CourtListener 10869039•People v. Alberry CA1/4
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Filed 6/2/26 P. v. Alberry CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173036
v. (Humboldt County
JACOB OSSIAN ALBERRY, Super. Ct. No. CR2402264A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jacob Ossian Alberry seeks reversal of his conviction for
felony conspiracy to commit petty theft under Penal Code sections 182 and
4881 following a negotiated disposition of his case. He argues that the
prosecution could only prosecute him for the more specific crime of
misdemeanor organized retail theft under section 490.4 pursuant to In re
Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 (Williamson). According to Alberry, the so-
called “Williamson rule” required that the prosecution prosecute him for this
more specific crime, particularly because committing organized retail theft
will commonly, if not always, also qualify as engaging in a conspiracy to
commit petty theft.
1 Statutory designations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
1
We disagree. The Williamson rule does not apply to Alberry’s case
because the Legislature intended conspiracy to commit petty theft and
organized retail theft to be different crimes requiring different elements of
proof. In the operative charging document, an information filed after a
preliminary hearing, the prosecution did not allege any facts showing that
Alberry could be convicted of organized retail theft. Nor are we persuaded
that the prosecution was required to so allege. The Legislature enacted the
organized retail theft statute, section 490.4, to address a growing trend of
organized groups of people stealing items for financial gain. Because this
relatively new crime requires proof of a different type of culpability than
conspiracy to commit petty theft—an offense for which there is no need to
establish theft for financial gain—the Williamson rule has no application.
We therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2024, the Humboldt County District Attorney’s office filed a
complaint charging Alberry with three criminal counts regarding events that
occurred at a Kohl’s store on June 1, 2024. The district attorney’s office
alleged that Alberry committed felony conspiracy to commit organized retail
theft in violation of sections 182, subdivision (a)(1) and 490.4, subdivision
(a)(1) (count 1) and that, in order to carry out the conspiracy, he and another
person “drove to Kohl’s together, entered and selected items together, and
left the store without paying”; committed misdemeanor organized retail theft
in violation of section 490.4, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2) in that he and
another person “did unlawfully and knowingly act in concert with one or
more persons to steal merchandise from [Kohl’s] with the intent to sell,
exchange, or return the merchandise for value”; and committed misdemeanor
petty theft in violation of section 488 (count 3) in that he and another person
2
“did willfully and unlawfully take personal property” from Kohl’s having a
reasonable and fair market value not exceeding $950.
At the preliminary hearing,2 evidence was presented that Alberry and
another person entered a Kohl’s store in Eureka, California through an
emergency exit not designated as a public entrance; then, separating, coming
back together, and separating again while in the store, took some
merchandise, including clothing; and then left together through an
emergency exit without paying for the merchandise, got into a car, and drove
away.
At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel argued the court
should not hold Alberry over on the counts involving organized retail theft
(counts 1 and 2) because, although there was sufficient evidence presented to
hold him over on the petty theft charge (count 3), there was insufficient
evidence that he took any merchandise “with the intent to sell, exchange, or
return the merchandise for value,” a required element of organized retail
theft as stated in section 490.4, subdivision (a)(1).3 Counsel further argued
that charging Alberry with conspiracy to commit organized retail theft under
section 182—the conspiracy statute—as an alternative was an end-run
around the legislative intent to carve out a specific exception for organized
retail theft in violation of cases such as Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651.
2 The hearing also considered a parole violation charge against Alberry
that is not a part of this appeal and which we do not discuss further.
3 Section 490.4, subdivision (a)(1) states that a person is guilty of
organized retail theft if, among other things, the person “[a]cts in concert
with one or more persons to steal merchandise from one or more merchant’s
premises or online marketplace with the intent to sell, exchange, or return
the merchandise for value.”
3
The prosecutor responded that Alberry and his associate did not try on
any of the merchandise. From this, he contended, it could be inferred that
they did not take the merchandise for personal use, which was sufficient
evidence to hold Alberry over for organized retail theft under counts 1 and 2.
The court found sufficient evidence to hold Alberry over for trial on the
petty theft charge (count 3) under the “exceedingly low standard” for doing
so. It reached the same conclusion on conspiracy to commit organized retail
theft (count 1) and organized retail theft (count 2), while commenting that
counts 1 and 2 “in essence, have the same elements, I think.” The court
anticipated the defense would raise the intent to sell, exchange, or return for
value issue again in a section 995 motion and opined that at trial the
prosecution would “likely need . . . additional evidence to show that there
was some sort of intent to sell, exchange, or return that merchandise for
value.”
After the preliminary hearing, the district attorney’s office dropped the
conspiracy to commit organized retail theft and organized retail theft
charges previously brought under sections 182 and 490.4. Instead, the office
charged Alberry in an information with first, felony conspiracy to commit
petty theft in violation of sections 182, subdivision (a)(1) and 488 (count 1) in
that he and another person “drove to Kohl’s together, entered and selected
items together, and left the store without paying”; and, second, misdemeanor
petty theft in violation of section 488 as was alleged in the complaint (count
2).
Alberry filed a motion under section 995 to set aside the information.
He argued, among other things, that pursuant to Williamson, the
prosecution was barred from pursuing its conspiracy to commit petty theft
count against him as an alternative to the more specific charge of organized
4
retail theft, section 490.4. Alberry contended that engaging in a conspiracy
and acting “in concert” (an element of organized retail theft) involved
“ultimately a distinction without a difference.”
At the hearing on Alberry’s section 995 motion, the prosecutor argued
the court should deny the motion for multiple reasons. First, conspiracy and
organized retail theft are different crimes, including because organized retail
theft requires elements be proven that are not required under conspiracy and
conspiracy was only an “inchoate” crime; second, conspiracy and acting in
concert are “different ideas”; and, third, section 490.4, the organized retail
theft statute, was established for a different type of crime, with “40, 50, 100
people going in and doing a smash and grab.”
The court denied Alberry’s section 995 motion. It concluded the
prosecution had the choice of how to charge. The prosecution could and did—
correctly in the court’s view—“recalibrate” and file an information based on
petty theft in violation of section 488, which was understandable since the
prosecution would have a difficult time at trial showing that Alberry acted
with the intent to sell, exchange, or return merchandise for value as required
to prove organized retail theft. The court further concluded that, given the
prosecution’s election to charge Alberry for petty theft under section 488
rather than for organized retail theft under section 490.4, attaching a count
1 conspiracy was “not . . . beyond the pale.”
Alberry subsequently entered a guilty plea to count 1, felony
conspiracy to commit petty theft in violation of sections 182, subdivision
(a)(1) and 488. The court found him guilty of that crime and dismissed count
2. It sentenced him to 16 months in prison, awarded him custody credits,
and imposed certain fines and fees. A timely notice of appeal followed. The
trial court granted Alberry’s request for a certificate of probable cause so
5
that he could appeal the court’s denial of his section 995 motion and bring
before this court the applicability of the Williamson rule to the conspiracy
charge.
II. DISCUSSION
Alberry argues that the Williamson rule bars prosecution of him for
conspiracy to commit petty theft under sections 182, subdivision (a)(1) and
4884 in light of the purportedly more specific statute prohibiting organized
retail theft, section 490.4. On that ground, he asks that we reverse his
conspiracy conviction, dismiss the conspiracy charge with prejudice, and
direct the trial court to permit him to withdraw his plea.
A. Legal Standards
1. The Williamson Rule
In Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 651, the California Supreme Court
held that Williamson should not have been convicted of felony conspiracy to
contract without a license in violation of Business and Professions Code
section 7028 under the general conspiracy statute, section 182, because the
Legislature intended the more specific misdemeanor conspiracy statute
contained in Business and Professions Code former section 7030 (added by
Stats. 1939, ch. 37, § 1, p. 384; repealed by Stats. 1963, ch. 1883, § 2, p. 3867)
to control. (Williamson, at pp. 653–655.) The court adopted the “ ‘general
rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same
matter as the specific act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be
4 Section 182, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[i]f two or more persons
conspire” “[t]o commit any crime,” they are punishable for conspiracy to
commit a crime, a felony.
Section 488 prohibits petty theft.
6
considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed
before or after such general enactment.’ ” (Id. at p. 654.)
This “Williamson rule” (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86),
sometimes referred to as an “inference” (People v. Irwin (1984) 155
Cal.App.3d 891, 899 (Irwin)), is used “ ‘to ascertain and carry out legislative
intent.’ ” (Murphy, at p. 86.) Under it, “if a general statute includes the
same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature
intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.
In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the
general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either
statute. [Citation.] ‘The rule is not one of constitutional or statutory
mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes
conflict.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific
statute covering much the same ground as a more general law is a powerful
indication that the Legislature intended the specific provision alone to apply.
Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the
issue of legislative intent and “requires us to give effect to the special
provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision
. . . and the special provision . . . .” [Citation.]’
“Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the
Williamson rule applies when (1) ‘each element of the general statute
corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute’ or (2) when ‘it
appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will
necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.’
[Citation.] In its clearest application, the rule is triggered when a violation
of a provision of the special statute would inevitably constitute a violation of
the general statute. . . .” (People v. Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 86.)
7
“ ‘Typically the issue whether a special criminal statute supplants a
more general criminal statute arises where the special statute is a
misdemeanor and the prosecution has charged a felony under the general
statute instead. [Citations.] Such prosecutions raise a genuine issue
whether the defendant is being subjected to a greater punishment than
specified by the Legislature, and the basic question for the court to
determine is whether the Legislature intended that the more serious felony
provisions would remain available in appropriate cases.’ ” (Mitchell v.
Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1250, fn. 14.) The Williamson rule is
“necessary to prevent a general statute from swallowing up the exceptions
contained in specific enactments.” (People v. Mayers (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d
809, 814.)
“It is not correct to assume that the rule is inapplicable whenever the
general statute contains an element not found within the four corners of the
‘special’ law. Rather, the courts must consider the context in which the
statutes are placed. If it appears from the entire context that a violation of
the ‘special’ statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the
‘general’ statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of
the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.”
(People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 502; see People v. Mayers, supra,
110 Cal.App.3d 809 [§ 332, the specific misdemeanor statute prohibiting
three-card monte, prevailed over § 182, subd. (a)(4), the general felony
conspiracy to defraud statute, because § 332 would otherwise be voided];
People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690, 699 [although forgery and
unemployment insurance fraud contain different elements, applying for aid
8
under a false identity is “one of the most common forms of unemployment
insurance fraud”].)5
By contrast, the Williamson rule does not apply when the statutes at
issue “contemplate different kinds of culpability or criminal activity.”
(People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 297; see id. at pp. 295–297
[Williamson rule inapplicable where the general crime of murder requires
malice, which is not required for the more specific crime of vehicular
manslaughter]; see also Hudson v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999,
1007 [Williamson rule inapplicable when “a felony statute requires a more
culpable mental state than a misdemeanor statute proscribing the same
behavior”].) “Where penal statutes addressing analogous conduct are
differentiated by kinds of culpability . . . [t]he differential in culpability
justifies the penological disparity and the inference underlying the
Williamson rule is dispelled.” (Irwin, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 899
[holding that the additional element of malice in the general statute “imports
a higher level of culpability” that dispelled Williamson inference].)
2. The Crimes at Issue in this Case
Alberry was prosecuted for conspiracy to commit petty theft, but
contends he could only have been prosecuted for organized retail theft.
The general conspiracy statute, section 182, provides in subdivision
(a)(1) that “[i]f two or more persons conspire” “[t]o commit any crime,” they
are punishable for conspiracy to commit a crime, a felony.
The petty theft statute, section 488, follows section 487’s prohibition of
“grand theft,” meaning theft of something exceeding $950 in value with
5 In People v. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494, the court disapproved of
language in People v. Ruster stating “that ‘a special statute does not supplant
a general statute unless all of the elements of the general statute are
included in the special statute.’ ” (Jenkins, at p. 503, fn. 9.)
9
certain exceptions not argued to apply here, and sections 487a through 487k
and section 487m, defining other circumstances constituting grand theft,
petty theft, or a public offense that are not argued to apply here. Section 488
provides, “Theft in other cases is petty theft.”
The organized retail theft statute, section 490.4, states in relevant part
that a person who “[a]cts in concert with one or more persons to steal
merchandise from one or more merchant’s premises or online marketplace
with the intent to sell, exchange, or return the merchandise for value” “is
guilty of organized retail theft.” (§ 490.4, subd. (a)(1).) These acts are
punishable by imprisonment in county jail for a period not exceeding one
year. (§ 490.4, subd. (b)(2).)
3. Standard of Review
The question of whether the Williamson rule applies to Alberry’s
conspiracy conviction turns on statutory interpretation. “ ‘Insofar as the
Penal Code section 995 motion rests on issues of statutory interpretation, our
review is de novo.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory
interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘We consider the language of the entire scheme and
related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
B. Analysis
Alberry argues that he could only be prosecuted for the more specific
crime of organized retail theft under section 490.4 because “a violation of the
organized retail theft statute will commonly, if not always, result in a
violation of the general conspiracy to commit petty theft. A defendant who
acts in concert with others to ‘. . . steal merchandise from one or more
10
merchant’s premises or online marketplace with the intent to sell, exchange,
or return the merchandise for value’ cannot help but risk prosecution for
conspiracy to commit petty theft. ([§] 490.4[, subd. ](a)(1).) It is no
coincidence that in the present case, the People first charged Alberry with
organized retail theft.”
The People disagree, arguing that the Williamson rule does not apply
to Alberry’s case “because the conspiracy and organized retail theft statutes
target different criminal acts and levels of culpability.” They point out that,
as we have discussed, “[w]here penal statutes addressing analogous conduct
are differentiated by kinds of culpability . . . [t]he differential in culpability
justifies the penological disparity and the inference underlying the
Williamson rule is dispelled.” (Irwin, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 899; see
also People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 295–297; People v. Powers
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 299 [Williamson rule does not apply because the
general statute has a scienter requirement absent in the more specific
regulation and, therefore, a violation of the regulation would not commonly
result in a violation of the statute].)
The People contend “the culpability discrepancy between the
conspiracy and organized retail theft statutes shows the Legislature meant
to target different transgressions and refutes any inference that section
490.4 was meant to preempt prosecution under the conspiracy statute.”
More specifically, the People argue that a conspiracy requires an agreement
to commit a crime and, therefore, involves a different type of culpability than
“acting in concert,” an element of the organized retail theft statute, which
relates only to the execution of theft in association with others who are not
necessarily conspirators.
11
The People have the better of the argument. We decline to apply the
Williamson rule on this record in light of the different types of culpability
involved with the respective crimes at issue. Stating our conclusion more
specifically, we believe there is a material difference between the type of
culpability involved with the offense of conspiracy to commit petty theft, the
actual charge the prosecution brought in its information below, and
organized retail theft, the charge Alberry contends was the only one that
could have been brought against him. Conspiracy to commit petty theft does
not require proof that organized groups of people stole for financial gain, a
showing required under the relatively new crime of organized retail theft.
The People contend this difference in culpability indicates the
Legislature intended the organized retail theft statute to address a different
crime than conspiracy to commit petty theft. We agree. Section 490.4 was
originally enacted via Assembly Bill No. 1065, effective January 1, 2019.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 803, § 1.) According to the author of the bill, section 490.4
was needed because “[i]n 2017, the National Retail Federation (NRF)
conducted the Organized Retail Crime Survey and found that organized
retail theft continues to be pervasive within the industry. The survey stated
that 95% of merchants reported having been a victim of coordinated theft,
resulting in revenue losses estimated at $30 billion per year. NRF define[d]
organized retail crime as theft/fraudulent activity conducted with the intent
to convert illegally obtained merchandise, cargo, cash, or cash equivalent
into financial gain, often through subsequent online or offline sales.
Organized retail crime typically involves a criminal enterprise that organizes
multiple theft rings at a number of retail stores and employs a fencing
operation to sell the illegally-obtained goods for financial gain. Organized
retail crime can also simply involve the recruitment of others to steal on
12
another’s behalf. Despite this growing trend in various forms of ‘Organized
Retail Crime,’ California has never adopted a Penal Code section making it a
crime. Therefore, new laws facilitating better collaboration between law
enforcement and businesses are necessary to improve our justice system’s
responses to chronic theft.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, com. on Assem. Bill
No. 1065 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), as amended Feb. 27, 2018, pp. 4–5; Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1065 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.),
as amended Aug. 7, 2018, p. 5 [same].)
In short, the Legislature passed section 490.4 in an effort to address a
growing trend of coordinated thefts, often organized by criminal enterprises
with multiple theft rings and a fencing operation, all operating in a
coordinated way to steal goods that are then sold for financial gain. This is a
more sophisticated crime with more elements to be proved than conspiracy to
commit petty theft, not just a more specific version of it. The issue here boils
down to whether, in passing section 490.4, the Legislature intended to
preempt the more general conspiracy statute, section 182. We think not.
Instead, we discern a legislative intent to create an additional enforcement
tool tailored to address an emerging new class of criminal activity, thereby
giving prosecutors greater flexibility to deal with the problem. But we see no
suggestion of any preemptive intent to make section 490.4 the exclusive
enforcement vehicle for this emerging class of criminal activity. Alberry’s
proposed application of the Williamson rule would turn the Legislature’s
intent on its head, since the People would be forced to proceed with an
organized retail theft charge that, in some circumstances, may be more
difficult to prove than conspiracy to commit petty theft. Indeed, that seems
to explain what occurred here. The prosecution’s decision to charge Alberry
with conspiracy to commit petty theft rather than organized retail theft
13
appears to be based on its recognition of the different culpability that must
be proved in support of an organized retail theft charge. As the record
indicates, the prosecution dropped its complaint charges of organized retail
theft and conspiracy to commit organized retail theft after Alberry asserted,
and the court suggested, that there was insufficient evidence that Alberry
took any merchandise “with the intent to sell, exchange, or return the
merchandise for value,” a required element of organized retail theft under
section 490.4, subdivision (a)(1). This “theft for financial gain” element (as
opposed to for personal use, for example) need not be shown to prove a
charge of conspiracy to commit petty theft, and the prosecution did not make
any attempt to meet this element in its information allegations.
Two cases, People v. Montalvo (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 597 (Montalvo),
and People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370 (Lucero), seem to us most
instructive.
In Montalvo, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 597, defendant Montalvo and an
associate posed as undercover police officers to steal items from individuals
in two separate incidents. (Id. at pp. 601, 603–607.) Montalvo was convicted
of various crimes, including robbery in the first and second degree in
violation of sections 211 and 212.5. (Montalvo, at pp. 601–602.) On appeal,
Montalvo argued the Williamson rule required that he could only have been
tried regarding the conduct in which he allegedly engaged under section 530,
which prohibited false personation, and section 532, which prohibited false
pretenses, because the Legislature intended these to be more specific
statutes than section 211, the general robbery statute. (Montalvo, at pp. 602,
620–624.)
The appellate court noted that the underlying rationale for the
Williamson rule included a legislative focus on a particular type of conduct
14
by the defendant as deserving a particular punishment. (Montalvo, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 622.) The court continued, “Because the Williamson
rule ‘prohibits prosecution under a general statute when the conduct at issue
is covered under a more specific statute’ [citation], a necessary predicate to
the application of the rule is that the defendant’s conduct fits the elements of
the assertedly more specific statute.” (Ibid., original italics.) It rejected
Montalvo’s argument because his “conduct [wa]s not covered by the statutes
defendant relies upon and thus, defendant could not be convicted under
either statute.” (Ibid.) Section 530 required him to receive property intended
for the police officer he impersonated, but he was alleged to have taken
property from victims who were not alleged to have intended it for that police
officer. (Montalvo, at pp. 622–623.) Similarly, section 532 required that the
owner of the property consensually transfer property in reliance on a false
pretense, but there was no consensual transfer alleged. (Montalvo, at
p. 623.) The court held, “[Montalvo’s] conduct is not covered by sections 530
or 532. Thus, he could not be convicted of these assertedly more specific
statutes. Accordingly, a prosecution for robbery cannot be preempted under
the Williamson rule by offenses [Montalvo] did not commit.” (Ibid.)
In Lucero, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 370, defendant Lucero submitted
declarations from petition signers containing false information in seeking an
injunction to halt a petition drive to recall her from her position as a city
council member, and also submitted these declarations to law enforcement.
(Id. at p. 379.) She was found to have duped several people into signing
these declarations and convicted of preparing false writings with the intent
to produce them for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose, a felony violation of
section 134. (Lucero, at p. 379; § 134.) On appeal, she sought reversal based
on, among other things, her contention that the more specific statutes for
15
perjury, section 118, and subornation of perjury, section 127, not the more
general statute, section 134, covered her conduct and should have been the
bases for any prosecution of her. (Lucero, at pp. 379–380, 404–410.)6
The Lucero court, relying on Montalvo, also noted that the underlying
rationale for the Williamson rule included a legislative focus on a particular
type of conduct by the defendant as deserving a particular punishment and
that, therefore, a necessary predicate to the application of the Williamson
rule was that a defendant’s conduct fit the element of the more specific
statute. (Lucero, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) The court held that,
because there was no agreement between Lucero and the declarants to
provide false information and the declarants neither willfully nor with
knowledge of their falsity made the statements at issue, “neither perjury nor
subornation of perjury cover[ed] [Lucero’s] conduct regarding the petition
signers’ declarations. Consequently, [Lucero] could not be convicted of these
assertedly more specific statutes and the Williamson rule does not apply. A
prosecution for section 134 cannot be preempted under the Williamson rule
by offenses [Lucero] did not commit.” (Id., at p. 407; see id. at pp. 406–407.)
Here too, the prosecution did not seek to convict Alberry of organized
retail theft, nor make allegations sufficient to support such a charge.
Alberry fails to establish that the prosecution was required to do so. Given
these circumstances, and the legislative history we have discussed, we
conclude the Williamson rule does not apply, and the prosecution was free to
6 Lucero also submitted a declaration of her own for which she was
convicted under section 134, which she also argued was prohibited under the
Williamson rule in light of the more specific perjury statute. The court
rejected this argument as well, but under an analysis regarding the severity
of punishment provided for in these statutes that is not relevant here. (See
Lucero, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407–410.)
16
allege conspiracy to commit petty theft. Accordingly, we reject Alberry’s
argument that, under the Williamson rule, we must reverse his conviction
for conspiracy to commit petty theft.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
17
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