CourtListener 10869072•Nampeera v. CMG Mortgage CA1/4
Texto completo
Filed 6/1/26 Nampeera v. CMG Mortgage CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JACQUELINE NAMPEERA et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A170936
v.
CMG MORTGAGE, INC., (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. C23-02918)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant and appellant, CMG Mortgage, Inc. (CMG), appeals from an
order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the wage-and-hour class
action filed by its employees, plaintiffs and respondents, Jacqueline
Nampeera and Donna Prevost. The trial court denied the petition, finding
CMP did not meet its burden of proving the parties had an agreement to
arbitrate the controversy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2).1 The court determined
CMG did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
electronic signatures on its proffered April 2, 2021 arbitration agreement (the
2021 agreement) were “ ‘the act[s] of’ ” Nampeera and Prevost as required by
Civil Code section 1633.9. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.
1
I.
BACKGROUND
In November 2023, plaintiffs filed a class action against CMG, alleging
CMG failed to pay its hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees overtime for
hours worked and failed to provide meal and rest breaks. The complaint also
alleges various labor code violations and unfair business practices, and seeks
civil penalties pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (PAGA). (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)
In January 2024, CMG moved for an order compelling arbitration of
plaintiffs’ claims in their individual and representative capacities based on
the 2021 agreement. In support of its motion, CMG presented the
agreements purportedly signed by Nampeera and Prevost in 2021. CMG also
presented two declarations from its chief human resources officer, Melissa
Harbourne.2 Harbourne stated that on April 1, 2021, she sent an email (April
1 email) to all CMG employees notifying them of an updated arbitration
agreement and the timing to return the agreement. The subject line of the
April 1 email referred to “Updated Employee Handbook and other HR
Documents.” The email, which was addressed to “Team,” stated: “In the
coming days, you will receive the updated Employee Handbook,
Acknowledgments (Confidentiality, Harassment, Discrimination and
Retaliation Prevention Acknowledgement), Arbitration Agreement, Safe Act
Policy and the Injury and Illness Prevention Program via DocuSign. Please
review and sign these documents no later than April 26, 2021.” (Orig.
underlining omitted.)
2 Harbourne’s first declaration was submitted with the motion to
compel. Her second declaration was submitted with the reply. The reply
declaration contained new facts for which the court permitted supplemental
briefing.
2
Harbourne summarily asserted that plaintiffs signed their respective
agreements “via DocuSign” on April 2, 2021. Harbourne explained that,
because DocuSign generates a unique Envelope ID once the electronic
signature has been completed, it is reasonable to conclude that Nampeera
and Prevost electronically signed and returned the document with their
respective Envelope IDs, and that Nampeera and Prevost electronically
added their signatures to the agreements prior to DocuSign sending them
back to CMG, as is the protocol for all electronically-executed agreements
issued by CMG via DocuSign. Harbourne did not explain how CMG verified
that the DocuSign documents were accessed and signed by the intended
recipients. CMG made no showing of the efficacy of any security procedure
applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic
signature was attributable. CMG’s evidence did not include the emails
purportedly sent to the plaintiffs in follow up to the April 1 email.
In opposition, plaintiffs each asserted they neither received nor signed
the 2021 arbitration agreement. Both plaintiffs further averred that when
they were hired, CMG’s “IT Department” created their work emails and they
personally did not set up the passwords associated with the emails. Each
attested: “to my knowledge the IT Department and my supervisors could
access my work email account.”
Specifically, Nampeera declared: “To the best of my recollection, the
email I received did not mention an arbitration agreement . . .[¶] To the best
of my knowledge, I did not electronically sign this document.” Nampeera
further averred: “To the best of my knowledge, I did not electronically sign a
CMG arbitration agreement in 2021 and I never authorized anyone at CMG
to sign an arbitration agreement on my behalf.”
3
Similarly, Prevost averred: “To the best of my recollection, I did not
electronically sign this document or authorize anyone to sign this document
on my behalf . . . [¶] To the best of my knowledge, I never received or
reviewed CMG’s 2021 arbitration agreement while I was working at CMG.”
In her reply declaration, Harbourne attached agreements purportedly
signed by Prevost on May 22, 2019 (2019 agreement) and by Nampeera on
November 24, 2020 (2020 agreement). She also provided for corresponding
DocuSign summaries for each agreement, as well as for the 2021 agreement,
which included “Certificate[s] of Completion.” Harbourne declared that the
Certificates of Completion confirmed that Nampeera and Prevost signed the
2021 agreement based on a comparison of their respective Envelope IDs and
unique signature codes, which match the signatures on the 2021 agreement.
Neither the 2019 nor the 2020 agreements are mentioned in the motion
to compel arbitration. The motion sought to compel arbitration solely on the
2021 arbitration agreement. In its supplemental brief, CMG argued only
that the 2019 and 2020 agreements were evidence that plaintiffs signed prior
versions of CMG’s arbitration agreements, also via DocuSign, in the same
manner as they signed their 2021 arbitration agreements.
In a detailed, written order the court denied the petition. The court
found CMG met its initial burden by providing a copy of the 2021 arbitration
agreement with its motion. However, plaintiffs had, by a preponderance of
the evidence, raised a question about the authenticity of the electronic
signatures. First, while Harbourne averred that she sent the April 1st email
to “all employees,” the email itself did not identify which employees were
included on the email; nothing in the email itself indicated that the 2021
arbitration agreement was sent to either plaintiff. Second, “and more
concerning,” CMG had not provided sufficient evidence to counter plaintiffs’
4
contention that other people had access to their email accounts; both
plaintiffs averred that their emails and passwords were created by CMG and
plaintiffs did not set up their own passwords. Accordingly, the court
concluded the burden shifted back to CMG to show the signatures were
authentic. Although CMG produced evidence that DocuSign creates a
“ ‘unique Envelope ID’ ” after a signature is placed on the document, CMG did
not provide any evidence that each plaintiff “ ‘was assigned a unique, private
username and password such that the only person who could have accessed
the . . . portal and signed the agreement.’ (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco,
LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)” Thus, the court concluded CMG did
not carry its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
plaintiffs’ signatures were authentic.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
DISCUSSION
CMG contends the court’s ruling that CMG failed to prove the existence
of the 2021 arbitration agreement is not supported by substantial evidence.
In support of this assertion, CMG challenges the adequacy of plaintiffs’
respective declarations because they are based on equivocal statements made
to the “best” of their “knowledge.” CMG further argues plaintiffs forfeited the
authenticity issue as to the 2019 and 2020 agreements.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
State and federal arbitration laws “are grounded in a policy of ‘treating
arbitration [agreements] like all others,’ not one preferring arbitration to
litigation.” (Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562,
583, citing Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411, 418.) “Accordingly,
in determining whether a party to an arbitration agreement has lost the right
5
to arbitrate by litigating the dispute, a court should treat the arbitration
agreement as it would any other contract, without applying any special rules
based on a policy favoring arbitration. That is, courts should apply the same
procedural rules that they would apply to any other contract.” (Quatch, at
p. 583.) Thus, when presented with a motion to compel arbitration, the trial
court’s first task is to determine whether an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists. (Gorlach v. Sports Club Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1497,
1504–1505; § 1281.2 [requiring court to order arbitration “if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists”].)
The party seeking arbitration “bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the
evidence,” and the trial court decides the issue in a summary proceeding,
sitting as the trier of fact, weighing evidence and assessing credibility.
(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)
When a motion to compel arbitration involves a disputed electronic
signature, courts “resolve the dispute using a three-step burden-shifting
process.”3 (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere);
accord, West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 985, 993.)
In the first step, “the moving party bears the burden of producing
‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’ ”
(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165
(Gamboa).) The moving party satisfies this initial burden by stating
verbatim the provisions of the agreement or by attaching a copy of the
agreement to the motion. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical
3 Because CMG and plaintiffs use this burden-shifting framework, we
assume without deciding it applies here.
6
Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058 (Espejo), citing Condee v. Longwood
Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal
procedures of document authentication.’ ” (Gamboa, at p. 165.) If the
arbitration agreement is not disputed, “then nothing more is required for the
moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.” (Ibid.)
But, “[i]f the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the
opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing
party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of
the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, italics added.)
The opposing party “need not prove that his or her purported signature is not
authentic, but must submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and
shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent . . . .” (Iyere, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)
If there is a factual dispute, the court proceeds to the third step, in
which “the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties” by a preponderance of the
evidence. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165–166.)
When a trial court finds that the party seeking arbitration failed to
carry its burden, it is “ ‘ “almost impossible” ’ ” to prevail on appeal. (Fabian
v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066–1067 (Fabian).)
This is because, on appeal, we presume the trial court found the evidence
lacked sufficient weight and credibility to satisfy the burden of proof — a
finding that is binding on us as the reviewing court. (Id. at p. 1067; Jones v.
Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1196 (Jones).)
Therefore, unless the trial court made a specific finding of fact in favor of the
losing party, all factual matters must be viewed in support of the judgment,
7
and all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party. (Jones, at
p. 1196.)
Accordingly, where, as here, the trial court finds the moving party
failed to meet its burden of proof, “ ‘ “the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Fabian, supra, 42
Cal.App.5th at p. 1067, quoting Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 972, 978–979.) To prevail under this standard, “the appellant
must show that his evidence compelled a finding that he met his burden of
proof as a matter of law.” (Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196, italics
added.)4
B. The Trial Court did not Err by Finding that Plaintiffs Shifted the
Burden to CMG to Prove Authentication
CMG contends plaintiffs failed to raise a factual dispute as to the
authenticity of the electronic signatures on the 2021 arbitration agreements.
CMG asserts plaintiffs never affirmatively and unequivocally stated they did
not sign the arbitration agreements, but rather each plaintiff stated: “To the
best of my recollection, I did not electronically sign” the 2021 arbitration
agreement.
4 Without ever addressing the applicable standard of review, CMG
asserts the trial court’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence.
But, “it is ‘misleading’ to say that the review is for substantial evidence”
where “the decision is based on a failure of a party to meet its burden of
proof.” (Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196.) Regardless, as discussed
herein, the court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g.,
Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, fn. 1.)
8
First, plaintiffs’ challenge of the electronic signatures on the arbitration
agreements raised a factual dispute. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Ruiz) [finding declaration that plaintiff “did
not recall electronically signing the 2011 agreement” sufficient to raise a
factual dispute].) Each plaintiff declared to the best of their recollection they
did not sign the agreements or authorize anyone to sign on their behalf. Both
plaintiffs further attested that they did not personally set up the passwords
associated with their work emails. Each declared that CMG had access to
their work email accounts. These statements made under the penalty of
perjury were sufficient to challenge the authenticity of the agreements and
shift the burden to CMG to produce evidence establishing valid agreements
existed. (See Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 840–841, 846.) Under step
two of the analysis, Plaintiffs bore “not the ultimate burden of proof but only
a burden of production of evidence creating a dispute as to their signature's
authenticity; the ultimate burden of proof remains with the arbitration
proponent.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755, fn. 7.) Here, both
plaintiffs stated to the best of their knowledge they did not electronically sign
the 2021 arbitration agreement. CMG suggests these statements mean that
plaintiffs were professing a mere lack of recollection that they e-signed the
agreements, which CMG urges does not create a dispute as to the
authenticity of their signatures. Although that is one interpretation, another
reasonable interpretation of their statements is that plaintiffs believed they
did not electronically sign the 2021 arbitration agreement, but could not
assert denials with 100% certainty because of the nature of an electronic
signature (as opposed to a wet signature). As the trial court implicitly did,
we conclude a fair reading of plaintiffs’ declarations is that they did not sign
the agreements. In addition, as the trial court explained, the April 1 email to
9
all employees did not identify which employees were included on the email,
that nothing in the email itself indicated that the 2021 arbitration agreement
was sent to either plaintiff, and that other people had access to plaintiffs’
email accounts. On this record, CMG fails to persuade us that there was no
substantial evidence for the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs met their
burden of production.
Second, CMG’s reliance on our decision in Iyere is misplaced. There, an
employer had moved to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims based on
copies of arbitration agreements bearing their handwritten signatures.
(Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 751.) As we explained, “[a]n individual
cannot confirm or deny the authenticity of an electronic signature by viewing
a computer printout of the person’s printed name followed by the words
‘(Electronic Signature).’ In such a case, the individual’s inability to recall
signing electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that the
person did not do so. However, an individual is capable of recognizing his or
her own personal signature. If the individual does not deny that the
handwritten personal signature is his or her own, that person’s failure to
remember signing is of little or no significance.” (Id. at p. 757.)5
In reversing the order denying the employer’s motion, we noted the
plaintiffs did not deny having signed the agreement or claim their physical
signatures were forged or inauthentic. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
5 Our position as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a
factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature is at odds
with Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165. (See Ramirez v. Golden
Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 825.) As this case is
limited to the authenticity of electronic signatures, we need not further
address this split.
10
p. 756.) Rather, the plaintiffs admitted they had signed a stack of documents
at the employer’s behest and the signatures on the arbitration agreements
were theirs. (Id. at pp. 753, 756.) Each plaintiff further declared, “ ‘I do not
recall ever reading or signing any document entitled Binding Arbitration
Agreement . . . . I do not know how my signature was placed on [the
document].’ ” (Id. at p. 756, italics added.) In light of plaintiffs’ admissions
that the signatures were theirs, we concluded their declarations did “not
create a factual dispute” as to whether they had signed the agreement.
(Ibid.) Nampeera and Prevost made no such admissions here. Rather, each
could not recall electronically signing the agreements. These statements
made under the penalty of perjury may be reasonably regarded as evidence
that Nampeera and Prevost did not sign the agreements. (See id. at p. 757.)
Accordingly, there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence challenging the
arbitration agreements to shift the burden back to CMG to produce evidence
establishing the electronic signatures on the arbitration agreements were
authentic. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846; Espejo, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.)
C. CMG’s Evidence did not Compel a Finding of Authentication as a
Matter of Law
CMG was required to demonstrate that Nampeera and Prevost did, in
fact, sign the documents electronically. (See Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1124–1125; Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) A proponent seeking to authenticate an electronic
signature must show the electronic signature “ ‘was the act of the person,’ ”
which could be shown “ ‘in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of
any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the
11
electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.’ ” (Ruiz, at p. 843,
italics omitted; see Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) “For example, a party may
establish that the electronic signature was ‘the act of the person’ by
presenting evidence that a unique login and password known only to that
person was required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence
detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the
document and the accompanying security precautions.” (Bannister v.
Marinidence Opco, LLC, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545 (Bannister).) A
summary assertion in a declaration that the opposing party electronically
signed the arbitration agreement is insufficient; there must be facts
explaining how the signature “came to be placed” on the agreement. (Ruiz,
supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 843–844; see Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1069–1070 [declaration deemed insufficient where declarant only
“ ‘summarily asserted’ ” that the opposing party “ ‘entered into’ ” the
agreement and did not explain the process used to obtain and verify the
electronic signature, including how the agreement was presented to the
opposing party, the specific location and time the agreement was signed, and
how the signature could have been placed on the agreement by only that
party].)
Here, CMG failed to carry its burden because the evidence it
provided—which rested entirely on Harbourne’s declarations—was not so
uncontradicted and unimpeached that it compelled a conclusion that CMG
sustained its burden of establishing that Nampeera and Prevost placed the
electronic signatures on the arbitration agreements. (See Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 844.) Although Harbourne explained the DocuSign process,
she did not explain how CMG employees securely accessed the DocuSign
portal — i.e. how only a specific employee, as opposed to anyone else with
12
access to the employee’s email, could have logged on and signed the
agreement. Instead, she summarily concluded that Nampeera and Prevost
electronically signed the agreements based on the confirmation information
provided by DocuSign.
The trial court found that CMG’s evidence did not detail the security
precautions regarding the use of the DocuSign portal such that plaintiffs
were the only individuals who could have accessed the 2021 agreements and
signed them; there were no unique usernames and passwords or other login
information. The trial court’s explanation is entirely consistent with Civil
Code section 1633.9 and the statement of the rule articulated above. (See
Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.)
The court also took into consideration and credited plaintiffs’
statements that other people had access to their email – a position seemingly
unrefuted by CMG. Misconstruing its burden, CMG asserts that even if the
statements were true, plaintiffs failed to present any evidence demonstrating
that anyone at CMG “actually did access the email accounts.” (Italics
omitted.) Plaintiffs by their statements raised a question as to the
authenticity of their electronic signatures. It was then up to CMG to present
evidence refuting plaintiffs’ claims. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 165–166.) This they did not do.
Our conclusion that CMG did not meet its burden is informed by Ruiz
and Espejo. In Ruiz, the reviewing court affirmed a trial court’s ruling
denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration on the ground the
employer did not meet its burden of authenticating the employee’s purported
electronic signature on the arbitration agreement. (Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) The employer’s initial evidence consisted of its
business manager’s declaration summarily asserting the employee, Ruiz, was
13
the person who electronically signed the agreement, and a copy of the
agreement bearing an electronic signature in Ruiz’s name with a date and
time stamp for the signature. (Id. at p. 843.) After Ruiz averred he “did not
recall” electronically signing the agreement, the business manager offered a
reply declaration explaining that the arbitration agreement was part of an
employee acknowledgment form the employer presented to all of its
employees, and that each employee was required to log into the company’s
HR system, using his or her “ ‘unique login ID and password,’ ” to review and
sign the acknowledgment form. (Id. at p. 844.) However, the business
manager “did not explain how, or upon what basis, she inferred that the
electronic signature on [the agreement] was ‘the act of’ Ruiz.” (Ibid.) The
Ruiz court held this omission “left a critical gap in the evidence supporting
the petition” that rendered it “insufficient to support a finding that the
electronic signature was, in fact, ‘the act of’ Ruiz.” (Ibid.)
A year after Ruiz, the reviewing court in Espejo reversed a trial court’s
order denying an employer’s petition to compel arbitration. (Espejo, supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1050–1051.) In Espejo, to authenticate an electronic
signature, the defendant submitted a declaration from its systems consultant
who detailed the company’s “security precautions regarding transmission and
use of an applicant’s unique username and password.” (Id. at p. 1062.)
Specifically, the systems consultant stated that the agreement was emailed
to the applicant, that access to the agreement required a username and
password that was only “provided by phone ‘directly and orally to the
applicant,’ ” and that to proceed the applicant was required to immediately
reset the password. (Id. at p. 1053.) The Espejo court concluded that these
details were sufficient to establish that the electronic signature was “the act
of” the plaintiff (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)) even if Espejo “did not ‘recall
14
seeing or accessing’ ” the arbitration agreement. (Espejo, supra, at pp. 1054,
1062.)
As explained above, when an appeal turns on the appellant’s failure of
proof, a reviewing court can reverse only if the record shows “ ‘the appellant’s
evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466, italics added.)
Espejo presented such a record. Here, by contrast, CMG provided a generic
email—purportedly sent to “all employees”—indicating that an arbitration
agreement would be sent “[i]n the coming days.” Harbourne could only attest
upon “inform[ation] and belie[f]” that plaintiffs received the arbitration
agreements by DocuSign. She further surmised it was “reasonable to
conclude” plaintiffs electronically signed the agreements based on “a unique
Envelope ID” generated by DocuSign. However, Harbourne did not explain
how CMG employees accessed DocuSign documents, and what, if any,
security measures CMG utilized to ensure the electronic signatures were the
acts of its employees. As in Ruiz, there was a “critical gap” in the evidence
supporting the petition that rendered it “insufficient to support a finding”
that the electronic signatures were, in fact, the acts of Nampeera and
Prevost. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844.) Nampeera and Prevost
effectively denied signing an arbitration agreement and each affirmatively
denied they authorized anyone at CMG to sign on their behalf. While the
phrasing of plaintiffs’ denials is subject to alternative interpretations, we
defer to the trial court’s implicit finding that plaintiffs’ declarations were
persuasive evidence that plaintiffs did not sign the agreements and that
CMG’s evidence to the contrary lacked sufficient weight and credibility to
15
satisfy the burden of proof. (Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067; Jones,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1196.) And there is additional countervailing
evidence someone at CMG could have electronically signed the agreements.
Both plaintiffs averred that their emails and passwords were created by
CMG and neither plaintiff ever set up her own password.
In sum, CMG’s evidence was neither uncontradicted nor “ ‘ “ ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination’ ” ’ ”
that it was insufficient to meet their burden. (Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1067, 1070.) The trial court was not compelled to find the electronic
signatures authentic.
D. CMG May Not Rely on the 2019 and 2020 Agreements
Finally, CMG argues that even if plaintiffs did not electronically sign
the 2021 agreement, they signed other agreements in 2019 (Prevost) and
2020 (Nampeera), and the motion should have been granted on those prior
agreements. We disagree. CMG did not seek to compel arbitration based on
the 2019 and 2020 arbitration agreements, and did not mention either
agreement until it filed its reply papers. And, even then CMG did not seek to
compel arbitration based on the prior agreements. Rather, CMG referenced
the prior agreements to show how plaintiffs purportedly signed “multiple
DocuSign[] arbitration agreements throughout their respective employment
with CMG.” It wasn’t until the hearing on its motion that CMG asserted the
prior agreements were an independent basis to compel arbitration of
plaintiffs’ claims. Such tardiness amounts to a forfeiture or waiver. (See
Gallo v. Wood Ranch USA, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 621, 646 [raising issue
for first time at hearing forfeited or waived], disapproved on another point in
Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 349; Rancho Pauma
Mutual Water Co. v. Yuima Municipal Water Dist. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th
16
109, 118–119 [alluding to argument for first time during hearing in the trial
court did not preserve issue for appeal]; Acosta v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 471, 480 [argument raised for first time at
hearing on motion; waived].) Thus, the argument that the 2019 and 2020
agreements were an independent basis to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’
claims was not properly presented to the trial court and is not properly before
this court. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)
III.
DISPOSITION
The order denying CMG’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)
17
_________________________
Sweet, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Brown, P. J.
_________________________
Goldman, J.
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Marin, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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