CourtListener 10865734•People v. Johnson CA4/3
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Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Johnson CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064810
v. (Super. Ct. No. M-19955)
MICHAEL JOHNSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Servidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Paige B. Hazard, Steve Oetting and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury found defendant Michael Johnson to be a sexually violent
predator (SVP). An SVP is “a person who has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in
that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal
1
behavior.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
Johnson’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jurors that they needed to unanimously agree on which
diagnosed mental disorder he has (a unanimity instruction).
But long-standing case law makes clear that “a unanimity
instruction does not apply in SVP civil commitment proceedings.” (People v.
Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 59 (Fulcher); see also People v. Carlin
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 347 (Carlin).) We see no reason to depart from
these holdings; therefore, we affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1973, Jane Doe One (JD1) was at a laundromat doing laundry
when Johnson came up behind her and demanded sex. When JD1 refused,
Johnson physically assaulted her, took her into a public bathroom, and
sexually assaulted her. Johnson was convicted of rape.
In 1978, Johnson was at the home of his cousin JD2, shortly after
being released from prison. Johnson gave JD2 a note saying that he wanted
to have sex with her. When JD2 refused, Johnson physically and sexually
assaulted her. Johnson was convicted of rape.
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code; we will also omit the word “subdivision” or “subd.”
2
In June 1993, JD3 was in her home when she heard a knock at
her front door. Johnson violently forced his way in. Johnson grabbed a knife
from the kitchen and pointed it JD3’s neck. Johnson ordered JD3’s five-year-
old son to go into the bathroom and close the door. Johnson tried to rape JD3,
but was unable to do so. Johnson fled when JD3’s husband arrived home.
Johnson was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape.
In November 1993, JD4 came home and saw Johnson at her front
door. Johnson entered her home and refused to leave. Johnson forcibly
grabbed JD4, told her not to scream, and threatened to kill her. Johnson
sexually assaulted JD4. Johnson was convicted of crimes including rape and
forcible oral copulation.
SVP Proceedings
In 2022, the People filed an SVP petition to seeking to civilly
commit Johnson upon his release from state prison. The trial court found
probable cause to believe Johnson was likely to engage in sexually violent
predatory criminal behavior upon his release, and ordered Johnson to be
confined to a state hospital pending a trial.
In 2024, the court presided over a jury trial. Dr. Andrew
Tamanaha, a clinical psychologist, opined Johnson has an antisocial
personality disorder, and he was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal
behavior. Dr. Stephen Jenkins, a forensic psychologist, opined Johnson has
an antisocial personality disorder, and a nonspecific paraphilic disorder (an
abnormal interest in sex), and he posed an above average risk for reoffending.
Dr. Christoper Fisher, a forensic psychologist, testified for Johnson and
opined he did not have a mental disorder and had a low risk of reoffending.
At the conclusion of the 10-day trial, the jury found it true that
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Johnson is an SVP under the meaning of the SVP Act (SVPA). The trial court
committed Johnson to the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH) for an
indeterminate term.
II.
DISCUSSION
Johnson claims the trial court erred because it did not instruct
the jurors sua sponte that they needed to unanimously agree as to which
diagnosed mental disorder he has (a unanimity instruction). We disagree.
Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when
considering whether a trial court erred in not giving a unanimity instruction
on its own motion. (People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568.)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: A) state general principles
of law; B) summarize the relevant trial court proceedings; and C) analyze the
facts as applied to the law.
A. General Legal Principles
“‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who
has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the
health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in
sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600 (a)(1).)
“‘Diagnosed mental disorder’ includes a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the
person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600 (c).)
“Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
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determines an inmate nearing release from prison may be an SVP, the SDSH
designates two psychiatrists or psychologists to examine the person using a
standardized assessment protocol.” (People v. Superior Court (Smith) (2018) 6
Cal.5th 457, 462.) “If the evaluators concur that the person qualifies as an
SVP, then the Director of State Hospitals must forward a request that a
petition for commitment be filed in the superior court of the county that
imposed the sentence the person is currently serving.” (Ibid.)
“If the court finds probable cause that ‘the individual named in
the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior
upon his or her release,’ the case proceeds to trial.” (Needham v. Superior
Court (2024) 16 Cal.5th 333, 351.)
“SVP trials are ‘“special proceedings of a civil nature,”’ wholly
unrelated to any criminal case.” (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th
802, 815.) “A person subject to this article is entitled to a trial by jury, to the
assistance of counsel, to the right to retain experts . . . .” (§ 6603 (a).) In a
SVP trial, the verdict must be unanimous, and the finding that a person is an
SVP must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. (§§ 6603 (g), 6604.)
“In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous.” (People v.
Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).) A trial court has a sua sponte
duty to give a unanimity instruction in criminal cases when it is needed.
“[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the
prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to
agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.) “This requirement of unanimity as to
the criminal act ‘is intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will
be convicted even though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree
the defendant committed.’” (Ibid., italics added.)
“On the other hand, where the evidence shows only a single
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discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime
was committed or what the defendant’s precise role was, the jury need not
unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’
whereby the defendant is guilty.” (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) For
instance, in a first degree murder trial the jurors must unanimously agree
defendant committed the specific crime, but the jury “need not agree on a
theory of premeditation or felony murder” and “the jury need not agree on
whether defendant was guilty as the direct perpetrator or as an aider and
abettor as long as it agrees on a specific crime [citation].” (Id. at p. 1133.)
B. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to Johnson’s SVP trial, the People filed a motion asking
“the court to preclude an unanimity requirement regarding [Johnson’s]
specific diagnosed mental disorder. The jury must be unanimous that
[Johnson] has a diagnosable mental disorder . . . . However, there is no such
requirement of unanimity as to the specific diagnosis that comprises the
‘diagnosable mental disorder.’”
The People argued: “It is clear that all jurors do not have to agree
on the theory that gives rise to a finding of first degree murder [citation] and
in the same vein, all jurors do not have to agree on the specific mental
disorder that gives rise to a finding of a ‘diagnosed mental disorder.’”
At a pretrial hearing, Johnson did not object to the People’s
motion in limine, and the trial court granted the motion. The court explained:
“I believe the case law is that there is no unanimity requirement so long as
the jury makes a true finding that Mr. Johnson does suffer from a specific
diagnosed mental disorder.”
During the trial, the People asked for a jury instruction to
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affirmatively inform the jurors that they did not have to agree on the specific
diagnosed mental disorder. The trial court noted that the pattern SVP jury
instruction did not affirmatively state this, but the court told the prosecutor
that he could make this argument to the jury, and Johnson did not object.
The court instructed the jury that “the People must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that: [¶] 1. [Johnson] has been convicted of committing a
sexually violent offense; [¶] 2. He has a diagnosed mental disorder; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, he is a danger to the
health and safety of others because it is likely that he will engage in sexually
violent predatory criminal behavior.” (CALCRIM No. 3454.) The court also
instructed: “Your verdict must be unanimous. This means that, to return a
verdict, all of you must agree to it.” (CALCRIM No. 3454.)
At the close of the evidence, the prosecutor argued: “Ladies and
gentlemen, the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
respondent has a diagnosed mental disorder. I want to be clear about one
thing, though: You are not required to agree as to which diagnosis he has. All
you have to all agree is he has a diagnosis. Some of you might think it’s other
specified paraphilic disorder . . . ; some of you might think it’s antisocial
personality disorder; some of you might think it’s both. The law does not
require you to agree. All it requires you to do is find that he does have a
diagnosed mental disorder.”
C. Application and Analysis
The SVPA requires a jury’s verdict to be unanimous, but the law
does not require unanimity as to alternative factors supporting an SVP
finding. (Fulcher, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) In Fulcher, a jury found
defendant to be an SVP based on a sexually violent offense defendant had
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committed about eight years prior (in 1998). A sexually violent offense is
generally an offense committed by “force, duress or substantial sexual
conduct.” (Ibid.) On appeal, defendant argued that “the trial court erred in
failing to give sua sponte a unanimity instruction . . . on whether the jury
found force, duress or substantial sexual conduct.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
disagreed: “Since SVP proceedings are civil in nature, even though some
criminal procedural protections apply, the rule requiring a unanimity
instruction does not apply in SVP civil commitment proceedings.” (Ibid.)
In Fulcher, the appellate court explained that “in a criminal
proceeding, a unanimity instruction is required concerning acts that could be
charged as separate offenses but is not required as to elements of a charged
criminal offense. In the instant SVP proceeding, duress, force, and
substantial sexual conduct are alternative factors or elements required in
finding the 1998 offense qualifies as a sexually violent offense. A unanimity
instruction is not required sua sponte on those requisite factors.” (Fulcher,
supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) The court held: “Since the [trial] court
adequately instructed the jury on each of the elements of defendant’s civil
commitment, we conclude the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by
not giving a unanimity instruction sua sponte.” (Ibid.)
In 2007, a year after Fulcher, another appellate court came to a
similar holding. (Carlin, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347–348.) In Carlin, a
jury found defendant to be an SVP based on three prior convictions for
sexually violent offenses. (Ibid.) On appeal, defendant argued that “the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree
on which prior convictions involved substantial sexual conduct.” (Id. at p.
347.) The Court of Appeal disagreed: “Under the SVPA, the jury must
determine whether the requirements for classification as an SVP have been
8
established ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and the jury’s verdict must be
unanimous. [Citations.] There is no statutory requirement regarding
unanimity for each subpart of the SVP determination.” (Ibid.)
In Carlin, the appellate court explained: “Even under the
unanimity rule applicable to criminal cases, a unanimity instruction is
required only in specific circumstances. The instruction is required if the
evidence shows that several criminal acts may have been committed, but the
defendant was not charged with a separate violation for each act; there must
be a unanimous verdict regarding each specific act for which the defendant is
convicted. [Citations.] If, in contrast, the prosecution presents multiple
theories regarding one criminal act or event, a unanimity instruction is not
required.” (Carlin, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 347, italics added.)
The Carlin court held that because defendant’s prior three prior
“convictions constitute alternative means of satisfying the ‘sexually violent
offense’ element, similar to presentation of multiple possible overt acts in a
conspiracy case, we conclude the jury need not unanimously agree on which
. . . convictions satisfied the ‘sexually violent offenses’ element. The People’s
alleged presentation of multiple acts that could show ‘substantial sexual
conduct,’ a relevant factor in establishing a ‘sexually violent offense,’ is
similarly a presentation of alternative theories that does not require
unanimity.” (Carlin, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 348, italics added.)
We agree with the holdings in Fulcher and Carlin. In this case,
the SVPA required the jurors to find Johnson had “a diagnosed mental
disorder.” (§ 6600 (a)(1).) However, the jurors were not required to agree on
which diagnosed mental disorder Johnson suffered from. There was some
evidence Johnson had an antisocial personality disorder, and there was some
evidence he had a nonspecific paraphilic disorder. But these were simply two
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alternative legal theories that did not require unanimity. (See Russo, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or
. . . the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty”].)
The trial court fulfilled its obligations by instructing the jury:
“Your verdict must be unanimous.” (See CALCRIM No. 3454.) And consistent
with Fulcher and Carlin, we hold that the court had no further obligation to
instruct the jurors sua sponte that they also had to unanimously agree on
“each subpart of the SVP determination.” (Carlin, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at
p. 347; see also Fulcher, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.)
As the prosecutor correctly argued to the jurors: “You are not
required to agree as to which diagnosis he has. All you have to all agree is he
has a diagnosis. Some of you might think it’s other specified paraphilic
disorder . . . ; some of you might think it’s antisocial personality disorder;
some of you might think it’s both. The law does not require you to agree. All it
requires you to do is find that he does have a diagnosed mental disorder.”
Thus, we find the trial court did not commit an instructional
error, and we affirm the judgment.
Johnson notes that in 2006, the SVPA was amended to allow for
longer (indeterminate) periods of civil commitment. (Prop. 83, as approved by
voters, Gen. Elec. Nov. 7, 2006.) Johnson points out that this occurred after
the appellate court’s opinion was filed in Fulcher, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 41
(filed on January 11, 2006). Therefore, Johnson argues that Fulcher’s
holding—that the unanimity rule does not apply in an SVP trial—is no longer
controlling. We disagree.
First of all, we note that the opinion in Carlin was filed in 2007,
which is after the SVPA was amended. And again, just as in Fulcher, the
appellate court held in Carlin that “[t]here is no statutory requirement
10
regarding unanimity for each subpart of the SVP determination.” (Carlin,
supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 347.)
But more importantly, we agree with the Attorney General that
“there is nothing in length of commitment that would compel adding such a
statutory requirement of unanimity as to each criterion under the SVPA
where the Legislature and [the] electorate have declined to do so.” (See
United Shippers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 359, 362 [“The
Legislature is presumed to be aware of case law when it amends a statute”];
see also O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 98 [“in enacting an
initiative, voters are presumed to be aware of existing laws”].)
Johnson also argues that a “diagnosed mental disorder is a fact
for jury determination; it is not a legal theory.” (Capitalization & boldface
omitted.) We disagree.
A diagnosed mental disorder is defined in the SVPA as follows:
“‘Diagnosed mental disorder’ includes a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to
the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a
menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600 (c).) That is, a diagnosed
mental disorder is a legal theory because it includes no criminal acts that the
defendant must commit, and the jury must then agree on, which would
trigger the unanimity rule. (See Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [“the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act”].)
Further, the unanimity rule requires a jury to agree on a criminal
defendant’s different acts that form the basis of a crime, but it does not
require the jury to agree on different facts supporting the legal theory
underlying the crime. (People v. Davis (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 28, 34.) The
unanimity “rule takes as irrelevant any jury disagreement on subordinate
11
issues. It matters not that jurors may disagree over the theory of the crime,
for example, whether the situation involves felony murder or premeditated
murder. Nor does it matter that they disagree on the theory of participation,
for example, whether there was direct participation or aiding and abetting or
coconspiracy. Nor does it matter that they disagree about the facts proving any
of these theories. If each juror concludes, based on legally applicable theories
supported by substantial evidence, that the defendant is guilty of the charged
offense, the defendant is properly found guilty even if the jurors disagree
about the particular theories or facts.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Finally, Johnson argues: “The SVPA expressly provides for the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard and for a unanimous jury verdict.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) And: “The duty to instruct in a civil
proceeding arises from the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” We agree these are correct propositions of law.
But the pattern jury instruction used by the trial court expressly
complied with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” and the “unanimous jury
verdict” requirements of the SVPA. (See CALCRIM No. 3454 [a jury must
find that a person is an SVP “beyond a reasonable doubt” and the “verdict
must be unanimous”].) Thus, the trial court fulfilled its duty to instruct in
this SVP special proceeding of a civil nature, and there was no instructional
error or due process violation as Johnson contends. (See Moore v. Superior
Court, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 815.)
To reiterate and conclude, it is settled law that a trial court is not
required to give a unanimity instruction in an SVP jury trial. (Fulcher, supra,
136 Cal.App.4th at p. 59; Carlin, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 347.) And
Johnson’s various arguments on appeal do not convince us to depart from
these long-standing holdings.
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III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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