In re A.R. CA2/4

CourtListener 10863461Calctapp22 de mai. de 2026

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Filed 5/22/26 In re A.R. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.R. et al., Persons Coming B348515
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24CCJP03113A,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 24CCJP03113B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________________________

S.R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s exit order
granting N.Z. (mother) sole physical custody over A.R. (born
February 2021) and Thomas R. (born September 2023). We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
Early in their lives, A.R. and Thomas began witnessing
their parents’ domestic violence. During a November 2022
altercation in A.R.’s presence, father allegedly kicked and threw
things at mother and brandished a firearm. Criminal charges,
including possession of a firearm by a felon, were brought against
father, and the criminal court issued a three-year criminal
protective order prohibiting him from approaching mother and
A.R., contacting them, blocking their movements, and seeking to
determine their whereabouts. A.R. was declared a dependent
based on the altercation, parents’ history of domestic violence,
and father’s 2019 conviction for spousal battery. In October 2023,
jurisdiction in the dependency case was terminated with an order
granting mother sole custody and father, who had not completed
his reunification plan, supervised visitation.

1 We do not recite the entire factual and procedural background,
as the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its history.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 851.)

2
The instant appeal arises from a second dependency case
following another altercation in May 2024 when A.R. and Thomas
witnessed mother throwing a knife at father that ricocheted off a
wall. The children were removed from the home and declared
dependents of the Orange County juvenile court due to parents’
failure to protect. The petition described the May 2024
altercation, parents’ unresolved problem with domestic violence;
and their mutual violations of the criminal protective order. It
also described father’s failure to complete the anger management
program ordered in the prior dependency case and his extensive
criminal history.
In October 2024, the case was transferred to the Los
Angeles Superior Court and assigned to the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The
juvenile court ordered reunification services for both parents.
By February 2025, mother was employed, had completed
parenting and domestic violence programs, enrolled in individual
therapy, was returning negative drug test results, and had been
granted unmonitored visitation. The children were returned to
her care. Though father was slower to comply with his
reunification plan, he obtained employment, eventually
completed parenting and domestic violence programs, and began
returning negative drug tests. Despite this progress, however,
mother and father still struggled to coparent, and they continued
to have heated arguments largely centered around father
providing financial support for the children.
Father requested overnight visitation, and in May 2025,
DCFS assessed the two-bedroom home he shared with paternal
step-grandfather (grandfather). The social worker described the
living room as “overwhelmingly cluttered” because boxes and

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large black bags filled with clothing, mannequins, and household
items were piled very high, in some places near the ceiling, and
on the sofa. Father indicated that the items, which belonged to
grandfather, could not be moved. DCFS deemed the home an
“unsafe and unsuitable environment for young children,
particularly for overnight stays” due to very limited walking
space and tripping hazards. As of mid-July 2025, these
conditions were unremediated.
Three criminal cases involving father were active
throughout the dependency proceedings, including the case in
which the criminal protective order issued. Father disclosed he
was scheduled to serve jail time but hoped to receive a minimum
sentence of four months. It was unknown when incarceration
would begin. A pretrial hearing scheduled for July 2025 was
later continued to September.
In August 2025, the juvenile court conducted a contested
section 364 hearing. Father did not present evidence but
requested that the court either keep the case open or place the
children in his home. The court terminated jurisdiction and
ordered joint legal custody of the children, sole physical custody
to mother, and unmonitored visitation to father. It found that
the criminal protective order did not permit father to have
physical custody, his home had not been assessed as appropriate,
and he continued to have challenges peacefully coparenting with
mother.
Father filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
On appeal, father argues that substantial evidence did not
support an implied finding that the children’s best interests were

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served by granting mother sole physical custody. He argues the
children were then living with mother, and the court improperly
deferred to this “status quo.” Further, he contends the court
erroneously based its custody ruling on a misunderstanding of
the criminal protective order.

A. Governing Law
The purpose of the section 364 hearing was for the court to
review the services provided to the family and the progress made
by the family in eliminating the conditions or factors that
required court supervision. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364, subd. (b).)
Section 362.4 empowers the juvenile court, if it terminates
jurisdiction over a dependent minor, to issue an order
determining the custody of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 362.4, subd. (a).) The court’s focus and primary consideration
in making such an order must always be the best interests of the
child. (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) Because
dependency proceedings arise when children are subject to or at
risk of abuse or neglect, the presumption of parental fitness that
underlies custody law in the family court does not apply. (In re
J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.).) We review the
juvenile court’s custody ruling for an abuse of discretion and will
not disturb it unless the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd. (Id. at p. 113.)

B. Analysis
We discern no abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion.
Substantial evidence supported its implied finding that the
children’s best interests were served by granting mother sole
physical custody. (See In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254,

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1260 [reviewing court “will infer a necessary finding provided the
implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence”].) Contrary
to father’s assertions, the court did not grant physical custody to
mother merely because that was the status quo. Rather, mother
had proved she could care for the children. DCFS reported
mother “demonstrated that she is able to provide a safe
environment to her children and has the protective capacity to do
so,” and it recommended she have sole physical custody.
On the other hand, evidence of father’s behavior indicated
it would not be in the children’s best interests for him to have
custody. He continued to be combative with mother when
discussing financial support for the children, even when social
workers were present to facilitate the conversation. Further,
father demonstrated a lack of insight regarding his responsibility
for past domestic violence by repeatedly violating the criminal
protective order. For example, he tried to talk to mother after a
court hearing and blocked the movement of her vehicle, and he
pressured her to disclose her address after she moved to a new
home. Father also could not provide a safe home for A.R. (then
four years old) and Thomas (then less than two years old). He
lived in a cluttered home that was deemed unsafe for overnight
visits, and he was unable or unwilling to remediate these
conditions. The court also had reason to doubt whether father
would be available to oversee the children on a day-to-day basis.
He faced trial and sentencing in his criminal cases, which
included felony charges, and he expected to be incarcerated for at
least four months beginning on an unknown date. From these
circumstances, the court could reasonably conclude that the
children’s best interests would not be served in father’s custody.

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Father argues the juvenile court’s order should be reversed
because the court mistakenly believed the criminal protective
order precluded it from granting him physical custody of the
children. Father further notes that Thomas was not a protected
person under the protective order, which issued before he was
born.
To the extent the juvenile court erred in relying on the
order to deny him physical custody of the children, particularly
Thomas, any such error was harmless. (B.D. v. Superior Court
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1160 [harmless error applies in
dependency proceedings, and we reverse only if it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error].) The
juvenile court had ample evidence to support a finding that their
best interests were served by placing them in mother’s custody,
and there is no reasonable probability that its decision would
have changed if it had not considered the protective order.
Should the conditions upon which the custody order was based
change in the future, father is free to seek joint physical custody
in the family law court. (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.)

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

COGLIATI, J. **

** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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