CourtListener 10870229•People v. Garcia-Lara CA1/5
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Filed 6/4/26 P. v. Garcia-Lara CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174834
v.
ALVARO EMILIO GARCIA-LARA, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. Nos. 01-24-04541, AP25-00039)
Defendant Alvaro Emilio Garcia-Lara challenges the reversal by the
appellate division of the Contra Costa Superior Court (appellate division) of a
lower court order granting his motion to suppress evidence collected during
an investigation for driving under the influence (DUI) following a traffic stop.
(Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).)1
We granted defendant’s motion to certify this case for transfer from the
appellate division to resolve the issue of whether a police officer’s observation
of a driver’s red, glossy eyes and strong odor of cologne provided reasonable
suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after instigating a traffic stop. We
now conclude these observations, without more, do not provide the requisite
reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate division’s
1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory citations herein are to the
Penal Code.
1
judgment, reinstate the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress,
and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On November 16, 2024, around 2:25 a.m., Concord Police Officer
Zachary Schaffer saw a gray vehicle stopped at a red light at an intersection.
The vehicle then proceeded to drive through the intersection while the light
remained red, prompting Officer Schaffer to instigate a traffic stop to address
the red light violation.
Officer Schaffer contacted the driver, later identified as defendant, and
asked for identification.3 Officer Schaffer noticed defendant had red, glossy
eyes and a strong odor of cologne. Based on these observations, Officer
Schaffer suspected defendant may have been intoxicated. However, because
defendant indicated that he only spoke Spanish, Officer Schaffer paused the
traffic stop to request assistance from a Spanish-speaking officer. Officer
Molina, who spoke Spanish, arrived within about three minutes.
With language assistance from Officer Molina, defendant advised
Officer Schaffer that he had been working construction earlier that evening.
The officer did not notice any odor of alcohol emanating from defendant.
Nonetheless, Officer Schaffer “[i]mmediately” began a DUI investigation,
instructing defendant to exit his vehicle to undergo field sobriety tests (FST).
Defendant was later arrested for a DUI.
On December 6, 2024, a complaint was filed charging defendant with
three misdemeanors: driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code,
2 Our recitation of the facts is taken from the police report produced by
the prosecution during discovery and the transcript of testimony from Officer
Zachary Schaffer at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress.
3 Defendant produced a Nicaraguan identification card rather than a
valid driver’s license.
2
§ 23152, subd. (a); count 1); driving with 0.08 percent blood-alcohol content
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 2); and driving a motor vehicle without a
valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 3).
On February 10, 2025, after his arraignment, defendant filed a motion
to suppress evidence obtained in connection with the traffic stop on
November 16, 2024, including his responses to pre-FST questions from the
officer, his performance on the FST’s, and the results of a preliminary alcohol
screening and chemical test.
Following a hearing on April 4, 2025, the trial court granted his motion
with respect to all evidence relating to the DUI investigation after defendant
was instructed to exit his vehicle. The court reasoned that having red, glossy
eyes and wearing cologne “are not in themselves a sufficient indication . . .
that there is a basis for prolonging an otherwise legitimate traffic stop [for a
red light violation] into a get out of the car and do FSTs type DUI
investigation.”
The prosecution appealed the trial court’s order, and on September 30,
2025, the appellate division reversed. In its written opinion, the appellate
division concluded: “[T]he information available to Officer Shaffer did rise to
the level of reasonable grounds to suspect that [defendant] was driving under
the influence of alcohol.” “We are not aware of any requirement that an
officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a driver may be driving
under the influence of alcohol must conduct a further investigation to
ascertain whether there is an adequate basis for conducting a DUI
investigation.”
On October 13, 2025, defendant filed an application for certification for
transfer and review to this court, which the appellate division denied.
3
On November 13, 2025, defendant filed a petition for transfer in this
court, which we granted.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before this court is whether Officer Schaffer had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after stopping defendant
for a red light violation based on the officer’s observations that defendant had
red, glossy eyes and smelled strongly of cologne. We think not.
I. Legal Framework.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
As such, a defendant may move to suppress evidence on the grounds that the
search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. (§ 1538.5, subd.
(a)(1)(A).) “[T]he burden to show proper justification for [a warrantless
search and seizure] rest[s] on the prosecution.” (People v. Gale (1973)
9 Cal.3d 788, 795.)
A seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an
officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” restricts a person’s
liberty. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 [20 L.Ed.2d 889].)
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining
officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the
totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the
person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.)4
4 A “reasonable suspicion” to detain requires a lesser showing than
“probable cause” to arrest. Not only can “ ‘reasonable suspicion . . . be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but also . . . reasonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
4
“ ‘Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for
which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the
suspicion that a crime is being committed.’ ” (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1013, 1053–1054.) Thus, “[a] seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police
investigation of that violation. . . . [T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries
in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address
the traffic violation that warranted the stop [citation] and attend to related
safety concerns [citation]. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of
the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’
[Citations.] Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” (Rodriguez v.
United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 [191 L.Ed.2d 492], 1st & 2d bracketed
insertions added (Rodriguez); see id. at p. 355 [an officer’s “mission” during a
traffic stop includes addressing the traffic violation; checking the driver’s
license, registration, and proof of insurance; and determining whether the
driver has outstanding warrants—all of which “serve the same objective as
enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly”].)
Under certain circumstances, an officer conducting a traffic stop may
also investigate a suspected crime unrelated to the infraction that initially
prompted the stop. However, the officer “may not do so in a way that
prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.” (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355;
accord, People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 940 (Ayon) [the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to “ ‘diligently pursue[] a means of investigation
probable cause.’ ” (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 230–231, quoting
Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 [110 L.Ed.2d 301].)
5
reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly’ ”].) Thus,
an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while
impaired is required to extend a routine traffic stop to involve a more
intrusive DUI investigation requiring the driver to exit his or her vehicle to
perform FST’s. (Ayon, at p. 941; see People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
735, 742 [an officer’s subjective beliefs are generally irrelevant to the
lawfulness of a search and seizure].)
Here, the trial court found that Officer Schaffer’s prolonging the traffic
stop in order to investigate defendant for a DUI by having him exit the
vehicle to undergo FST’s was not independently supported by individualized,
reasonable suspicion. We agree with this conclusion.
“ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,
we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are
supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent
judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria
and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) “In doing so we do not consider each
fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.” ’ ” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th
1032, 1043 (Flores); see People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 56 [when a
misdemeanor appeal is certified for transfer to the appellate court, the Court
of Appeal’s “review is as if the parties directly appealed from the trial court
ruling on defendant’s suppression motion”].)
Our record, considered objectively and in its totality, fails to support a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol or otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Officer Schaffer testified
that he suspected defendant may have been intoxicated and, therefore,
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decided to conduct a DUI investigation based on two factors: defendant had
red, glossy eyes and smelled strongly of cologne. These factors are not
enough to provide reasonable suspicion of a DUI crime. (See Flores, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 1045 [the defendant’s presence “in a ‘known narcotic[s]
area[],’ where the officer had arrested someone for drug-related crimes the
night before, does not tip the scales in favor of detention,” when the officer
did not see the defendant “engage in any conduct suggesting he was there to
buy or sell drugs or was otherwise involved in illegal conduct”]; Ayon, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 940 [finding no substantial evidence to support the
officer’s claim that the defendant appeared intoxicated when the defendant
“did not display any conduct demonstrating insobriety, such as slurred or
irregular speech, an inability to walk or stand normally, confusion, or any
other mental incapacity,” and he was not “acting any more nervously than a
typical person in a traffic stop”].)
The People suggest that Officer Schaffer knew from his training and
experience that impaired drivers tend to try to mask smells of alcohol with
cologne and often exhibit defendant’s driving pattern of coming to a stop
before running through a red light. They argue: “ ‘Experienced police officers
naturally develop an ability to perceive the unusual and suspicious which is
of enormous value in the difficult task of protecting the security and safety of
law-abiding citizens.’ (People v. Courtney (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1190.)”
Firstly, it is questionable whether Officer Schaffer was, in fact, an
“experienced police officer” given that he was sworn in as a peace officer just
three months before defendant’s arrest. In any event, putting aside his
limited experience, we disagree that the factors Officer Schaffer relied on—
red, glossy eyes and a strong scent of cologne—created a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was driving under the influence.
7
As the California Supreme Court has emphasized: “A mere deviation
from perceived social convention does not automatically signal criminal
behavior. The particular conduct relied upon must, when considered in the
totality of circumstances, support a reasonable suspicion that the person to
be detained is, or is about to be, engaged in activity ‘relating to crime.’ ”
(Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1045.) Thus, when an officer perceives
something odd yet not in and of itself suggestive of criminal activity—such as
in People v. Jackson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 730, a nervous driver sitting
awkwardly and wearing “a big bulky jacket on what feels to be a hot humid
night”—the officer’s perception, without more, “is unremarkable because a
universe of alternative explanations exists.” (Id. at p. 738; accord, In re L.G.
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 818, 822 [“Nervousness, an unrelated arrest, and a
gang companion did not create reasonable suspicion L.G. was at that moment
committing a crime”].)
The same is true here. A driver, such as defendant, wearing strong
cologne and having red, glossy eyes after completing a day’s work at a
construction site, is unremarkable given the multitude of plausible
explanations having nothing to do with alcohol impairment. (Cf. People v.
Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102–104 [reasonable suspicion justified
drug investigation during traffic stop when multiple objective factors were
present in addition to the defendant’s red and watery eyes and an
“overwhelming masking odor,” including defendant’s erratic driving, his
nervousness, and the “absence of car owner, presence of pager and cell phone,
dashboard screw indicating possible removal, etc.”]; U.S. v. Torres-Sanchez
(9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1125–1126 [officer had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a further criminal investigation after stopping a driver for suspected
speeding, lack of license plates, and illegally tinted windows when the driver
8
“was extremely nervous,” the occupants did not own the vehicle and did not
have a vehicle registration, and the officer “noticed a strong smell of cologne
in the car”].)
Indeed, in this case, there is no objective evidence defendant was
engaged in conduct related to the crime of driving under the influence.
Defendant’s vehicle was not weaving or swerving. Defendant did not have
difficulty producing a form of identification or operating the vehicle’s controls.
He did not admit to drinking. There was no odor of alcohol. Defendant’s
speech was not slurred, and he did not appear uncooperative, confused, or
especially nervous. As defendant correctly notes, “favorable answers,
observations, [and] perceptions must be regarded by the detaining officer as
suspicion-allaying . . . .” (Pendergraft v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d
237, 242.)5
The People pivot, emphasizing that the trial court found “the otherwise
legitimate traffic stop was prolonged not because there was insufficient
evidence to suggest [defendant] was under the influence, but because he was
ordered to ‘get out of the car and do FSTs.’ ” They argue that “because an
officer may order a driver out of a vehicle as a matter of course during a
traffic stop, it cannot reasonably be found that such an order in this case
unduly prolonged the detention or violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights.”
This argument, we conclude, mischaracterizes our record.
5 Defendant identifies his ethnicity as Latino and argues that the
wearing of cologne may have been a “racially coded indicator[]” relied upon by
the officer to prolong the detention. He relies on a consumer marketing study
related to fragrance use by various ethnic groups in the United States.
However, because this study is not part of our record on appeal, we decline to
consider it.
9
In fact, the trial court ruled there was an insufficient factual basis for
prolonging an otherwise legitimate traffic stop into a “get out of the car and
do [an] FSTs type DUI investigation.” (Italics added.) Thus, the court was
concerned that the officer required defendant to undergo sobriety testing
after he got out of the car, not just that he ordered defendant out. It is well
established that, on appeal, we draw all inferences from the record in favor of
the trial court’s ruling and “defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express
or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Glaser
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
In so holding, we agree with the People that, at the hearing, the trial
court limited questioning on what took place after Officer Schaffer instructed
defendant to exit the vehicle. Specifically, when the prosecutor asked Officer
Schaffer, “[W]hat, if anything, did you observe when he stepped out of the
vehicle?” the court sustained defense counsel’s objection that the question
was: “Beyond the scope.” However, in response, the prosecutor did not
challenge the court’s ruling, much less make a record as to why further
questioning was, in fact, warranted. Instead, the prosecutor stated,
“No further questions.”
As stated ante, the prosecution, not defendant, had the burden to prove
Officer Schaffer’s warrantless search was justified. (People v. Gale, supra,
9 Cal.3d at p. 795.) As such, to the extent the record on appeal leaves
unanswered questions regarding Officer Schaffer’s dialogue with defendant
while conducting the DUI investigation, we decline to resolve them, on the
basis of conjecture, in the People’s favor. In any event, the record is quite
clear as to the following. Officer Schaffer testified that after pulling
defendant over for running a red light, he paused the traffic stop to await the
arrival of Officer Molina, a Spanish-speaking officer who could converse with
10
defendant in his native language. Officer Molina arrived about three
minutes later. At that point, according to Officer Schaffer’s testimony, he
“[i]mmediately” pivoted away from the traffic stop in order to conduct the
DUI investigation. It was during this investigation that Officer Schaffer
ordered defendant to undergo the FST’s—the evidence of which was the
subject of defendant’s suppression motion.
Thus, on this basis, we conclude Officer Schaffer prolonged the traffic
stop beyond the “ ‘time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission
[of addressing defendant’s red light violation]’ ” in order to conduct a DUI
investigation that lacked a legal justification. Viewing the entire record
objectively, there is no evidence establishing reasonable suspicion to believe
defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Rodriguez, supra,
575 U.S. at p. 357, 2d bracketed insertion added.) While “officers may ‘draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences,’ ” they
cannot “rely on mere hunches.” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295,
299.)
Accordingly, because defendant was unlawfully detained, all evidence
collected during his detention must be suppressed. As our high court
instructs: “The Fourth Amendment recognizes a measured framework for
acceptable official intrusion upon the life of any individual. Police officers
and private individuals may well occupy the same public space and have no
particular interaction. . . . But before an officer can compel compliance with a
show of authority, articulable facts must support a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. In the absence of such facts, the person is constitutionally
protected and empowered to go on his or her way.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 1051.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the appellate division is reversed, and the trial court
order granting defendant’s suppression motion is reinstated. The matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A174834/People v. Alvaro Emilio Garcia-Lara
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