In re E.S. CA4/1

CourtListener 10865079Calctapp27 de mai. de 2026

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Filed 5/27/26 In re E.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re E.S. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

S.D. COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN D087464
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521696A-D)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander M. Calero, Judge. Affirmed.
Nita Mehta under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant, K.R.
Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, F.S.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

K.R. (Mother)1 appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional orders
removing her four children from her physical custody under Welfare and

Institutions Code2 section 361, subdivision (c)(1). She contends that
substantial evidence did not support the children’s removal and that there
were reasonable alternative means of protecting them. We conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dispositional orders and we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Events Leading to the Petition
Mother has three minor children with Father: E.S. (age 13), Es.S. (age

7), and L.S. (age 7).3 Mother has another minor child, A.C. (age 15), whose
biological father is deceased. In 2015, Mother and Father had a violent
argument in the presence of A.C., E.S., and two older (now adult) siblings
that resulted in Father being arrested and Mother obtaining a temporary
restraining order. This incident prompted an unsuccessful voluntary case
with the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (Agency). The

1 F.S (Father) filed an appeal that was dismissed under In re Sade C.
(1996) 13 Cal.4th. 952, 954. Because Father is no longer a party to this
appeal, we discuss him only when relevant.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

3 Our decision reflects the children’s ages at the time of the contested
jurisdiction and disposition hearing on January 9, 2026.

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parents made minimal progress and Father moved back into the home and
was not receptive to treatment for domestic violence.
Mother and Father separated in 2023 but remained in contact.

Between February 2025 and September 2025,4 the police responded to
12 incidents involving Mother, Father, and Mother’s boyfriend, E.H. In
February, Mother called Father for help because E.H. was blocking Mother’s
vehicle. When Father arrived with the children, E.H. sprayed pepper spray
through an open car window, causing E.S. to have trouble breathing. Mother
was granted an emergency protective order against E.H. In March, a witness
saw Mother push and strike E.H. several times while outside. Mother ran
into her apartment and E.H. banged on the door saying, “I’m going to kill
you” while the children were in the living room. In May, when the children
were at home, Father discovered E.H. in Mother’s room and struck him in the
face five times. A.C. had to physically intervene. In June, after an
altercation in the presence of the children, Mother was granted an emergency
protective order against Father and later obtained a criminal protective order
(CPO) against him. In July, in the presence of A.S., Father grabbed Mother,
pulled her toward him, and shoved her with both hands. In August, E.H.
kicked in Mother’s apartment door while Mother, L.S., and Es.S. were inside.
In September, after an argument with Mother during a car ride, Father
prevented Mother from leaving the car, drove very fast, and threatened to kill
them both.

4 All dates herein are for the year 2025, unless otherwise specified.

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B. Petition and Detention Hearing
On September 29, the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) alleging all four children had suffered or there
is a substantial risk that the children will suffer serious physical harm or
illness as a result of the failure or inability of their parents to supervise or
protect them.
At a detention hearing on October 1, the court made prima facie
findings on the petitions. The court ordered the children detained with
Mother under strict conditions that both parents abide by the CPO, have no
contact in the children’s presence, and exchange the children at the Chula
Vista Police Department. The court ordered Father’s visitation unsupervised
but prohibited Father from transporting the children to school. The court
also instructed Father to use a food delivery service for all food deliveries to
Mother and children.
At a special hearing on October 13, the Agency reported that the
parents were violating the court’s orders and the CPO. Specifically, Father
drove the children to school, and the parents did not exchange the children at
the Chula Vista Police Station. The court instructed the parents to modify
their conduct. It rejected, however, the Agency’s recommendation to detain
the children with a relative.
C. Initial Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency expressed concern over
Mother’s long history of domestic violence and continued violent altercations
in the presence of the children, despite having participated in services in the
past. In addition to the 12 reported incidents between Mother, Father, and
E.H., it alleged at least 10 unreported incidents.

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At the initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing on October 22,
Mother requested modification of the protection orders to allow parents to
better coordinate with transporting the children. The court clarified that the
CPO contains an exception to the “no contact” rule, allowing for peaceful
contact only for the safe exchange of children and court ordered visits. It
reminded the parties that the criminal court, not the juvenile court, has the
authority to modify the CPO. The court scheduled a pretrial conference and a
contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
D. Special Hearing
At a special hearing on December 3, the Agency requested the children
be detained outside Mother’s care. It reported that Mother violated the CPO
by meeting with Father and the children at a pumpkin patch and later at a
mall. On another occasion, Father chased Mother, Mother’s new boyfriend,
and the children in his car. A few days later, while Mother was driving with
the children, a police officer pulled her over and handcuffed her because
Father reported the car as stolen. Mother also reported Father was following
them and he had threatened to take the car because she was not being
intimate with him. Mother admitted communicating with Father when she
needed money.
The Agency reported that on October 31, Mother and children moved
into a domestic violence shelter.
Based on the continued altercations between the parents in the
presence of the children and violations of the CPO and court orders, the court
found detention with Mother was contrary to the children’s welfare and there
is a substantial danger to the physical health of the children or they are
suffering severe emotional damage. It found there were no reasonable means
by which the children’s physical or emotional health may be protected

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without removing the children from Mother’s physical custody. The court
also found substantial evidence that Mother would flee the jurisdiction of the
court. The court ordered the children detained in the care of their adult
brother and ordered supervised visitation for Mother.
E. Contested Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At the jurisdiction and disposition trial on January 9, 2026, the court
admitted the Agency’s detention and jurisdiction/disposition reports,

including addendums.5 The Agency reported that Mother had attempted to
pick up the children from after-school care without the caregiver sibling in
violation of the court’s order.
After hearing the argument of counsel, the court sustained the
petitions and made true findings on section 300, subdivision (b)(1), declared
the children dependent, and found by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
there is a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the children” if returned to their parents;
and (2) there was “no reasonable means by which the children’s health [could]
be protected without the removal.” The court also granted a one-year
juvenile restraining order protecting the children from Father. It ordered
ongoing removal from parents and supervised visitation for Mother. On
appeal, Mother challenges the court’s dispositional orders of removal.

5 The court observed that two addendum reports dated January 9, 2026,
were filed. It did not receive into evidence the second report because it only
contained recommendations.

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DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
A juvenile court has “broad discretion” to determine a child’s best
interest when crafting a disposition order. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.) The court, however, may not remove a child from a
parent’s physical custody unless it “finds clear and convincing evidence . . .
[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [child] if the [child] were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the [child’s]
physical health can be protected without removing the [child] from the
[child’s] parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
For removal, or continued removal as in this case, there is no
requirement that the parent be dangerous or that the child suffer harm.
(In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126 (John M).) Instead, section
361, subdivision (c), focuses on “ ‘averting harm to the child.’ ” (Ibid.) In
determining whether removal is necessary, “ ‘[t]he court may consider a
parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances. [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.)
We review the court’s decision for substantial evidence, keeping in
mind that the juvenile court is required to make a dispositional finding by
clear and convincing evidence. (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358,
367.) The question before us is “ ‘whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.] We view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the
trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts
in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (In re
M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960.) “[T]he appellant bears the burden of

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showing ‘ “ ‘there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature’ ” ’ to
support the dispositional removal order.” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
227, 245.)
B. Disposition
Mother challenges the court’s finding that returning the children home
would pose a substantial danger to their “physical health, safety, protection
or physical and emotional well-being.” (See § 361, subd. (c)(1).) Mother also
contends there was no clear and convincing evidence to support its related
finding that “no reasonable means” existed to protect the children’s physical
health short of removal (see ibid.), since she had secured housing in the
domestic violence shelter where the children also could live. We disagree.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that placement with
Mother created a risk to the children’s physical health, safety, and well-
being. As early as 2015, Mother exposed her minor children to domestic
violence between herself and Father. Mother’s post-separation conflict
between Father and E.H. was frequent and dangerous—including 12
reported police-involved incidents and at least 10 unreported incidents in
eight months of 2025—and the conflicts routinely involved the children.
Mother violated the court’s orders by contacting and spending time with
Father in the children’s presence at a mall and a pumpkin patch. Her
continued reliance on Father and her disregard of court orders, including the
CPO, indicates that Mother has yet to understand the risk of harm to the
children caused by her ongoing involvement with Father. (See John M.,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 [the focus of the removal statute is to avert
harm to the child].)
The juvenile court also reasonably found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that no reasonable alternative short of removal from Mother’s

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custody would adequately protect the children. Numerous alternatives were
extended to Mother, such as the children’s initial detention with Mother, the
court’s protective orders, and the CPO. Mother continued to violate the
protective orders and have prohibited contact with Father which led to
altercations with Father in the presence of the children. While Mother is
herself a victim of domestic violence, her repeated disregard for the harmful
consequences of maintaining contact with Father—thereby enabling his
continued control and influence—demonstrates an indifference to the
children’s safety and emotional well-being.
We are not persuaded by Mother’s contention that the children’s
removal was unnecessary because she could care for them at the domestic
violence shelter. At the time of disposition she had not yet started her
parenting class and had only participated in a few domestic violence group
therapy sessions with the provider. Although Mother recently took steps to
distance herself from Father by moving into a domestic violence shelter, the
Agency reported that Mother still failed to understand the protective issue
and gain insight. Because Mother was only in the early stages of addressing
the protective issue that necessitated the children’s removal, it was
reasonable for the juvenile court to continue removal of the children from
Mother.
The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best
serve and protect the child’s best interests (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863), and its conclusion that no reasonable means were
available to protect the children without removing them from the Mother’s
custody is supported by substantial evidence on this record. (See John M.,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126.)

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DISPOSITION
The dispositional orders are affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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