CourtListener 10869047•In re C.C. CA5
Texto completo
Filed 6/2/26 In re C.C. CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re C.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F090946
SOCIAL SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 21CEJ300019-2;
Plaintiff and Respondent, 21CEJ300019-3; 21CEJ300019-4)
v.
OPINION
NICOLE O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Brian M.
Arax, Judge.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Douglas T. Sloan, County Counsel, and Lisa R. Flores, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Nicole O. (mother) is the mother of C.C., C.G. and E.G. (collectively,
the children), who are the subjects of this dependency case. Mother challenges the
juvenile court’s order issued at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing
that resulted in her parental rights being terminated. Mother contends the juvenile court
erred when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Mother
also contends the juvenile court failed to make final Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) findings and orders.
We conditionally reverse the orders terminating parental rights and remand for
further proceedings to ensure compliance with ICWA and the California Indian Child
Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq.) (Cal-ICWA).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Removal
In January 2021, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (the
department) filed an original petition alleging C.C., C.G., and their older brother J.L.
were described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The allegations involved eight-month-
old C.G. testing positive for methamphetamine without a reasonable explanation. The
petition alleged mother and C.G.’s father, Christopher G. (father), had substance abuse
problems that affected their ability to provide regular care for C.C. and C.G.
The whereabouts of J.L’s father, P.L. were unknown, and C.C.’s father, Ce.C.,
was in local custody. Mother and Ce.C. denied having any Indian ancestry when
questioned by the department. During a team decision meeting, mother identified her
brother, sister, and mother as her support system. The maternal grandmother, three
maternal aunts, and a maternal uncle attended the meeting through a videoconferencing
platform due to COVID-19 protocols. At the detention hearing, C.C., C.G., and J.L. were
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2.
ordered detained from mother’s custody, and they were placed together in the home of
C.C.’s paternal grandmother.
The allegations were found true at the jurisdiction hearing held on March 10,
2021. The juvenile court ordered C.C., C.G., and J.L. removed from the custody of
mother, and family reunification services were provided to mother and C.G.’s father.
Mother was ordered to participate in parenting classes, substance abuse evaluation and
recommended treatment, mental health evaluation and recommended treatment, domestic
violence evaluation and recommended treatment, and random drug testing. Reasonable
supervised visits were to occur between mother, C.C., C.G., and J.L. A six-month review
hearing was set for October 13, 2021. The juvenile court found ICWA was not
applicable to C.C. and C.G.
Family Reunification Period
In August 2021, E.G. was detained shortly after his birth due to mother’s
substance abuse during the pregnancy. The department filed a petition alleging mother
tested positive for amphetamines while E.G. was in utero. Mother and father informed
the department they had no Indian ancestry at the time of E.G.’s removal. The juvenile
court sustained the allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and family
reunification services were ordered for mother at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing
held on October 27, 2021. ICWA was found to be not applicable to E.G. Mother
identified father as the biological father of E.G., but he had not signed the declaration of
parentage.
At a continued six-month review hearing on November 17, 2021, family
reunification services were ordered to continue as to C.C., C.G., and J.L. In April 2022,
the juvenile court continued family reunification services for mother as to E.G., and a 12-
month review hearing was set for October 5, 2022. A combined 12-month and 18-month
review hearing was scheduled for July 13, 2022, as to J.L., C.C., and C.G. After several
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continuances, a contested review hearing was held on May 17, 2023, for the children and
J.L.
The final report prepared for the combined 12-month review for E.G. and 24-
month review for J.L., C.C., and C.G., dated February 13, 2023, recommended family
reunification services be terminated for mother and father and a section 366.26 hearing be
set. The children were placed together, and the care providers were willing to provide a
permanent plan of adoption. Mother was participating in an outpatient substance abuse
program and she completed her parenting class. She attended 32 sessions of her domestic
violence program. The social worker’s report noted mother recently became consistent
with her visitation.
The juvenile court adopted the department’s recommendation at the contested
review hearing, and it terminated reunification services for mother and father. A section
366.26 hearing was set for August 30, 2023, for the children. Supervised visitation
between mother and children was reduced to twice per month.
January 2024 Selection and Implementation Hearing
The section 366.26 report, dated August 28, 2023, recommended that the juvenile
court order continued foster care with a goal of placement with a fit and willing relative
for J.L. and terminate the parental rights of mother and father and a plan of adoption be
ordered for the children. The children remained placed together in their same placement,
and their longtime care providers were willing to provide a plan of adoption.
Mother’s attendance of visits was inconsistent at the beginning of the proceedings,
but she improved her consistency once visitation became supervised by a third party.
The adoption social worker observed visits between mother and the children. Mother
read books, played games, and showed affection to the children during the visits. The
department’s assessment indicated that the children appeared to have a relationship with
mother. However, the relationship did not seem to be a significant parent-child
relationship that would cause harm to the children if severed.
4.
The ICWA status section of the report indicated mother claimed possible Apache
ancestry on July 24, 2023. The department contacted several maternal and paternal
relatives of the children to inquire about possible Indian ancestry. The maternal uncle
had been told that his grandfather had Apache ancestry, but he explained that none of
their family members were enrolled members. No other family members were able to
provide any further information to support mother’s claim of Apache ancestry.
On September 7, 2023, a Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child
(form ICWA-030) was sent to the federally recognized Apache and Cherokee tribes. On
October 2, 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting either family maintenance
or family reunification services. The department filed the final responses to its notice on
December 1, 2023. None of the responses from tribes indicated the children were either
members or eligible for membership in their tribe.
The juvenile court held a contested hearing on mother’s section 388 petition and
the section 366.26 hearing on January 19, 2024. The section 388 petition was denied.
The juvenile court found termination of parental rights would be detrimental because
there would be substantial interference with a sibling relationship and the children would
benefit from continuing their relationship with the parents.
A plan of legal guardianship was ordered for the children. Visits between mother
and the children were ordered to occur at a minimum of twice per month. The juvenile
court ordered continued dependency jurisdiction, and a postpermanent plan review
hearing was set for July 10, 2024. There were no explicit findings related to ICWA in the
written orders for the section 366.26 hearing.
Postpermanency Proceedings
The status review report, dated June 28, 2024, recommended legal guardianship
with dependency remaining as the most appropriate permanent plan for the children. The
children remained stable in their guardianship placement. Mother and C.C.’s paternal
grandmother each denied having any additional information related to mother’s claim of
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possible Indian ancestry on May 31, 2024. The department recommended that ICWA
continue to be inapplicable to the children.
During supervised visits, mother was observed interacting and redirecting the
children when necessary. There were no behavioral concerns from the children after
visits. The guardian was unwilling to increase visitation to unsupervised at the time of
the report. At the postpermanent plan review hearing, the juvenile court found legal
guardianship with dependency continued to be the appropriate plan, and another review
hearing was set for December 18, 2024. The orders for the review hearing contained no
explicit findings related to ICWA, but all prior orders not modified were to remain in full
force and effect.
The department’s report for the postpermanent plan review hearing recommended
legal guardianship remain as the children’s permanent plan. The setting of a section
366.26 hearing to assess a plan of adoption was recommended for C.C. At 12 years of
age, C.C. made numerous requests for the children to be adopted by their guardians.
In an addendum report, the department requested that a section 366.26 hearing be
set to assess for a plan of adoption on behalf of C.G. and E.G. as well. The department’s
assessment determined that a plan of adoption would be more appropriate for each of the
children, and the guardians were willing to provide a plan of adoption for the children.
C.G.’s clinician informed the social worker that a plan of adoption with the guardians
would be beneficial for C.G.
At a continued review hearing held on January 22, 2025, mother was present and
represented by counsel. A section 366.26 hearing was set for May 21, 2025, for the
children.
August 2025 Selection and Implementation Hearing
The section 366.26 report, dated May 13, 2025, recommended that the juvenile
court terminate the parental rights of mother and father and a plan of adoption be ordered
for the children. The children remained placed together in the home of C.C.’s
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grandparents. C.C. and C.G. had been placed in the home since their removal in January
2021, and E.G. was placed with the guardians shortly after his birth. The guardians felt
the children were already their own children because they had cared for them since the
children were infants.
All three children were observed to be in good physical health, and they were
developing in an age-appropriate manner. Twelve-year-old C.C. was considered
“specifically adoptable” due to the guardians’ desire to provide him with a permanent
plan of adoption. C.G. and E.G. were described as generally adoptable due to their young
ages of four years old (C.G.) and three years old (E.G.).
The department’s case notes indicated mother was not consistent with her
supervised visits with the children. During supervised visits, mother would bring food
and play games with the children. At the end of visits, mother told the children that she
loved them and hugged them.
The adoption social worker observed two of three scheduled visits between mother
and the children in April 2025 and May 2025. Mother did not attend one of the
scheduled visits. The family engaged in conversation and a variety of activities during
the visits. The children left the visits without any distress, and the guardians reported the
children did not ask for mother or ask to visit her. C.C. shared that he enjoyed visiting
with mother occasionally.
The adoption social worker’s assessment concluded that the children had been out
of the parents’ care for the majority of their lives, and their guardians had a significant
amount of time to build a parent-child relationship with the children. The guardians
expressed their commitment to adoption during each home visit with the social worker.
C.C. desired to be adopted because he felt safe and well cared for in the guardians’ home.
The department believed the children deserved to have stability and continuity in their
life through a plan of adoption.
7.
The ICWA status section of the report detailed the previous inquiries completed
by the department, and additional attempts were made to follow up with maternal and
paternal family members in April 2025. The available relatives were unable to provide
any additional information relating to possible Indian ancestry for the children.
On May 19, 2025, father filed a section 388 petition requesting “to put services on
hold and an opportunity to reunif[y] with [the] children.” The petition alleged father
“completed most of [his] services and tested negative” after a prior incarceration. The
juvenile court set the section 388 petition for a hearing on the same date as the upcoming
section 366.26 hearing. Both hearings were continued to allow for further assessment by
parents’ counsel.
The department filed an addendum report, dated June 12, 2025, which
recommended that father’s section 388 petition be denied. The social worker’s report
also included an assessment of the children’s relationship with J.L. due to the court’s
previous determination that C.C.’s relationship with mother and J.L. prevented him from
being adopted. Although C.C. was conflicted about his desire for a permanent plan of
adoption during the previous section 366.26 hearing, he had consistently expressed a
desire to be adopted for the past year. On June 4, 2025, the adoption social worker asked
C.G. and E.G. if they wanted to grow up with the guardians; each responded, “[Y]es,”
and E.G. identified the guardian as his “mom.”
On June 16, 2025, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the children be
placed in her care under a plan of family maintenance. A hearing was set on mother’s
request for July 16, 2025.
In a separate addendum report, dated July 15, 2025, the department recommended
that mother’s section 388 petition be denied. It was determined that mother’s
circumstances had not changed significantly enough to provide her with family
maintenance services. The assessment determined that mother’s request did not serve the
children’s need for permanency.
8.
On August 20, 2025, mother was present for the contested hearing on the parents’
section 388 petitions and section 366.26 hearing. The contested hearing began with
testimony from the adoption social worker, Monica R., and she testified over the course
of several dates. Monica testified regarding her experience as a social work practitioner.
She served as the adoption social worker during the previous section 366.26 hearing, and
she was reassigned to the case in February 2025. The sibling relationship between C.C.
and J.L. was described by Monica as “[a] mere friendship.”
Mother testified regarding her relationship with the children. She was the primary
caretaker of the children before their removal, and she described her relationship with the
children as “real close.” Mother was visiting with the children twice per month in the
time leading up to the contested hearing. She claimed the guardian would cancel visits
often. The children appeared happy to see mother, and the family did arts and crafts
together.
Mother also provided testimony in support of her request for family maintenance
services. She was participating in an outpatient substance abuse program and a 12-step
program. Mother believed any permanent plan other than adoption would be in the
children’s best interest.
On December 3, 2025, the contested hearing continued with testimony from
father. He was visiting in-person with C.G. and E.G. twice per month for one hour since
his release from prison on September 20, 2025. Father testified that his bond and
relationship with C.G. and E.G. kept getting stronger. During the visits, father, C.G. and
E.G. ate and played together. Father was still getting to know C.G. and E.G. because
they had been away from him, but he felt C.G. and E.G. trusted him.
Father indicated he was in support of mother’s request for family maintenance
services, and he was willing to do any services offered by the department. He believed
his request would be in C.G. and E.G.’s best interest because it would allow them to grow
up with their mother and father. Father was not in agreement with the plan of adoption
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for C.G. and E.G. because the guardians would not allow him to be a father to them. His
testimony concluded with an acknowledgment of previous “bad choices,” but he felt that
he came a long way as a father.
In closing argument, counsel for the department and children requested the
parents’ petitions be denied and termination of parental rights for the children. Counsel
for mother argued that either her section 388 petition should be granted or the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption was applicable. Father’s primary request
was to not terminate parental rights for the children. Father’s counsel expressed support
for mother’s request for family maintenance services, and he requested enhancement
services be provided in the event that mother’s petition was granted.
After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court proceeded to its ruling
on the section 388 petitions. The juvenile court reviewed the children’s case history, and
it noted that four years and 10 months had passed since C.C. and C.G.’s initial placement
into foster care. In relation to the children’s best interest, the juvenile court determined
that any changes by the parents were not for a long enough period given the children’s
young ages.
As to the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption, the juvenile
court discussed the children’s recognition of mother and the length of time spent outside
of her care. Mother was nurturing and highly appropriate during her visits with the
children. However, the children were described as “thriving and developing” in the care
of their guardians. The court ultimately concluded there was not an adequate parental
bond that outweighs the benefit of adoption. The court also determined the sibling
relationship exception had not been proven.
Father’s and mother’s section 388 petitions were denied. The juvenile court found
the children were likely to be adopted, and it terminated the parental rights of mother and
the children’s fathers and selected a permanent plan of adoption for the children. The
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court made no additional findings regarding the potential application of ICWA as to the
children at the hearing. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Beneficial Parent-child Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption.
A. Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Thus, the parent must prove three elements in order to prevail
under the beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the
“straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the
extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is
on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good
behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
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The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus
should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would
be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might
include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) An adoptive home might provide a
new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
those problems, making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Caden C., the court held “that because the parent continued to struggle with
substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of foster care and
benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the child’s
relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Rejecting that conclusion, our Supreme Court found “[t]he
Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific
elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles
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with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they
inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed,
on balance, by losing it.” (Id. at p. 638.)
B. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two
elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–
640.) The juvenile court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
(Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only
when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the question is “whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
C. Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that mother did not meet her
burden of proof as to the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
The department concedes that substantial evidence exists in the record to support a
finding that mother visited regularly. However, the juvenile court did not find there was
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sufficient evidence that maintaining the children’s relationship with mother outweighed
the benefits of adoption to establish the exception.
In support of her contention that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the
exception, mother cites to evidence that she had positive and affectionate interactions
with the children during visits. While mother consistently visited the children, satisfying
the first prong of the exception, she failed to identify any evidence that would compel a
finding that termination of her parental rights would cause the children great harm. The
evidence before the court established that the children appeared to enjoy the supervised
visits that occurred with mother for the four years following their removal. However,
evidence that the children had pleasant visits with their mother is not enough to preserve
parental rights. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 [“The parent must
do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond
with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant.”].)
Finally, mother also cites to the case of In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, in
support of her contention that the juvenile court erred by considering whether mother
provided parental caretaking to the children. In M.V., the juvenile court acknowledged
that the child wanted to remain in contact with her parents and live with both her parents
and her relative care providers, and that she would be sad if she could not see her parents
again. (Id. at p. 1184.) The court then moved on to the third, detriment element, before it
“caught itself” and stated that there was clearly a bond with the child and parents. (Id. at
pp. 1184–1185.) There was no further discussion about the beneficial relationship
element of the analysis, which caused the appellate court to describe the analysis as
“cursory” (id. at p. 1184), and state, “The court does not appear to have evaluated the
quality of the parent-child relationships or to have considered factors such as M.V.’s age,
how much of her life she spent in her parents’ custody, the positive or negative effects of
interaction with the parents, and M.V.’s particular needs. [Citation.] This was error.”
(Id. at p. 1185.)
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We do not find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by relying on
impermissible factors in ruling on the exception. The juvenile court considered the
amount of time the children spent in mother’s custody, and there is no indication that it
relied on mother’s present inability to provide care to bar the parent-child relationship
exception, both factors Caden C. ruled irrelevant in determining the applicability of the
parent-child relationship exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [courts should
not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child]; id. at p. 637 [a parent’s
“continued struggles” with the issues that led to dependency cannot, “standing alone,” be
a bar to the parental-benefit exception].)
In sum, the evidence in the record weighed in favor of the preferred permanency
option of adoption. Given the fact that the children were still young and spent the
majority of their young lives in the care of their prospective adoptive parents, we find the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Under these circumstances, the juvenile
court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and remand is unwarranted.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in
declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and its orders
terminating mother’s parental rights were proper.
II. ICWA Inquiry
Mother also contends the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was
not supported by sufficient evidence because the record for the termination hearing did
not include explicit ICWA findings.
A. Applicable Law
Under ICWA’s state analogue, Cal-ICWA (§ 224 et seq.), the court and county
child welfare department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a
child,” who is the subject of a juvenile dependency petition, “is or may be an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a).) The agency’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking the child, parents,
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legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may
be, an Indian child ....” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)
When initial inquiry gives rise to a “reason to believe” (but not sufficient evidence
to determine there is a “reason to know”) that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
“further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child” is required, which
includes gathering additional biographical information from family members and
contacting relevant tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), (C).) “Contact with a tribe shall
include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or citizenship eligibility determination, as well as information on the current
status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
The agency “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description
of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received
pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this
information was provided to the relevant tribes.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)
Before finding ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court must make a finding that the
department conducted “proper and adequate further inquiry” and exercised “due
diligence” in doing so, and that “there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
B. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s finding that there is no reason to know whether a
child is an Indian child under a substantial evidence standard, and the court’s finding that
the department has conducted a proper and adequate inquiry and due diligence for abuse
of discretion. (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 600–601; In re Ezequiel G. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.)
Regarding the juvenile court’s discretion in evaluating the department’s inquiry
efforts, this court explained in K.H., “so long as the [department] conducts a reasonable
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inquiry and documents its results, the juvenile court will have the room to exercise its
discretion in determining whether the [department’s] efforts are sufficient to satisfy the
mandates of ICWA and related California law.” (In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 604.) “The [department’s] inquiry must extend far enough to reasonably ensure that if
there is information the child is or may be an Indian child, that information is gathered.”
(Ibid.)
An inadequate inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights with directions to the child welfare department to conduct an
adequate inquiry, supported by record documentation. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1136.)
C. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court did not make oral or written ICWA findings at
the conclusion of the contested section 366.26 hearing on December 3, 2025. The
department asserts that the orders should be affirmed because the juvenile court’s ICWA
finding could be implied from its reading of the department’s report and maintaining
prior orders.
The juvenile court is required to make findings as to the applicability of the
ICWA, in part because it must “make certain findings affecting an Indian child before
ordering foster care or terminating parental rights.” (In re M.B. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
1496, 1502; see In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704–705, 709.) Where
“the dependency case is still ongoing, any perceived deficiencies with ICWA inquiry and
noticing may still be resolved during the normal course of the ongoing dependency
proceedings.” (J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461.) However,
compliance with ICWA is required before terminating parental rights. (In re K.M. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 450, 458.)
In the present case, mother initially denied having any Indian ancestry at the time
of the children’s detention. The juvenile court found ICWA was not applicable at the
17.
children’s disposition hearings based upon mother’s initial denial. However, mother
claimed Apache ancestry in advance of the children’s first section 366.26 hearing in July
2023. The department sent formal notice to the Apache and Cherokee tribes, and none of
the tribes indicated the children were members or eligible for membership in their tribe
based on the information provided. The record contains no additional findings related to
the juvenile court’s ongoing inquiry into the children’s possible Indian ancestry after
mother’s reporting in July 2023. Accordingly, there is no record that the juvenile court
made a determination on the adequacy of the department’s efforts to inquire into the
children’s possible Apache ancestry.
Contrary to the department’s suggestion, an implied ICWA finding cannot be
found here. While findings may be express or implied, we will recognize an implied
ICWA finding only when we “can be confident that the juvenile court considered the
issue and there is no question but that an explicit ruling would conform to the implicit
one.” (In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 405.) The California Supreme Court has
implied an ICWA finding where, “without such a finding, [the court’s] obligation would
have been to order further inquiry to ensure that the appropriate tribe had notice and was
given the opportunity to intervene before the court terminated parental rights and
approved the adoption plan.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101; see In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1137, 1141 [reviewing implied finding].)
The department’s latest report included descriptions of the department’s recent
efforts at ICWA inquiry, which the juvenile court read and considered. However, this
does not establish that the juvenile court meaningfully considered the adequacy of the
department’s efforts to investigate the children’s potential Indian ancestry since mother’s
belated reporting. In sum, we cannot conclude the juvenile court considered and decided
that the department fulfilled its inquiry and notice obligations and the ICWA does not
apply. Accordingly, we remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an ICWA
finding based on the department’s demonstration of inquiry and notice.
18.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally reversed. The matter is
remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA as described in
this opinion. If the court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence has been conducted and concludes ICWA does not apply (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)),
then the court shall reinstate the orders terminating parental rights. If the court concludes
ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (See 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a); §§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1), 224.3, 224.4.)
DETJEN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
PEÑA, J.
19.
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