Winslett v. Dothan Security CA4/1

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Filed 5/28/26 Winslett v. Dothan Security CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

BEVERLY WINSLETT, D085715

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2403846)

DOTHAN SECURITY, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Tony Raphael, Judge. Affirmed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Matthew G. Kleiner, and Andrea K.
Williams for Defendants and Appellants.
Employee Justice Legal Group, Kaveh S. Elihu, and Daniel J.
Friedman for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 2022, Congress passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) (9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402),
which amended the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (id., § 1 et seq.). “In
general terms, the EFAA renders arbitration agreements unenforceable at
the plaintiff’s election in sexual assault and sexual harassment cases that
arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022, the EFAA’s effective date.” (Doe v.
Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 559 (Doe)).
In this case, defendants Dothan Security, Inc. (DSI) and Phillip Bailey
appeal an order denying their motion to compel plaintiff Beverly Winslett to
arbitrate her sexual harassment and other employment-related claims
against them and to stay proceedings. The trial court denied the motion on
the ground the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the EFAA.
Because we conclude that Winslett’s claims accrued after the EFAA became
effective, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

DSI has its corporate office in Alabama. It employs thousands of people
to provide security services in 15 states, including California, and purchases
supplies in interstate commerce. DSI hired Winslett as a security guard on
January 18, 2022. As part of the process, she reviewed and signed several
documents, including a Binding Arbitration Agreement (Agreement). The
Agreement states it “will be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act” and
requires “arbitration of all claims, controversies, or other disputes arising out
of [Winslett’s] employment or its termination (collectively, the ‘Claims’) that
either party may have against the other, including [DSI’s] . . . current and
former . . . employees.”
Two years later, Winslett filed a complaint for damages and other relief

against DSI and Bailey in the trial court.1 She asserted that Bailey was an
employee of DSI and was her site supervisor on January 18, 2022. On that
date, Bailey allegedly “groped [her] legs and groin area and rubbed himself

1 Our recitation of the facts regarding the claimed sexual
assault/harassment is based on the allegations of the complaint.
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on her” while the two were inside a security guard station. Winslett
protested, but he “continued inappropriately touching [her]” and said, “ ‘I am
the site supervisor, your schedule depends on me. I can do what I want.’ ”
Two weeks later, Winslett alleged, Bailey “kept trying to touch her” as
she attempted to report a theft. On February 9, 2022, she “formally reported
[Bailey’s] assault and battery to [DSI’s general manager], who “pressured
[her] to retract her claim, saying, ‘Keep your head down and work. Reporting
it means losing your schedule, overtime. It is how things go in security,
especially for women of color.’ ”
On March 17, 2022, DSI put Winslett on the graveyard shift and
reduced her hours. Although Bailey worked the following shift, he “arrive[d]
thirty minutes early, and crowd[ed] into the single-occupancy guard booth
with [her] to ostensibly receive updates.” Initially, at least, DSI ignored
Winslett’s repeated requests for a transfer to a site away from Bailey.
Eventually, she was sent to one with “a moldy and filthy guard shack.” By
May 27, 2022, Winslett concluded that Bailey’s “unwelcome discriminatory
and harassing conduct” and DSI’s inaction created such a hostile work
environment that she had to resign.
Winslett’s complaint asserted causes of action for assault; battery;
violations of civil rights laws; discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent
discrimination and harassment, and retaliation, in violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.); wrongful
termination; violations of Labor Code provisions on retaliation, rest and meal
breaks, and payment of wages; and unfair competition. She further alleged
that at no time since her resignation had she been paid her final wages.
Six days after DSI was served with the complaint, its attorney sent
Winslett’s attorney an e-mail in which he requested that she submit her

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claims to arbitration. After receiving no response to the e-mail, DSI filed a
motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1281.2, 1281.4.) It argued the Agreement involved interstate commerce
and was valid and enforceable under the FAA; it covered all the claims
alleged in the complaint; and the civil action had to be stayed until
completion of arbitration. In support of the motion, DSI submitted a
declaration from its president, Eddie Sorrells, who described DSI’s interstate
business operations and the paperwork associated with Winslett’s hiring.
Sorrells attached as an exhibit to his declaration a copy of the Agreement.
Winslett opposed the motion on multiple grounds. She argued DSI did
not establish the existence of an arbitration agreement by admissible
evidence. Winslett asserted the FAA did not require enforcement of the
Agreement because her employment by DSI had a “trivial” impact on
interstate commerce and because the EFAA rendered the Agreement
unenforceable. She also maintained that the Agreement could not be
enforced because it was unconscionable.
Winslett filed objections to Sorrells’s declaration and to the Agreement.
She filed her own declaration, in which she stated that she worked for DSI in
California and never traveled outside California as part of her job. Winslett
also filed a declaration from her attorney, who stated, “The majority of
[Winslett’s] claims are based on the sexual harassment she was subjected to
at the hands of [Bailey].”
DSI filed a reply in which it responded to Winslett’s arguments,
repeating and expanding on points made in its initial moving papers. DSI
claimed the EFAA did not apply because the alleged conduct on which
Winslett’s complaint was based occurred before the EFAA took effect and the

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statute was not retroactive. DSI also filed objections to the declarations of
Winslett and her attorney.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration and
to stay proceedings, after which it issued a written order. The court
overruled all evidentiary objections, rejected Winslett’s defense of
unconscionability, and concluded that the FAA required enforcement of the
Agreement except as to claims covered by the EFAA. It granted the motion
to compel as to claims not covered by the EFAA, but denied it as to covered
claims. The court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on which
claims were covered and on whether the case should be stayed while any
claims not covered were arbitrated.

In its supplemental brief, DSI, joined by Bailey,2 again argued the
EFAA did not apply because any sexual harassment dispute between the
parties arose before the EFAA was enacted. DSI alternatively asserted that
if the EFAA applied, only two counts alleging harassment under the FEHA
were exempt from arbitration, and the civil action should be stayed until
completion of arbitration of all other counts. In her supplemental brief,
Winslett maintained that because her case related to a dispute about sexual
assault or sexual harassment, the EFAA applied to her entire case, no
individual claims were subject to arbitration, and no stay should issue.
The trial court held a second hearing on the motion to compel
arbitration, after which it issued a written order. The court ruled that the
EFAA “prohibits arbitration of the entire case” and denied the motion.

2 It is unclear from the record why Bailey did not join DSI’s earlier
filings. In their appellate briefs, the parties have treated Bailey as if he were
a party to the motion, and we shall do the same. Subsequent references to
DSI should be read to include Bailey unless the context indicates otherwise.
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DISCUSSION
DSI attacks the order denying its motion to compel arbitration. It
contends the trial court correctly ruled the Agreement was governed by the
FAA and was not unconscionable, but erroneously ruled the EFAA made the
Agreement unenforceable. DSI argues the EFAA does not apply to Winslett’s
case because the parties’ dispute arose before the statute was enacted and
the statute is not retroactive. It asks us to reverse the trial court’s order.
An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is appealable. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).) Where a trial court has denied such a motion
based on its interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts
(here, the allegations of the complaint), we review the order de novo.
(Enmark v. KF Community Care, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463, 471;
Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1158.)
We begin with the applicable statutes, the FAA and the EFAA. The
FAA provides that a written arbitration agreement involving interstate
commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract or

as otherwise provided in chapter 4.” (9 U.S.C. § 2, italics added.)3 Chapter 4
is the EFAA, which was “[e]nacted on March 3, 2022,” and “ ‘limits the scope
of [the FAA’s] broad mandate to enforce arbitration agreements.’ ” (Cornelius

3 The Agreement states it “will be governed by the [FAA].” Such a
statement in an arbitration agreement suffices to make the FAA govern its
enforceability even if the agreement does not involve interstate commerce.
(Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1048, 1054; Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 63, 72, 76; Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
956, 963.)
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v. CVS Pharmacy Inc. (3d Cir. 2025) 133 F.4th 240, 245 (Cornelius).) The
EFAA provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election
of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment
dispute or sexual assault dispute, . . . no predispute arbitration
agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case
which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to
the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.”
(9 U.S.C. § 402(a).)

The quoted provision nullifies arbitration agreements in sexual assault and
sexual harassment cases at the election of the complaining party. (Olivieri v.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 84 (Olivieri); Quilala
v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75,
83 (Quilala).) Thus, when a party invokes the FAA to compel arbitration in a
case involving allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment, the court
must decide whether the EFAA makes the arbitration agreement voidable.
There is no dispute this case involves the type of arbitration agreement
and the type of allegations that fall within the scope of the EFAA. DSI
concedes Winslett signed the Agreement before she started working as
a security guard for DSI. It also concedes that “[u]pon commencing her
employment, Winslett alleges she was immediately subjected to sexual
harassment and sexual assault,” including “allegations of sexual misconduct
by the site supervisor, Phillip Bailey.” Hence, the Agreement qualifies as a
“predispute arbitration agreement” under the EFAA, which defines that
phrase as “any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at
the time of the making of the agreement.” (9 U.S.C. § 401(1).) And Winslett’s
civil action against DSI “relates to [a] sexual assault dispute or [a] sexual
harassment dispute.” (Id., § 402(1); see id. § 401(3), (4) [defining “sexual
assault dispute” and “sexual harassment dispute”].) Her case thus satisfies

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the “substantive component” of the EFAA. (Cornelius, supra, 133 F.4th at
p. 245.)
The parties dispute whether Winslett’s case satisfies the “timing
component” of the EFAA. (Cornelius, supra, 133 F.4th at p. 245.) The
statute applies “with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on
or after the date of the enactment,” i.e., March 3, 2022. (Pub.L. No. 117–90,
§ 3 (Mar. 3, 2022) 136 Stat. 26, 28.) DSI argues the parties’ dispute arose in
February 2022, when Winslett reported the alleged sexual misconduct by
Bailey to DSI’s general manager, who “ ‘expresse[d] disagreement or [took] an
adversarial posture’ ” by dismissing Winslett’s complaint, pressuring her to
retract it, and failing to take corrective action. (Quoting Kader v. Southern
California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214, 222 (Kader).)
Winslett contends no dispute arose in February 2022 because DSI’s
agents did not then deny her allegations that Bailey had sexually assaulted
and harassed her. Instead they suggested the alleged misconduct was a
normal and expected part of the job that had to be tolerated. Thus, in
Winslett’s view, there was no concrete dispute regarding Bailey’s misconduct
before her constructive discharge on May 27, 2022. She also maintains that
since Bailey sexually assaulted and harassed her repeatedly throughout her
employment (Jan. 18, 2022–May 27, 2022), under the continuing violation
doctrine her “harassment and hostile work environment claims accrued after
the EFAA’s effective date, exempting her entire case from mandatory
arbitration.” We need not decide when exactly the dispute arose, because we
agree with Winslett that her claims accrued after the effective date of the
EFAA.
Before we can address the merits of Winslett’s accrual argument, we
must dispose of DSI’s objection that she forfeited the issue by not raising it in

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the trial court. We usually do not let parties make new arguments in this
court because, as DSI points out, “ ‘it would be unfair, both to the trial court
and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.’ ” (P&D
Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1344.) But
there has been no real change. Winslett cited the EFAA in her opposition to
the motion to compel arbitration and argued that forced arbitration of sexual
harassment cases is contrary to legislatively enacted public policy. She
asserted that Bailey repeatedly sexually harassed her and his conduct
eventually forced her to resign. At the first hearing on the motion, Winslett’s
attorney argued that a dispute arose no earlier than March 17, 2022, when
DSI retaliated against Winslett by assigning her a graveyard shift and
reducing her overtime hours. When questioned by the trial court about the
significance of that date, Winslett’s attorney responded that because no
retaliation had occurred until then, that was the earliest date that any
“contention” or “dispute” had arisen. In his view, where the retaliation began
after the EFAA was enacted on March 3, 2022, the Agreement was
unenforceable at Winslett’s option.
It is true that Winslett’s attorney did not specifically analyze the

timing component in terms of the “accrual” of her claim.4 But the invocation
of the EFAA in the opposition papers and the argument of her counsel at the
hearing sufficed to state Winslett’s general position that the Agreement was

4 This is not totally surprising. It was not until after both hearings on
the motion to compel were completed that the Second District Court of
Appeal decided the first California case addressing “when a sexual
harassment claim ‘accrues’ under the EFAA where . . . a plaintiff alleges
sexually harassing conduct occurring both before and after the EFAA’s
enactment.” (Doe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.)

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unenforceable because some of the acts underlying her sexual harassment
case occurred after the statute took effect. In our view, this was enough to
avoid forfeiting the accrual argument. Moreover, since accrual presents a
question of law to be decided based on undisputed facts, we have discretion to
consider the issue and exercise that discretion to the extent necessary to
reach the issue. (City of Norco v. Mugar (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 786, 793.)
We now turn to the merits of the accrual argument. Courts have
interpreted the timing component of the EFAA to mean the statute applies if
either the dispute arose on or after March 3, 2022, or the claim accrued on or
after that date. (Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC (6th Cir. 2025)
135 F.4th 398, 413 (Memmer); Cornelius, supra, 133 F.4th at p. 246; Hodgin
v. Intensive Care Consortium, Inc. (S.D.Fla. 2023) 666 F.Supp.3d 1326, 1329;
Doe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) Under the EFAA, “the time a claim
accrues means the point at which the statute of limitations clock starts

ticking.” (Olivieri, supra, 112 F.4th at p. 87.)5
For a sexual harassment claim based on a series of acts that over time
creates a hostile work environment, the time of accrual is the date of the last
act in the series, even if prior acts might have been actionable. (Doe, at

5 Under the EFAA, “[a] dispute arises when one party asserts a right,
claim, or demand, and the other side expresses disagreement or takes an
adversarial position.” (Kader, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) An employee
may register disagreement by “an internal complaint, external complaint, or
otherwise,” and an “employer [may] expressly or constructively oppose[ ] that
position.” (Cornelius, supra, 133 F.4th at p 247.) “The relevant question
is when the parties became adverse to one another.” (Memmer, supra,
135 F.4th at p. 409.) A claim may accrue before or after a dispute arises.
(Ibid.) As we explain, we need not decide precisely when the parties’ dispute
arose because Winslett’s sexual harassment claim accrued after the EFAA
took effect and that accrual is sufficient to make the statute applicable to her
case regardless of when the dispute arose.
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p. 572; see Olivieri, at p. 88 [hostile work environment claim continues to
accrue each time defendant commits act that is part of series of acts that
creates hostile work environment].) Winslett asserted a count alleging that
sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA created a hostile work
environment. (See Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j); Quilala, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 86.) That count incorporated the allegations that
Bailey “groped [Winslett’s] legs and groin area and rubbed himself on her”
when she started working for DSI on January 18, 2022, and continued his
“unwelcome and discriminatory and harassing conduct” until May 27, 2022,
when she “was effectively compelled to resign” due to the “intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment.” When the plaintiff alleges a course
of sexually harassing conduct that occurred both before and after March 3,
2022, the EFAA applies. (Olivieri, supra, 112 F.4th at p. 78; Doe, at p. 571.)
We accordingly conclude that the EFAA applied to Winslett’s case.
By filing a complaint in the trial court and opposing DSI’s motion to compel
arbitration, Winslett elected to render the Agreement unenforceable as to the
entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim. (9 U.S.C. § 402(a);
Quilala, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 88; Casey v. Superior Court (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 575, 588; Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024)

105 Cal.App.5th 791, 803; Doe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 577.)6 The court
thus correctly applied the EFAA to deny DSI’s motion to compel arbitration
and to stay proceedings. Because that is a sufficient basis to affirm the
challenged order, we need not decide whether the trial court ruled correctly
on Winslett’s evidentiary objections or unconscionability defense.

6 DSI “focuses on the threshold issue of [the] EFAA’s applicability” and
“do[es] not separately challenge” the trial court’s decision “extending [the]
EFAA to bar the entire case from arbitration.”
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to stay
proceedings is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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