People v. Lainez CA2/6

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Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Lainez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B321851
(Super. Ct. No. 1501755)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

JOSE BALMORE SAVARIA
LAINEZ, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Jose Balmore Saravia Lainez (Balmore), Jose Ricardo
Saravia Lainez (Ricardo), and Jose Narciso Escobar Hernandez
(Hernandez) appeal after a jury convicted them on multiple
counts of first-degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189),
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), and criminal
street gang conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182.5). The jury also
found true various gang, principal firearm discharge, and murder

1 Unless otherwise noted, all undesignated statutory

references are to the Penal Code.
special-circumstance allegations (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4), 190.2,
subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). Appellants were each
sentenced to lengthy prison terms that include multiple
indeterminate terms of life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP), and were ordered to pay fines and assessments.2
Appellants contend the trial court erred in finding the
prosecution did not unlawfully discriminate in exercising a
peremptory challenge against a prospective juror and raise
collective and individual claims of insufficient evidence,
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), and instructional,
evidentiary, prosecutorial, and cumulative error. Appellants also
request our independent review of the in camera hearings and
sealed materials related to their Hobbs motions. (People v. Hobbs
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (Hobbs).) Finally, appellants ask us to
strike and/or order correction of their fines and assessments.
We shall order that appellants’ parole revocation fines be
stricken and that Ricardo and Hernandez’s court operations and
court facilities assessments be corrected. We shall also order

2 Codefendants Jose Juan Sanchez Torres (Jose Torres) and

Olvin Serrano each pleaded guilty to two attempted murders and
admitted gang enhancement allegations and were each sentenced
to terms of 24 years and 8 months in state prison. In a separate
jury trial, codefendants Luis German Mejia Orellana (Luis), Juan
Carlos Lozano Membreno (Membreno), Marcos Manuel Sanchez
Torres (Marcos Torres), Juan Carlos Urbina Serrano (Juan
Serrano), and Tranquilino Robles Morales (Morales) were each
convicted and sentenced to indeterminate terms on multiple
counts of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and criminal
street gang conspiracy, and each of them have appealed (People
v. Torres, et al., B320379.) Charges were dismissed against prior
codefendant Emadalio Mejia Bonilla (Bonilla) after he was
sentenced to an LWOP term in a federal case.

2
correction of the minute order regarding Hernandez’s sentence.
Otherwise, we affirm.
Gang Evidence
Appellants were each convicted of committing their crimes
as active members of and participants in the Santa Maria Little
Salvy Loco Salvatruchas (SMLS’LS), a clique of the Mara
Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) criminal street gang.3 Santa Maria
Police Sergeant Scott Casey and former Santa Maria Police
Sergeant/current Santa Barbara District Attorney’s Office
Investigator Michael Hoffman testified as the prosecution’s gang
experts.
MS-13 was originally formed in Los Angeles by refugees
from El Salvador to provide protection from the 18th Street
criminal street gang. In 1993, the gang added “13” to its name to
show its allegiance to the Mexican Mafia state prison gang.
At all relevant times, MS-13 has engaged in a pattern of
criminal activity that includes murder, attempted murder,
extortion, and drug sales. Sergeant Casey opined among other
things that in January 2013, an individual was shot to death in
Santa Maria by SMLS’LS members because he was a perceived
rival of MS-13. Between 2013 and 2016 there were about 65,000
MS-13 members worldwide, about 7,000 to 10,000 of whom were
in the United States. All MS-13 members in the United States
are controlled by the MS-13 gang in El Salvador. MS-13’s
original motto was “kill, rape, and control.” More recently, some

3 The clique was previously named Santa Maria Lil Salvy

and identified by the moniker SMLS. In January 2016, the clique
modified its name and moniker to avoid confusion with the MS-
13 SMLS clique in El Salvador. For ease of reference, we
consistently refer to appellants’ clique as SMLS’LS.

3
MS-13 members disagreed with including “rape” in the gang’s
motto in light of the Mexican Mafia’s philosophy of not hurting
women and children.
In 2015 to 2016, SMLS’LS had 32 members. Codefendant
Juan Serrano, a.k.a. “Peligro,” was the leader of the clique. In
January 2016, Juan Serrano sent an MS-13 member in El
Salvador a list of the “homeboy” members of the SMLS’LS clique
that included appellants Balmore (a.k.a. “Duende”), Ricardo
(a.k.a, “Lagrima”), and Hernandez (a.k.a. “Cuervo”); codefendants
Olvin Serrano (a.k.a. “Catracho”), Luis (a.k.a. “Smiley”),
Membreno (a.k.a. “Psycho”), Marcos Torres (a.k.a. “Silent”), and
Morales (a.k.a. “Bandito”); former codefendant Bonilla (a.k.a.
“Espia”); and Christian Orellana (Christian; a.k.a “Maldito),
Ezequiel Escalante-Rivera (Escalante-Rivera; a.k.a. “Callado”),
David Rivera (Rivera; a.k.a. “Maliente”), and Luis David
Quintanilla (Quintanilla; a.k.a. “Fantasma”). Members achieve
“homeboy” status after they have committed a violent crime as a
form of induction and are formally “jumped in” to the gang by
being assaulted by other members. Homeboys are expected to
continue participating in and furthering MS-13’s criminal
activities. Sergeant Casey opined that Luis and Christian’s
brothers, Jose Francisco Mejia Orellana (Jose Francisco) and Jose
Eleuterio Mejia Orellana (Jose Eleuterio), and others were also
active members of and participants in the gang.
Photographs obtained from various phones and social
media depicted Balmore, Hernandez, and codefendants Morales,
Marcos Torres, and Jose and Olvin Serrano displaying MS-13’s
hand sign. A photograph from Hernandez’s phone depicted
“SMLS” graffiti from the Pirates Cove area of Avila Beach, where
the clique’s homeboys held their monthly meetings. A

4
photograph from Ricardo’s phone depicted the MS-13 creed “don’t
see, don’t hear, don’t speak.” Ricardo also exchanged text
messages with Juan Serrano and other SMLS’LS members that
discussed going after “snitches” and included photographs of MS-
13 related tattoos. Appellants were further identified as
members of the gang in a rap song video created by fellow gang
member Jose Soriano (Soriano). Based on his investigation,
Sergeant Casey opined that appellants, their co-defendants, and
others were members and active participants in SMLS’LS and
MS-13 when the charged crimes were committed.
SMLS’LS territory in Santa Maria included the area
bordered by Blosser Road to the west, Boone Street to the south,
Depot Street to the east, and Cypress Street to the north.
SMLS’LS also claimed territory in the area bordering Oxnard
and Port Hueneme. SMLS’LS and MS-13’s main rival is the 18th
Street gang and SMLS’LS’s local rivals are the Northwest and
West Park gangs. Rival gang members who enter SMLS’LS’s
territory are met with violence.
MS-13 members use coded language among themselves.
“Soup” and “crown” are code words for kill, and “chicken” is used
to refer to a potential victim or target. Members of the gang
express their disrespect for 18th Street gang members by calling
them “girls” or “chavalas,” and referring to them with the
feminine form of other Spanish words.

5
Murder Of Modesto Melendez (counts 40 & 41)4
On the night of May 16, 2015, Modesto Melendez (Modesto)
was shot to death on Williams Street in Santa Maria. A witness
who lived on nearby Pine Street was working on his car that
night when a black SUV with four male occupants parked behind
his car. The two men in the back seat of the SUV, who each
appeared to be about 25 years old and were wearing baggy
clothing and hooded sweatshirts, got out of the vehicle and
walked onto Williams Street. After four gunshots rang out, the
two men ran back onto Pine Street where the SUV picked them
up before heading south on Pine and then driving away. Other
witnesses also heard the gunshots and saw the two men running
away.
At 8:22 p.m., 911 received a call that a man appeared to
have been shot in his car on Williams Street. The police
responded to the scene and found a car parked along the curb.
The driver’s side window was shattered and Modesto was in the
driver’s seat with bullet wounds to his neck and chin and his
cellphone was in his lap near his hands. He was pronounced
dead at the scene.
A Facebook Messenger contact for “Celeste Montalvo”
(“Montalvo”), a.k.a. Aslin Bonilla, was subsequently found on
Modesto’s cellphone. The phone number used to create
“Montalvo’s” Facebook Messenger account belonged to Bonilla,
who had a tattoo of the name “Aslin” on his arm. Several
messages in the account referenced MS-13 and the account had

4 Balmore was convicted on count 40 of first-degree

murder, and Ricardo was convicted on count 41 of criminal street
gang conspiracy to commit murder. Hernandez was found not
guilty of both offenses.

6
been used to communicate with SMLS’LS member German
Rodriguez in November 2014, and with Olvin Serrano in early
2015. The account was also saved as a contact in Ricardo and
Morales’s phones.
Modesto and “Montalvo” began sending messages to each
other in January 2015, after Modesto accepted “Montalvo’s”
friend request. In their messages, Modesto and “Montalvo” both
said they were single and were from El Salvador. “Montalvo” told
Modesto her cousin was from the 18th Street gang. Modesto
replied that although he was not a member of that gang, the gang
used to take care of him, so he was not afraid. In messages sent
to a different account, Modesto stated he was a member of the
18th Street gang but had “retired.”
Two days before Modesto was murdered, “Montalvo” sent
him a photograph of a woman in lingerie and invited him to come
to her house on May 16th after her aunt left. On the morning of
May 16th, Modesto and “Montalvo” discussed their meeting and
agreed to meet at 7:30 p.m. At 7:17 p.m., “Montalvo” sent
Modesto a message stating “ ‘[m]y love, the house number is 602
Williams Street.’ ” Over the course of the day Modesto repeatedly
called the phone number “Montalvo” had given him, with the last
call being made just four minutes before the first 911 call
reporting the shooting.
Throughout that day and leading up to the time of the
shooting, Balmore, Ricardo, Bonilla, Olvin Serrano, and
Escalante-Rivera called or messaged each other numerous times.
Ricardo also repeatedly called or sent messages to a phone
number belonging to a woman named Vilma who was in a
relationship with Bonilla. Some of the calls were close in time to
the communications between Modesto and “Montalvo.” Ricardo’s

7
cellphone usage was consistent with being in the area of the
crime scene around the time of the 8:22 p.m. 911 call and then
heading south in a vehicle. Balmore’s cellphone was south of the
crime scene 20 minutes after the 911 call. Sergeant Casey opined
that Modesto’s murder benefitted appellants’ gang by eliminating
a rival gang member.
Murder Of Oscar Joaquin And Attempted Murders Of
V. Cantu and K. Ranmarine (counts 37-39)5
On July 28, 2015, Northwest gang member Cantu6 was in a
park in Santa Maria when a friend called and said his brother
had been “jumped” by rival West Park gang members. Cantu
decided to go look for West Park members to fight and was picked
up in a stolen truck by Ranmarine, a Northwest associate, and a
Northwest member named Hector. The truck subsequently
picked up a few more people, including Oscar Joaquin (Joaquin),
who was also a member or associate of the Northwest gang.
Cantu, Ranmarine, and Joaquin drove around in the truck
after the others transferred to another vehicle. After the truck
ran out of gas, they left it at a gas station at the intersection of

5Balmore and Ricardo were found guilty on counts 37, 38
and 39 of criminal street gang conspiracy to commit murder.
Hernandez was found not guilty of those crimes, and all three
appellants were found not guilty of the first-degree murder of
Joaquin and conspiracy to commit the murders of Cantu and
Ranmarine.
6 Cantu, who was charged with conspiracy to commit

assault with a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement, entered
a plea deal in which he received immunity for testifying at
appellants’ trial and was placed in the witness protection
program. Ranmarine did not testify but was also placed in
witness protection.

8
Main Street and Blosser Road and set out to walk to Cantu’s
aunt’s house. Ranmarine and Cantu each carried a machete and
Joaquin had a baseball bat. As they were walking near the
intersection of Barrett and Western Streets, which is in MS-13’s
territory, they were confronted by two men in black clothing.
One of the men said, “ ‘[w]hat’s cracking with you fools’ ” and the
other man pulled out a baseball bat. They all began fighting and
Cantu swung his machete but did not strike anyone. Gunshots
suddenly rang out and they all ran. Cantu heard nine gunshots
as he dropped his machete and ran to a nearby Walmart, where
he called his mother to pick him up.
At 10:02 p.m., a resident of the area called 911 to report
that someone had been shot in front of her house. Joaquin, who
was shot six times from behind and suffered eleven incise wounds
that included a severed wrist, was found lying on his back in the
intersection and subsequently died from his injuries. Cantu and
Ranmarine both escaped without injury.
Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent Michael Easter
analyzed the cellphone records in the case and testified for the
prosecution. The cellphone usage of Balmore, Rivera, Luis, and
Quintanilla was consistent with each of them being in the
vicinity of the crime scene around the time of the 911 call at
10:02 p.m. Ricardo’s phone was active in the area south of the
crime scene at 8:31, 10:11, and 10:14 p.m. The phones of several
other SMLS’LS members were also in the same area during the
same timeframe. Call-detail records showed an increase in the
number of calls between Balmore, Ricardo, and their fellow
SMLS’LS members from 6:00 to 10:59 p.m. Multiple calls took
place between 8:39 and 11:38 p.m., and all calls were less than a
minute long with many less than 30 seconds. According to

9
Sergeant Casey, Joaquin’s murder and the attempted murders of
Cantu and Ranmarine benefitted appellants’ gang by protecting
their territory from perceived rivals.
Attempted Murders Of E. Martinez, M. Castillo,
And J. Alfaro (counts 28-33)7
On the night of September 28, 2015, Martinez, Castillo, and
Alfaro were all shot while standing together outside a market on
the corner of Blosser Road and Cypress Street. A few weeks prior
to the shootings, Martinez and Alfaro were walking in the alley
behind the market when a black truck drove towards them. As
the truck was passing, the two young men in the truck flashed
hand signs and yelled “ ‘Mara.’ ” Martinez and Alfaro ignored
them and kept walking.
On the night of the shootings, Martinez walked to the
market and drank beer outside with Alfaro and Castillo.
Surveillance video from two nearby businesses depicted the
shootings and preceding events. At 7:51 p.m., Alfaro was seen
walking and standing by the market. A white Nissan Altima
associated with Escalante-Rivera began circling the area two
minutes later, and Martinez joined Alfaro outside the market
shortly thereafter. At 8:14 p.m., a Ford truck associated with
Membreno began circling the area. At 8:36 p.m., a blue Toyota
Corolla associated with Balmore began circling the area and
Castillo joined Martinez and Alfaro. Shortly before 11:00 p.m.,
the market closed and the employees began leaving. A few

7 Ricardo And Hernandez were found guilty on counts 28,

29 and 30 of conspiracy to commit murder, and on counts 31, 32
and 33 of criminal street gang conspiracy to commit murder.
Balmore was found not guilty on counts 28, 29 and 30, but guilty
on counts 31, 32 and 33.

10
minutes later, the Ford truck and Nissan Altima began
repeatedly circling the area. At 11:16 p.m., two individuals with
handguns approached Martinez, Alfaro and Castillo and shot all
three of them without saying anything. The assailants appeared
to be Hispanic and in their 20’s and wore dark hoodies or ski
masks over their faces. Alfaro called 911 at 11:21 p.m.
Martinez, Alfaro and Castillo all suffered significant
injuries but survived. Seventeen cartridge casings and three
intact bullets were recovered from the scene. Martinez was
hospitalized for a year as a result of his injuries and lost his right
leg, part of his intestine, one of his kidneys, and part of his liver.
All three victims denied gang membership and there was no
evidence otherwise.
The cellphone usage of Ricardo, Membreno, Marcos Torres,
Quintanilla, Rivera, and Juan Serrano was consistent with them
being in the general area of the crime scene shortly after the
shootings. The cellphone usage of Escalante-Rivera, Membreno,
Luis, and Quintanilla was consistent with them being in a vehicle
that was circling the area of the crime scene prior to the
shootings. Hernandez’s cellphone was activated in the area just
east and north of the crime scene at 10:35, 10:39, and 10:41 p.m.,
and south of the crime scene at 10:37 p.m. Between 8:01 p.m.
and Alfaro’s 911 call at 11:18 p.m., there were multiple brief calls
between Ricardo, Quintanilla, and other members of the
SMLS’LS gang. There was no activity on the phones from 11:18
until 11:23 p.m. After Alfaro’s 911 call at 11:21 p.m., there were
multiple calls between Hernandez and Quintanilla and
Hernandez and Luis.
Sergeant Casey opined that the shootings of Martinez,
Castillo and Alfaro benefitted MS-13 because the victims were

11
perceived rivals who infringed on the gang’s territory and
remained in the area after being challenged.
Murder Of Abrahan R. (count 26)8
Shortly before 7:30 p.m. on October 30, 2015, Abrahan R.
(Abrahan) and his 15-year-old brother Hugo were walking near
the corner of Smith and Cypress Streets when two men wearing
sweatshirts with their hoodies up approached them and began
shooting at them. Hugo ran to a nearby alley and heard six or
eight additional gunshots. After waiting a few minutes, Hugo
returned and found Abrahan lying on the ground and bleeding
from multiple gunshot wounds. The police received a 911 call
about the shooting at 7:39 p.m. Before Abrahan died en route to
the hospital, he told the police that the shooters fled in a gray
Chevy vehicle.
Abrahan was a former West Park gang member but had
been trying to get away from the gang. He was shot just outside
of MS-13’s territory. A couple of hours after the shooting,
Quintanilla messaged Juan Serrano that “ ‘the flower is
activated’ ” and “ ‘we crowned,’ ” which meant they had completed
their mission and killed someone.

8 Appellants were found guilty on count 26 of criminal

street gang conspiracy to commit Abrahan’s murder. They were
acquitted on count 24 of first-degree murder, and on counts 25 of
conspiracy to commit the murder of Abrahan’s brother Hugo.
(We refer to Abrahan and Hugo by their first names to protect
Hugo’s identity.) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count
27, which charged appellants with criminal street gang
conspiracy to murder Hugo, and those charges were ultimately
dismissed.

12
Balmore’s cellphone usage was consistent with being south
of the area of the crime scene around the soccer field at Depot
Street and Enos Drive between 6:11 and 7:37 p.m., and Ricardo’s
cellphone was consistent with being near the same area at 6:11
p.m. The cellphones of several other SMLS’LS members were
also consistent with being in or near the area of the crime scene
around the time of the shooting. From 5:16 p.m. and 5:22 p.m.
there were multiple brief calls between Hernandez and
Quintanila, as well as calls between Ricardo and Quintanilla,
Marcos Torres, and Jose Torres. From 7:17 p.m. until the 911
call at 7:39 p.m., there were brief calls between Balmore and
Quintanilla and Ricardo and Quintanilla, as well as calls between
other SMLS’LS members. Seconds after the 911 call there was a
call between Luis and Juan Serrano followed by brief calls
between Hernandez and Morales, Hernandez and Marcos Torres,
and Ricardo and Bonilla, in addition to several calls between
other SMLS’LS members.
Sergeant Casey opined that that the murder of Abrahan
benefitted MS-13 because he and Hugo were perceived rival gang
members.
Murder Of Ulises Garcia-Mendez And Attempted Murders Of G.
Gonzalez And R.R. Flores (counts 18-23)9
On the night of November 20, 2015, 17-year-old Ulises
Garcia-Mendez (Garcia-Mendez), 16-year-old Gonzalez, and

9 Balmore and Ricardo were convicted on count 18 of the

first degree murder of Ulises Garcia-Mendez, and on counts 19
and 20 of conspiracy to commit the murders of Gonzales and
Flores. Hernandez was found not guilty on counts 18, 19, and 20,
but guilty on counts 21, 22, and 23 of criminal street gang
conspiracy.

13
Gonzalez’s uncle Flores were walking on Thornburg Street when
three men approached, shot all three of them, and then ran away.
Before the shooting, one of the perpetrators said, “what’s up.”
The police received a 911 call about the shootings at 7:56
p.m. Gonzalez and Flores survived but Garcia-Mendez, who was
shot 10 times, did not. The police recovered 16 nine-millimeter
Luger shell casings near Garcia-Mendez’s body, all of which had
an “RP” or “A-USA” head stamp.
Sergeant Casey opined that Gonzalez and Flores were
members of the West Park gang. Garcia-Mendez was not known
to be associated with any gang.
Cellphone usage of Balmore and other SMLS’LS members
was consistent with them being at the area of the crime scene
around the time of the 911 call. Hernandez’s phone was active in
the area north of the crime scene at 6:21 p.m. and 8:02 p.m., and
Ricardo’s phone was active in the same area at 7:59 p.m.
Hernandez’s phone activated the same cell tower and sector as
Ricardo’s phone. Between 6:49 p.m. and the 911 call at 7:56 p.m.,
there were multiple brief calls between Balmore and other
SMLS’LS members. Shortly after the 911 call, there were calls
between Balmore and Morales, Balmore and Quintanilla, and
Ricardo and Membreno. At 8:02 p.m., Ricardo texted Balmore
“Brother, was the soup already made?” At 8:03 p.m. there was a
call between Balmore and Ricardo, followed by calls several
minutes later between Juan Serrano and Marcos Torres and a
call from Hernandez to Juan Serrano. At 9:02 p.m., Ricardo sent
Juan Serrano a text asking, “which chicken did you guys fly,”
followed by a call between them at 9:07 p.m.

14
Sergeant Casey opined that the shootings benefitted MS-13
by eliminating rivals, which allowed them to expand their
territory and control.
Murder Of Brayan Mejia Molina (counts 16 & 17)10
On the night of December 4, 2015, 18-year-old Brayan
Mejia Molina (Brayan) was shot to death while in his vehicle near
his residence on Sonya Lane. A witness saw a light-skinned
individual shooting into the vehicle. Another witness who lived
on Sonya Lane heard the gunshots, looked outside, and saw two
young light-skinned Hispanic men run away to the nearby cul-de-
sac behind a gate. She then saw two vehicles in the cul-de-sac
turn around. After being shot, Brayan crashed his vehicle into a
light pole. He sustained 10 gunshot wounds and died at the
scene.
Mr. Mejia, Brayan’s father, subsequently provided the
police with a video of Brayan dancing while wearing a soccer
jersey with the number “18” on it. The police also obtained a
photograph of Brayan, who was from an area dominated by the
18th Street gang, pointing a middle finger toward someone
throwing an MS-13 gang sign.
The cellphone usage of Balmore, Ricardo, Hernandez, and
other SMLS’LS members was consistent with them being at the
area of the crime scene around the time of the 911 call at 9:34
p.m. Between 8:36 and 9:21 p.m., there were multiple brief calls
between Balmore and others. Less than a minute after the 911

10 Balmore and Ricardo were convicted on count 16 of first

degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to
Hernandez on that count, but convicted him on count 17 of
criminal street gang conspiracy to commit murder.

15
call there was a 17-minute call between Hernandez and Juan
Serrano, followed by a call from Luis to Balmore that was either
“dropped” or went directly to voicemail. At 11:32 p.m., Richard
texted Juan Serrano “We crowned, fool,” meaning they had killed
someone. At 12:08 a.m., Ricardo sent Escalante-Rivera a news
article about the shooting. At 1:31 a.m., he sent Bonilla a text in
Ohio stating, “We made soup today.”
Sergeant Casey opined that Brayan’s murder benefitted
MS-13 by eliminating a perceived or actual rival.
Murders Of Javier Murillo-Sanchez And Aaron Hernandez-
Sanchez (counts 12-15)11
At about 6:30 p.m. on January 12, 2016, cousins Javier
Murillo-Sanchez (Murillo-Sanchez) and Aaron Hernandez-
Sanchez (Hernandez-Sanchez) were shot to death while walking
together on South Oakley Avenue. Surveillance video from a
nearby business showed a car pull up and park near the
southeast corner of Church Street and South Oakley Avenue
while a second car parked further north on South Oakley and a
third car was on Church Street to the west. After the victims
walked past the first car, three men got out, started following
them, and shot them while they were crossing the street. The
suspects then ran to their car and all three cars drove away.
Each victim sustained seven gunshot wounds.
The cellphone usage of Balmore, Hernandez, and six of
their codefendants was consistent with all of them being at the

11 Ricardo and Hernandez were convicted on counts 12 and

13 of first degree murder. Balmore was found not guilty on those
counts, but guilty on counts 14 and 15 of criminal street gang
conspiracy to commit murder.

16
area of the crime scene around the time of the 911 call at 6:31
p.m. Ricardo’s phone was not in the crime scene area around
6:31 p.m. but moved south of the area after the 911 call was
made. There were multiple brief calls among the group between
5:51 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., followed by multiple brief calls after the
911 call was made. A couple of hours later, Ricardo messaged
Soriano that they were “[c]elebrating a double soup” and added,
“two chickens, we made soup” and “[h]ere we are eating the
soup.”
The shootings occurred just outside of MS-13’s claimed
territory. Murillo-Sanchez was a West Park gang member, but
there was no evidence that Hernandez-Sanchez had any gang
affiliation. Sergeant Casey opined that Murillo-Sanchez and
Hernandez-Sanchez were targeted because of where they were
walking and how they were dressed and that the murders
benefitted MS-13 by eliminating perceived rivals who were
“infringing” on the gang’s territory.
Murders Of Augustine Jaime Montano-Barajas And Donaciano
Morales-Suarez (counts 8-11)12
At approximately 9:45 p.m. on January 25, 2016, Augustine
Jaime Montano-Barajas (Montano-Barajas) and Donaciano
Morales-Suarez (Morales-Suarez) were shot to death while in
Morales-Suarez’s car on South Elizabeth Street. Morales-Suarez
crashed the car after being shot three times. Montano-Barajas,
the front seat passenger, sustained 13 gunshot wounds.

12 Ricardo and Hernandez were convicted on counts 8 and 9

of first degree murder. Balmore was found not guilty on those
counts, but guilty on counts 10 and 11 of criminal street gang
conspiracy to commit murder.

17
A witness who called 911 at 9:46 p.m. reported seeing two
“gang members” outside his house “running around shooting”
before running towards the intersection of South Elizabeth and
East Cook Streets. Shortly after the shootings, another witness
who lived on East Cook Street saw two men run and get into the
backseat of a car that drove away. A third witness, who also
lived on East Cook Street, saw two men in dark clothing walking
on the street before getting into a car that drove away; one of the
men got in the front passenger seat, while the other got in the
rear passenger seat behind the driver.
Sergeant Casey opined that Montano-Barajas was an 18th
Street gang member because he had numerous gang-related
tattoos and there were photographs of him wearing an “18” jersey
and making one of the gang’s hand signs. There was no evidence
that Morales-Suarez had any gang affiliation.
The shootings occurred as Morales-Suarez was dropping
Montano-Barajas off at his residence after the two had worked
out at a nearby gym where Balmore and Morales were also
members. Shortly after Morales-Suarez had signed into the gym
six nights earlier, Morales texted Juan Serrano that he was at
the gym and that “ ‘there is a girl here from the alley.’ ” The next
evening, Ricardo texted Morales “ ‘we are here ready. The girls
didn’t go. Let us know.’ ” Morales responded “ ‘[t]he chicken fell
down’ ” and Ricard replied, “ ‘[a]ll right. We’re going now.’ ”
Morales subsequently sent a message to Marcos Torres stating
that “ ‘[t]he signal will be when I call you’ ” and giving a
description of two men, one “ ‘tall’ ” and one “ ‘short.’ ”
On the night of the murders, Morales-Suarez signed into
the gym at 8:13 p.m. At 9:48 p.m., the police received a 911 call
reporting a suspicious black truck in the area where the

18
shootings occurred. At 11:19 p.m., Ricardo texted Juan Serrano
that the “pigeon” was gone. The next day, Bonilla sent
Membreno a message from Ohio congratulating him on “making
soups” and urging him to “keep it up.”
The cellphone usage of Hernandez, Membreno, Morales,
Juan Serrano, and Luis were consistent with each of them being
at the area of the crime scene around the time of the 911 call at
9:46 p.m. Ricardo’s phone was south of the crime scene at 9:18
p.m. There were multiple brief calls and texts among the group
that night prior to and shortly after the murders, as well as a
brief call between Balmore and Morales at 6:03 p.m.
Sergeant Casey opined that Montano-Barajas was targeted
by MS-13 as a result of his tattoos and that his murder benefitted
the gang because it involved tracking and eliminating a member
of the gang’s primary rival.
Conspiracy To Murder J.M. Melendez And S. Melendez And
Criminal Street Gang Conspiracy (counts 5 - 7)
In December 2015, J.M. Melendez (J.M.) and his uncle S.
Melendez (Melendez) lived in Guadalupe. Modesto, who was
murdered in May 2015 (see ante, p. 6), was J.M.’s cousin.
On December 2, 2015, Bonilla, who was in Ohio, told
Ricardo he had photographs of rivals in Guadalupe and sent
Facebook profile screenshots of J.M., Melendez, and three other
men. Ricardo responded that they would “make soup” later.
Bonilla replied that he was going to kill someone soon and sent
Ricardo an image of a person’s back with a large 18th Street
tattoo. Ricardo sent the screenshots he had received from Bonilla
to Marcos Torres, Olvin and Juan Serrano, and Escalante-Rivera,
and they all discussed the individuals depicted in the
screenshots.

19
On January 28, 2016, wiretaps were authorized on Balmore
and Ricardo’s cellphones. On February 17, 2016, authorized
wiretaps were added to Hernandez and Luis’s phones.
In January and February 2016, J.M. and Melendez were
working in the agricultural field on Garey Street with a crew that
included Luis, a.k.a. “Min”; Marcos Torres; Jose Torres’s
girlfriend Enedina Tomas, a.k.a. “Mimi;” J.M.’s cousin Franklin;
and a woman named Mayra. J.M. drove a green Toyota Corolla,
and Franklin drove a white Honda Civic.
On February 2, 2016, Ricardo and Luis talked about going
to look for “girls.” Luis said that Juan Serrano would be driving
a gray car and that Membreno would be driving “the bambina,” a
black Ford F-150 truck that belonged to the clique. The next day,
Ricardo and Marcos Torres discussed going to find the targeted
victims.
On February 6, Ricardo, Hernandez, Luis, Membreno, and
Morales agreed to meet up and look for “the girls” after they got
off work. Ricardo and Luis agreed they would not let “those
fuckers” get away. They expressed concern about missing the
victims and discussed going to the agricultural field to find them.
Shortly thereafter, Luis told Ricardo the victims were in a white
Honda and a green Toyota that was driving into a nearby gas
station. Luis confirmed that J.M. was driving the Toyota. At
1:16 p.m., Ricardo and Luis discussed going to Guadalupe and
having Olvin Serrano flash his lights when he pulled up behind
them.
At 1:37 p.m., Ricardo told Luis he had lost sight of J.M.’s
Toyota and asked for the vehicle’s license plate number. Luis did
not know that information and instead gave Ricardo the partial
license plate number of the white Honda. At 1:50 p.m., Ricardo

20
and Luis discussed meeting at Olvin Serrano’s house. Luis also
told Ricardo he had “two tacos,” i.e. drugs, and Ricardo said
someone wanted one
At 3:29 p.m., Carlos Antonio Rivera Mendez, a.k.a. “Tono,”
asked Ricardo if he wanted “to go and run” at Los Pozos and
asked him to contact Luis. A minute later, Ricardo and Luis
discussed wanting “to go run.” Luis noted they did not have a car
and told Ricardo the “chickens” were returning to work. Ricardo
replied, “It’s hard to do that [thing] there.” They agreed to
continue looking.
At 11:10 a.m. on Sunday, February 7, Ricardo asked Luis if
they were already in Guadalupe. Luis replied that he and Olvin
Serrano were almost there. In a 2:49 p.m. group call with
Hernandez, Luis, and Juan Serrano, Ricardo said they needed to
“make sure” that “the chickens” were there. Three minutes later,
Ricardo and Morales discussed going to look for “the chickens” at
around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. Ricardo told Morales to take Balmore’s
car.
At 4:27 p.m., Ricardo and Balmore discussed taking
Balmore’s gray car at around 6:00 p.m. to find the “chickens” and
“turn them into soup.” Approximately 30 minutes later, Balmore
told Morales he would pick him up in 20 minutes. At 5:21 p.m.,
Balmore and Morales arrived at Ricardo’s residence to pick him
up. At 5:50 p.m., Ricardo told Juan Serrano that “we” were
where J.M. and Melendez were supposed to be, but the police
were present. Ricardo said they would return the following day.
That same day, the police went to conduct video
surveillance at Minami Park and the adjoining soccer fields.
Hernandez arrived at the soccer field driving a black Ford F-150
truck along with Ricardo, who was wearing a jersey with the

21
number “13” on it, and Ricardo’s girlfriend Mayra Ortega. Juan
Serrano arrived in a Toyota Camry. Orellana, Membreno, and
Marcos Torres were also present.
Before Ricardo’s 5:50 call with Juan Serrano, police
detectives identified Franklin’s white Honda and located J.M.
and Melendez at a soccer field in Guadalupe. The detectives told
J.M. and Melendez their lives were in danger and took them into
protective custody.
The next day, the SMLS’LS members continued looking for
J.M. and Melendez. At 6:51 a.m. that morning, Luis told Ricardo
that he and others had gone to where J.M. and Melendez had
been the day before but did not find them. A few hours later,
Ricardo had Jose Torres contact “Mimi” to find out J.M. and
Melendez’s work schedule.
In another series of phone calls, Balmore agreed to help
Marcos Torres get his car released from impound at the Santa
Maria police station. Balmore and his girlfriend subsequently
arrived at the police station in a black Yukon. Membreno,
Marcos Torres, and Marcos Torres’s girlfriend Mayra Gomez
arrived in Membreno’s Ford F-150 truck, which had distinctive
white striping on the sides and back. In other calls later that
day, Luis told Ricardo that Membreno and Jose Torres had not
seen J.M. and Melendez in the fields, and Ricardo and Balmore
discussed not finding them at their residences. The following
day, Ricardo and Juan Serrano discussed their inability to find
the “chickens” and said they had disappeared because they were
afraid.
In a February 10, 2016 phone call, Ricardo told Bonilla they
were ready and had planned to get J.M. and Melendez but they
had disappeared. Bonilla suggested that J.M. and Melendez

22
might have known they were being followed and that Ricardo
should also be alert because the police might be aware of what
was happening. That afternoon, Ricardo and Morales agreed to
go to Guadalupe to continue looking for J.M. and Melendez.
Later, Ricardo told Hernandez that he and Morales had arrived
in Guadalupe. Hernandez said that he, Membreno, Luis, and
“Mimi” had unsuccessfully looked for J.M. and Melendez at their
workplace.
On the afternoon of February 12, 2016, the police issued a
ruse press release stating that J.M. and Melendez had been
arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for identity
fraud. Approximately 40 minutes later, Ricardo told Hernandez
that J.M. and Melendez had been arrested by immigration
authorities.
Sergeant Casey opined that murdering J.M. and Melendez
would have benefitted MS-13 because the men were perceived
rivals of the gang and the elimination of rivals benefits the gang.
Conspiracy To Commit Murder Of John Doe 1 (count 1)13
On February 13, 2016, Ricardo, Balmore, Escalante-Rivera,
Morales, Membreno, and Marco Torres discussed meeting at 7:00
p.m. at the beach. SMLS’LS members held their gang meetings
at Pirate’s Cove near Avila Beach. On the afternoon of February
16, Luis talked to Ricardo about doing “gang business” in Oxnard.
On February 18, Ricardo and Hernandez participated in calls
regarding the sale and delivery of narcotics and Ricardo inquired
regarding the status of the previously discussed plans to buy two
firearms in Bakersfield.

13Appellants were found not guilty on counts 2, 3, and 4 of
conspiracy to commit the murders of John Does 2, 3, and 4.

23
On February 20, 2016, Sergeant Casey discovered that
several SMLS’LS members had travelled to Bakersfield. During
phone calls, Ricardo discussed testing and purchasing a .38-
caliber firearm. Later that evening, Luis told Hernandez he was
in Bakersfield with his brothers and had just purchased a gun.
On February 21, Luis told Ricardo that his brother Jose Eleuterio
would be travelling to Oxnard with one of the guns the next day.
Morales later called Ricardo to confirm he had the .38-caliber
firearm.
The next day, Balmore and several other SMLS’LS
members travelled from Santa Maria to Oxnard. Hernandez and
Marcos Torres discussed picking up a firearm and giving it to
Balmore, and Balmore and Marcos Torres discussed taking “the
toys” to Oxnard. Hernandez also told Juan Serrano he would
bring “the girl,” i.e., the gun, to “those fools” in Oxnard.
At 5:28 p.m., Hernandez asked Soriano, who lived in
Oxnard, if there were any rival gang members there and Soriano
replied they were “always here.” Hernandez said Balmore and
Morales were also coming to Oxnard and were bringing guns,
including a CZ and the recently purchased .38-caliber firearm.
Concerned by what they were hearing, the Santa Maria
police alerted the Oxnard Police Department and continued
providing them with updated information. The Oxnard police
sent a heavy presence to several locations around Perkins Road
and Cuesta Del Mar Drive based on the cellphone pings and
drove with their lights and sirens on for approximately two
hours.
At 7:10 p.m., Hernandez and Juan Serrano, who did not go
to Oxnard, discussed awaiting news from their fellow gang
members who were there. A minute later, Hernandez called

24
Catherine Rodriguez, a.k.a. “Lazy,” and told her Balmore was in
Oxnard. Hernandez and Rodriguez also discussed a shooting in
Oxnard on February 16 in which Hernandez had participated. At
7:26, Luis referred to the alleyways near the intersection of
Perkins and Cuesta Del Mar and told Christian that four rivals
were coming down the alleyway by the school. A few minutes
later, Christian confirmed that Balmore and Jose Francisco were
positioned in their cars near the alleyway. Luis expressed
concern that there were too many surveillance cameras in the
area and told Christian to get set up in a more secure location.
At 7:43 p.m., Luis told Juan Serrano they had lost sight of
their targets after they went into an apartment complex and
were waiting for them to come out to an area away from the
surveillance cameras. Luis reported that he was in a car with
Morales and Marcos Torres while Balmore was in another car.
At 8:02 p.m., Luis said that rivals had fired a shot, that there
were a lot of police in the area with their sirens on, and that they
would wait and see if they could get their targets to move closer
to the 101 Freeway. At 8:54, Marcos Torres told Luis they were
heading back to Santa Maria. At 10:10 p.m., Balmore texted
Ricardo that they were just leaving. Ricardo asked if they “made
soup” and Balmore replied they had not because the area was
“really hot” with the police.
On the morning of February 23, 2016, Ricardo asked Luis if
they were going back to Oxnard. Ricardo said he had heard “it’s
hot down there.” Luis and Membreno subsequently discussed
consulting with Hernandez on whether they would be going back
to Oxnard. Balmore and Luis both said they would be returning,
with Luis adding that they would go back the following day.

25
The next afternoon, Ricardo, Hernandez, Membreno, Luis,
and Juan Serrano drove back to Oxnard. That night, the Oxnard
police saturated the area around Perkins and Cuesta Del Mar,
the 5400 block of J Street, and the Port Hueneme Beach public
parking lot with marked patrol cars and the sheriff’s helicopter.
Ricardo, Hernandez, and the others subsequently returned to
Santa Maria due to the high police presence. Ricardo said they
did not “make soup” because the weather was “really hot.”
Arrests, Searches, And Seizures
On March 3, 2016, appellants and their codefendants were
arrested, their residences were searched, and various items were
seized, including 40 cellphones. Items found in Ricardo’s
bedroom included 10 rounds of loose .38-special ammunition in a
box behind a dresser and a jersey with the number “13” on it.
The items recovered from a trash bag next to Hernandez’s bed
included a CZ 75B semiautomatic handgun (Gun 2) loaded with
two different brands of ammunition and a belt with the number
“13” on it. In Hernandez’s bedroom and closet the police also
found a .40-caliber magazine in a shoe, three rounds of
ammunition for a .45-caliber and .30-caliber firearm in a sock,
and two boxes of 9-millimeter and .38-special ammunition in a
paper bag with a receipt showing they were purchased in
Bakersfield on October 11, 2015. An expended .38-caliber bullet
casing was recovered from a waste basket in a bathroom.
At the residence shared by Juan Serrano and Luis, the
police seized a loaded 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol (Gun 1)
that was wrapped in a plastic bag and hidden in a toilet tank in a
bathroom. The police also recovered what appeared to be
marijuana, mini baggies with marijuana leaves in them, a digital
scale, a box containing 16 rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition,

26
and a sock containing two 9-millimeter cartridges and two .38-
special cartridges. Samples from the rear interior of a silver-gray
Toyota Camry at the property tested positive for gunshot residue.
A 9-millimeter expended casing was also found in the “windshield
wiper pocket” area of the engine compartment. A sample
obtained from the driver’s side door window of Marcos Torres’s
black Honda Civic also tested positive for gunshot residue.
DNA Evidence
Based on DNA analysis, it was determined there were at
least two contributors to the DNA mixture found on Gun 1’s grip
trigger and safety buttons, and four contributors to the mixture
found on the magazine. There was “very strong” support for the
conclusion that Juan Serrano was a contributor to the DNA
mixture obtained from Gun 1’s grip, trigger and safety buttons,
and “strong” support for the conclusion that Olvin Serrano was a
contributor to the same mixture. There was “very strong
support” for the conclusion that Hernandez was a contributor to
the DNA mixture obtained from Gun 1’s magazine; the likelihood
that Hernandez and three unknown individuals were
contributors to the DNA mixture was “approximately 110 billion
times more likely” than if four unknown individuals were the
contributors. There was “[no] support” for the inclusion of
Balmore or Ricardo.
Ballistics Evidence
Tracy Peck, a senior criminalist, with the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department, testified as the prosecution’s
firearms and toolmark expert. After analyzing and comparing
the ballistics evidence, Peck opined that a total of seven firearms,
three of which were recovered, were used in the shootings.

27
Gun 1, which was found at the residence of Juan Serrano
and Luis, was used in the December 4, 2015 shooting of Brayan
and the January 2, 2016 shootings of Murillo-Sanchez and
Hernandez-Sanchez. Gun 2, which was found at Hernandez’s
residence, was used in the May 16, 2015 shooting of Modesto.
A Glock 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol (Gun 4), which was
recovered on November 17, 2015 from a vehicle linked to Soriano,
was used in the July 28, 2015 shooting of Joaquin and the
September 28, 2015 shootings of Martinez, Castillo, and Alfaro.
A 9-millimeter pistol (Gun 5), which was not recovered, was used
in four of the shootings. The same pistol also fired the 9-
millimeter cartridge casing found in the Toyota Camry at Juan
Serrano and Luis’s residence.
Defense Evidence
Ricardo did not present any evidence on his own behalf.
Hernandez presented the testimony and report of Benjamin Rose,
an expert in digital forensics and electronic discovery. Among
other things, Rose testified that some of the prosecution’s
cellphone evidence showed Hernandez’s phone was not at or near
the location of the crimes at the times they were committed, and
that the software he used to map the cell tower sites upon which
the prosecution’s evidence was based provided a more accurate
location of those sites.
Balmore presented the testimony of gang expert Martin
Flores. Flores testified among other things that gang members
often “brag, exaggerate, [and] make up stories” about their clique.
Flores also testified that young people who are not gang members
have embraced the culture and that many famous rappers have
rapped about fabricated incidents of crime and violence.

28
Appellants’ Convictions And Sentences
The jury found Balmore guilty on 3 counts of first degree
murder (counts 16, 18, and 40), 5 counts of conspiracy to commit
murder (counts 1, 5, 6, 19, and 20), and 17 counts of criminal
street gang conspiracy to commit murder (counts 7, 10, 11, 14, 15,
17, 21-23, 26, 31-33, 37-39, and 41). As to the murders, the jury
found true special-circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§
190.2, subd. (a)(3)), lying-in-wait (id., subd. (a)(15); counts 16 and
40), and gang murder (id., subd. (a)(22)). The jury also found
true allegations as to the murder and conspiracy to commit
murder counts that the crimes were committed for the benefit of
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)), and that a
principal intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§
12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). Balmore was found not guilty of first
degree murder in counts 8, 9, 12, 13, 24, and 34, and not guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder in counts 2 through 4, 25, 28
through 30, 35, and 36. The trial court sentenced him to a total
state prison term of 385 years to life plus three consecutive
LWOP terms.
Hernandez was found guilty on 4 counts of first degree
murder (counts 8, 9, 12, and 13), 6 counts of conspiracy to commit
murder (counts 1, 5, 6, 28-30), and 13 counts of criminal street
gang conspiracy (counts 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21-23, 26, and 31-
33). As to the murders, the jury found true special-circumstance
allegations of multiple murder, lying-in-wait (counts 8 and 9),
and gang murder. The jury also found true allegations as to the
murder and conspiracy to commit murder counts that the crimes
were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that
a principal intentionally discharged a firearm causing death.
Hernandez was found not guilty of first degree murder in counts

29
18, 24, 34, and 40, not guilty of conspiracy to commit murder in
counts 2 through 4, 19, 20, 25, 35, and 36, and not guilty of
criminal street gang conspiracy in counts 37 through 39 and 41.
The court sentenced him to a total term of 339 years to life plus
four consecutive LWOP terms.14
Ricardo was found guilty on 7 counts of first degree murder
(counts 8, 9, 12, 3, 16, 18, 40), 8 counts of conspiracy to commit
murder (counts 1, 5, 6, 19, 20, 28-30), and 17 counts of criminal
street gang conspiracy (counts , 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 1-23, 26, 31-33,
37-39, 41). The jury also found gang and firearm allegations true
as to the murder and conspiracy to commit murder counts.
Ricardo was found not guilty of first degree murder in counts 24
and 34, and of conspiracy to commit murder in counts 2 through
4, 25, 35, and 36. The court sentenced him to a total term of 439
years to life plus seven consecutive LWOP terms.
The trial court also ordered each appellant to pay a $10,000
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), imposed and stayed parole
revocation fines (§ 1202.45) in the same amount, ordered each of
them to pay court operations and court facilities assessments (§
1465.68; Gov. Code, § 70373), and awarded presentence custody
credit.

As the People note, Hernandez’s minute order
14

erroneously states that he was sentenced to an aggregate term of
225 years to life plus 4 consecutive LWOP terms. We shall order
the minute dear corrected to accurately reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185.)

30
Contentions15
I.
Batson/Wheeler Motion; Code Civ. Proc. § 231.7
Appellants contend the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge against a
prospective juror with Hispanic ethnicity (Prospective Juror No.
7). They claim the court erred in concluding that recently
enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 (hereinafter section
231.7) did not apply to the case, and that the court in any event
erred in denying their motion to exclude Prospective Juror No. 7
pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d
69] and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. Ricardo also
contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel (IAC) by failing to urge the court to apply section 231.7.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusions that section
231.7 did not apply to this case and that appellants failed to
make a prima facie showing that Prospective Juror No. 7 was

15Appellants purport to join in each other’s arguments.
“While we note these joinders, they are not well taken to the
extent [appellants] have failed to argue a miscarriage of justice in
each individual circumstance.” (People v. Nilsson (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1, 12, fn. 2.) “Appellate counsel for the party
purporting to join some or all of the claims raised by another are
obligated to thoughtfully assess whether such joinder is proper as
to the specific claims and, if necessary, to provide particularized
argument in support of his or her client’s ability to seek relief on
that ground. If a party’s briefs do not provide legal argument and
citation to authority on each point raised, ‘ “the court may treat it
as waived, and pass it without consideration. . . .” ’ ” (People v.
Bryan, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363-364
(Bryan).)

31
excluded on account of her Hispanic ethnicity. Accordingly, the
court did not err in denying appellants’ Batson/Wheeler motion.
“ ‘Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson
motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial
evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] “We review a trial
court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s
justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ‘ “with great
restraint.” ’ [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses
peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great
deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide
reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court
makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the
nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are
entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 547 (Jimenez.)
“Under Batson/Wheeler jurisprudence, ‘ “[t]here ‘is a
rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being
exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to
demonstrate impermissible discrimination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(Jimenez, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 547-548.) Under a three-
step process, a defendant must first “ ‘ “make out a prima facie
case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise
to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In this
step, the party opposing the peremptory challenge must provide
‘ “ ‘evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 548.) If the trial court finds the defendant failed to set forth a
prima facie case of discrimination and the reviewing court agrees,
“the claim is resolved” on appeal. (People v. Scott (2015) 61
Cal.4th 363, 391 (Scott); see also People v. Farnam (2002) 28

32
Cal.4th 107, 135 [“[I]f we find that the trial court properly
determined that no prima facie case was made, we need not
review the adequacy of the prosecution’s justifications, if any, for
the peremptory challenges”].) A trial court’s finding on this issue
must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (See
Farnam, at p. 136.)
On January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill
No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to add section 231.7, which
creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in
the use of peremptory challenges. The new law, by its express
terms, “applies in all jury trials in which jury trial selection
begins on or after January 1, 2022.” (§ 231.7, subd. (i); Stats.
2020, ch. 318, § 2.) “Under section 231.7, the party objecting to
the peremptory challenge is no longer required to make a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination. Instead, ‘upon objection to
the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to [section
231.7],’ the party exercising the peremptory challenge must state
the reasons for exercising the challenge. [Citation.] Also, certain
reasons for a peremptory challenge are presumptively invalid
under section 231.7 unless rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence that they are unrelated to the prospective juror’s
perceived membership in a protected group and that the reasons
bear on the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. [Citation.]”
(People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, fn. omitted.)
As we have noted, section 231.7 applies to “jury trials in
which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022.” (Id.,
subd. (i).) Appellants acknowledge that jury selection in this case
began on November 1, 2021, when the prospective jurors were
given written questionnaires to fill out. (See People v. Peterson
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 428 [recognizing in the context of a capital

33
case that “[j]ury selection . . . typically begins with prospective
jurors filling out written questionnaires”].) Because jury
selection did not begin on or after January 1, 2022, the trial court
correctly concluded that section 231.7 did not apply. It is of no
moment that jury selection was still underway as of that date. If
the Legislature had intended for the statute to apply in these
circumstances, it would have said so.
We reject appellants’ assertion that the “spirit” of section
231.7 compels us to disregard the statute’s plain and express
language regarding the date of its application. (See In re Ge.M.
(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1519, 1522-1523, citation omitted [“The
court will decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute only
when to do so would inevitably frustrate the manifest purposes of
the legislation as a whole”].) The statute was enacted on January
1, 2021, yet the Legislature expressly determined that the statute
only applies to cases in which jury selection began on or after
January 1, 2022.
Following appellants’ logic, to conform with the “spirit” of
section 231.7 the law would have to be applied to all trials in
which jury selection began prior to January 1, 2022, but was still
underway as of that date. The legislative history makes clear,
however, that such a construction was deliberately rejected. As
first introduced, Assembly Bill No. 3070 stated that the law
would apply to any trial “in which jury selection has not been
completed as of January 1, 2021.” (Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) The bill was subsequently amended to
apply to trials in which jury selection “begins on or after April. 1,
2021.” (Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 13,
2020.) A week later, the language was amended again to state
that the new law only applies to trials in which jury selection

34
begins on or after January 1, 2022. (Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 20, 2020.) It is thus clear that the
Legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to trials—such
as appellants’—in which jury selection began prior to January 1,
2022 but had not been completed as of that date. Contrary to
appellants’ claim, we “may not speculate that [the] Legislature
meant something other than what it said[.]” (People v. Schoop
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 470, citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 412.)
Although the literal meaning of words in a statute
“ ‘ “ ‘ “may be disregarded to avoid absurd results,” ’ ” ’ ” courts
should do so only “ ‘in “ ‘extreme cases . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Morales (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 800, 806.) “ ‘To justify
departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the
results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could
not have intended them.’ [Citation.] Such is not the case here.”
(People v. Alaybue (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 207, 224.) Accordingly,
the court properly found that section 231.7 did not apply. It
necessarily follows Ricardo’s claim that his attorney provided IAC
by failing to object otherwise fails for lack of prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 693-694
(Strickland).)16

16 Ricardo’s request for judicial notice of five articles is

denied. He did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of
the two articles he offers as support for his claim that the court
was required to apply Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 in
adjudicating his objection to the peremptory challenge of
Prospective Juror No. 7. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th
86, 134 [“ ‘[A]s a general rule the [appellate] court should not
take . . . [judicial] notice if, upon examination of the record, it
appears that the matter has not been presented to and

35
Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that
appellants failed to meet their burden of setting forth a prima
facie case on their Batson/Wheeler motion. In denying the motion
at the first stage, the court properly found there was no evidence
the prosecutor was excusing a group of people based on their race
or ethnicity and that the prosecutor had asked numerous
questions of Prospective Juror No. 7.
As appellants acknowledge, Prospective Juror No. 7 was
the only Hispanic person against whom the prosecutor had
exercised a peremptory challenge and the jury panel included
other individuals who identified as having Hispanic ethnicity.
“Although circumstances may be imagined in which a prima facie
case could be shown on the basis of a single excusal, in the
ordinary case, including this one, to make a prima facie case after
the excusal of only one or two members of a group is very
difficult. [Citation.]” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598,
fn. 3, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Sanchez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 665, 686.) Indeed, it is “ ‘ “impossible,” ’ as a practical
matter, to draw the requisite inference [of discrimination] where
only a few members of a cognizable group have been excused and
no indelible pattern of discrimination appears. [Citations.]”
(People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 747; see also People v.
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 342-343 [trial court properly found
no prima facie case of discrimination where the prosecutor

considered by the trial court in the first instance’ ”].) In any
event, neither article supports the proposition for which it is
offered. Ricardo’s request for judicial notice of one of the same
articles and an additional three articles as support for his claim
that Evidence Code section 352.2 applies retroactively is denied
as moot in light of our Supreme Court’s recent holding to the
contrary. (See post, pp. 59-60.)

36
excused the only two African-Americans in a 78-person jury
pool].)
Here, the prosecutor also went on to note that “[b]oth the
victims in this case and the defendant[s] are of the same race.
Hispanic jurors could just as easily relate to or empathize with
the victims as [the] defendants, therefore any sort of alleged
racial-based exclusion by the People would make no logical
sense.” The prosecutor added that “we did not exercise the
peremptory challenge [against Prospective Juror No .7] for race-
based reasons, but because of the juror’s answers which led us to
believe she sympathizes with gang members and criminal
activity.” The court found that this statement “appears to the
court to be reasonable and is not a mere pretext.” (See People v.
Rushing (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 801, 811 [expression of
sympathy toward gang members was a valid race-neutral reason
for exercising peremptory challenge].) Because substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that no prima facie case of
discrimination was established, appellants’ Batson/Wheeler
motion was properly denied at the first stage. (Scott, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 391.)
II.
Sufficiency Of The Evidence
a. Hernandez - Conspiracy To Commit Murder (§ 182)
Hernandez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions on counts 28, 29, and 30 for conspiracy to
commit the first degree murders of Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro.
He contends there is no evidence from which the jury could have
reasonably found he had the specific intent to agree to kill the
victims and to commit those killings. We are not persuaded.

37
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] This determination ‘presumes in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cardenas
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821 (Cardenas).) “Reversal on this ground
is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331.)
“Conspiracy ‘ “is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is
an agreement to commit an unlawful act.” ’ [Citation.] This
crime has four elements: (1) the existence of an agreement
between at least two persons; (2) the specific intent to agree to
commit an offense; (3) the specific intent to commit the offense
that is the object of the agreement; and (4) an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, which may be committed by any
conspirator. [Citations.]” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151,
163 (Ware).)
“While it may be useful to show the precise role the
defendant intended to play in achieving the object of the
conspiracy, the prosecution is not required to establish precisely

38
how the defendant intended to achieve the ends of the conspiracy
or that the defendant’s chosen means were effective in achieving
those ends. Nor, certainly, must the prosecution establish the
intent to participate in every act necessary to complete the object
offense. [Citation.] But ultimately, to connect any individual to
the charged conspiracy, the prosecution must at least establish
that the individual specifically intended to agree to commit the
criminal offense and to play at least some role in achieving it.
[Citation.]” (Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 166–167.) The trier
of fact may infer that a conspiracy exists “ ‘ “ ‘from the conduct,
relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators
before and during the alleged conspiracy.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302-303.)
The evidence is sufficient to support Hernandez’s
convictions for conspiracy to commit the murders of Martinez,
Castillo and Alfaro. Hernandez’s arguments to the contrary fail
to account for the standard of review, which requires us to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.
(Cardenas, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 821.) Hernandez admits he
was a member of SMLS’LS when Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro
were shot, and substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that he conspired with his fellow gang members to commit those
shootings with the requisite intent to kill. The evidence at trial
set forth a longstanding modus operandi in which members of the
gang sought out rivals or perceived rivals, collectively conducted
surveillance of their intended victims with multiple vehicles, and
frequently exchanged information with each other by phone as
they determined when and where to carry out their crimes.
The evidence also established that Hernandez and his
fellow gang members employed this modus operandi in planning

39
and carrying out the murders of Martinez, Castillo, and Alfaro.
The cellphone usage of Hernandez and seven of his co-
conspirators was consistent with all of them being in the vicinity
of the crime scene when the 911 call regarding the shootings was
made at 11:21 p.m. Contrary to Hernandez’s claim, the lack of
any direct evidence that he had possession of his phone that
night did not preclude such a finding based on the circumstantial
evidence evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
Hernandez and his co-conspirators made multiple calls to each
other immediately after the 911 call, which supports an inference
that they were confirming the murders had been committed. And
when Hernandez was arrested, he was found in possession of the
gun used to kill Modesto under the same modus operandi. In
light of this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that
Hernandez “had the specific intent to agree to kill and the
specific intent to commit killings, whether personally or by
playing a role in killings carried out by others.” (Ware, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 167.)
Hernandez’s reliance on Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th 151, is
unavailing. In that case, our Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant’s “membership in a group with violent aims and his
association with individuals who commit violent crimes” was
insufficient to support a finding that he specifically intended to
commit murder or to enter an agreement to commit murder. (Id.
at p. 174.) The alleged object of the conspiracy was a
“nonspecific” agreement to kill rival gang members. (Id. at p.
163.) Here, the evidence at trial was sufficient to connect
Hernandez’s conduct and mental state specifically to the murders
of Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro and does not merely concern his
gang membership. Hernandez’s claim that the evidence is

40
insufficient to support his convictions for conspiring to commit
those murders, thus fails.
b. Hernandez - Criminal Street Gang Conspiracy (§182.5)
Hernandez contends the evidence is also insufficient to
support his convictions under section 182.5 for active
participation in a criminal street gang conspiracy to commit the
first degree murders of Molina (count 17); Garcia-Mendez,
Gonzalez and Rojas (counts 21 through 23); Abrahan (count 26);
and Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro (counts 31 through 33). We
reject this contention as well.
“Section 182.5 created a new form of conspiracy that is
distinct from the traditional understanding of the crime[.]”
(People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 261 (Johnson).) The
statute provides: “[A]ny person who actively participates in any
criminal street gang . . . with knowledge that its members engage
in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity
. . . and who willfully promotes, furthers, assists, or benefits from
any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang is guilty
of conspiracy to commit that felony and may be punished as
specified in subdivision (a) of Section 182.” (§ 182.5.)
Gang conspiracy under section 182.5 differs from
traditional criminal conspiracy in five ways. (Johnson, supra, 57
Cal.4th at pp. 261-262.) First, the defendant “must be an active
gang participant with knowledge of other members’ pattern of
criminal gang activity.” (Id. at p. 262.) Second, a gang
conspiracy requires the commission or attempted commission of
felonious criminal conduct. (Ibid.) Third, a gang conspiracy does
not require any prior agreement among the conspirators to
promote, further, or assist in the commission of a particular
target crime. Accordingly, “an active and knowing gang

41
participant who acts with the required intent to promote, further,
or assist in the commission of a felony by other gang members
can violate section 182.5.” (Ibid.) Fourth, a gang
conspiracy “requires the actual commission of felonious criminal
conduct as either an attempt or a completed crime.” (Ibid.) Fifth,
a gang conspiracy includes “not only a gang member who
promotes, furthers, or assists in the commission of a felony, [but
also] an active and knowing participant who merely benefits from
the crime’s commission, even if he or she did not promote,
further, or assist in the commission of that particular substantive
offense.” (Ibid.) The court explained, “[d]ue to the organized
nature of gangs, active gang participants may benefit from crimes
committed by other gang members. When such benefits are
proven along with the other elements of the statute, section 182.5
permits those benefitting gang participants to be convicted of
conspiracy to commit the specific offense from which they
benefitted.” (Ibid.)
Sufficient evidence supports Hernandez’s convictions for
criminal street gang conspiracy to commit the murders of Molina,
Garcia-Mendez, Gonzalez, Rojas, Abrahan, Martinez, Castillo
and Alfaro. In arguing otherwise, Hernandez again gives short
shrift to the standard of review, which compels us to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Contrary to
his claim, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the finding that
he was an active participant in SMLS’LS at all relevant times
and knew the members of the gang engaged in or had engaged in
a pattern of criminal activity. Among other things, Hernandez
does not challenge any of the gang enhancements found true as to
multiple counts of which he was convicted. There was also
evidence to support the jury’s finding that he willfully promoted,

42
furthered, or assisted in the felonious conduct upon which his
convictions under section 182.5 are based. Hernandez’s gang
employed the same modus operandi in committing all the crimes
and he participated in the phone calls and/or text messages
preceding and following each of those crimes while in the vicinity
of their commission. His claim that the evidence is insufficient to
support the challenged convictions accordingly fails.
c. Balmore – Criminal Street Gang Conspiracy
Balmore fares no better in contending the evidence is
insufficient to support his conditions for criminal street gang
conspiracy to commit the first degree murders of Montano-
Barajas and Morales-Suarez (counts 10 and 11); Murillo-Sanchez
and Hernandez-Sanchez (counts 14 and 15); Abrahan (count 26);
Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro (counts 31 through 33); and
Joaquin, Ranmarine and Cantu (count 37 through 39). He does
not dispute the evidence of his active gang membership and fails
to undermine the ample evidence of his participation in the
modus operandi employed to commit each of the crimes of which
he was convicted. Although he notes that the evidence indicates
he only participated in one phone call on the night that Montano-
Barajas and Morales-Suarez were murdered, under the totality of
the circumstances that evidence supported an inference that he
thereby willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in the
commission of the murders.
Balmore’s attempts to diminish the evidence that his
Toyota Corolla was one of the gang’s known vehicles “casing” the
area prior to the shootings of Martinez, Castillo and Alfaro are
similarly unavailing. As the People persuasively argue, “[e]ven
assuming Balmore was not the one driving the Corolla, there was
evidence that vehicles associated with the members were shared

43
amongst the members. . . . Evidence that Balmore permitted the
gang to use the car for the attack indicates he willfully furthered
or assisted in the gang’s attempted murder of Martinez, Castillo,
and Alfaro.” Balmore’s claim of insufficient evidence thus fails.
III.
Jury Instruction On Criminal Street Gang Conspiracy (§ 182.5)
Appellants contend the trial court misinstructed the jury on
the crime of criminal street gang conspiracy, as set forth in
section 182.5. They claim the court prejudicially erred in failing
to instruct that they could be found to have “willfully benefitted”
from their fellow gang members’ felonious criminal conduct only
if they “ha[d] knowledge” of that conduct “prior to or during the
commission of the charged offense.” (Italics omitted.) We are not
persuaded.
The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
all elements of any charged offense. (People v. Mil (2012) 53
Cal.4th 400, 409.) This duty extends to the general principles of
law that govern the case, i.e., those principles closely and openly
connected with the facts before the court, and which are
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v.
Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 529-530.) Pinpoint instructions
connect specific facts to a legal issue involved in the case. (People
v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 191.) Such instructions are
required to be “ ‘ “given upon request when there is evidence
supportive of the theory. . . .” ’ ” (Ibid.) But “[i]t is error to give
an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law,
has no application to the facts of the case.” (People v.
Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 66.) We consider the challenged

44
instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) And we “ ‘assume
that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding
and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’ ” (People v.
Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028, superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th
404, 509.) We also consider the arguments of counsel in
assessing the potential impact of an instruction on the jury.
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202.)
Balmore submitted a proposed jury instruction for section
182.5, for which there is no pattern instruction. He asserted that
section 182.5 “must be construed to require the defendant to
‘willfully’ benefit from and have knowledge of the charged felony
offense committed by the gang members at the time the felony is
committed.” Balmore proposed the following: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of violating Penal Code section 182.5, the
prosecution must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant actively
participated in a criminal street gang; [¶] 2. When the
defendant participated in the gang, he had knowledge members
of the street gang engaged in, or had engaged in, a pattern of
criminal activity; [¶] 3. The defendant willfully promoted,
furthered, and assisted in the felony offense charged in counts
___, by directly and actively committing the charged felony
offense or by aiding and abetting the charged felony offense. [¶]
AND [¶] 4. A member of the gang committed or attempted to
commit the felony. . . . In order [to] ‘willfully’ promote, further,
assist, or benefit, the defendant must have knowledge prior to or
during the commission of the charged offense. [¶] . . . [¶] As the

45
term is used here, a willful act is one done willingly or on
purpose. To do an act willfully is to do it knowingly.”
The prosecution filed an opposition to Balmore’s proposed
instruction. The prosecution asserted among other things that
the proposed instruction omitted the element that a defendant
can be found guilty if he “benefitted” from the underlying felony
offense and erroneously required findings that the defendant (1)
directly committed or aided and abetted the underlying felony
offense; and (2) had knowledge of the felony at the time it was
committed.
The prosecution proposed the following instruction: “The
defendants are charged . . . with criminal street gang conspiracy.
[¶] To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant actively participated in a
criminal street gang; [¶] 2. When the defendant participated in
the gang, he knew that members of the gang engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; [¶] 3. The
defendant willfully promoted, furthered, assisted, or benefitted
from any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang: [¶]
AND [¶] 4. Members of that gang committed or attempted to
commit the felony. [¶] . . . [¶] As the term is used here, a willful
act is one done willingly or on purpose. [¶] To do a thing
willfully is to do it knowingly.” Following off-the-record
discussions regarding jury instructions, the court instructed the
jury as proposed by the prosecution.
The court did not err. As the prosecution noted, Balmore’s
proposed instruction was legally incorrect. Moreover, appellants
offer no meaningful support for their assertion that a gang
member cannot be found to have “willfully benefitted” from a
felony offense of which he or she had no knowledge prior to or

46
during the commission of that offense. People v. Abbate (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 100, does not so hold. In that case, the defendant
argued that section 182.5 violates due process because it
“punishes a defendant for willfully benefitting ‘without
knowledge that the benefit received came as a result of criminal
gang conduct.’ ” (Abbate, at p. 113.) In rejecting this argument,
the court of appeal reasoned that a defendant who willfully
benefits from felonious gang conduct “impliedly knew that he or
she reaped a benefit from that conduct.” (Ibid.)
As the People note, “the knowledge requirement in
‘willfully benefits’ applies to whether the defendant knew he or
she received a benefit from the felonious gang conduct. It does
not further require that the defendant knew of the conduct before
he knowingly received the benefit.” Moreover, it is conceivable
that a gang member could willfully benefit from felonious conduct
of which he or she had no prior or contemporaneous knowledge.
For example, an individual could be found to have willfully
benefitted from his gang’s sale of drugs by receiving and
accepting money he knew was obtained through individual sales
of which he had no actual knowledge.
In any event, the prosecution did not urge the jury to
convict appellants on the mere finding that they “willfully
benefitted” from the crimes upon which their criminal street gang
conspiracy convictions are based. Rather, the prosecution
asserted that appellants willfully promoted, furthered, and
assisted the underlying felonious conduct. As Ricardo’s attorney
asserted without objection in his closing argument, on these
theories “[k]nowledge after the fact is not enough to get to you
criminal street gang conspiracy.” Counsel also argued without
objection that in order to find Ricardo guilty of criminal street

47
gang conspiracy under section 182.5 “[t]he prosecution must show
a gang-related felony or that he aided and abetted a felony
committed by gang members and he must do so knowingly, not
simply benefit after the fact.” Appellants’ claim of instructional
error accordingly fails.
IV.
Ricardo’s Wrist Restraint
Ricardo contends the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering his left wrist to be restrained during trial. We disagree.
Prior to trial, the sheriff’s office filed a motion requesting
an order that Ricardo be physically restrained during trial with
leg shackles and a restraint on his left wrist. The court granted
the motion, which set forth the requisite showing of a manifest
need for the restraints. (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th
186, 206.) Among other things, while in jail Ricardo had been
involved in a gang-related assault. (See, e.g., People v. Young
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 934 [manifest need for restraints can be
established “with ‘ “evidence that the defendant . . . threatened or
assaulted other inmates . . .” ’ ”].) Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the restraint of Ricardo’s left
wrist during trial. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270.)
Ricardo does not challenge the decision to shackle his legs.
In any event, any error in ordering that Ricardo’s wrist be
restrained would be harmless because the record contains no
evidence the restraint was visible to the jury or that it prejudiced
his right to testify or participate in his defense. (People v. Poore
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 288-289.) Trial counsel’s remark that
some of the jurors might be able to see the wrist restraint was
mere speculation. (People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th
886, 910-911; see also Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 392 [“the

48
possibility that some jurors may have perceived defendants were
wearing some type of device does not establish a constitutional
violation”].) The trial court stated “I don’t believe the custody
status is revealed” by the wrist restraint. When physical
restraints are visible to the jury, the trial court has a sua sponte
duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 204. (See People v.
Jacobs (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1140.) Ricardo, however,
does not contend the court erred in failing to give the instruction.
Moreover, the evidence at trial of Ricardo’s “violent
tendencies . . . was far stronger than any inference the jury might
have drawn from the [wrist restraint] regarding his dangerous
character.” (People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 350.)
Ricardo’s claim thus fails for lack of prejudice.
V.
Firearm/Toolmark Expert Testimony
a. Expert Peck
Appellants contend the trial court failed to exercise its
gatekeeping duty to limit the testimony of Tracy Peck, the
prosecution’s firearms and toolmark expert, as provided in People
v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504 (Azcona). We are not
persuaded.
Prior to trial, Hernandez moved in limine to exclude or
limit Peck’s testimony. The motion alleged among other things
that firearm comparison evidence is not generally accepted in the
scientific community. Hernandez requested that Peck be
precluded from testifying “that the bullets from [multiple] crime
scenes were fired from a single weapon” or that she be limited to
stating that “bullets from the multiple crime scenes are
consistent and could have been fired from [an] identifiable

49
weapon[.]” Balmore and Ricardo subsequently joined in the
motion.
The prosecutor offered that Peck would be testifying, in
accordance with the recommendations of the Association of
Firearm and Toolmark Examiners (AFTE) and the Department of
Justice, that “she would not exclude as to any other firearms” and
would “not quantify her opinion in any such way.” The court
denied the motion.
In her testimony at trial, Peck stated that her opinions
regarding firearms used in the shootings were not “to the
exclusion of every firearm in the world.” Peck also agreed there
is “some level of subjectivity in the examination of firearm
evidence” and that her opinions were subjective. She made clear
that there was no statistical certainty to her opinions.
The court did not err in declining to limit Peck’s testimony
as requested by appellants. Evidence Code sections 801 and 802
require the trial court to act as a gatekeeper to prevent the jury
from hearing unreliable expert opinions. (Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747,
769, 771.) The court’s decision on this issue is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion (id. at p. 773), and there was no abuse of
discretion here.
Azcona, on which appellants rely, is inapposite. In Azcona,
the firearm expert testified that bullet casings were fired from
the same gun “ ‘to the practical exclusion of all other guns.’ ”
(Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.) The defendant had
also unsuccessfully objected to the expert’s testimony at a
hearing held under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24. After
acknowledging our Supreme Court’s holding that Kelly did not
apply to a similar method of firearm toolmark examination, the

50
court of appeal found the defendant had in any event failed to
meet his burden of showing that a clear majority of the scientific
community no longer accepted the technique as reliable. (Azcona,
at pp. 511-513, citing People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401.)
The court of appeal also found, however, that the trial court
had failed to comply with its gatekeeping duty to ensure that the
expert’s opinion was supported by material upon which the
expert relied. (Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.) The
court noted that evidence presented by the defense at the Kelly
hearing “should have prompted the trial judge “to carefully
determine what conclusions can reliably be drawn from the
methodology in question.” (Id. at p. 513.) The expert’s testimony
that the bullet casings came from the same gun “ ‘to the practical
exclusion of all other guns’ ” amounted to “unfettered expert
testimony that went [well] beyond what the underlying material
supported.” (Id. at pp. 513-514.) The court reasoned: “There was
support for the opinion that the projectiles likely came from the
same gun, perhaps more likely than not, but there was no basis
to present it as a scientific certainty. The trial court abused its
discretion by failing to limit the expert’s opinion to what was
actually supported by the material the expert relied on.” (Id. at
p. 514.)
Azcona does not support appellants’ claim. Contrary to the
expert in Azcona, Peck made clear that her opinions were
subjective and were not stated to a scientific certainty or to the
exclusion of all other guns. As the People note, the methodology
employed by Peck—which involved the microscopic comparison of
a totality of the visual characteristics found on the projectiles—
was also “more robust . . . than the limited striation analysis”
applied in Azcona. (See Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 512.)

51
Moreover, appellants requested that Peck be limited to
stating that “bullets from the multiple crime scenes are
consistent and could have been fired from an identifiable
weapon.” Although Peck did not state her opinions to this limited
degree, she made clear those opinions were not scientifically
certain and were also subjective. Moreover, appellants each had
the opportunity to cross-examine Peck regarding her opinions.
We also agree with the People that the evidence of appellants’
guilt, independent of ballistics and firearms evidence, is strong.
Because it is not reasonably probable that the result of the
proceedings would have been different had the court limited
Peck’s testimony as requested by appellants, any error in failing
to so limit that testimony was harmless. (People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th
393, 446 [applying Watson harmless error analysis to erroneously
admitted expert testimony].)
Again, relying on Azcona, appellants also contend that
Peck’s testimony regarding peer review of her work was
testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of the federal
confrontation rights. (See Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p.
514.) As the People note, appellants did not object to that
testimony, which was actually elicited by Balmore and
Hernandez’s counsel. Because there was no objection, the
contention is forfeited. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616,
654.)
We reject appellants’ alternative contention that their
attorneys’ failure to object amounts to IAC. Even if counsel’s
failure to object constituted deficient performance, it is not
reasonably probable that any of the appellants would have
achieved a more favorable result had there been an objection.

52
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) If counsel had objected
when the allegedly objectionable testimony regarding peer review
was elicited or given, the court could have prevented the jury
from hearing it or ordered it stricken with an admonition not to
consider it. But the jury still would have heard Peck’s opinions
and been presented with the evidence she relied on to reach those
opinions. The jury also still would have heard and considered all
of the other testimony and evidence at trial, which is
independently sufficient to reject the finding of prejudice here.
Appellants’ IAC claim accordingly fails.
b. Exclusion Of Proposed Defense Expert
Appellants contend the trial court also abused its discretion
in excluding the proffered testimony of Dean Faigman, a
purported defense expert on the reliability of firearm toolmark
methodology. We disagree.
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved in limine to
exclude Faigman’s testimony. Faigman had testified at an
Evidence Code section 402 hearing at the trial of appellants’
codefendants, in which the trial judge ultimately found that
firearms identification evidence was not subject to the
requirements of Kelly. The prosecution asserted that Faigman
did not qualify as an expert in ballistics under Sargon and
Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 because he is merely “an
academic scholar” without any expertise, training, or experience
in toolmarking or ballistic comparison. The prosecution also
offered that the trial judge in the codefendants’ trial had already
resolved the issue and found Faigman’s opinions to be outside of
mainstream science.
The prosecution submitted transcripts of Faigman’s
testimony at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing at the

53
codefendants’ trial, the trial judge’s ruling, and Faigman’s
declaration as exhibits. Faigman’s declaration states he is a
leading scholar on “the use of scientific research in legal decision
making” whose writings and teachings relate to “forensic science
and issues surrounding proper scientific methodology for
scientific evidence offered in applied settings, in particular
including courtrooms.” The stated “core concern” is “whether
firearms identification expertise . . . is generally accepted by the
scientific community and possesses a methodological and
statistical foundation adequate to support the opinion of firearm
expert witnesses in court.” Faigman asserted that scientific
studies did not support Peck’s claim that the source of fired
bullets and cartridge cases could be identified or linked to one
another, and that the underlying theory and techniques were also
not accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community.
Faigman declared that “firearms examiners should not be
permitted to offer an opinion that a particular bullet or cartridge
case came from a particular firearm. A firearms examiner should
be limited to testifying only that a particular bullet or cartridge
case came from a general type or class of firearms.”
At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the trial court gave
a tentative decision to exclude Faigman from testifying because
he was a law professor with no experience in firearms, his
proffered testimony on scientific research and legal
decision making was irrelevant, “and to the extent it is relevant,
that’s the purview of the finder of fact.” The court added that a
firearms expert or defense counsel, and not merely “an expert in
legal theory,” could challenge Peck’s conclusions and any flaw in
how error was measured.

54
In opposing the motion, Hernandez asserted that Faigman
was a qualified expert under Evidence Code section 720 and that
his testimony discrediting the prosecution expert’s methodology
was admissible. Balmore and Ricardo subsequently joined in
Hernandez’s arguments. Appellants noted that the judge in the
codefendants’ trial stated the defense had presented legitimate
criticisms regarding the reliability of the ballistics comparison
analysis. Appellants argued that “[f]irearms identification
evidence is, at this juncture, not generally accepted by the
relevant scientific community” and Faigman should be allowed
“to testify about the many issues in accepting that testimony at
face value.”
In a reply, the prosecution argued that Faigman’s
proffered opinion on whether firearms examination evidence
should be used as evidence in a criminal case was a legal
conclusion usurping the court’s gatekeeping role, which the court
had already exercised. The prosecution asserted it was not the
province of an expert to testify, as proffered by Faigman, that
“the [c]ourt should never have permitted the firearms matching
testimony and that, now that the testimony will be admitted, the
jury should disregard it.” The prosecution further asserted that
the microscopic comparison of cartridge casings done in this case
was the same as the one done in Azcona and did not fall within
Kelly. Moreover, the exclusion of Faigman did not violate
appellants’ right to present a defense because he did not
qualify as an expert “in study design or the foundational validity
of the field of firearms identification” and his opinion was based
on a theory outside the mainstream of science and unsupported
by scientists in the toolmarking field.

55
At the next hearing on the motion, the court reiterated the
grounds for its tentative ruling excluding Faigman’s testimony.
The court noted that Faigman’s testimony would be relevant and
valid in the context of a Kelly hearing, but since the court had
already determined the evidence was admissible, the proffered
testimony was irrelevant and not helpful to the jury. The court
reasoned it would be relevant for an expert in firearms to testify
Peck “is wrong and here is why,” but that Faigman’s testimony
that “the entire field of criminal forensic science is flawed” was
not relevant.
After hearing further arguments by the parties, the court
adopted its tentative ruling as its final ruling. The court referred
to Faigman’s declaration that “Peck’s claim . . . that [bullets and]
cartridge [cases] can be linked to one another or uniquely to a
particular gun is not supported by the scientific literature or by
scientists who [have] evaluated that literature.” The court
reasoned that Faigman’s “piggy-backing in” other experts who
are not subject to cross-examination “may improperly have an
effect on the jury.” Hernandez’s counsel stated that she would
provide Peck with articles she wanted to discuss on cross-
examination, and the court stated, “That’s a fair and appropriate
way to do it.”
The court did not err. “The trial court has broad
discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations] but
lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (People v Carter
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167.) The court also exercises
broad discretion in deciding whether to admit expert testimony
(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773), and has discretion to
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially

56
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
Faigman’s testimony as irrelevant and because it had the
potential to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. Faigman
intended to testify that Peck should not have been allowed to
opine that a particular bullet or shell casing was from a
particular firearm because the field of firearms identification and
its underlying theory and techniques are not accepted as valid by
the relevant scientific community. As the People aptly put it, “it
was not up to the jury to decide the scope of Peck’s testimony.
That gatekeeping role belonged to the trial court.” We also agree
with the People that while Faigman’s testimony at the Evidence
Code section 402 hearing in the codefendants’ trial may have
been appropriate, since the court in this case had already ruled
that Peck’s opinions were admissible “the same testimony here
before a jury was irrelevant and properly excluded.”
We also reject appellants’ assertion that the alleged error
amounts to a violation of their constitutional rights to present a
defense. Faigman’s proffered testimony was not “crucial defense
evidence.” (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82,
overruled in part on other grounds as stated in People v. Doolin
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) In any event, any error was
harmless under any standard. As we have noted, the evidence of
appellants’ guilt, even independent of the ballistics evidence, was
strong. Moreover, Peck was extensively cross-examined on the
reliability of firearms identification examinations and the various
studies cited by Faigman. Among other things, Peck did not

57
dispute that in one of the studies she relied on the combined error
rates for hard and soft errors was 53 percent for comparing
bullets and 44 percent for comparing cartridge cases. She also
acknowledged that her opinions were subjective and were not to a
scientific certainty. Appellants’ claim accordingly fails for lack of
prejudice.
VI.
MS-13’s Motto
Appellants contend the court prejudicially erred in
admitting evidence that MS-13’s motto is “kill, rape, control.”
They assert that the reference to “rape” should have been
excluded as irrelevant because there were no allegations of rape
in the case and the motto should have been excluded under
Evidence Code section 352 as inflammatory and highly
prejudicial. The court denied appellants’ motion to preclude
Sergeant Casey from referring to the motto because “[t]he expert
is going to say that the local chapter of an international gang
relies on the reputation of the international gang to exert control
in their location, so it’s relevant.”
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence. The evidence was relevant on the grounds identified by
the court. Moreover, as the People aptly note, “[t]he court could
reasonably anticipate that any potential prejudice from
accurately including the word ‘rape’ in the motto could readily
be—and in fact was—cured by pointing out that the current case
did not involve rape allegations and by eliciting the sergeant’s
testimony that local affiliates of the organization rejected the
inclusion of ‘rape.’ ” Because appellants were each acquitted on
multiple counts, it is also clear that the jury was not inflamed by
evidence of the motto. In addition, the evidence was very brief,

58
and the independent evidence of appellants’ guilt was strong.
Any error in admitting the evidence was thus harmless. (People
v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 549; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d
at p. 836.)
VII.
Rap Videos
The prosecution played three SMLS’LS rap videos at trial
without objection and provided the jury with transcripts of those
videos. Screenshots of another video were also shown.
Appellants contend their trial attorneys provided IAC by failing
to object to the videos under Evidence Code section 352. They
further contend that Evidence Code section 352.2, which went
into effect after they were convicted, applies retroactively to their
trial.17 Our Supreme Court recently rejected the latter
contention (Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 687-693), and
appellants do not establish that counsels’ failure to object under
Evidence Code section 352.2 amounts to IAC.
“Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, ‘The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create

17 “Evidence Code section 352.2, which became effective on

January 1, 2023, calls for a particularized inquiry when the
admissibility of a creative expression is challenged under
Evidence Code section 352. . . . The statute defines a ‘“creative
expression”’ as ‘the expression or application of creativity or
imagination in the production or arrangement of forms, sounds,
words, movements, or symbols, including, but not limited to,
music, dance, performance art, visual art, poetry, literature, film,
and other such objects or media.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Aguirre
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 687 (Aguirre).)

59
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.’ The ‘undue prejudice’ that Evidence Code
section 352 is concerned with ‘“is that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual
and which has very little effect on the issues.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] A
‘ “court enjoys broad discretion” ’ in determining the admissibility
of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 [citation], and we
review a ruling under the statute for an abuse of this discretion
[citation]. ‘A ruling subject to this standard of review “will not be
disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 686-687.)
To establish that their trial attorneys provided IAC by
failing to object to the rap videos under Evidence Code section
352, appellants must demonstrate both deficient performance
and prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that they would have
achieved a more favorable result had counsel objected.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 693-694.) Even
assuming that appellants could establish the deficient
performance prong, they do not establish the prejudice prong.
(See id. at p. 697 [when IAC claim fails for lack of prejudice, the
reviewing court need not decide whether counsel’s performance
was deficient].) The rap videos were not overly inflammatory, the
prosecutor only briefly discussed them in her closing and rebuttal
arguments, and the jury was instructed on the limited purposes
of their admissibility. Moreover, there was strong independent
evidence of appellants’ guilt, and they were each acquitted on
multiple counts. Appellants’ IAC claims accordingly fail.

60
VIII.
Prosecutorial Error
Appellants contend the prosecutor prejudicially erred18
during her rebuttal argument by misstating the law regarding
the presumption of innocence. We are not persuaded.
Claims of prosecutorial error are subject to federal and
state standards of review. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th
774, 835 (Jablonski).) The federal Constitution is violated when
the prosecutorial error infects the trial with such a degree of
unfairness as to render defendant’s conviction a denial of due
process. (Ibid.; People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127.)
Prosecutorial error involving comments by prosecutors to jurors
has generally been viewed by California courts as error of less
than constitutional magnitude (see People v. Bolton (1979) 23
Cal.3d 208, 214, fn. 4), warranting “reversal only if it is
reasonably probable the trial outcome was affected.” (Shazier, at
p. 127.)
“[A] prosecutor is allowed to vigorously argue the case and
is afforded ‘significant leeway’ in discussing the facts and the law
in closing argument. [Citations.]” (Azcona, supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 516.) To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial
error based on remarks to the jury, a defendant must show a
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood or applied the
prosecutor’s comments in an improper or erroneous manner.

18 Although appellants label the alleged error as

“misconduct,” “ ‘[t]he term prosecutorial “misconduct” is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a
prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind. A more apt
description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’ ” (People
v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666-667 (Centeno).)

61
(Jablonski, supra, 87 Cal.4th at p. 835.) “ ‘In conducting this
inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most
damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
“ ‘ “The presumption of innocence, although not articulated
in the [federal] Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial
under our system of criminal justice.” . . . “[T]he presumption of
innocence continues not only during the taking of the testimony,
but during the deliberations of the jury and until they reach a
verdict.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Once an otherwise properly instructed
jury is told that the presumption of innocence obtains until guilt
is proven, it is obvious that the jury cannot find the defendant
guilty until and unless they, as the fact-finding body, conclude
guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Thus,
although a prosecutor should not make ‘statements that appear
to shift the burden of proof onto a defendant (as a defendant is
entitled to the presumption of innocence until the contrary is
found by the jury),’ it is permissible to argue that ‘the jury should
return a verdict in [the People’s] favor based on the state of the
evidence presented.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 1085, 1100.)
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury “it’s
time for accountability. These defendants were presumed
innocent when we started, but not anymore, not since the
evidence has been presented. They have now been proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” After the court overruled Balmore’s
objection that the prosecutor had misstated that law, the
prosecutor continued: “These serial killers terrorized a
community. . . . They are absolutely guilty of what they did do.

62
They are no longer considered innocent. Show these victims that
we presented the case and it’s time for accountability and
justice.”
After the concluding instructions were read and the jury
began deliberating, the court asked the defense if they had
anything else they wanted to put on the record. Balmore’s
counsel responded by “stress[ing] that [the] presumption of
innocence remains until the jury renders a verdict.” The court
replied: “I think it stops once it stops, once the case is closed and
they begin deliberating, so it starts once you read them that last
instruction. It’s not until they have made a decision. It’s once
they have been read [CALCRIM No.] 3550.”
We reject the People’s contention that appellants’ claim of
prosecutorial error is forfeited because defense counsel did not
request that the jury be admonished to disregard the prosecutor’s
alleged misstatement of the law. Because the court overruled
counsel’s objection, such a request would have been futile. (See
People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 781, fn. 15 [recognizing
that “the requirement that a defendant also seek a curative
instruction to alleviate the effect of improper argument applies
only if the court sustains the defense objection as to its
impropriety”].)
We conclude, however, that the prosecutor did not misstate
the law regarding the presumption of innocence. Rather, she
merely asserted that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to overcome that presumption. (See, e.g., People v.
Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 184 [prosecutor did not misstate
law by arguing that the presumption of innocence “doesn’t stay”
and that “[o]nce the evidence convinces you he is no longer
innocent, that presumption vanishes”]; People v. Panah (2005) 35

63
Cal.4th 395, 463 [prosecutor properly argued to the jury that the
evidence presented at trial had “ ‘stripped away’ ” the defendant’s
presumption of innocence]; People v. Goldberg (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 170, 189 [prosecutor did not err in arguing that “
‘once the case has been proven to’ ” the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt “[t]here is no more presumption of innocence”].)
The two cases appellants offer in support of their claim to
the contrary are inapposite. In People v. Cowan (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1152, the prosecutor told the jury “the presumption
of innocence is in place ‘only when the charges are read’ and that
the ‘presumption is gone’ thereafter.” (Id. at p. 1159.) The court
of appeal recognized that this statement impermissibly conveyed
that the presumption of innocence no longer applied as a
procedural matter once the trial began and thus constituted an
improper attempt to lighten the prosecution’s burden of proof.
(Id. at p. 1160.) Here, by contrast, the prosecutor did not suggest
that the presumption had ended before the close of evidence and
that the presumption was unrelated to the evidence.
In People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1407,
the prosecutor stated in closing that “ ‘[t]he presumption of
innocence is over.’ ” (Id. at p. 1407, italics omitted.) The
prosecutor first used this phrase while discussing the state of the
evidence, which the court of appeal found analogous to the
remarks approved in Goldberg. (Id. at pp. 1407-1408.) Although
this first statement was not improper, the appellate court held
that the prosecutor erred by using the phrase a second time when
he said, “ ‘It’s fairly obvious that [the defendant] committed all of
the crimes we are accusing him of. The presumption of innocence
is over. He has gotten his fair trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 1407, italics
omitted.) The court reasoned that these remarks

64
improperly “implied that the ‘fair trial’ was over” and that the
jury should consequently no longer “respect the presumption of
innocence.” (Id. at p. 1408.) Here, the prosecutor merely argued
that the presumption of innocence no longer applied because the
evidence at trial had proven appellants were guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Her remarks were thus more analogous to
those approved in Booker, Panah, and Goldberg than those found
improper in Dowdell.
Even assuming that the prosecutor misstated the law, any
error would be harmless regardless of the standard of review.
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 220 on the
presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed the
jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 200 that “[i]f you believe that the
attorney’s comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you
must follow my instructions.” We presume the jury understood
and followed these instructions. (People v. Frederickson (2020) 8
Cal.5th 963, 1024.) Appellants’ claim of prosecutorial error thus
fails.
IX.
Hernandez’s Mistrial Motion
Hernandez contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial based on comments the
prosecutor made on rebuttal regarding Hernandez’s counsel’s
presentation to the jury of an incorrect exhibit regarding the
location of the shootings of Martinez, Castillo, and Alfaro. We
conclude otherwise.
A trial court should grant a motion for mistrial “ ‘only when
a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably
damaged . . . .’ ” (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 673.)

65
“ ‘ “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.
[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial
is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested
with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.” ’ ”
(People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 148 (Suarez).) We review
the denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion. (Schultz,
at p. 673; People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 149.)
In her closing argument, Hernandez’s attorney argued that
aside from the rap song and the 2014 photograph showing him
making a gang sign, there was no evidence against Hernandez
regarding the shootings of Martinez, Castillo, and Alfaro.
Counsel asked the jury to compare Agent Easter’s chart mapping
Hernandez’s cellphone activity in People’s Exhibit 46-P5 with the
report of Hernandez’s expert Rose. She claimed the map in the
People’s exhibit contained “[a] huge mistake” by erroneously
identifying the location of the crime scene. According to defense
counsel, Hernandez’s phone appeared to be in the crime scene
area as the prosecutor claimed because “when you plot it wrong,
it is.” Defense counsel argued that the crime scene was correctly
located in Rose’s slide, which demonstrated that Hernandez’s
phone was not within the crime scene area at 10:39, 11:37, or
11:40 p.m.
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor discussed People’s
Exhibit 46-P5 and told the jury that Hernandez’s counsel showed
them “an incorrect exhibit.” The prosecutor asserted: “That was
not the exhibit that’s been admitted into evidence. This is the
exhibit that’s been admitted into evidence. This is the People’s
exhibit. This is Special Agent Easter’s map with the correct
crime scene location. I don’t know where that came from. This is

66
the evidence. . . . And this is from the Blosser shooting and
defendant Jose Hernandez’s phone is in the area, consistent with
being in the area of the crime scene. Special Agent Easter told
you that and the defense cell tower witness told you that. He
said, yeah, it’s consistent. I agree with Agent Easter’s map.
There is no question.”
The court gave its final instructions, and the jury began its
deliberations. Following an unrecorded discussion, the court
stated that various issues regarding exhibits would be discussed
the next morning, and the parties agreed to waive their clients’
appearance. The court asked the parties whether there was
anything else they wanted to put on the record, and Hernandez’s
counsel replied “[n]o, your honor. Thank you.”
Following another unrecorded discussion the next morning,
the prosecutor stated that Hernandez’s counsel had suggested
that Hernandez suffered prejudice as a result of the prosecutor’s
comments regarding People’s Exhibit 46-P5; counsel had
declined, however, the prosecution’s offer to reach a stipulation as
a remedy. The court said the issue would not be discussed
without the defendants being present and continued the matter
to the following day. The court denied the prosecutor’s request to
address and resolve the issue without delay and told Hernandez’s
counsel “[i]t’s up to you to decide how to frame the issue and
what, if any, remedy you are requesting.” Counsel stated that
the prosecution’s proposed stipulation “cast[] blame on the
defense instead of having the government take any responsibility
. . . [for] continu[ing] to provide discovery after [the] discovery
cut-off period.” After the court suggested that they work on a
stipulation “where the language is satisfactory to all the parties,”

67
the prosecutor added that “I didn’t offer any parameters for a
stipulation. I just suggested a stipulation.”
That same day, Hernandez filed a motion for mistrial
alleging prosecutorial misconduct based on People’s Exhibit 46-
P5. The motion alleged that prior to trial the prosecution
provided defense counsel a flash drive containing about 3,000
exhibits that were pre-labeled with “electronic” exhibit numbers.
The prosecution continued sending new discovery to the defense
throughout jury selection and trial, including 30 disks. Because
the prosecution did not specify that one of those disks (Disk 444)
contained a “new” People’s Exhibit 46-P5 that was “altered to
correct a significant error,” counsel was unaware of this new
exhibit.
Hernandez’s motion also offered that his trial counsel
pointed out the mistake in the original People’s Exhibit 46-P5 to
the jury “not knowing a new exhibit existed.” According to
Hernandez, the prosecutor showed the jury the corrected version
of the exhibit in her rebuttal argument and “then attacked the
integrity of defense counsel by suggesting that defense counsel
was incompetent for displaying the ‘wrong’ exhibit, or that
defense counsel purposely doctored the exhibit.” Hernandez also
asserted that the prosecutor acted in bad faith because she knew
the pre-labeled People’s Exhibit 46-P5 (which contains incorrect
information regarding the location of the crimes) had the same
number as the replacement exhibit (which contains the correct
information). The motion added that Hernandez’s counsel had
attempted to make an oral motion for mistrial before jury
deliberations began, but the court denied her request and asked
for a written motion.

68
In opposing the motion, the prosecution argued that
Hernandez’s counsel “knowingly and intentionally misled the
jury” by displaying an exhibit she knew had been corrected.
Agent Easter corrected the mistake in the original exhibit,
misidentifying the crime scene location as one block south of the
actual location, and the People provided the corrected exhibit to
the defense in Disk 444. Agent Easter and Hernandez’s cell
tower expert Rose both testified to the correct exhibit at trial, and
that exhibit was admitted into evidence. The prosecutor’s
comments in rebuttal did not denigrate counsel’s integrity but
merely responded to counsel’s argument about the exhibit and
directed the jury to the exhibit that was actually admitted at
trial. In any event, counsel’s failure to object forfeited the
opportunity for a curative instruction or admonition. Moreover,
counsel’s refusal to discuss the prosecutor’s offer to formulate a
stipulation before the jury began deliberating indicated counsel
did not “truly” believe the harm was prejudicial.
The next morning, the court heard the motion and denied
it. The court noted that each exhibit was marked in court on the
record and that all slides shown during closing arguments were
merely demonstrative aids, not evidence. The court found that
neither attorney engaged in misconduct and “that this issue is
not one that rises to the level of irreparable damage or the
fairness of a trial.” The court added that “[t]he court is not going
to take any further action, is not going to give an instruction to
the jury; however, if the parties reach a stipulation, the court
would read that stipulation to the jury.”
The court did not abuse its discretion. Hernandez fails to
show he suffered any prejudice as a result of the confusion
regarding the correct version of People’s Exhibit 46-P5 that could

69
not have been cured by an admonition or instruction. (Suarez,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 148.) After Hernandez’s counsel
presented the jury with the incorrect version of the exhibit, the
prosecutor properly exercised her “wide latitude in describing the
deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account.
[Citations.]” (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)
Contrary to Hernandez’s claim, the prosecutor did not suggest
that defense counsel had deliberately presented the wrong
exhibit. As the People note, “[t]he prosecutor did not attribute
the misidentification of the exhibit to Hernandez’s counsel at all.”
Hernandez does not undermine the court’s finding that the
prosecution’s comments regarding the exhibit were not made in
bad faith. Moreover, defense counsel did not object when the
prosecutor made her comments on rebuttal and declined the
prosecution’s offer to reach a stipulation regarding the issue that
could have been read to the jury. Accordingly, Hernandez’s
motion for a mistrial was properly denied.
X.
Cumulative Error
Appellants contend their convictions should be reversed
due to cumulative error. As set forth above, appellants fail to
demonstrate any prejudicial error. Even if we agreed that
appellants’ claims of evidentiary error had merit, the claimed
errors were insignificant in light of the evidence of appellants’
guilt. Appellants’ contentions of cumulative error accordingly
fail. (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 884.)

70
XI.
Hobbs Review
Prior to trial, appellants moved to unseal and obtain copies
of the affidavits submitted in support of the wiretap orders. The
prosecution opposed the motion pursuant to Hobbs and Evidence
Code section 1041 and asked the court to conduct an in camera
hearing.
After conducting such a hearing, the court noted the
prosecution had agreed that almost all of the affidavits could be
provided to the defense. The court agreed with the prosecution
that the informants identified in the affidavits were not material
witnesses and that there was thus good cause to redact all
information related to the identity of those informants. The court
granted the prosecution’s motion to seal the materials related to
the Hobbs motion and hearing.
In January 2020, the court stated it had conducted an in
camera hearing pursuant to Hobbs at which Sergeant Casey had
testified about the continued need to keep portions of the
affidavits at issue under seal. The court ordered two items to be
unredacted and released to the defense and the remaining
portions of the affidavits to remain sealed.
Appellants ask us to independently review the sealed
record of the hearing on their Hobbs motion to determine
whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
Under Evidence Code sections 1041 and 1042, all or part of
an affidavit in support of a search warrant may be sealed when
necessary to protect the identity of a confidential informant.
(Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 963, 970–971.) But when an
affidavit in support of a search warrant has been sealed, it
conflicts with a defendant’s right to “reasonable access to

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information that might form the basis for challenging the validity
of a search warrant.” (Id. at p. 962.) In this situation, a
defendant may file a “Hobbs motion” to have the trial court either
unseal the affidavit and/or to have the trial court review the
affidavit in camera to determine whether it provides probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant. (Id. at p. 975.) The
court then must “examine the affidavit for possible
inconsistencies or insufficiencies regarding the showing of
probable cause.” (Id. at pp. 973, 970.) A trial court should review
“all the relevant materials in camera to determine whether they
will support defendant’s challenges to the search warrant.” (Id.
at p. 971.)
In conducting such a review, the “first step is to determine
whether the affidavit or any major portion of it has been properly
sealed.” (People v. Heslington (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 947, 957
(Heslington).) Courts must consider two issues: (1) “ ‘whether
sufficient grounds exist for maintaining the confidentiality of the
informant's identity’ ”; and (2) “ ‘whether the extent of the sealing
is necessary to avoid revealing the informant’s identity.’ ” (Ibid.)
If the court concludes the affidavit was properly sealed, the
court then considers the second step of the Hobbs procedure.
(Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 974–975.) At this step, the court
must “determine whether ‘there is a reasonable probability the
defendant would prevail’ on his suppression motion.”
(Heslington, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.) On a motion to
quash, the court must assess “whether, under the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ presented in the search warrant affidavit and the
oral testimony . . . there was ‘a fair probability’ that contraband
or evidence of a crime would be found in the place searched
pursuant to the warrant.” (Hobbs, at p. 975.) On a motion to

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traverse, the court determines whether the defendant’s general
allegations of misrepresentations or omissions are supported by
the search warrant affidavit or testimony offered at the in
camera hearing. (Id. at pp. 974–975.) If the court concludes
there is a reasonable probability of success, the People must
consent to release the sealed portion, or the motion must be
granted. (Heslington, at pp. 957–958.) “We independently review
the court’s decision to seal a portion of the search warrant
affidavit.” (People v. Camel (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 989, 1009.)
Having reviewed the relevant record, we conclude the trial
court did not err in ordering the affidavits to be sealed.
(See People v. Martinez (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 233, 241–
242 [appellate court conducts an independent review of the sealed
materials].) Sufficient grounds support maintaining the
confidentiality of the informants’ identities. Releasing any sealed
information would tend to reveal those identities. There were no
material misrepresentations or omissions in the sealed affidavits.
We agree with the trial court and conclude that under the totality
of the circumstances, the wiretap orders were supported by
probable cause.
XII.
Fines And Assessments
Appellants contend the trial court erred in imposing and
staying a parole revocation fine as to each of them pursuant to
section 1202.45, subdivision (a), because none of their sentences
include a period of parole. The People properly concede the point.
(See People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [parole
revocation fine improperly imposed upon defendant sentenced to
indeterminate term on one count and LWOP on another].)
Accordingly, we shall order the parole revocation fines stricken.

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We also agree that Ricardo and Hernandez’s judgments
must be corrected to reflect the proper court facilities and court
operations assessments.19 Under Government Code section
70373, appellants must pay a $30 court facilities assessment on
each count of conviction. Under section 1465.8, they must each
pay a $40 court operations assessment as to each count on which
they were convicted. Ricardo was convicted on 32 counts, so the
court should have imposed a total court facilities assessment of
$960 under Government Code section 70373, and a total court
operations assessment of $1,280 under section 1465.8.
Hernandez was convicted on 23 counts, so he must pay a $690
court facilities assessment and a $920 court operations
assessment. We shall order Ricardo and Hernandez’s abstracts of
judgment modified accordingly.
Appellants also contend for the first time on appeal that
the court violated their constitutional rights, as contemplated in
People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, overruled in part
by People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23, by ordering each of
them to pay a $10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a
court operations surcharge (Gov. Code, § 69926, subd. (a)), and
court facilities and court operations assessments (Gov. Code, §
70373, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), without first determining their
ability to pay. Because these contentions were not raised below,
they are forfeited. (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856–

19 As to Ricardo, the court orally imposed a $750 court

facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373, and
a $1,000 court operations assessment under section 1465.8.
Ricardo’s abstract of judgment, however, reflects a court facilities
assessment of $1,230 and a court operations assessment of
$1,640. Hernandez was ordered to pay a $1,230 court facilities
assessment and a $1,640 court operations assessment.

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859; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 597–598; People
v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155.)
Disposition
The parole revocation fines imposed and stayed as to all
three appellants pursuant to section 1202.45, subdivision (a), are
ordered stricken. The judgment as to Ricardo is further corrected
to reflect the imposition of a $960 court facilities assessment
under Government Code section 70373, and a $1,280 court
operations assessment pursuant to section 1465.8. The judgment
as to Hernandez is further corrected to reflect the imposition of a
$690 court facilities assessment and a $920 court operations
assessment. The minute order for Hernandez’s sentence shall
also be corrected to reflect a total term of 339 years to life plus 4
terms of life without the possibility of parole. The superior court
clerk shall forward certified copies of the amended abstracts of
judgment to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

VAN ROOYEN, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Sup. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art

VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)

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Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jose Balmore Saravia
Lainez.
Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Jose Ricardo Saravia Lainez.
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jose Narciso Escobar
Hernandez.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

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