CourtListener 10865078•In re Julius A. CA4/2
Texto completo
Filed 5/27/26 In re Julius A. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re JULIUS A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
E087585
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2400047)
Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION
v.
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elizabeth Tucker, Judge.
Conditionally reversed with directions.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County
Counsel, and Prabath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A.R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights
to her minor son, Julius A. Mother argues that the court and the Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services (the Department) failed to comply with the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state law. We
agree and conditionally reverse.
BACKGROUND
Mother has three sons with different fathers: Arturo C. (born in 2014), A.F. (born
in 2017), and Julius (born in November 2022). This appeal involves only Mother and
Julius.
The family came to the attention of the Department in December 2023, when the
Department received two referrals alleging general neglect and physical and emotional
abuse of the children by Mother and their respective fathers. Mother was reported to be
homeless and living in a motel with the children. Mother reported that she and the
children were living in a motel because the maternal grandparents kicked the family out
of their home.
The second referral alleged that Julius’s father, N.A. (Father), punched Mother in
the mouth and broke her jaw with Julius present. Law enforcement responded to the
incident, and Mother was taken to the hospital by paramedics. Mother wanted Father
prosecuted and said that she would live with the maternal grandfather.
On the day that the second referral was made, a social worker visited the motel,
the hospital, and the maternal grandmother’s address but was unable to locate Mother.
The social worker reported that “[a]n older man who identified himself as the maternal
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great uncle reported that the mother did not live in the home, and she only received mail.”
One week later, Mother spoke with the social worker but refused to allow the social
worker to see her or Julius. Arturo and A.F. were living with their fathers. The social
worker spoke with Arturo, who said that he did not know where Mother was, but he
disclosed that she “frequents the maternal grandmother’s home.” Arturo’s paternal
grandmother later told a social worker that Arturo last visited Mother at the maternal
grandparents’ house on Christmas Day in 2023.
In mid-February 2024, a social worker again visited the maternal grandmother’s
house. The social worker reported that “[a]n older gentleman who identified himself as
the maternal uncle reported that the mother did not live in the home and she only receives
mail there.” Mother later spoke with the social worker on the telephone and described
her living situation as “legally homeless,” but she “verified sleeping at the maternal
grandmother’s home nightly.” A social worker made unannounced visits to the maternal
grandparents’ house on February 29 and March 2, 2024. During the second visit, “the
maternal uncle and maternal great grandmother indicated [Mother] and Julius did not
reside at that residence and were homeless.” The maternal great-grandmother said that
Mother “comes and goes” at the maternal grandparents’ house.
In February 2024, the social worker questioned Mother about whether she had any
Indian ancestry, and Mother denied that she did.1 Mother denied that she had ever lived
1 Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory
language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect
is intended.
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or attended school on a reservation or received any benefits from an Indian tribe. In mid-
February 2024, the social worker spoke with a liaison from the Torres Martinez Desert
Cahuilla Indians, who confirmed that Mother was not a registered member of that
federally recognized tribe.2 (87 Fed.Reg. 4636-02 (Jan. 28, 2022).) The social worker
reported that “[n]o information was found regarding the mother or children identifying
tribal family member information.”
The Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
as to Julius. (Unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
The petition contained allegations against Father under subdivision (a) of section 300 and
against both parents under subdivisions (b)(1) and (g).
Mother appeared at the initial hearing with Julius. Mother’s counsel represented
that Mother had been staying with the maternal grandfather. Father was not present,
because he was in jail. Several of Julius’s paternal relatives, including Father’s sister
Ariana A., attended the hearing. The court continued the hearing for one day to allow
Father to attend but questioned the paternal relatives who were present about Indian
ancestry. All paternal relatives denied any Indian ancestry. Mother filed a Judicial
Council form ICWA-020 (ICWA-020) stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry.
Father was present in custody at the continued detention hearing the following
day. Father’s counsel stated that Father had no Indian ancestry and would later file an
2 The record does not contain any information explaining why the social worker
contacted the tribe. There is no indication in the record that anyone identified Mother or
any relative as being a member of the Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians.
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ICWA-020. That day, Father’s counsel filed the ICWA form on Father’s behalf, stating
that Father had no Indian ancestry.
The court detained Julius from both parents and detained Arturo and A.F. from
Mother. Julius was placed with his paternal aunt, Ariana, and Arturo and A.F. were
placed with their respective fathers. The court found that there was no reason to believe
that Julius was an Indian child.
In June 2024, the Department filed an amended petition containing new
allegations involving A.F. under subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) of section 300 against
Mother and A.F.’s father. At the detention hearing on the amended petition, the court
detained A.F. from his father. Mother and her sister, Miranda R. appeared at that
hearing. Miranda told the court that she was unaware of any Indian ancestry within the
family.
After several continuances, the court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition
hearing in September 2024. Mother reported that she continued to live at the maternal
grandfather’s house. The court found true the allegations as to Julius against both
parents. The court removed Julius from both parents’ custody, ordered reunification
services for Mother, and bypassed reunification services for Father under subdivision
(e)(1) of section 361.5. The court found that ICWA did not apply.
In the period between the detention hearing and the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, both parents told a social worker that they did not have any Indian ancestry.
Mother repeatedly reiterated that denial after the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
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The court terminated Mother’s reunification services at a combined six- and 12-
month status review hearing in May 2025, and it set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing as to Julius. In subsequent reports, the Department did not identify any new
relatives questioned about Indian ancestry.
The court held the section 366.26 hearing in December 2025. The court found
Julius likely to be adopted and terminated both parents’ parental rights. Although the
court did not make an express ICWA finding at the section 366.26 hearing, the order
terminating parental rights “was necessarily premised on a current finding by the juvenile
court” that ICWA did not apply to Julius. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10.)
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court prejudicially erred by failing to ensure that
the Department conducted an adequate ICWA inquiry. We agree. The Department failed
to discharge its duty of initial inquiry with respect to certain maternal extended family
members.
To be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA, a child must be either (1) a
member or citizen of a federally recognized Indian tribe, or (2) eligible for membership
or citizenship in such a tribe and the biological child of a member or citizen. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4), (8); § 224.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(1); In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
334, 338.) The child welfare agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty
of initial inquiry and the duty of further inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
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671, 678 (Ricky R.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1152, fn. 18.)
“The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.” (Ricky R.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) The child welfare agency’s duty to inquire begins
“when first contacted regarding a child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The agency must ask
the “party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the
child may be an Indian child,” and the agency must also ask the child and the child’s
family members, including extended family members, upon first contact with those
individuals. (Ibid.) In addition, if the child is taken into the agency’s temporary custody
under section 306, “or if they were initially taken into protective custody pursuant to a
warrant described in Section 340,” then the agency must ask “the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults who are
the child’s stepparents, grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, and first or second cousins. (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Juvenile courts must conduct their own initial inquiry as well. “Federal
regulations require state courts to ask each participant ‘at the commencement’ of a child
custody proceeding ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is
an Indian child.’” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678-679, quoting 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a) (2022).) Similarly, state law requires the court to pursue an ICWA inquiry at
the first hearing on a dependency petition (or at the first court appearance of a party or
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“other interested person[],” if the party or other interested person was not present at the
first hearing). (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
“‘[R]eason to believe that an Indian child is involved’ triggers the duty of further
inquiry. [Citation.] ‘[R]eason to believe’ exists whenever the court or [the child welfare
agency] has ‘information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member [or citizen], or may be eligible for membership [or citizenship], in an Indian
tribe.’” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 679, quoting § 224.2, subd. (e), 1st par. &
(e)(1).)
The juvenile court may find that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings if it
finds “that an agency’s inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the
resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) The “court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is
adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation]
subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed
record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.
However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by
sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by California law [citation],
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did
not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry
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is inadequate, conditional reversal [of an order terminating parental rights] is required so
the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the
child.” (Ibid.)
The Department failed to inquire of maternal extended family members who were
reasonably available in this case. The Department had contact information for the
maternal grandparents but never asked them about Indian ancestry. Social workers
visited their home multiple times before the initial petition was filed, but there is no
evidence that the Department attempted to communicate with either of them during those
visits. There is also no evidence that the Department attempted to contact them after the
proceeding was initiated.
Mother contends that the Department also erred by failing to ask the maternal
great-uncle about possible Indian ancestry, but we find no error with respect to him. He
does not qualify as an extended family member under the statutory definition.3 (§ 224.1,
subd. (c)(1); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.)
The court and the Department asked only Mother and the maternal aunt about
Mother’s ancestry. Given that (1) inquiry was made of only those two individuals, (2)
the maternal grandparents were likely to be good sources of information on the issue, and
3 On appeal, the parties appear to agree that the person who spoke to the social
worker at the maternal grandparents’ house is the maternal great-uncle, but there is some
confusion in the record on that point. The Department referred to an older man at the
maternal grandparents’ house as both the maternal great-uncle and the maternal uncle. If
the Department determines that the person is Julius’s uncle and not his great-uncle, then
the maternal uncle does qualify as an extended family member and the Department
should ask him about possible Indian ancestry.
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(3) the maternal grandparents were readily available, the juvenile court abused its
discretion by finding that the ICWA inquiry was adequate, proper, and duly diligent.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) We therefore conditionally reverse the order
terminating parental rights and remand for the Department to conduct a proper inquiry.
(Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. On remand, the
juvenile court shall order the Department to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under
subdivision (b) of section 224.2 and, if applicable, the duty of further inquiry (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)) and the duty to provide notice to the proper tribes (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a);
§ 224.3). The court shall also order the Department to comply with the documentation
requirements of rule 5.481(a)(5) of the California Rules of Court. If the court
subsequently determines that the Department has complied and that ICWA does not
apply, then the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If the court
determines that ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and
related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
LEE
J.
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