CourtListener 10869052•ALS United Greater San Diego v. The Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Assn. CA4/1
ALS United Greater San Diego v. The Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Assn. CA4/1
CourtListener 10869052Calctapp2 de jun. de 2026
Texto completo
Filed 6/2/26 ALS United Greater San Diego v. The Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Assn. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ALS UNITED GREATER SAN DIEGO, D086068
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CU004752C)
THE AMYOTROPHIC LATERAL
SCLEROSIS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Gregory W. Pollack, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with directions.
Barnes & Thornburg, Noah A. Katsell, Joel Meyer, C. Julian Kennedy,
and Oliver C. McClymonds for Defendant and Appellant.
Quade & Associates, Michael W. Quade and Cheryl L. Gustafson for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The ALS Association, Greater San Diego Chapter (the Chapter), used
to be a local chapter of a national organization, The Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis Association (the Association). Both entities support and advocate
for people suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). After failed
merger negotiations, the Chapter separated from the Association and
changed its name to ALS United Greater San Diego (ALS United). The
Association then communicated with patients, donors, and healthcare
providers about the separation. ALS United sued the Association and in a
16-count complaint alleged the communications contained false and
disparaging statements that caused financial loss. The Association
responded with a special motion to strike seven counts that were based on
the communications, on the ground they constituted a strategic lawsuit
against public participation (SLAPP). The trial court granted the motion on
two counts and denied it on five. The Association challenges the denial
portion. We conclude the trial court should have granted the motion either
entirely or partially as to all seven counts. We therefore affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
I.
Parties’ Relationship
The Association and ALS United are nonprofit corporations that
provide services to and advocate for people with ALS, a fatal degenerative
disease of the central nervous system characterized by progressive weakness
and wasting of muscles (Stedman’s Medical Dict. (28th ed. 2006) p. 1733).
The Association used to operate under a federated structure of local chapters
throughout the United States. The Association funded research into the
causes of and treatments for ALS; certified ALS multidisciplinary clinics; and
increased awareness of ALS among policymakers, scientists, healthcare
professionals, and the public. The local chapters raised funds and ran direct-
2
care programs. The Chapter operated in San Diego County, Imperial County,
and parts of Riverside County.
In July 2021, the Association decided to eliminate the federated
structure and began negotiations to merge the chapters into itself. The
Association and the Chapter executed a Transfer Agreement dated December
22, 2021, by which the Chapter transferred assets to the Association and the
Association assumed liabilities of the Chapter and agreed to offer
employment to its employees. Approximately $2.7 million was transferred
from the Chapter’s bank account to the Association, and a large portion of the
Chapter’s durable medical equipment, supplies, and donated cars was
liquidated. During continued negotiations about the merger, the Chapter
came to believe the promises and representations the Association had made
to induce the Chapter to sign the Transfer Agreement and to part with a
significant portion of its cash were false. The Chapter also repeatedly
expressed concerns about how the Association was spending donations and
failing to meet the Chapter’s needs.
On July 9, 2023, a majority of the Chapter’s board of directors voted not
to merge with the Association. In the majority’s view, the conditions
precedent to the merger were not satisfied and the Transfer Agreement was
obtained by false and fraudulent pretenses. The two entities have remained
separate since then.
The Association completed its merger with other chapters in September
2023 and no longer has any chapters. The Chapter changed its name to ALS
United on January 19, 2024.
3
II.
Post-Separation Communications by the Association to Third Parties
After the parties separated, the Association communicated with third
parties about the separation. The communications included the following.
On February 15, 2024, the Association sent a mass e-mail to donors and
constituents in the San Diego area “to clarify an unfolding situation
regarding [the Association] and a new organization calling itself ‘ALS United
Greater San Diego.’ ” The e-mail stated:
“We are disheartened and upset that some individuals are
claiming to represent the Greater San Diego Chapter of the ALS
Association. Rather, this is not simply a matter of the same
organization with a new name, as they claim. This is a new
organization entirely, with very limited resources, and consisting
of only four employees, three of whom were fundraisers with just
over one year’s experience working for an ALS organization.
“We are sorry to have to share this information, but we are
deeply concerned about members of our community being misled
that they are going to receive the same level of service and
experience with this purported organization as they would with
[the Association].”
The signatories claimed they had “over 60 years of cumulative experience
working and volunteering for the ALS community,” and assured recipients
the Association remained “committed to making ALS livable for everyone
until we can cure it” and would continue to provide the “consistent and high
standard of service and support [it] had provided for over four decades.”
The Association scheduled its annual fundraising walk for October 6,
2024, one week before ALS United’s scheduled walk. In social media
promotions, the Association called the October 6 walk the “ ‘23rd Walk to
Defeat ALS’ ” or the “ ‘23rd Greater San Diego Walk to Defeat ALS’ ” and
4
included a picture of a person formerly employed by the Association but then
employed by ALS United.
ALS United became aware of a May 15, 2024 e-mail exchange between
Eugene Brandon (a member of the Association’s board of trustees) and Ed
Witt (whose family had raised funds for the Chapter in past years) about the
two ALS walks scheduled for October. Witt wrote that family members and
friends were asking which walk to support in e-mails and text messages. He
continued:
“I strongly suggest there NOT be two walks and that for the sake
of being adults you settle your differences. Who is right and who
is wrong…..WHO cares? The families and friends of those living
with and fighting ALS should not be bothered by this dispute.
Both groups are hurting this community. Getting emails and
texts is really BAD.”
Brandon agreed it was a “confusi[ng]” and “sad situation” and responded:
“As I’ve watched this unfold, I’ll reiterate that we have had our
walk the same place and time for 23 years (I’ve been to 19 of
them); it is our biggest fundraising event each year, and I can’t
imagine cancelling simply because another group of 4 former
employees who quit to start their own ALS support effort is
planning a walk at the same time. It feels like it is on this other
group to explain how they decided to have a walk and took the
ALS Association’s contact list and used that to publicize it? I’m
sorry if that doesn’t sound adult but how does it make sense to
cancel our annual walk and entrust a new group will do as good a
job with a walk, or patient care for that matter? We don’t know
anything about their putative org or capabilities, capacity,
authenticity, integrity, etc etc... ?”
The Witt family’s fundraising for ALS United that year was less than half of
what it had been in prior years for the Chapter.
After separation from the Association, ALS United perceived changes
in its relationships with a rehabilitation center and a clinic. The
5
rehabilitation center “was conflicted on partnering with [ALS United] as the
company had in the past” and “was concerned that [ALS United] was a new
organization without sufficient means to operate.” The clinic was also
“concerned about [ALS United] being a new organization” and required
negotiation of a new memorandum of understanding before the clinic would
allow ALS United back on site. ALS United believed the Association’s
statements that ALS United was a new organization with inadequate
resources caused the changes in its relationships with the rehabilitation
center and the clinic.
III.
Post-Separation Diversion of Online Donations
In June 2024, employees of the Association who used to work for the
Chapter accessed ALS United’s account at an online donation platform
without ALS United’s consent. The employees requested the platform
deactivate ALS United’s profile because ALS United was going to “operate
under the umbrella” of the Association. The platform granted the request
and, as a result, donations of at least $2,000 intended for ALS United were
diverted to the Association before reactivation of ALS United’s profile.
IV.
Litigation
In August 2024, ALS United sued the Association for monetary and
other relief based on allegedly wrongful acts the Association committed
during and after the unsuccessful merger negotiations, including those
previously described in parts II and III. The complaint alleged 16 counts for:
(1) trade libel; (2) conversion; (3) violation of Penal Code section 502
(unauthorized access to computer systems and data); (4) violation of Civil
Code section 3344 (misappropriation of name or likeness); (5) common law
6
misappropriation of name or likeness; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) intentional
interference with prospective economic relations; (8) negligent interference
with prospective economic relations; (9) violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17200 (unfair competition); (10) intentional misrepresentation;
(11) false promise; (12) concealment; (13) negligent misrepresentation;
(14) breach of contract; (15) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing;
and (16) declaratory relief.
The Association responded with a special motion to strike portions of
the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16).
The motion targeted count 1 and counts 4 through 9 for “seek[ing] to punish
[the] exercise of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest” that is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The Association
argued the counts it moved to strike concerned its attempts to raise funds
from prior donors and the public during an ongoing dispute with ALS United,
and the statements and advertisements on which the counts were based were
designed to provide information about that dispute so that potential donors
could decide which entity they would send their donations. The Association
further argued ALS United could not show a reasonable probability it would
prevail on any of the targeted counts, because, among other reasons, the
statements on which the counts were based were nonactionable opinions. In
support of the motion, the Association’s attorney submitted a declaration that
attached a copy of the certificate of amendment of articles of incorporation
the Chapter filed with the Secretary of State on January 19, 2024, to change
its name to ALS United.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
7
ALS United opposed the anti-SLAPP motion in part. It agreed to
dismiss counts 4 and 5, which alleged statutory and common law
misappropriation of name or likeness. ALS United argued the Association
had not met its burden to show counts 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9 arose from speech
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, because the speech at issue did not
implicate a matter of public interest and was “purely commercial in nature.”
ALS United also argued it had a reasonable probability of prevailing on those
counts. The opposition papers included declarations with attached exhibits
from ALS United’s executive director, Brandy Wiegand, and community
engagement manager, Jackson Strong.
Wiegand described what she considered to be false or misleading
statements about ALS United in the February 15, 2024 mass e-mail the
Association sent to donors in the San Diego area, in Eugene Brandon’s May
15, 2024 e-mail to Ed Witt, and in the Association’s promotional materials for
its October 6, 2024 walk, and how she believed those statements negatively
affected donations to ALS United. Wiegand also described unauthorized
access by employees of the Association to ALS United’s account at the online
donation platform and the diversion of donations. She described disruptions
in ALS United’s relationships with a rehabilitation center, a clinic, and
former sponsors and related costs and lost donations, which she believed
were caused by the Association’s statements that ALS United was a new
organization with inadequate resources. Wiegand attached to her declaration
copies of: (1) material she said she found on the Association’s website
concerning its October 6, 2024 walk; (2) e-mails concerning the unauthorized
access by employees of the Association to ALS United’s account at the online
donation platform; and (3) an e-mail from the fundraising team captain who
8
declined an invitation to attend an ALS United fundraising event and stated,
“My allegiance will remain with the original group.”
Strong described a March 7, 2025 meeting with Al Schaffer, who had
led fundraising efforts for the Chapter’s annual ALS walks in past years but
did not participate in the walk on October 13, 2024. Strong said Schaffer’s
“questions clearly showed that he had an impression that [ALS United] did
not have the financial resources and/or ability to provide to the ALS
community as it did in prior years” and “also had the impression that
donations to [ALS United] would stay/be used locally and lack of clarity how
the funds from the 2023 walk were deposited and how they would be used
and by whom.” Strong attached copies of: (1) the mass February 15, 2024 e-
mail the Association sent to donors in the San Diego area; (2) the May 15,
2024 e-mails between Eugene Brandon and Ed Witt, which Strong said Betsy
Witt forwarded to him; and (3) a May 7, 2024 e-mail about the Association’s
October 6, 2024 walk to defeat ALS, which Strong said his roommate
forwarded to him.
The Association filed a reply in which it responded to ALS United’s
arguments and repeated and expanded on arguments made in the initial
moving papers. It also filed objections to portions of the declarations of
Wiegand and Strong and to the attached exhibits. The grounds for the
objections included lack of foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), lack of personal
knowledge (id., § 702), improper opinion (id., § 800), hearsay (id., § 1200), and
lack of authentication (id., § 1401).
The trial court held a hearing and issued a written ruling on the anti-
SLAPP motion. The court overruled all the Association’s evidentiary
objections. It granted the motion as to counts 5 and 6 (statutory and common
law misappropriation of name or likeness), which ALS United conceded
9
should be dismissed. The court assumed that counts 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9 arose
from activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, ruled ALS United had
met its burden to show a probability of prevailing on those counts, and denied
the motion as to them.
DISCUSSION
I.
Parties’ Contentions
The Association attacks the trial court’s order to the extent it denied
the anti-SLAPP motion. (See Old Republic Construction Program Group v.
The Boccardo Law Firm, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 859, 866, fn. 4
[defendant may appeal order that grants anti-SLAPP motion on some counts
and denies it on others].) The Association argues it met its burden to show
the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the targeted counts, because they arose
from speech on an issue of public interest, namely, statements it made to the
ALS community about its separation from ALS United. It argues ALS
United did not meet its burden to show a probability of prevailing on those
counts, because one count does not exist as a matter of law, the others arose
from opinions rather than provably false assertions of fact, and ALS United
did not submit sufficient admissible evidence to support any of them. The
Association asks us to vacate the trial court’s order and to direct the court to
grant the anti-SLAPP motion in full.
ALS United defends the trial court’s order. It argues the commercial
speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the statements at
issue. ALS United also argues the Association did not meet its burden to
show the anti-SLAPP statute applies, because the statements underlying the
targeted counts involved no issue of public interest. It argues that even if the
anti-SLAPP statute applies to those counts, it satisfied its burden to show a
10
probability of prevailing on them, because each stated a legally valid basis for
relief and was supported by sufficient admissible evidence the underlying
statements were provably false. ALS United asks us to affirm the challenged
order.
II.
Commercial Speech Exemption
We first address ALS United’s contention the commercial speech
exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute defeats the Association’s motion. A
court should consider the exemption before proceeding to an analysis under
the statute because speech or conduct within the scope of the exemption is
not protected by it. (Xu v. Huang (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 802, 807.) The
exemption, in pertinent part, states:
“Section 425.16 does not apply to any cause of action brought
against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or
leasing goods or services, including, but not limited to, insurance,
securities, or financial instruments, arising from any statement
or conduct by that person if both of the following conditions exist:
[¶] (1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of
fact about that person’s or a business competitor’s business
operations, goods, or services, that is made for the purpose of
obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of,
or commercial transactions in, the person’s goods or services, or
the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering the
person’s goods or services. [¶] (2) The intended audience is an
actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat
the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential
buyer or customer[.]” (§ 425.17, subd. (c), italics added.)
The commercial speech exemption “ ‘should be narrowly construed.’ ”
(Simpson Strong-Tie Co, Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 22 (Simpson).)
ALS United, as the plaintiff, has the burden to prove the exemption applies.
(Id. at p. 26.)
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ALS United argues, without citation to authority, the exemption
applies because “[c]haritable solicitation is a ‘commercial activity’ ” and it
“compete[s]” with the Association for employees and donations. We disagree.
The exemption applies when a cause of action targeted by an anti-SLAPP
motion is “against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or
leasing goods or services.” (§ 425.17, subd. (c); see Simpson, supra,
49 Cal.4th at p. 30 [listing elements of exemption]; All One God Faith, Inc. v.
Organic & Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1186, 1212 (All One God Faith) [commercial speech exemption did not apply
to nonprofit trade association that itself sold no goods but whose members
did].)
In its complaint, ALS United described the Association as a “non-profit
corporation existing for charitable purposes related to ALS” whose “primary
function [is] to fund research into the causes of and treatments or cures for
ALS, to certify ALS multidisciplinary clinics, and to develop awareness of
ALS among policymakers, scientists, healthcare professionals, and the
general public.” The Transfer Agreement attached to the complaint likewise
described the Association as “a charity” whose “mission is to discover
treatments and a cure for ALS, and to serve, advocate for, and empower
people affected by ALS to live their lives to the fullest.” Because the
Association primarily engages in charitable activities, not in “selling or
leasing goods or services,” the commercial speech exemption does not apply.
(§ 425.17, subd. (c); see All One God Faith, at pp. 1218–1219.) We thus
proceed to an analysis under the anti-SLAPP statute.
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III.
Anti-SLAPP Analysis
“The anti-SLAPP statute enables defendants to quickly terminate
meritless actions against them that are based on their constitutionally
protected rights to speak freely and petition for redress of grievances.”
(Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 147.) To that end, the statute
provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. First, a
defendant moving to strike a claim2 must show the claim arises from speech
or conduct within one of the four categories of protected activity listed in
section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396.)
Second, if the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show the targeted claim is legally sufficient and is supported by
evidence that, if credited, would suffice to sustain a judgment for the
plaintiff. (Baral, at pp. 384–385, 396.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies
both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected
2 In this context, “claim” is a term of art. An anti-SLAPP motion may
attack an entire count as pled or only a part of it. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016)
1 Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral).) “Claim” refers to alleged acts asserted as the
basis for a remedy, whether the acts constitute a whole count or just a part of
it. (Id. at p. 395; Miszkewycz v. County of Placer (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 67,
73; Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 458.)
13
speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to
being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
89.) We review the trial court’s decision on both steps de novo. (Geiser v.
Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250 (Geiser); Balla v. Hall (2021)
59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
A. Step one: Arising from protected activity
The Association has the initial burden to show the counts it moved to
strike from ALS United’s complaint arise from activities protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute. It argues, as it did in the trial court, the statements
underlying those counts fall within the protected category of “any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”3
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Our Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for
determining whether speech is within that category. First, a court identifies
what, if any, issue of public concern the speech implicates. (Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1249; FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133, 149 (FilmOn).) Second, the court considers the functional relationship
between that issue and the speech, i.e., whether the speech contributes to
public discussion of the issue. (Geiser, at p. 1249; FilmOn, at pp. 149–150.)
The content (words used) and context (speaker, audience, location, timing,
and purpose) of the speech are relevant to both parts of the test. (Geiser, at
3 Courts have attributed no substantive difference to the phrases “public
issue” and “issue of public interest” and have used them interchangeably.
(See, e.g., Dubac v. Itkoff (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 540, 548 (Dubac); Wilbanks
v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898 (Wilbanks); Du Charme v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107,
119 (Du Charme).) We do the same.
14
pp. 1252–1254; FilmOn, at pp. 140, 143.) As we shall explain, the Association
met its burden to show each targeted count arises at least in part from speech
that satisfies the two-part test.4
We begin by identifying the Association’s speech that forms the basis
for liability on the counts it moved to strike from ALS United’s complaint.
(Willis v. The Walt Disney Co. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1013 (Willis).)
• The trade libel count is based on the Association’s allegedly “false
statements to potential donors [and] medical clinics that disparaged
[ALS United]” and caused loss of donations and disruptions in working
relationships.
• The unjust enrichment count is based in part on allegedly wrongful
deprivation of “revenue/donations by way of trade libel.”
• The counts for intentional and negligent interference with prospective
economic relations are based on “false statements made about [ALS
United] to donors and others” that disrupted relationships with those
donors and others.
• The unfair competition count is based in part on the counts for trade
libel and interference with prospective economic relations, which ALS
United alleged constitute unfair business practices.
All those counts incorporate, and so are at least partially based on, the prior
allegations about the Association’s February 15, 2024 mass e-mail to donors,
4 ALS United complains the Association relies on cases that predate the
articulation of the two-part test in FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th 133. FilmOn did
not supplant all prior case law interpreting and applying section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4), and did not disapprove any of the cases cited by the
Association. To the contrary, FilmOn approvingly cited some of those cases
for the points of law for which the Association cites them. (See, e.g., FilmOn,
at pp. 145, 146, 150, 153, citing Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 1534 (Terry), Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 883, and
DuCharme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 107.) In any event, we use the two-part
FilmOn test in making our decision.
15
the May 15, 2024 e-mail from Eugene Brandon to Ed Witt, and similar
statements made at fundraisers and to healthcare providers.5
ALS United alleged that by these communications the Association
intended to persuade donors and healthcare providers to stop dealing with
ALS United by falsely stating it was a new organization with resources
insufficient to provide services at the same level as had been provided before
it separated from the Association and by disparaging ALS United’s
employees. ALS United alleged the false statements and implications caused
reputational harm and financial loss. Hence, the speech of which ALS United
complains “underlies or forms the basis for” at least part of each count the
Association moved to strike. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062.)
The next question is whether the speech identified concerns “a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) The Association argues it does, because the
speech concerns fundraising for ALS and provision of services to ALS
5 ALS United contends other actions for which it is suing the Association
“fall entirely outside the scope of protected speech or petitioning activity.”
ALS United lists the Association’s (1) unauthorized access to ALS United’s
account on the online donation platform, (2) diversion of online donations,
(3) scheduling of a walk one week earlier than ALS United’s walk,
(4) providing false information about the walk dates to vendors, and (5) use of
an ALS United’s employee’s photographs in promotional materials without
permission. Except for the unauthorized use of the photographs, which
formed the basis for the causes of action for statutory and common law
misappropriation of name or likeness (counts 4 & 5) that ALS United
conceded should be stricken, the other actions it has identified were not the
basis for liability on the counts the Association targeted in its anti-SLAPP
motion. Those actions underlie other causes of action, which are not at issue
in this appeal.
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patients in the San Diego area after the termination of the Association’s
relationship with the Chapter. And these are topics the Association claims
are matters of interest to donors, service providers, and the public. ALS
United counters that the speech does not implicate a matter of public
concern, because the speech is part of a “private dispute” between two
charitable organizations and is “fundamentally commercial” in that “it
disparages a business competitor’s qualifications and resources to induce
customers (donors) to redirect their business (charitable contributions).” The
Association has the better argument.
Speech does not fall outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute just
because it occurs in private or is part of a dispute between private parties.
Speech may concern “a public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(4)) even if it also concerns a private dispute. (Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1253; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher
Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 465.) And subdivision (e)(4) of the
statute may apply to speech that occurs in private between private parties if
it involves an issue of public interest. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 146;
Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546; Averill v. Superior Court (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1174–1175.) Issues that qualify as “public” within the
meaning of subdivision (e)(4) include, but are not limited to, those that are of
concern to a substantial number of people or that are of concern to a limited
but definable portion of the public and are part of an ongoing controversy,
dispute, or discussion. (Geiser, at p. 1248; FilmOn, at p. 145; Du Charme,
supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.)
The statements underlying the targeted counts implicate such a public
issue. In the February 15, 2024 mass e-mail ALS United alleged the
Association sent to “many former donors and constituents in the San Diego
17
community” the Association sought “to clarify an unfolding situation”
involving itself and ALS United. The e-mail stated the Association remained
the same organization dedicated to serving ALS patients and their families in
the San Diego area as it had for more than four decades, and ALS United was
a new organization with limited resources that could not provide the same
level of service and experience. ALS United alleged the Association made
similar statements about ALS United at fundraisers and to healthcare
providers. The May 15, 2024 e-mail Eugene Brandon sent Ed Witt addressed
the confusion about the relationship between the two organizations created
by the two scheduled ALS walks and expressed doubt about ALS United’s
ability to serve the ALS community. The topic of these communications, i.e.,
the recent separation of ALS United from the Association and their
respective abilities going forward to raise funds for and to serve the local ALS
community, is “ ‘of concern to a substantial number of people’ ” (Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1248) or at least “to a limited, but definable portion of the
public” involved in “an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion” (Du
Charme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 119)—that is, ALS patients and their
families, donors, and healthcare providers in the San Diego area. We thus
conclude the first part of the FilmOn test is satisfied. (See Geiser, at
pp. 1253–1254 [“Only when an expressive activity, viewed in context, cannot
reasonably be understood as implicating a public issue does an anti-SLAPP
motion fail at FilmOn’s first step”].)
The second question under the FilmOn test is whether the statements
underlying the targeted counts were “in furtherance of the [Association’s]
exercise of . . . the constitutional right of free speech in connection with [the]
public issue” identified. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 151 [“a statement is made ‘in connection with’ a public issue when it
18
contributes to—that is, ‘participat[es]’ in or furthers—some public
conversation on the issue”].) The Association answers affirmatively and
contends its statements provided information to the local ALS community
about the parties’ organizational split, the two walks scheduled for October
2024, where to direct donations after the split, and how support would be
provided after the split. ALS United answers negatively and contends the
Association is not a disinterested informant of the public on ALS care options
or nonprofit governance issues; rather, the Association is a business
competitor that directed commercial communications to a narrow, specific
audience for the purpose of diverting to itself donations that otherwise would
have gone to ALS United. Again, the Association has the better argument.
The second part of the FilmOn test does not involve “a normative
evaluation of the substance of the speech. We are not concerned with the
social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the
conversation in any particular direction.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 151.) Also, “ ‘[w]hether speech has a commercial or promotional aspect is
not dispositive’ of whether it is made in connection with an issue of public
interest.” (Id. at p. 154.) The sinister motive ALS United attributes to the
Association or the efficacy of its communications in competing with ALS
United for donations are not relevant considerations. Instead, we consider
the speaker, the audience, and the purpose, timing, and location of the speech
to determine “whether [the Association]—through public or private speech or
conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one
of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 140, 143, 151; see Dubac,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 550–551 [speaker, audience, location, timing,
and purpose are relevant to decision whether statements “contribute to public
discussion of public issues”].) We now analyze those contextual factors.
19
First, the speaker: The statements at issue were made by the
Association, which is a national organization that funds research on ALS and
advocates for and provides support to ALS patients, including those in the
San Diego area. Second, the audience and location: The statements were
made to ALS patients, their families, their healthcare providers, and donors
in the San Diego area. Third, the timing: The statements were made after
the Chapter separated from the Association, changed its name to ALS
United, and scheduled a walk for one week after the Association’s walk.
Fourth, the purpose: The statements were made to address the confusion
that the separation created for the local ALS community, to assure the
community that the Association is still dedicated to providing it with a high
level of service, and to advise the community that ALS United is a new entity
that lacks the resources and experience needed to provide the level of service
that had been provided before the separation. Such statements by a speaker
with knowledge of a developing situation to provide information to an
audience when it needed the information to eliminate confusion about the
situation contributed to the discussion of an issue “ ‘of concern to a
substantial number of people.’ ” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1248.) By
making the statements, the Association “participated in, or furthered, the
discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 151; accord, Willis, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 1020.) The
second part of the FilmOn test is also satisfied.
In summary, we conclude the Association met its burden to show the
counts it moved to strike from ALS United’s complaint “aris[e] from”
statements “in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(4).)
20
B. Step two: Probability of prevailing
After the Association met its burden at step one, the burden shifted to
ALS United to show “a probability that [it] will prevail on the claim[s]” the
Association moved to strike. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 384.) ALS United must “demonstrate that each challenged claim based on
protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral, at
p. 396.) To do that, it may not rely solely on the allegations of its complaint
and must submit admissible evidence to support the allegations. (Sweetwater
Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.)
The Association argues ALS United did not meet its burden because the
counts targeted by the anti-SLAPP motion are legally insufficient or
insufficiently supported by admissible evidence. Except for parts of two
counts, we agree with the Association.
1. Trade Libel (Count 1)
In the cause of action for trade libel (count 1), ALS United alleged the
Association’s “false statements to potential donors [and] medical clinics that
disparaged [ALS United]” caused loss of donations and disruptions in
working relationships. To prevail on this count, ALS United would have to
prove the allegedly disparaging statements contain false assertions of fact.
(Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
1135, 1156; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993,
1010–1011 (ComputerXpress).) “[O]pinions will not support a cause of action
for trade libel.” (ComputerXpress, at pp. 1010–1011.) The only disparaging
statements alleged in the complaint for which ALS United submitted any
supporting evidence were the February 15, 2024 mass e-mail from the
Association to donors and constituents in the San Diego area, the May 25,
2024 e-mail from Eugene Brandon to Ed Witt, and statements Wiegand
21
suspected the Association made to a rehabilitation center and a clinic. ALS
United argues that in those communications the Association did not express
opinions but made provably false assertions of fact by stating or implying:
(1) ALS United was a “new” organization with “limited resources”;
(2) members of the ALS community were being “misled” about the level of
service and experience ALS United could provide; (3) its employees “quit” and
“took” the Association’s contact list with them; and (4) ALS United lacked
“capabilities, capacity, authenticity, [and] integrity.” We are not persuaded.
Whether a statement is one of fact or one of opinion is a question of
law. (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260
(Baker); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601
(Gregory); Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.) “Statements
of fact can be true or false, but an opinion—‘a view, judgment or appraisal
formed in the mind . . . [, a] belief stronger than impression and less strong
than positive knowledge’—is the result of a mental process and not capable of
proof in terms of truth or falsity.” (Hofmann Co. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 390, 397 (Hofmann Co.).) To make the
distinction, the court must decide how the average listener or reader would
likely understand the statement by considering not only the language used
but also the nature and full content of the statement and the knowledge and
understanding of the audience to which the statement was directed. (Baker,
at pp. 260–261; ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011.)
Indicators that a statement is an opinion include informality, generality,
vagueness, subjectivity, cautious phrasing, and use of hyperbole. (Gregory, at
p. 603; ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1–7 (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 603, 624;
ComputerXpress, at p. 1013; Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury News (1989)
216 Cal.App.3d 172, 191 (Fletcher).) Indicators that a statement is an
22
assertion of fact include formality, specificity, objectivity, seriousness of tone
and content, and assurance the speaker has personal knowledge or
experience of the matter. (ZL Technologies, at p. 624; Bently Reserve LP v.
Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 428–429, 431; Overstock.com, Inc. v.
Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 705.) Using these
guidelines, we assess the statements on which ALS United bases its trade
libel claim.
The portions of the February 15, 2024 mass-email of which ALS United
complains are opinions. The statement on which ALS United primarily
focuses is that it was “a new organization entirely, with very limited
resources.”6 That statement was “wholly subjective” (Fletcher, supra,
216 Cal.App.3d at p. 191) and “too vague to be taken as fact by a reasonable
reader” (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 The Association
did not, as ALS United erroneously claims, make “specific factual claims
about [ALS United’s] age, financial resources, and the circumstances of its
formation.” The only factual claim, which followed immediately in the same
sentence, was that ALS United “consist[ed] of only four employees, three of
whom were fundraisers with just over one year’s experience working with an
ALS organization.” That factual assertion, which ALS United does not
dispute, provided a basis for the prior assertions that ALS United was “new”
and had “limited resources.” “When the facts supporting an opinion are
6 Based on “conversations” and “information and belief,” Wiegand
suspected the Association similarly told a rehabilitation center that ALS
United “was a new organization without sufficient means to operate” and a
clinic that ALS United was “a ‘new organization.’ ” Those statements are
nonactionable opinions for the same reasons the mass e-mail contains
nonactionable opinions and will not be analyzed separately.
23
disclosed, ‘readers are free to accept or reject the author’s opinion based on
their own independent evaluation of the facts.’ ” (Franklin v. Dynamic
Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 387 (Franklin).)
The full content of the mass e-mail and its context make it even clearer
that the portions of which ALS United complains are opinions. The
Association sent the e-mail to donors and constituents in the San Diego area
“to clarify [the] unfolding situation” involving itself and ALS United. The
signatories claimed they collectively had served the ALS community for more
than 60 years and “reassure[d]” recipients the Association “is still here and
dedicated to serving those living with ALS and their families in the Greater
San Diego community.” The Association cautioned recipients not to be
“misled that they are going to receive the same level of service and experience
with this purported organization [i.e., ALS United] as they would with [the
Association].” The gist of the e-mail was that ALS United “was ‘too small’ to
handle” the needs of the local ALS community and that the Association “was
large enough to handle [them].” (Coastal Abstract Service, Inc. v. First
American Title Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 725, 731.) That is “exactly
the kind of ‘puffery’ that does not qualify as a statement of fact capable of
being proved false.” (Ibid.; see Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Internat., Inc.
(5th Cir. 2000) 227 F.3d 489, 499 [defendant’s claim its pizza and ingredients
were “better” than those of competitor was “an exaggerated opinion of
superiority,” not “a ‘false or misleading’ statement of fact”].)
The statements in the May 15, 2024 e-mail from Eugene Brandon to Ed
Witt are also not provably false assertions of fact. ALS United contends
Brandon implied it committed “theft or misappropriation, a specific factual
claim capable of proof or disproof,” by stating its employees “quit” and “took”
the Association’s contact list and by questioning their “capabilities, capacity,
24
authenticity, [and] integrity.” Read in isolation, the statements are
susceptible to that interpretation. But we must read the statements in the
context of the entire e-mail exchange between the participants to decide how
the statements likely would be understood by the average reader. (Baker,
supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 260–261; ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1011.) When we do so, we conclude they are nonactionable opinions.
The e-mail exchange was an informal conversation in which two people
on a first-name basis shared their views about the two ALS walks scheduled
one week apart in October 2024. Witt expressed frustration over the harm
and confusion the scheduling was causing the ALS community, and he
“strongly suggest[ed] there NOT be two walks.” Brandon responded the
Association’s walk has been held “at the same place and time for 23 years”
and has been its “biggest fundraising event each year.” If either walk were to
be canceled, Brandon suggested, it should be ALS United’s walk, because its
employees “quit to start their own ALS support effort,” “took [the
Association’s] contact list and used [it] to publicize” ALS United’s walk, and
lacked the wherewithal “to do as good a job with a walk” as the Association
could do. ALS United does not dispute that its employees “quit” by
terminating their former affiliation with the Association when the Chapter
refused to merge and changed its name to ALS United or that they “took” the
donor list by keeping and using it to promote ALS United’s walk. Those are
the points Brandon conveyed to Witt in the e-mail explaining why two ALS
walks were scheduled only one week apart and why he thought it made no
sense for the Association to cancel its walk. Brandon was not accusing ALS
United of theft or misappropriation. He was merely expressing his opinion
that ALS United was not qualified to hold an ALS walk and by doing so was
causing harm and confusion in the ALS community. (See Taus v. Loftus
25
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 [“very doubtful” statement implying plaintiff was
unfit for military service could be viewed as statement of fact rather than
expression of opinion]; Gregory, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 604 [statements that
“plaintiffs are not performing their duties competently and that they are not
considering the best interests of the union membership” were opinions];
Franklin, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 [statement that plaintiff was “not
an ‘honorable company’ ” was “classic assertion[ ] of subjective judgment”].)
For these reasons, we conclude the trade libel count is based on
statements that are mere opinions, not provably false assertions of fact.
Since “opinions will not support a cause of action for trade libel”
(ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011), ALS United did not meet
its burden to show a probability of prevailing on that count.
2. Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic
Relations (Counts 7 & 8)
For similar reasons, ALS United failed to meet its burden on the causes
of action for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic
relations (counts 7 & 8). In those counts, ALS United alleged the Association
made “false statements . . . about [ALS United] to donors and others” that
disrupted relationships with those donors and others. ALS United relies on
the same statements underlying the trade libel cause of action which we have
already determined are opinions. Opinions, however, are legally insufficient
to support a claim for interference with prospective economic relations. “Like
the tort of trade libel, interference with prospective economic advantage
requires false statements of fact.” (ComputerXpress, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1014; accord, Charney v. Standard General, L.P. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
149, 153, 157.) The trial court should have stricken counts 7 and 8.
26
3. Unjust Enrichment (Count 6) and Unfair Competition (Count 9)
The causes of action for unjust enrichment (count 6) and unfair
competition (count 9) are so-called “mixed causes of action” in that they are
based on both speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and other conduct
not protected by the statute. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382.) In the
unjust enrichment count, ALS United alleged the Association “wrongfully
deprived [ALS United] of [its] interest in revenue/donations by way of trade
libel and/or other wrongful conduct causing a loss of revenue/donations.” In
the unfair competition count, ALS United alleged it lost money or property
because of the Association’s unfair business practices, including “trade libel,
misappropriation, conversion, interference with economic relations, various
types of fraud, including fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and
breach of the implied covenant.” When a single count alleges multiple acts as
a basis for relief, the anti-SLAPP motion reaches acts that constitute
protected activity but not acts that are unprotected. (Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni); Baral, at p. 382.)
Allegations of protected activity, but not those of unprotected activity, are
stricken unless the plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on the
allegations of protected activity. (Bonni, at p. 1012; Baral, at p. 396; Newport
Harbor Offices and Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 28, 48, 50–51.)
Under Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, and the other cases cited in the
preceding paragraph, ALS United’s causes of action for unjust enrichment
and unfair competition are subject to the Association’s special motion to
strike only to the extent they are based on the counts for trade libel,
misappropriation of name or likeness, or interference with prospective
economic relations, which are counts that ALS United conceded or we have
27
determined should have been stricken. To the extent the causes of action for
unjust enrichment and unfair competition are based on conversion, fraud,
breach of contract, or other wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint, they
do not arise from protected activity and are not subject to being stricken
under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court erred by denying the special
motion to strike to the extent the causes of action for unjust enrichment and
unfair competition are based on the causes of action for trade libel,
misappropriation of name or likeness, or interference with prospective
economic relations. But it correctly denied the motion to the extent the
causes of action for unjust enrichment and unfair competition are based on
other wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint.
We reject the Association’s assertion that “[e]ven if some allegations
supporting a cause of action are not protected activity, the entire cause of
action is subject to [an anti-SLAPP motion] ‘if at least one of the underlying
acts is protected conduct, unless the allegations of protected conduct are
merely incidental to the unprotected activity.’ ” That assertion, which is
based on a case that predates Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, is not an accurate
statement of current law. Under Baral, only the portion of a mixed cause of
action that arises from protected activity is subject to being stricken under
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 382.)
We also reject the Association’s argument that “[t]he trial court erred in
refusing to strike [ALS United’s] unjust enrichment claim, which fails as a
matter of law.” The Association correctly points out this court has held there
is no cause of action for unjust enrichment. (Levine v. Blue Shield of
California (2008) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1138; Durell v. Sharp Healthcare
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370.) That holding was made in appeals that
challenged rulings on demurrers, which may eliminate a separately pleaded
28
count that “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
(§ 430.10, subd. (f).) As we have explained, however, an anti-SLAPP motion
may eliminate a separately pled count only to the extent it arises from speech
or petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382.) To the extent ALS United’s
cause of action for unjust enrichment arises from “other wrongful conduct
causing a loss of revenue/donations,” it is not subject to an anti-SLAPP
motion.
C. Conclusion
In summary, we conclude the causes of action for trade libel (count 1)
intentional interference with prospective economic relations (count 7), and
negligent interference with prospective economic relations (count 8) arise
entirely from opinions that are not actionable as a matter of law. We further
conclude the causes of action for unjust enrichment (count 6) and unfair
competition (count 9) arise partially from opinions that are not actionable as
a matter of law. ALS United therefore failed to meet its burden to show the
causes of action are “legally sufficient” to the extent they arise from opinions,
and the trial court erred by not striking them entirely or in part. (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396.) Our conclusions make it unnecessary for us
to consider the parties’ arguments on the admissibility and sufficiency of the
evidence to support the causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The order granting in part and denying in part the special motion to
strike is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to vacate its order and to enter a new order:
(1) granting the motion as to the causes of action for trade libel (count 1),
statutory and common law misappropriation of name or likeness (counts 4 &
29
5), and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic
relations (counts 7 & 8) by striking those causes of action in their entirety
from the complaint; and (2) granting the motion as to the causes of action for
unjust enrichment (count 6) and unfair competition (count 9) by striking from
those causes of action the references to trade libel, misappropriation of name
or likeness, or interference with economic relations in paragraphs 168 and
203 of the complaint and otherwise denying the motion as to those causes of
action. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
30
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