CourtListener 10870817•People v. Bryant CA4/2
Texto completo
Filed 6/5/26 P. v. Bryant CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085436
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF014648)
KEVIN DARNELL BRYANT, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
At a hearing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75, the trial court found that it
had no authority to modify defendant and appellant Kevin Darnell Bryant’s three strike
25-years-to-life sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Reform
Act). On appeal, defendant contends remand is required for the trial court to consider his
motion to strike his prior strike convictions in light of the California Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838 (Guevara).
The People agree that defendant is entitled to full resentencing, applying revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act. We agree and reverse the postjudgment order and remand
for full resentencing.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2009, a jury convicted defendant of second degree burglary (§ 459)
and petty theft with a prior (§ 666). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true
that defendant had previously suffered seven prior prison terms (§ 667, subd. (b)) and
three serious or violent felony strike convictions (§§ 667 subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(A)).
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
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On April 17, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to 32 years to life in state
prison: 25 years to life for the second degree burglary, a stayed 25 years to life for the
petty theft with a prior, and consecutive one-year terms for the seven prior prison terms.
On December 11, 2023, in light of section 1172.75, subdivision (a), the trial court
recalled defendant’s sentence, struck his seven prison priors, and resentenced defendant
to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. The court ordered the clerk of the court to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and set the matter for a further resentencing
hearing. The amended abstract of judgment was filed on December 18, 2023.
On September 18, 2024, defendant filed a request that the court reconsider his
third strike sentence and dismiss one of his strike priors under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) in the interest of justice. The People opposed
the request, asserting that defendant was not entitled to full resentencing hearing.
The further resentencing hearing was held on January 22, 2025. Following
argument by defendant’s retained counsel, the trial court found that section 1172.75 did
not entitle defendant to full resentencing and thus did not consider defendant’s Romero
motion. The court thereafter resentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison.
Defendant timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends remand is required for the trial court to consider his motion to
strike his prior strike convictions in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Guevara,
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supra, 18 Cal.5th 838. The People agree that defendant is entitled to full resentencing.
We agree the matter should be remanded for reconsideration by the trial court.
The Reform Act “limited indeterminate life sentences for nonserious, nonviolent
third strike offenses.” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 849.) Pursuant to the Reform
Act, codified at section 1170.126, a defendant can petition for a recall of sentence and
request resentencing. (Guevara, at p. 849.) In 2021, section 1172.75 was enacted by the
Legislature, directing courts resentencing defendants to use currently applicable
sentencing rules and to “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion” with a goal of eliminating “disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
After the enactment of section 1172.75, many courts addressed the relationship
between sections 1170.126 and 1172.75, specifically whether the latter unconstitutionally
amended the former. In Guevara, the Supreme Court held that because section 1172.75
incorporates the consideration of the danger to public safety inherent in section 1170.126,
the two statutes “operate harmoniously,” and section 1172.75 is therefore constitutional
and a valid, applicable statute under which a defendant may request resentencing.
(Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 850.)
The Supreme Court explained “when a defendant is being resentenced pursuant to
a separate vehicle, section 1172.75 (one that did not exist at the time that
section 1170.126’s two-year filing deadline had expired in the absence of good cause),
allowing resentencing outside of the two-year window without establishing the good
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cause necessary to file a late section 1170.126 petition does not unconstitutionally amend
the Reform Act.” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 865, italics omitted.)
“Construing the discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 as
applicable at a section 1172.75 resentencing ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘maintain[s] the integrity of both
statutes,’ ” ’ ” ’ such that ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘the two may stand together.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 865.) “The legislative history suggests the voters
understood that where a court conducting a resentencing inquiry for third strike
defendants serving an indeterminate term found relief ‘would pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety,’ the defendant would not be entitled to resentencing.
[Citation.] We conclude . . . that interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating the
discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 would honor this concern
and thus eliminate constitutional doubt.” (Id. at pp. 865-866, fn. omitted.)
“In exercising this discretion, the voters established that the resentencing court
may consider: ‘(1) The petitioner’s criminal conviction history, including the type of
crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments,
and the remoteness of the crimes; (2) The petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation while incarcerated; and (3) Any other evidence the court, within its
discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ [Citation.]” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th
at p. 866, fn. 9.)
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“The resentencing court is not bound by the prior dangerousness determination
associated with [defendant’s] section 1170.126 petition. Rather, section 1172.75 requires
that the resentencing court makes a new determination as to whether a defendant’s
resentencing would ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as of the
present day. [Citation.] A prior finding that a particular defendant poses a risk to public
safety under section 1170.126, subdivision (f) is unquestionably relevant, and will no
doubt be given consideration by a court subsequently resolving a resentencing under
section 1172.75 involving an indeterminate Three Strikes sentence. However, given
significant passage of time, it is possible that a defendant who once presented a threat to
public safety may no longer do so. For instance, not only may defendants present
evidence that they have significantly rehabilitated since a prior section 1170.126
proceeding, but serious illness or advanced age may have substantially reduced the
danger to public safety they once posed. Realistically assessing such changed
circumstances is appropriately left to the trial court on remand.” (Guevara, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 878, fn. 17.)
Here, because the Guevara court overturned the cases relied upon by the lower
court in finding defendant ineligible for section 1170.126 relief at the section 1172.75
hearing, the court’s order finding defendant ineligible for full resentencing must be
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should
conduct an analysis of whether defendant, at the time of the hearing, continues to pose a
danger to public safety.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying defendant’s petition for full resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75 is reversed. The case is remanded to the superior court. “If
the superior court determines that resentencing [defendant] pursuant to the revised
penalty provisions of the Reform Act would ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety,’ the court shall reimpose an indeterminate term. [Citation.] If the superior
court does not determine that resentencing [defendant] would ‘pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety,’ and [defendant] is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act,
the court shall resentence [defendant] pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the
Reform Act. [Citation.]” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 878. fns. omitted.) Upon
resentencing, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
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