People v. Herrera CA2/6

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Filed 6/3/26 P. v. Herrera CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337508
(Super. Ct. No. SA105206)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JAVIER GOMEZ HERRERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Javier Gomez Herrera appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of 15 offenses he committed against 11
women, most of whom were passengers in his Uber/Lyft vehicle.
At trial, he conceded guilt on nine of the charged counts. He was
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after seven years
on three counts plus 12 years in state prison. On appeal, Gomez
Herrera raises claims of instructional error, prosecutorial
misconduct, and an unconstitutional sentence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 27, 2021, Los Angeles County Police Detective
Lesley Perkins went to an apartment in the UCLA area after one
of the residents, G.S., reported that someone entered her
apartment and sexually assaulted her. Detective Perkins
obtained a surveillance video in which she observed a car parked
near G.S.’s apartment around the time the incident occurred.
The video showed the man got out of the car, entered G.S.’s
apartment, and went into her bedroom for about 20 minutes. The
detectives created a crime bulletin including the description of
the suspect and the car, a gray Ford Fusion.
Two weeks later, a UCLA police officer who was aware of
the crime bulletin noticed an unoccupied car that was “running”
and parked on a red curb about half a block from G.S.’s
apartment. After the car began moving, the officer initiated a
traffic stop, and he obtained the driver’s license. The driver was
Gomez Herrera. The officer notified Detective Perkins of the
encounter and sent her a picture of Gomez Herrera’s license and
still images from the officer’s body camera. From this
information, Detective Perkins learned that Gomez Herrera
previously rented a gray Ford Fusion.
Gomez Herrera was arrested a few days later. Officers
found three cell phones in his car. One of the phones contained
videos depicting the sexual assaults of several unconscious
women. Gomez Herrera had red rashes on his right arm and
freckles on his left hand above the middle finger knuckle. The
hands depicted in the videos matched Gomez Herrera’s hands.
Officers searched his home and found clothing matching those
seen in the videos. Gomez Herrera was an Uber and Lyft driver.
Detective Perkins obtained his work history to identify the

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victims in the videos. The jury was presented with numerous
videos. All the women except one testified at trial.1
Count 1 (G.S.) and count 2 (M.L.)
G.S. and M.L. were roommates who shared a bedroom. In
March 2021, G.S. took an Uber ride to her apartment. Gomez
Herrera was her driver. Without her knowledge, he took videos
of her during the ride and as she went up to her apartment. He
took videos of her sleeping from outside her bedroom window.
Videos from his phone showed that he returned to G.S.’s home
five times from April to June 2021.
On August 4, 2021, G.S. was out of town. M.L. was alone in
the bedroom and fell asleep naked. Around 2:00 a.m., she woke
up and noticed the bedroom door opening and a bright flashlight
on her face. She saw a “middle-aged Hispanic man” in her
bedroom. He said, “Oh, sorry” and turned around and left. When
he left, M.L. noticed the back door of the apartment was open.
Gomez Herrera took a video of him entering M.L.’s bedroom
and her lying in bed. M.L. identified herself in still images from
the video and identified Gomez Herrera in a photo lineup and at
trial.
Videos from Gomez Herrera’s phone showed he returned to
the apartment two more times a few weeks later and filmed G.S.
from outside the apartment windows.
On August 27, M.L. was out of town, and G.S. slept alone in
the bedroom. G.S. woke up when she noticed a flashlight above
her head and a man standing next to her. Her bed covers were
pulled down to her ankles, and the man was touching her vagina
over her underwear. He was stroking his penis over his clothes.

1 Victim E.G. died before trial.
The jury was informed she
passed away “due to unrelated causes.”

3
When she jumped out of bed and started yelling, the man walked
out of the apartment. G.S. called the police.
Gomez Herrera took 15 videos on his phone, which showed
him inside G.S.’s bedroom, going through a laundry basket and
taking out pairs of women’s underwear. He filmed G.S. sleeping
with her breasts exposed. One video showed him moving her
underwear and putting his finger toward her vagina, and another
video showed him reaching from behind toward her vaginal area.
Another video showed him fondling her breasts. G.S. identified
herself in still images taken from the videos.
G.S. and M.L. moved out of the apartment at the end of
August. Gomez Herrera returned to the apartment two more
times thereafter.
Counts 3–5 (E.G.) and counts 6–7 (E.-L.S.)
E.G. and E.-L.S. were close friends. In July 2020, they
spent the day and night together, and had about seven or eight
drinks each throughout the entire day. Around 3:00 a.m., they
were feeling intoxicated and decided to return to E.-L.S.’s home.
One of E.G.’s other friends requested an Uber, and the three of
them got into the car. E.-L.S. recalled entering the car, and she
could not remember what happened afterward. She woke up
naked in her home the next morning. E.G. and her friend were in
the living room sleeping. E.-L.S. noticed her front door and the
gate to that door were slightly open.
Gomez Herrera took 13 videos on his phone relating to E.G.
and E.-L.S. The videos showed E.-L.S. sleeping on her bed and
Gomez Herrera moving her legs and penetrating her vagina with
his fingers. The videos showed E.G. sleeping on the sofa, Gomez
Herrera spreading her legs apart, and him using his fingers to
penetrate her vagina. He also lifted her top and fondled her

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breast while he masturbated. He then penetrated her vagina
with his finger again and touched her breasts again. E.-L.S.
identified herself and E.G. in still images taken from the videos.
She obtained the Uber receipt, which showed Gomez Herrera was
their driver.
Counts 8–9 (Y.L.)
In October 2019, Y.L. called a Lyft. She identified Gomez
Herrera as the driver. He offered her a water bottle, which she
drank and “passed out.” When she woke up, his fingers were
touching her vagina under her underwear. She felt penetration.
Gomez Herrera recorded 13 videos, which showed him
moving Y.L.’s underwear to expose her vagina and using his
fingers to penetrate her vagina. In another video, he touched her
vagina while he masturbated. He also fondled her breasts and
put his mouth on her breast. Y.L. identified herself in still
images from the videos and obtained a Lyft receipt showing
Gomez Herrera was her driver.
Count 10 (S.A.)
In September 2019, S.A. went out to celebrate a friend’s
birthday, became “very drunk,” and did not remember getting
home. She later saw from a receipt that she took a Lyft to return
home. Gomez Herrera recorded six videos, which showed S.A.
sleeping in the backseat, and him inserting his finger into her
vagina. S.A. identified herself in a still image taken from a video.
Count 11 (L.S.)
In October 2019, L.S. ordered a Lyft to take her home after
drinking. She did not remember the ride home. Gomez Herrera
took seven videos, which showed L.S. unconscious. He inserted
his fingers into her vagina and touched her chest. L.S. identified

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herself from a still image taken from a video and obtained a copy
of the Lyft receipt, which showed Gomez Herrera was her driver.
Count 12 (G.C.)
In May 2021, G.C. drank several shots of tequila at a bar.
Her friend requested an Uber for G.C. G.C. got into the Uber
alone. She “blacked out” on the ride home. She met the Uber
driver the next day because she had left her phone in his car.
She identified Gomez Herrera as the driver.
Gomez Herrera took six videos, which showed him lifting
G.C.’s shirt and touching her nipple and breast. He put his finger
underneath her pants and underwear and penetrated her vagina
with his finger. G.C. was sleeping. G.C. identified herself in still
images taken from a video and obtained a copy of the Uber
receipt, which showed Gomez Herrera as the driver.
Count 13 (V.V.)
In October 2020, V.V. requested an Uber. She fell asleep in
the car and did not remember the ride home. Gomez Herrera
took nine videos, which showed V.V. sleeping. He reached for her
right thigh, touched her breasts, and exposed and touched her
nipples. V.V. identified herself in a still image taken from a video
and obtained the Uber receipt, which showed Gomez Herrera was
the driver.
Count 14 (B.R.)
In October 2020, B.R. requested an Uber ride to her home.
She fell asleep in the car and woke up screaming and crying. She
ran out of the car and tried to call her boyfriend. When her
boyfriend contacted her, she told him, “a man was trying to touch
her.” B.R. said she did not remember details except she got into
an Uber and when she woke up, she was kicking someone off her.
Gomez Herrera took one video showing B.R. sleeping in his car

6
and him touching her nipple. B.R. identified herself in a still
image taken from the video.
Count 15 (L.G.)
In October 2020, L.G. went to a house party and had one or
two drinks. She requested an Uber ride. She fell asleep and did
not remember the Uber ride back to her hotel. Gomez Herrera
took 11 videos, which showed L.G. asleep in his car. He adjusted
her shorts and moved her hair away from her bralette. He
exposed her nipple and made a pinching motion in the area of the
nipple over her bralette. He touched her breast. L.G. identified
herself in a still image taken from a video and obtained an Uber
receipt, which showed Gomez Herrera was the driver.
Jail phone calls
On the day after his arrest, Gomez Herrera made phone
calls to a woman. The jury heard recordings of these phone calls
and were provided with a Spanish to English translation of the
calls. Gomez Herrera told the woman that he met G.S. when he
drove her and a friend to her apartment. He said he went back to
the apartment and saw them naked through a window. He also
said that he took videos on his phone. He returned to the
apartment again when the residents were asleep. He admitted
touching G.S. and masturbating while inside the apartment.
Concession, jury verdict, and sentencing
During closing argument, Gomez Herrera conceded guilt on
counts 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14.
The jury found Gomez Herrera guilty of all 15 counts as
charged: assault with intent to commit sexual penetration during
a burglary as to G.S. (Pen. Code,2 § 220, subd. (b); count 1); first

2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

7
degree burglary involving M.L. (§§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21); count
2); assault with intent to commit sexual penetration during
burglary as to E.G. (§ 220, subd. (b); count 3); sexual penetration
of an unconscious person as to E.G. (§ 289, subd. (d)(2); count 4);
sexual battery of E.G. (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 5); assault with
intent to commit sexual penetration during burglary as to E.-L.S.
(§ 220, subd. (b); count 6); sexual penetration of an unconscious
person as to E.-L.S. (§ 289, subd. (d)(2); count 7); sexual
penetration of an intoxicated person as to Y.L. (§ 289, subd. (e);
count 8); sexual battery of Y.L. (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 9);
sexual penetration of an unconscious person as to S.A., L.S., and
G.C. (§ 289, subd. (d)(2); counts 10, 11, and 12); and sexual
battery of V.V., B.R., and L.G. (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); counts 13, 14,
and 15).
The court sentenced Gomez Herrera to an indeterminate
term of life with the possibility of parole after seven years on
counts 1, 3, and 6 each, and a determinate term of 12 years (four
years on count 2, consecutive two years each for counts 8, 10, 11,
and 12). It stayed six-year terms for counts 4 and 7 and
six-month terms for counts 5 and 9, and imposed concurrent
six-month terms for counts 13, 14 and 15. Gomez Herrera
challenges his convictions on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, and 15.
DISCUSSION
CALCRIM No. 1191B
Gomez Herrera contends the modified CALCRIM No.
1191B instruction violates due process because it deprived him of
the presumption of innocence and a right to a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed: “If the
People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed one or more of [the sex offenses charged in counts 1, 3

8
through 15], you may, but are not required to conclude from that
evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit
sexual offenses and, based on that decision, also conclude that
the defendant was likely to commit the other sex offenses charged
in this case. [¶] If you find that the defendant committed one or
more of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to
consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by
itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another crime. The
People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
Gomez Herrera did not object to this instruction. Failure to
object to an instruction forfeits the issue unless the error affects
his substantial rights. (People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1535 (McCoy); § 1259.) Because Gomez Herrera asserts a
constitutional violation and raises an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, we address the issue on the merits.
There was no error. Our Supreme Court upheld a similar
instruction in People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152
(Villatoro) and People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007
(Reliford). We are bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455 (Auto Equity).)
In Villatoro, our Supreme Court upheld a modified version
of CALCRIM No. 1191, which instructed the jurors that if they
decided that the defendant committed one of the charged sexual
offenses, they may “conclude from that evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit the other charged
crimes of rape and sodomy, and based on that decision also
conclude that the defendant was likely to and did commit” the

9
other charged rape and sodomy crimes. (Villatoro, supra, 54
Cal.4th at p. 1167.)
Villatoro held that the instruction did not impermissibly
lower the standard of proof or otherwise interfere with the
defendant’s presumption of innocence because it “clearly told the
jury that all offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
even those used to draw an inference of propensity.” (Villatoro,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. at p. 1168; see also Reliford, supra, 29
Cal.4th at pp. 1012–1013 [propensity instruction under CALJIC
No. 2.50.01 allowing an inference that the defendant had a
disposition to commit sex crimes based on evidence he committed
other sex offenses did not lower standard of proof].) And like
Villatoro, the trial court here instructed with CALCRIM No. 220,
which reiterates that the defendant is presumed innocent and
explains that only proof beyond a reasonable doubt will overcome
that presumption. (Villatoro, at p. 1168.)
Gomez Herrera further contends the trial court did not
weigh the probative value of the evidence against its probability
of undue prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352) before instructing with
CALCRIM No. 1191B. But even if the court erred, any error
would have been harmless. The victims’ testimonies and video
evidence were “strikingly similar in various respects.” (Villatoro,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1168.) Gomez Herrera was the Uber/Lyft
driver for each of the victims or their roommate. He committed
each act when the victim was unconscious and took videos of his
offenses. “The evidence was highly probative of defendant’s
propensity to commit such crimes, and its value substantially
outweighed any prejudice.” (Id. at p. 1169.)

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CALCRIM No. 1048
Gomez Herrera contends he was deprived of due process
because CALCRIM No. 1048 fails to expressly identify the
specific intent necessary for a violation of section 289, subdivision
(d), sexual penetration of an unconscious person.3 He did not
object to this instruction. Although failure to object forfeits the
contention on appeal (McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1535;
§ 1259), we reach this contention because Gomez Herrera
contends that the instruction violated his constitutional rights
and that the failure to object amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel. We review this contention de novo. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.) Thus, we “view the challenged
instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.”
(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229.)
Sexual penetration of an unconscious person is a specific
intent crime, requiring the prosecution to prove the defendant
acted with the specific intent “to gain sexual arousal or
gratification or to inflict abuse on the victim.” (McCoy, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1540.)
We conclude the jury was properly instructed. The jury
was instructed that the crime of sexual penetration of an
unconscious person (§ 289, subd. (d)) as charged in count 12,

3 Gomez Herrera also challenges CALCRIM No. 1047 which
instructs on sexual penetration of an intoxicated person (count 8).
Because he conceded count 8 and the only sexual penetration
count he contests is count 12 (sexual penetration of an
unconscious person (G.C.)), we only review CALCRIM No. 1048.

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required “a specific intent or mental state.” The jury was also
instructed: “For you to find a person guilty of these crimes, that
person must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act but
must do so with a specific intent or mental state. The act and the
specific intent or mental state required are explained in the
instruction for that crime.” The court also instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 1048, in part, as follows: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of [sexual penetration of an unconscious
person], the People must prove that [¶] . . . the defendant
committed an act of sexual penetration with another person[.]
[¶] . . . [¶] ‘Sexual penetration’ means penetration, however
slight, of the genital opening of the other person for the purpose of
sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.” (Italics added.)
CALCRIM No. 1048 accurately informed the jury that the
sexual penetration offense required Gomez Herrera to act with
the “purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.” And,
CALCRIM No. 252 correctly informed the jury that Gomez
Herrera was required to possess the specific intent described in
CALCRIM No. 1048. There was no error.
Lesser related offense instruction (count 2)
Gomez Herrera contends the trial court erred when it
refused to instruct on attempted sexual battery as a lesser
related offense of burglary in count 2. We disagree.
“A trial court has a duty to instruct on general principles of
law that are ‘closely and openly connected to the facts before the
court and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the
case.’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 554.) Thus, a trial
court must instruct a jury on any crimes that are necessarily
included within a charged crime (“lesser included” offenses) if
there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed the

12
lesser included offense but not the charged crime. (People v.
Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196.) A crime is a lesser included
offense if the charged crime requires proof of every element of the
lesser included crime. (Id. at p. 197; People v. Licas (2007) 41
Cal.4th 362, 366.)
This duty to instruct does not extend to a lesser related
crime that includes an element that the charged crime does not
include unless the prosecutor consents. (People v. Birks (1998) 19
Cal.4th 108, 136–137; People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 211;
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1230 (Rangel).) This
distinction is grounded in the separation of powers: When the
People charge a crime, that charging decision necessarily
encompasses all lesser included crimes to the charged crime.
Because lesser related crimes are outside this charging decision,
instructing on lesser related crimes over the prosecutor’s
objection risks impinging on prosecutorial discretion entrusted to
the executive branch. (Birks, at pp. 134–135; Hicks, at p. 211.)
Here, Gomez Herrera requested instruction on attempted
sexual battery as a lesser related offense of first degree burglary.
The prosecutor objected and the trial court properly refused to
instruct on attempted sexual battery. “Under Birks, ‘instruction
on a lesser related offense is proper only upon the mutual assent
of the parties.’ ” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1230.)
Gomez Herrera acknowledges that Birks is binding
authority, but nevertheless asks us not to apply Birks where the
lesser related offense can constitute a defense theory. He asserts
that failure to give the lesser related offense instruction under
such circumstances implicates his constitutional right to present
a defense. We are not persuaded.

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Not only are we bound by Birks (Auto Equity, supra, 57
Cal.2d at p. 455), but Gomez Herrera is not entitled to an
instruction on “lesser offenses which are not necessarily included
in the charge.” (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.) Birks does
not articulate an exception or limitation. Nor does refusal to give
an instruction on a lesser related offense impinge upon Gomez
Herrera’s constitutional right to present a case. (People v. Taylor
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 622.)
Prosecutorial misconduct
Gomez Herrera contends the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by allegedly (1) misstating the modified acquittal-
first rule and (2) appealing to the jury’s passions and prejudices.
The Attorney General correctly contends forfeiture. (People v.
Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 171.) Had counsel objected, the trial
court could have addressed any purported misconduct and
admonished the jury to disregard any impropriety.
Forfeiture aside, there was no reversible error. Gomez
Herrera contends the prosecutor misstated the law by telling the
jury they were required to find him not guilty of the charged
greater offenses before considering the lesser included offenses.
But this mischaracterizes the prosecutor’s statements. The
prosecutor told the jury, “You heard a lot of talk about lesser
crimes, and you heard a lot of about different charges that may or
may not apply. . . . We were obligated to present you with the
lesser charges. [¶] But there’s a reason he’s charged with . . .
burglary, sexual battery, sexual penetration of an intoxicated
person, sexual penetration of a person who was unconscious, and
assault to commit sexual penetration during a residential
burglary. . . . [¶] Just because you get lesser crimes doesn’t mean
you even have to go there unless one of you has a question as to

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whether or not I’ve proven these charges. I’ve proven every
single one of them.”
In our view, the prosecutor’s statement did not dictate the
order in which the jury was required to consider the charged and
lesser included offenses. Instead, the prosecutor asserted that
they met their burden to prove the charged greater offenses and
that the jury would not need to decide the lesser crimes. This is
consistent with People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 324–
325.) The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No.
3517, which provides in part: “It is up to you to decide the order
in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence, but I
can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you have
found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater
crime.” We presume the jurors understood and followed the
court’s instruction. (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175,
223; People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 202 (Gonzalez).)
Gomez Herrera also contends the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by appealing to the passions and prejudices of the
jury during closing argument: “The worst part of this case is not
just the fact that these women were sexually assaulted, it’s all
the other violations. It’s the fact that they were surreptitiously
recorded. It’s the fact that strangers from the community are
forced to watch these women in their most vulnerable states. It’s
the fact that they don’t even know what’s contained on those
tapes. You do. You do. You watched it.”
Even if we assume these statements appealed to the jury’s
sympathy for the victims, there is no prejudicial error under

15
Chapman4 or Watson.5 The prosecutor’s comments were isolated
and brief, and harmless given the overwhelming evidence
including the videos, the victims’ testimonies, and the conceded
counts. (See People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 933.) And, the
jury was instructed to rely on the evidence, and not to rely on
bias or sympathy to make their decision. (CALCRIM No. 200.)
We presume the jury understood and followed these instructions.
(Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 202.)
Cruel and unusual punishment
The trial court sentenced Gomez Herrera to three
consecutive life sentences on counts 1, 3, and 6 pursuant to
section 220, subdivision (b). The punishment for violating section
220, subdivision (b) is imprisonment in the state prison for life
with the possibility of parole. The court imposed mandatory
consecutive sentences pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (d)
because Gomez Herrera committed assault with intent to commit
a sexual offense against three separate victims.
Gomez Herrera contends this punishment is grossly
disproportionate to his offenses and constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under the federal and California
Constitutions. We conclude this contention is forfeited because
Gomez Herrera failed to object on this ground. “A defendant’s
failure to contemporaneously object that his sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment forfeits the claim on appellate
review.” (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)

4 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

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Forfeiture aside, we conclude the sentence does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Whether a sentence is
cruel and/or unusual is a question of law we review de novo.
(People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) But we “give
substantial deference both to the Legislature’s broad authority to
determine the parameters for the punishments for crimes, and to
the trial court’s discretion in imposing specific sentences.”
(People v. Gomez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 493, 499.)
Under the California Constitution, a sentence constitutes
cruel or unusual punishment if it is “ ‘so disproportionate to the
crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’ ” (People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.)
Deference to the Legislature “is an important element in any
disproportionality analysis” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959,
972), and three analytical techniques aid this deferential review:
“(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender,
with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment
California imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) a
comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in other
jurisdictions for the same offense.” (Id. at p. 973.)
Here, Gomez Herrera used his position of trust to commit
sexual offenses against vulnerable victims. Gomez Herrera was a
rideshare driver for companies widely used by the general public.
He sexually assaulted these women in their homes while they
were sleeping or unconscious and videotaped his assaults. As the
trial court aptly stated, “These acts are brutal in their own way.
Some or all of these women will be permanently emotionally

17
scarred to different degrees. And that is not taken lightly by this
court or by the legislature.”
Gomez Herrera compares his offenses with sexual
penetration of an unconscious person which results in a
determinate term of three, six, or eight years in prison. He also
compares his offenses with various sexual offenses involving
minors, which carry higher determinate sentences. These
comparisons are inapt because the sexual assaults here were
committed against sleeping or unconscious victims in their
homes. Gomez Herrera committed burglary for the purpose of
sexually assaulting his young female customers. His crimes
violated his victims’ sense of security and inflicted great and
lasting psychological harm. As such, we reject Gomez Herrera’s
claim that his crimes are less serious than premeditated
attempted murder which also carries a life sentence.
Gomez Herrera concedes there is “no directly comparable
crime” in other jurisdictions. And, our state constitution “does
not require California to march in lockstep with other states in
fashioning a penal code. It does not require ‘conforming our
Penal Code to the “majority rule” or the least common
denominator of penalties nationwide.’ ” (People v. Martinez
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516.) Gomez Herrera’s punishment
is not so disproportionately harsh as to shock the conscience or
offend notions of human dignity. Given the deference we afford
to the Legislature to determine punishment, we conclude the
punishment is not cruel or unusual under our state constitution.
Nor does Gomez Herrera’s sentence violate the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const.,
8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “ ‘narrow
proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ”

18
(Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (plur. opn. of
O’Connor, J.).) “Outside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980)
445 U.S. 263, 272.) “There is considerable overlap in the state
and federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly
differently, . . . [t]he touchstone in each is gross
disproportionality.’ ” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711,
733.)
The Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a comparison
between the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 60.) In the
“ ‘rare case’ ” this threshold comparison leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality, “the court should then compare the
defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Ibid.) For
reasons discussed above, Gomez Herrera’s case is not the “rare”
case in which an inference of gross disproportionality arises. No
Eighth Amendment violation exists.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Lastly, Gomez Herrera contends that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance if we conclude he forfeited any of
his contentions. Because we have concluded that none of his
contentions would result in reversal, Gomez Herrera cannot show
counsel’s actions resulted in prejudice. His ineffective assistance
of counsel claim fails. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 694; In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)

19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

20
Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Christopher G. Sanchez
and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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