CourtListener 10865739•Marriage of Valenzuela and Serrano CA4/1
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Filed 5/28/26 Marriage of Valenzuela and Serrano CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of JACQUELINE
VALENZUELA and JOSE ANGEL
SERRANO.
D086230
JACQUELINE VALENZUELA,
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 23FL006669E)
v.
JOSE ANGEL SERRANO,
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Charles E. Bell, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph Charles La Costa for Appellant.
Jose Angel Serrano, in pro. per., for Respondent.
Jacqueline Valenzuela appeals from a marital dissolution judgment
directing the sale of a residential property and awarding the proceeds to her
ex-husband Jose Angel Serrano. She contends the judgment should be
reversed because Serrano allegedly committed perjury at trial. We reject this
contention because the record on appeal contains no evidence of the alleged
perjury, and Valenzuela never raised this claim or moved to set aside the
judgment in the family court. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Valenzuela and Serrano were married in January 2021 and separated
less than two months later. In June 2023, Valenzuela filed a petition for
dissolution of the marriage.
The parties contested the disposition of a residential property in
El Cajon. The family court conducted a trial to resolve this issue on
November 15, 2024. The record on appeal does not include a reporter’s
transcript or agreed or settled statement of the trial.
On December 2, 2024, the court held a hearing to render its decision
after trial. The court ordered the El Cajon property sold with the proceeds
going solely to Serrano. The court directed Valenzuela’s counsel to prepare
the judgment.
No judgment was entered for over four months. In March 2025, before
entry of judgment, Serrano requested sanctions against Valenzuela for
failure to cooperate in the sale of the property. Valenzuela’s counsel
responded with a declaration stating that Serrano had not contacted him and
that he was willing to cooperate with Serrano’s efforts to sell the property.
His declaration did not mention anything about Serrano committing perjury
during the trial. The record does not reflect the court’s ruling on the
sanctions request.
On April 17, 2025, the court entered judgment directing sale of the
property and awarding the proceeds to Serrano according to the terms of its
prior ruling of December 2, 2024. Valenzuela filed this appeal from the
judgment. She never filed a motion to set aside the judgment in the trial
court.
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DISCUSSION
For the first time on appeal, Valenzuela contends that the judgment
must be set aside under Family Code section 2122 because Serrano allegedly
admitted that he committed perjury at the trial. She contends that Serrano
made this admission in a letter he sent her “days after the trial.” This
contention fails for two reasons.
First, the record on appeal does not include either Serrano’s allegedly
perjurious testimony or the letter in which he allegedly admitted committing
perjury. There is no reporter’s transcript or other proper record of Serrano’s
testimony at the trial on November 15, 2024. As for the letter, Valenzuela’s
opening brief refers to “EXHIBIT 1” and “EXHIBIT 2” and “EXHIBIT A” as
proof of the alleged perjury, but there is no such exhibit in the appellate
record. The letter is not included anywhere in the clerk’s transcript and
Valenzuela admits it was not presented to the trial court. Even if appellate
courts made factual findings in the first instance, we could not make a
finding of perjury without a proper record of either the allegedly perjurious
testimony or the alleged proof of perjury.
“ ‘It is the duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the
court establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.’ ” (Hotels Nevada, LLC
v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) “By failing to
provide an adequate record, appellant cannot meet his burden to show error
and we must resolve any challenge to the order against him.” (Ibid.)
Valenzuela suggests that we may consider her claim of perjury by
taking judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 459) or taking new evidence on appeal
(Code Civ. Proc., § 909). But she has not filed any such motion. “To obtain
judicial notice by a reviewing court under Evidence Code section 459, a party
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must serve and file a separate motion with a proposed order.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.252(a).) The same is true of a request to make findings or take
evidence on appeal. (Id., subds. (b), (c).) In any event, Serrano’s letter would
not be subject to judicial notice under any of the provisions of Evidence Code
section 452. Moreover, appellate courts exercise their authority to take new
evidence only in exceptional circumstances, and even then, only “where to do
so will result in the litigation’s termination, either by affirming the judgment
or reversing and directing judgment be entered in favor of the appellant.”
(Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC
(2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 605 (Bombardier).) Here, Valenzuela is asking
us to reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial based on her claim of
perjury. Thus, “making the requested findings would not end this litigation.”
(Ibid.)
Second, Valenzuela did not raise her claim of perjury in the family
court and never filed a motion to set aside the judgment under Family Code
section 2122. As noted, Valenzuela contends that Serrano’s admission of
perjury came in a letter he sent to her “days after the trial.” The trial
occurred on November 15, 2024 and the judgment was not entered until
April 17, 2025. Valenzuela had five months to bring the matter to the family
court’s attention before judgment was entered. She failed to do so. Moreover,
she never filed a motion to set aside the judgment based on perjury as
authorized by Family Code section 2120, et seq. (See Rubenstein v.
Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1147 [“ ‘Family Code section 2120 et
seq. provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for setting aside such
judgments on grounds of actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity,
or mistake’ ”]; see Fam. Code, § 2122 [specifying grounds and time limits for
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setting aside a family court judgment and listing perjury as one of the
authorized grounds].)
“Generally, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.” (Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35,
44.) “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the
attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) It is “premised upon the idea that a party should not
sit on his or her hands, but instead must speak up and provide the court with
an opportunity to address the alleged error at a time when it might be fixed.”
(Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 266.)
Although we have discretion to consider a pure issue of law for the first
time on appeal, Valenzuela’s claim of perjury plainly involves disputed facts.
Serrano vigorously contests Valenzuela’s accusation and asserts that she has
taken a single sentence of his letter out of context. “We will not overrule the
trial court’s factfinding responsibility and authority and reinstate litigation
where it was [the appellant] who failed to bring the facts to the trial court’s
attention in the first instance.” (Bombardier, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at
p. 605.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Serrano may recover his costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
RUBIN, J.
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