Section 549, 550, or 551 of the Penal Code shall be

3
subject, in addition to any other penalties that may be prescribed
by law, to a civil penalty . . . .”].) (Further unspecified statutory
references are to the Penal Code.)
3. Summary Judgment Motion
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that no triable issues of material fact existed as to whether they
had violated section 550, the necessary predicate of Heath &
Yuen’s IFPA cause of action. Respondents raised several
arguments; we recount those still relevant on appeal.
First, respondents argued the allegation about the legality
of the McLaren’s turn could not have been materially fraudulent
given the van driver’s comparative fault and its status as a mere
allegation in a complaint. They provided evidence of the former
and a declaration from CIGA, which paid to settle the suit, as to
the latter. CIGA had always considered Marchino at fault for the
collision and did not view Silver Bird’s claims to be fraudulent.
Second, respondents argued they did not produce a
materially fraudulent repair bill, but rather a legitimate
estimate. The motion addressed the theory of fraud Heath &
Yuen had alleged in its complaint — that the repair bill was false
because the repair company had not produced it in response to
Heath & Yuen’s subpoena for documents tied to the McLaren.
Respondents produced a declaration from the repair company
explaining why it had not produced the document — it was not
tied to the McLaren’s vehicle identification number (VIN) — and
asserting the document’s legitimacy. The document showed an
unapproved estimate for approximately $7,000 to add a “clear
bra” to the McLaren. Respondents’ motion also urged the repair
document could not have been material because it was an
estimate, not a bill, and Silver Bird had withdrawn its claim for

4
repair work damages before settling. Corroborating this was a
declaration from Silver Bird’s counsel describing multiple
occasions in 2019 and 2020 when he made Heath & Yuen aware
of the revised damages claim. Also corroborating was the CIGA
declaration stating CIGA was aware of Marchino’s GEICO
insurance, which covered the repairs to the McLaren, and that
Silver Bird had withdrawn its claim for repairs but was
continuing to pursue damages for loss of use and diminution in
value.
Third, respondents argued there was no unlawful
concealment of Marchino’s GEICO insurance during the prior
litigation. They asserted Silver Bird had no duty to disclose
Marchino’s insurance, any alleged discovery abuse related to the
nondisclosure of insurance should have been dealt with in the
underlying suit by a motion to compel, and Heath & Yuen knew
GEICO was the driver’s insurer during the underlying case in
any event. As was relevant with the repair estimate, after
GEICO paid for repairs to the McLaren as Marchino’s insurer,
Silver Bird withdrew its claim for those damages prior to settling.
The CIGA declaration disclosed its view that the settlement
of the auto collision suit was proper, in part, because a jury could
have still awarded loss of use or diminution in value damages
based on the van driver’s comparative fault. CIGA was unaware
of Heath & Yuen’s intention to file an IFPA suit based on the
prior litigation, and “CIGA did not condone or authorize” it.
4. Summary Judgment Opposition
In opposition, Heath & Yuen asserted there were violations
of section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (2), sufficient to maintain
the IFPA claim.

5
The firm emphasized evidence it believed showed that
respondent’s asserted statements were false instead of
meaningfully addressing questions of materiality. The firm, for
instance, argued respondents had not satisfied their initial
summary judgment burden because they had not established the
McLaren’s turn was legal, the repair estimate was legitimate,
and GEICO had paid only for repair costs.
The firm also submitted evidence it asserted created a
material dispute of fact regarding falsity. Regarding the legality
of the turn, the firm presented the post-collision photograph and
testimony from the van driver to urge the McLaren’s U-turn was
illegal and the van driver was not distracted at the time of the
collision. Regarding the estimate, the firm presented discovery
responses in which Silver Bird suggested it regained use of the
McLaren a week before the date of the challenged repair
estimate. It further included its own copy of the repair estimate
from the prior suit, which bore a different addressee, Silver Bird,
compared to the version of the estimate supporting respondents’
summary judgment motion, which was addressed to Marchino.
And the firm also presented a preliminary estimate from a
different repair company for repairs authorized on the McLaren,
which included, among nearly $70,000 in 46 listed services, the
same “clear bra” service as the purportedly fraudulent estimate.
Regarding GEICO, the firm offered Silver Bird’s prior discovery
responses that it had no insurance and argued this was a
misrepresentation. The firm also offered, seemingly against its
interest, a picture it acquired in the prior suit of Marchino’s
insurance card showing GEICO was Marchino’s insurer.
Heath & Yuen concluded its opposition with a request for a
continuance to depose a GEICO representative and gather 13

6
further items of discovery. Respondents filed a reply and
objected to the requested continuance.
5. Trial Court’s Rulings
Though we lack a transcript of the summary judgment
hearing, we know the trial court denied a continuance and
granted summary judgment for respondents.
The trial court summarized section 550, subdivision (b)(1)
and (2), the provisions Heath & Yuen had relied upon in opposing
summary judgment, and addressed the parties’ showings as to
them. The trial court concluded that section 550 required the
alleged fraud to be material and that materiality was lacking.
The allegedly false claim about the legality of the
McLaren’s U-turn was immaterial because “CIGA presumed
Marchino was at fault” in the underlying litigation. Heath &
Yuen, in response, had not presented evidence, like a declaration
from an insurance agent, employee, or expert, demonstrating an
insurer would find such an allegation in an unverified complaint
material. The court concluded there was no evidence that absent
the statement of legality “CIGA would not have paid out on the
claim or would have paid a different amount.” Meanwhile, the
production of an allegedly fraudulent invoice in the prior suit was
immaterial because Silver Bird had withdrawn a claim for repair
damages before settlement. The trial court did not address the
alleged concealment of Marchino’s insurer, GEICO.
Heath & Yuen later moved for reconsideration, which the
trial court denied.
Heath & Yuen timely appealed from the grant of summary
judgment. On appeal, Heath & Yuen has not challenged the
denial of a continuance or its motion for reconsideration. We
accordingly do not consider evidence the firm included with its

7
reconsideration motion or attached in opposition to respondents’
later-filed, still-pending attorney fees motion, including
additional testimony and documents from GEICO. (See Bailey v.
San Francisco District Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611,
620 [limiting review to the factual record before the trial court
when it ruled].) Heath & Yuen cites these materials in its
appellate briefing without acknowledging they were not part of
the original summary judgment record. This burdened
respondents and the court with parsing out what evidence was
relevant on appeal, and it repeated what the trial court had
termed “scattershot” briefing. This tactic was improper.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment and Scope of Review
A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “[T]he
party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of
production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of
any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of
production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a
prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material
fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
850.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.) A party “shall not rely upon the allegations or denials

8
of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact
exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. (County
of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 489, 504.) While we are limited to “the
facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled
on that motion” (Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney’s
Office, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 620), we are not bound by the trial
court’s rationale (Ramalingam v. Thompson (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 491, 498).
“ ‘[O]ur review is [further] governed by a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure, namely, that “ ‘[a] judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct,’ ” and thus, “ ‘error
must be affirmatively shown.’ ” [Citation.] Under this principle,
[the nonmoving] plaintiff bears the burden of establishing error
on appeal, even though [the moving] defendant[ ] had the burden
of proving [its] right to summary judgment before the trial court.
[Citation.] For this reason, our review is limited to contentions
adequately raised and supported in plaintiff’s brief.’ ” (Hodges v.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 894, 904.)
Waiting to raise arguments against summary judgment in an
appellate reply brief is insufficient. (Bitner v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065,
fn. 3.) Further, a “party cannot avoid summary judgment by
relying on theories not alleged in the pleadings or argued to the
trial court.” (Holman v. County of Butte (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
177, 189; see Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 443–446.)
Opposing summary judgment below, Heath & Yuen
expressly argued violations of section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and

9
(2), supported its IFPA cause of action. It did not cite to any
portion of subdivision (a) or to subdivision (b)(3). The trial court
accordingly never addressed those provisions. But in its
appellate briefing, the firm has raised subdivisions (a)(2) and
(b)(3).
Subdivision (a)(2), which penalizes the presentation of
claims for the same loss to multiple insurers, does not appear in
Heath & Yuen’s IFPA complaint. And the firm’s invocation of
that subdivision is only under a heading in the opening brief that
raises an argument regarding the post-ruling evidence. Since
unpled theories cannot defeat summary judgment and we assess
only the evidence presented at the time of the motion, we do not
consider any potential claim under subdivision (a)(2).
Subdivision (b)(3), which penalizes concealing events that
affect insurance payments, does appear in Heath & Yuen’s
complaint and in the firm’s opening brief on appeal. But the firm
did not cite the provision in its summary judgment opposition.
While that opposition referenced concealment generally speaking,
the argument it made is not the one Heath & Yuen made in its
complaint or now makes on appeal. That is, the summary
judgment opposition argued respondents concealed details of
what the GEICO payment may have covered whereas the firm’s
appellate brief, like its complaint, contends respondents
concealed GEICO’s existence and payment entirely — i.e.,
whether it paid anything. Heath & Yuen thus failed to develop
its present concealment claim under subdivision (b)(3) before the
trial court and deprived the trial court of an opportunity to rule
on such an issue. We deem this a forfeiture. (See Bitner v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1065 [“Having failed to raise or develop this

10
issue in the trial court, plaintiffs cannot raise the issue for the
first time on appeal”]; Christina C. v. County of Orange (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1383 [“ ‘The principles of “theory of the
trial” apply to . . . summary judgment motions’ ”]; Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684
[“ ‘ “[A]lthough we use a de novo standard of review here, we do
not transform into a trial court” ’ ”].) But even if not forfeited,
we, like respondents, address the pleaded subdivision (b)(3) claim
and conclude, below, that it lacks merit.
At oral argument, after receiving this court’s tentative
ruling in favor of respondents, Heath & Yuen tardily invoked
section 550, subdivision (a)(1). We do not consider that
subdivision any further. (Dalessandro v. Mitchell (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1091, fn. 4.)
II. No IFPA Violation
We ultimately agree with the trial court that summary
judgment for respondents was appropriate because the alleged
misrepresentations were not materially fraudulent.
A. Section 550 and Materiality
Under section 550, “It is unlawful to do, or to knowingly
assist or conspire with any person to do, any of the following: [¶]
(1) Present or cause to be presented any written or oral statement
as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim for payment or
other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that the
statement contains any false or misleading information
concerning any material fact. [¶] (2) Prepare or make any written
or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer
or any insurance claimant in connection with, or in support of or
opposition to, any claim or payment or other benefit pursuant to
an insurance policy, knowing that the statement contains any

11
false or misleading information concerning any material fact. [¶]
(3) Conceal, or knowingly fail to disclose the occurrence of, an
event that affects any person’s initial or continued right or
entitlement to any insurance benefit or payment, or the amount of
any benefit or payment to which the person is entitled.” (§ 550,
subd. (b)(1)–(3), italics added.)
Proof of insurance fraud under section 550, subdivision
(b)(1) through (3) requires a showing of materiality. The
requirement is expressly stated in subdivision (b)(1) and (2).
While subdivision (b)(3) does not use the word “material,” it
nonetheless requires materiality. A concealment or
nondisclosure is actionable under subdivision (b)(3) only if it
“affects any person’s” right to insurance benefits. “Affect” means
“to produce an effect upon (someone or something),” “to act on
and cause a change in (someone or something),” or “to influence
(someone or something).” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affect> [as of June
1, 2026].) With both fraud “concerning any material fact” and
fraudulent concealment that “affects any person’s . . . right or
entitlement” to insurance payments, the conduct at issue must be
impactful — that is, material. (§ 550, subd. (b)(1)–(3).) Others
have linked subdivision (b)(1)–(3) in this fashion. (See State ex
rel. Wilson v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 579, 594,
600 [describing subdivision (b)(3) as addressing the concealment
of “material information”].) Heath & Yuen offers no convincing
reason to make immaterial omissions actionable.
“[F]alse statements to obtain insurance benefits” are
material “if the statements convey information on subjects which
are ‘germane’ or ‘reasonably relevant’ to the insurer’s
investigation and which could bear directly and importantly on

12
the investigation and evaluation of the bona fides of the claim.”
(People v. Gillard (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 136, 152 (Gillard), italics
added.) “[T]he materiality of a statement is not determined by
the actual effect the statement had on the outcome of the
investigation”; instead, it “ ‘is determined by its prospective
reasonable relevance to the insurer’s inquiry.’ ” (Id. at p. 151.)
“ ‘[I]f the misrepresentation concerns a subject reasonably
relevant to the insured’s investigation, and if a reasonable
insurer would attach importance to the fact misrepresented, then
it is material.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Cummings v. Fire Ins. Exchange
(1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1416–1417, italics omitted.) The
standard includes “a finding the statement had the capacity to
affect the decisionmaking process.” (Gillard, supra, at p. 152.)
In similar contexts, courts have concluded “ ‘ “[a] fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, a reasonable [professional] would consider it
important in reaching a[] [professional] decision.” ’ ” (People v.
Butler (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 404, 421; see also People v. Kim
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 857, 865.) “The question of materiality, it
is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the
significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable
[professional].” (TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. (1976)
426 U.S. 438, 445; see also People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858,
871 [a material omission is one that “would have altered a
reasonable magistrate’s probable cause determination”].)
Applying these principles, we now turn to the alleged
section 550 violations.
B. “Legal” Turn
We start with Heath & Yuen’s assertion that respondents
violated section 550 because the underlying complaint falsely

13
alleged the McLaren was “making a legal turn” at the time of the
collision.
Moving for summary judgment on this asserted violation,
respondents submitted the complaint with the challenged
statement. The complaint was neither signed nor verified by any
of the respondents but rather was authored by a lawyer at a non-
party law firm. Respondents presented two expert opinions
suggesting the tour van driver’s fault for the accident. The
experts concluded that regardless of the U-turn’s legality, the
McLaren was stationary and visible, due to its bright orange
paint, and the van driver had time to stop to avoid the car but did
not due to distracted driving. Finally, respondents submitted the
declaration from CIGA’s adjustor, who testified that despite
awareness of Silver Bird’s claim that Marchino made a three-
point U-turn and the van driver was at fault, “CIGA disputed the
merits of Silver Bird’s claim” and instead asserted the turn’s
illegality and its being the accident’s cause. CIGA believed
“Marchino was fully at fault for the accident” but settled, in part,
because “there remained a potential that Silver Bird could
establish some liability as to [the underlying] Defendants on the
basis of comparative fault, a potential factual issue that could not
be eliminated entirely.” Though CIGA disputed Silver Bird’s
entitlement to relief and its view of the auto collision suit, “CIGA
did not view Silver Bird’s claims to be fraudulent.”
This evidence met respondents’ initial summary judgment
burden. It demonstrates the allegation in the underlying
complaint was not material. It was a legal conclusion that the
turn was lawful and did not describe or misstate any specific
facts about the turn. A bare legal conclusion such as the claim of
legality here, contained within an attorney’s unverified

14
complaint, is not something to which “a reasonable insurer would
attach importance.” (Gillard, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 151; cf.
Persson v. Smart Inventions, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1141,
1164 [distinguishing nonmaterial “forecasts” from specific facts
underlying them].) Insurance companies — as respondents
emphasize and as demonstrated by the CIGA declaration and the
conduct of the insurers in the auto collision suit — do not simply
accept as true conclusory allegations in an unverified, case-
initiating legal pleading directed to their insureds. Nor do
insurance companies limit their investigations based on them.
Indeed, here, the litigation unfolded, the “legality” allegation was
vigorously tested, and CIGA, representing a reasonable insurer,
said it was not defrauded.
In response, Heath & Yuen did not present evidence that
shows a dispute regarding the materiality of the complaint’s
claim. Instead, its evidence tends to support immateriality. The
firm included photographs the van driver took “immediately after
the incident” showing where the turn occurred and the driver’s
declaration that the McLaren’s turn was illegal. But the accident
occurred three months before Silver Bird filed suit. The insurer
thus had concrete facts, through its insured, supporting the claim
of illegality months before the contrary, but conclusory, claim
appeared in the unverified complaint. Heath & Yuen did not
produce any evidence, expert or otherwise, to undermine CIGA’s
testimony that supports the conclusion that a reasonable insurer
would not have found the claim in the complaint material.
Accordingly, Heath & Yuen cannot establish respondents
committed insurance fraud within the meaning of section 550
based on the complaint’s allegation, and summary judgment was
proper on this aspect of the firm’s IFPA cause of action.

15
Because we find the unverified complaint’s allegation
immaterial, we do not address the parties’ arguments about
whether respondents were sufficiently involved in the complaint’s
drafting. Nor do we address here, or elsewhere in this opinion,
any issues regarding the potential intersection of IFPA and the
litigation privilege, which the parties do not raise.
C. Repair Estimate
We next address Heath & Yuen’s assertion that a
fraudulent bill for the McLaren’s repairs was produced in
discovery during the underlying suit. The bill was fraudulent,
alleged Heath & Yuen’s complaint, because the owner of the
repair company, Protective Film Solutions, told Heath & Yuen
that “he had never issued such a document” and declared the
company had no responsive documents to the firm’s subpoena
request.
Again, respondents met their initial burden to show the
document did not convey false or misleading information about a
material fact. They produced a declaration from the owner of
Protective Film Solutions explaining why he had not produced
the document in response to Heath & Yuen’s subpoena. He had
searched for documents using the McLaren’s VIN, but the
company uses VINs when it documents repairs, not when it
generates estimates. Since the company provided an estimate for
the McLaren but never completed repair work, the estimate could
not be located with a VIN. The company, having later reviewed
its records, located the estimate, which quoted roughly $7,000
solely for a “clear bra” protective coating.
Respondents also presented a declaration from the attorney
who handled discovery in the prior litigation. Silver Bird had
produced the document in response to a request for production

16
directed at Silver Bird, the plaintiff in the suit; Marchino had not
produced the document. The parties in the prior litigation
interacted with each other and had confirmed the document was
an estimate, not a bill. In a response to a meet and confer letter,
Silver Bird’s attorney stated it had “provided repair estimates
because those estimates are currently in [Silver Bird’s]
possession, custody or control.” Lastly, Silver Bird’s attorney
noted that he had, well before settlement on multiple occasions in
2019, advised Heath & Yuen that Silver Bird was no longer
pursuing repair-related damages in the prior litigation, a
representation repeated in a 2020 joint court filing, as Marchino’s
insurer had paid for the repairs. The 2020 court filing was
followed up by an email seeking consent from Heath & Yuen to
file a formal amended complaint “remov[ing] the claim for
collision damages” as the plaintiff would “hence be seeking to
proceed in this case on the same theories of liability, but seeking”
the non-repair forms of damage.
Further corroborating this, CIGA’s declaration states it
“became aware during the Silver Bird action that Mr. Marchino
had collision coverage under his insurance policy with GEICO
that covered the damage to the McLaren, and that GEICO had
paid collision benefits for that damage.” Further, “[a]fter GEICO
paid the collision benefits to Mr. Marchino,” CIGA “became aware
that Silver Bird had withdrawn its claim for damages for the cost
to repair the McLaren, but was continuing to pursue damages for
loss of use and diminution in value.” At bottom, “CIGA did not
view Silver Bird’s damages claims to be fraudulent.”
In light of this evidence, Silver Bird’s production of the
protective coating estimate was not material under section 550.
Silver Bird proffered the estimate in response to a discovery

17
request for materials within its possession. And Silver Bird did
so with the caveat that it did “not yet have the repair bill/work
summary but [would] produce it upon receipt.” Respondents then
withdrew the associated damages claim from the lawsuit once
repairs had been completed and paid for and before negotiating a
settlement amount. As the declaration by CIGA suggests, a
reasonable insurer would not have “attach[ed] importance” to the
document, produced in the course of discovery, such that it could
“bear directly and importantly on the investigation and
evaluation of the bona fides of the claim.” (Gillard, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at pp. 151, 152.)
Heath & Yuen pivots to argue the estimate is nonetheless
materially fraudulent because the version the repair company
provided to support the summary judgment motion was
addressed to Marchino, whereas the version Silver Bird produced
in the prior litigation was addressed to Silver Bird. This,
however, disregards the theory of fraud actually alleged in the
IFPA complaint, which was that the entire document was
fraudulent because the repair company declared it did not exist.
Even so, both versions of the document state the same estimate
for the same potential work. The only difference is the addressee.
Heath & Yuen has not produced any evidence that the version
Silver Bird previously produced was fraudulent simply because
the repair company later verified a version addressed to
Marchino. Further, Heath & Yuen has not shown how having
two different addressees, both with potential interests in the
repair estimate, affects the materiality analysis discussed above.
Heath & Yuen’s speculative arguments to the contrary, without
supporting evidence, do not carry the firm’s summary judgment
burden. (See Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th

18
935, 945–946 [speculation and conjecture are insufficient to
oppose summary judgment].)
Heath & Yuen also argues the prior, now insolvent, insurer
Gateway might have viewed the estimate differently, and
materially, but it fails to offer a competing declaration from
anyone associated with that entity, or any other insurance entity
that might have shed conflicting light on the matter. Moreover,
the test for materiality is objective, not subjective, and thus
respondents did not need a declaration from Gateway to meet
their summary judgment burden. Heath & Yuen then argues
Silver Bird could not simply “retract” its estimate after payment
for repairs occurred by other means, but that is the nature of an
estimate and a reflection of both the pace that disclosures take in
litigation and the imprecision of conveying information by
document production. Finally, Heath & Yuen contends the
estimate is dated one week after the date Silver Bird later
contended the car was rendered operable. It is unclear why a car
could not first be rendered operable before putting on a protective
sealant, the work the estimate addressed.
D. GEICO
Finally, we address Heath & Yuen’s assertion that
respondents failed to disclose in discovery in the prior litigation
“a first party GEICO payment towards the damage to the
McLaren” in violation of section 550, subdivision (b)(3).
We reiterate that this was not Heath & Yuen’s argument
and theory in opposing summary judgment and, accordingly, we
find forfeiture. (See ante, Discussion, part I.) Even addressing
this argument on its merits, however, we find no triable issue of
material fact.

19
Concealment presupposes the other party’s unawareness of
the concealed fact. (Cf. Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40 [tort of fraudulent concealment requires,
inter alia, lack of awareness]; Bjoin v. J-M. Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 884, 901.) As already discussed,
CIGA, via Heath & Yuen, was aware of GEICO, its status as
Marchino’s insurer, and its payment for repairs. Also, CIGA and
the firm knew respondents had retracted their claim for repair-
related damages after Marchino received payment from GEICO.
But more than that, Heath & Yuen also knew of GEICO as
Marchino’s insurer because it possessed, from the prior litigation,
a picture of Marchino’s insurance card showing this very detail.
CIGA, our stand-in for a reasonable insurer, found nothing
fraudulent about the damages claims Silver Bird presented in the
litigation and did not condone Heath & Yuen’s IFPA fraud
claims. CIGA also understood that civil discovery is an evolving
process. It nonetheless agreed to settle even while Heath & Yuen
was seeking GEICO-related discovery, showing again the lack of
value of any missing information from GEICO. There was no
material concealment.
In response, Heath & Yuen largely, and improperly, points
to post-ruling materials that cannot create a triable issue of
material fact. Its contention, that GEICO’s coverage of repairs
meant the remaining damages claims in the auto collision suit
fell outside of CIGA’s statutory coverage mandates, is
unpersuasive. Silver Bird sued and settled with the prior
defendants, who were alleged tortfeasors, and did not sue CIGA.

20
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

SCHERB, J.

We Concur:

WILEY, Acting P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

21

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