Garcia v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. CA2/7

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Filed 5/21/26 Garcia v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MYRA GARCIA, B340684

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 20STCV32997)
v.

JOHN HANCOCK LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Atticus Injury Law and Atticus N. Wegman for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, Bruce Cleeland, Gary
LaHendro, Allison Harvey and Yury A. Kolesnikov for Defendant
and Respondent.

______________________
Myra Garcia tripped and fell when attempting to board an
elevator in a commercial building owned by John Hancock Life
Insurance Company (John Hancock). Garcia sued John Hancock,
alleging the elevator car was not level with the lobby floor and
John Hancock was responsible for this dangerous condition. She
appeals after the trial court granted John Hancock’s motion for
summary adjudication on her cause of action for violation of the
Disabled Persons Act (Civ. Code, § 54 et seq.) and subsequent
motion for summary judgment on her claims for premises
liability and negligence. We affirm the order granting summary
adjudication on the Disabled Persons Act claim. Because there is
a triable issue whether John Hancock created and thus had
notice of the alleged dangerous condition, however, we reverse
the order granting summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings on Garcia’s premises liability and negligence claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Trip and Fall
Garcia worked on the 17th floor of an office building in
downtown Los Angeles that John Hancock owned and managed.
Between 2014 and 2020, Garcia used the building’s elevators
“hundreds of times” and took Elevator No. 8 at least 25 to
50 times without incident.
In March 2020, Garcia was 62 years old. She had asthma
and diabetes but did not use or need any assistive equipment to
walk.
On March 9, Garcia followed her normal morning commute.
She drove her car to a park and ride, took a bus to downtown Los
Angeles, and then walked about a block and a half to the
entrance of the building. Garcia felt “some mild fatigue” after the
walk. Upon entering the building, however, Garcia walked
normally across the lobby to a bank of elevators. She held a

2
roller bag in her left hand, a handbag on her right shoulder, and
possibly a cell phone in her right hand.
When the doors of Elevator No. 8 were not fully open but
were open just enough for her to walk through, Garcia began to
enter the elevator, tripped, and fell to the floor. As a result of the
fall, Garcia broke her left leg.
Garcia believed her right foot got “caught” or “stuck” on
something in the threshold between the elevator floor and the
lobby floor because when she looked back, she did not see
anything in her path that would have caused her to fall. Garcia
never saw a height differential between the elevator floor and the
lobby floor but assumed there was a differential of two inches at
the time of her fall based on what she “felt” with her foot.
Building security personnel arrived immediately after
Garcia fell and did not notice a height differential between the
elevator floor and lobby floor once the elevator doors were in a
fully open position. The elevator was placed out of service. Three
days after the incident, the City of Los Angeles Department of
Building and Safety (City) inspected the elevator. The City
concluded the elevator’s safety features were in compliance with
all governing legal standards and permitted it to resume normal
service. Mechanic James Clark from Otis Elevator Company
(Otis), the elevator maintenance company for the building, then
conducted his own inspection. He found the height differential
between the elevator floor and the lobby floor when the elevator
doors started to open to be four and 1/2 inches but only 1/8 inch
when the elevator came to a stop with its doors fully open.

B. The Lawsuit
Garcia filed her lawsuit in August 2020. In her second
amended complaint, she alleged causes of action against John

3
Hancock and Otis for products liability, premises liability,
negligence, and, as to John Hancock alone, violation of the
Disabled Persons Act. She alleged that, as a common carrier,
John Hancock had a heightened duty of care that it breached by
not protecting her from “a dangerous and unstable” elevator. As
for her disability discrimination claim, Garcia alleged she
suffered from asthma and diabetes and that John Hancock
denied her “full and equal access to public accommodations due to
her disability.” She alleged the “mislevel[ed]” elevator was not in
compliance with standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and the California
Building Standards Code (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 24). She
requested damages and attorney’s fees.1

C. Motion for Summary Adjudication on Disabled Persons Act
Claim
In August 2022, John Hancock moved for summary
adjudication on Garcia’s disability discrimination claim.2 John
Hancock argued Garcia did not have standing to pursue damages
under the Disabled Persons Act because she was not denied equal
access to the building. Further, John Hancock noted that to
access her office Garcia could have taken other elevators besides

1 Garcia’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer,
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania,
intervened in the lawsuit and opposed John Hancock’s dispositive
motions. Neither Otis nor American Casualty is a party to this
appeal.
2 John Hancock also moved for summary adjudication on the
products liability cause of action, but Garcia dismissed that
claim.

4
the allegedly ADA-noncompliant Elevator No. 8, and thus she
was not denied access to her office or any other location in the
building.
John Hancock supported its motion with Garcia’s
deposition testimony, her medical records, deposition testimony
of her primary care physician, and records showing Elevator
No. 8’s inspection and permit history, among other evidence.
In opposition, Garcia argued she had standing to pursue
her claim under the Disabled Persons Act because her asthma
and diabetes “affected her ability to walk, breathe, and thus
access [the] subject elevator that misleveled at the time of the
incident.” Garcia relied on her deposition testimony and that of
her primary care physician regarding the nature of her disability.
Garcia also submitted declarations from engineers Joseph
Stabler and Paul Kayfetz, each of whom opined that surveillance
footage of Garcia’s fall revealed the elevator was misleveled at
the time she fell.
In January 2023, after a hearing, the court granted John
Hancock’s motion, concluding Garcia lacked standing to pursue
damages under the Disabled Persons Act because she had not
raised a triable issue that she was denied equal access to the
building due to her disability. The court assumed for purposes of
the motion that the elevator was not level when Garcia entered it
and that Garcia suffered from asthma and diabetes. Even so, the
court concluded, Garcia provided no evidence her disability
prevented her from accessing the building. The court explained,
“individuals without diabetes or asthma would equally be likely
to encounter the alleged violation here (i.e., the mis-leveled
elevator) and injure themselves.”

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D. Motion for Summary Judgment on Premises Liability and
Negligence Claims
In February 2024, John Hancock moved for summary
judgment on Garcia’s remaining causes of action for premises
liability and negligence. John Hancock conceded it was a
common carrier as the owner of the elevator and thus owed a
heightened duty of care to Garcia. Even so, John Hancock argued
Garcia’s claims had no merit because it did not have notice of the
alleged dangerous condition (i.e., a misleveled elevator) and thus
did not breach that duty. John Hancock asserted there was no
evidence suggesting it had actual or constructive knowledge of a
leveling issue with the elevator before Garcia fell.
To demonstrate it did not have constructive notice, John
Hancock pointed to evidence of five systems it had instituted to
ensure building patrons could be safely carried on its elevators:
(1) regular City inspections and permit approvals for the
elevators, including an inspection and approval within the last
six months that showed no safety issues or code violations;
(2) regular maintenance of its elevators by Otis; (3) an inspection
conducted by a third-party consultant, H.H. Angus, as to Otis’s
maintenance of the elevators; (4) cleaning of the elevators three
times a day by the building’s janitorial staff; and (5) a complaint
program that allowed reports of concerns or issues relating to the
elevators. John Hancock emphasized that, with these systems in
effect, it was not aware of any situation in which Elevator No. 8
failed to level correctly between a misleveling incident in 2012
and Garcia’s fall more than seven years later.
John Hancock supported its motion with elevator
inspection reports and deposition testimony of Garcia, building
manager Norma Madrid, mechanic Clark, and the City’s “person

6
most qualified” on elevator inspections, Luis Figueroa. John
Hancock also provided a declaration from Otis field manager
Aaron Harju regarding the maintenance and service of Elevator
No. 8. Harju stated that, in the five and a half years before
Garcia’s fall, Otis performed regular, routine, and preventative
maintenance on the elevator. Three and a half weeks before
Garcia’s fall, Otis performed four hours of general maintenance
during which an Otis mechanic observed the quality of the
elevator ride, car leveling, stopping accuracy, and door operation.
During the same five-and-a-half-year period, Otis did not receive
notice of or observe any similar accidents or complaints of injury
involving Elevator No. 8, nor did its maintenance records contain
any indication of a defect that would affect the elevator’s leveling.
In opposition, Garcia argued there were triable issues of
material fact regarding whether John Hancock breached the
heightened duty of care it owed to her. Garcia asserted there was
evidence that John Hancock was on notice of the dangerous
condition of Elevator No. 8 because, in July 2012, the elevator
failed to level correctly in the lobby with a height differential of
four inches. She also argued that notice was imputed to John
Hancock because it created the dangerous condition by (1) failing
to disable an “advance pre-opening” feature on the Elevator No. 8
that allowed the elevator doors to open before the elevator car
was level with the floor, and (2) failing to ensure Otis performed
the minimum necessary maintenance on the elevator per the
parties’ elevator maintenance agreement. Garcia pointed out
that Elevator No. 8 was the only one of the building’s
10 passenger elevators that had the advanced pre-opening
feature enabled at the time of her fall. Garcia proffered City
elevator inspector Larry Isidro’s testimony that use of the feature

7
poses risk because it allows the elevator doors to open before the
elevator is level, that use of the feature on only the one elevator
was “abnormal,” and that elevators installed after 1998 cannot by
law have such a feature. As for Otis’s maintenance, Garcia relied
on evidence that Otis’s contract with John Hancock required it to
provide a minimum of six hours of monthly maintenance on each
elevator but, in the year before Garcia’s fall, maintenance history
reports showed Otis performed less maintenance on Elevator No.
8 than was contractually required.
The court granted John Hancock’s motion, concluding
Garcia failed to create a triable issue that John Hancock had
notice of a dangerous condition. Most pertinently, the court
rejected Garcia’s argument that John Hancock created the
dangerous condition on Elevator No. 8 by failing to disable its
advanced pre-opening feature. The court determined “the mere
existence of this feature being enabled—as it was lawfully
allowed to be [because of its pre-1998 installation]—without more
is insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding a
breach of a duty of care.” The court concluded there was no
evidence showing this feature was the cause of any misleveling,
emphasizing the long stretch of time with no misleveling
incidents despite the feature being enabled.
The court entered judgment in John Hancock’s favor.
Garcia appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘A motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication is properly granted only when “all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” ’ ” (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024)

8
98 Cal.App.5th 1151, 1161 (Campbell); see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subds. (c) & (f); Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) “A defendant may
bring a motion [for summary judgment or summary adjudication]
on the ground the plaintiff cannot prove one of the required
elements of the case or there is a complete defense to the action.”
(Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 694, 702; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1),
(2) & (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 849.) “To carry its initial burden when the motion is
directed to the plaintiff’s case rather than an affirmative defense,
a defendant must present evidence that either ‘conclusively
negate[s] an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s]
that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’
evidence necessary to establish at least one element of the cause
of action.” (Luebke, at p. 702.) “Only after the defendant carries
that initial burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff ‘to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the
cause of action ....’ ” (Id. at pp. 702-703; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
We review summary judgment and summary adjudication
rulings de novo. (Campbell, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161;
accord, Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.) We
“ ‘liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment [or summary adjudication] and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ”
(Gonzalez, at p. 39; accord, Campbell, at p. 1161.)

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B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Adjudication
in Favor of John Hancock on Garcia’s Disabled Persons Act
Claim
1. Applicable law
The Disabled Persons Act provides that individuals with
disabilities “shall be entitled to full and equal access” to “places of
public accommodation ... and other places to which the general
public is invited.” (Civ. Code, § 54.1, subd. (a)(1); see Jankey v.
Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1044-1045 [the Act “generally
guarantees people with disabilities equal rights of access ‘to
public places, buildings, facilities and services, as well as common
carriers, housing and places of public accommodation’ ”].) “Full
and equal access,” in this context, means access meeting the
standards of the ADA, any related federal regulations, and any
state law prescribing even higher standards. (Civ. Code, § 54.1,
subd. (a)(3); see also id., subd. (d) [a violation of the right of an
individual under the ADA constitutes a violation of the Disabled
Persons Act]; accord, Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 184, 192.) “ ‘Access’ refers not only to entry into a
building but, more broadly, to the use of all facilities made
available for general public use, such as restrooms, parking, and
fixtures within a building.” (Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores
California, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 261 (Urhausen).)
Any person, firm, or corporation who denies full and equal
access to or otherwise interferes with the rights of a disabled
person under the Disabled Persons Act is liable for actual
damages, punitive damages from $1,000 to three times the actual
damages, and attorney’s fees. (Civ. Code, § 54.3, subd. (a).) To
recover damages under the Act, an individual must establish that
he or she was “actually denied equal access to a public place.”

10
(Reycraft v. Lee (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1219; see Donald v.
Cafe Royale, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 183.) To satisfy this
“standing” requirement, the plaintiff must show that “he or she
actually presented himself or herself to a business or public place
with the intent of purchasing its products or utilizing its services
in the manner in which those products and/or services are
typically offered to the public and was actually denied equal
access on a particular occasion.” (Reycraft, at p. 1224.)
The Disabled Persons Act only protects persons “denied
access to some public site or service due to their disability.”
(Turner v. Assn. of Am. Med. Colleges (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1412.) The purpose of Civil Code section 54.3 is to provide
a damages remedy to persons who have been denied the same
access to public facilities as persons without a disability.
(Urhausen, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 264.)
2. No triable issue exists that Garcia was denied access
to the building due to her disabilities
John Hancock does not dispute Garcia’s asthma and
diabetes were qualifying disabilities under the Disabled Persons
Act but argues Garcia failed to demonstrate a genuine factual
dispute existed that those disabilities affected her ability to
access the building. Accordingly, John Hancock argues, she has
not raised a triable issue that she was denied equal access due to
her disability. (See Turner v. Assn. of Am. Med. Colleges, supra,
167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412 [disabled persons must have been
denied access “due to their disability”].)
John Hanock proffered evidence that prior to her fall,
Garcia walked well without any assistive devices and never
reported any falls or ambulating difficulties to her physician
because of her asthma or diabetes. While Garcia had a

11
permanent disabled person parking placard from the California
Department of Motor Vehicles for her asthma, she voluntarily
refrained from using it to park in the structure underneath the
building. On the morning of her fall, although Garcia testified
she felt “some mild fatigue” due to her asthma after walking the
one and a half blocks from the bus to the building, Garcia
proceeded to walk normally into the building, following the same
path that she always did, while carrying multiple items. John
Hancock’s evidence was sufficient to shift the burden to Garcia.
Garcia asserts the uneven flooring between Elevator No. 8
and the lobby was a “more treacherous obstacle to navigate” for
her than for able-bodied persons, and thus she did not have equal
access to the building. Garcia relies on her primary care
physician’s testimony that asthma and diabetes can affect a
person’s ability to walk, stand, and breathe. But the physician
did not testify about the circumstances surrounding Garcia’s fall,
or even specifically about Garcia’s disability. On that topic,
Garcia testified that her asthma only made it difficult to walk
long distances when she was having a “really bad attack of
asthma,” usually triggered by a weather change or pollen in the
air, and that her diabetes made her tired and caused her to
change her diet but did not otherwise affect her daily activities.
Garcia did not proffer any evidence that she was suffering an
asthma attack or feeling any symptoms relating to her diabetes
when she fell. She did not present evidence to suggest her
fatigue or any other conditions related to her asthma or diabetes
caused her to trip and fall. Even assuming Elevator No. 8 was
not properly level that morning and thus was not ADA-compliant,
Garcia failed to raise a triable issue that she was prevented from
accessing the elevator because of her disability.

12
In addition, as John Hancock argues, Garcia admitted
Elevator No. 8 was not the only elevator she could use to access
her office on the 17th floor; there were at least two others.
Garcia had used the building’s elevators “hundreds of times”
uneventfully before her fall, and she presented no evidence
suggesting these other elevators were not ADA-compliant. Thus,
even if Garcia had proffered evidence to show she had a disability
that affected her ability to take Elevator No. 8 on the morning of
her fall due to a leveling issue with the elevator, she was not
denied “equal access” to the building because she could have used
one of the other elevators. (See Urhausen, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [disabled patron not denied access to
store because even if she could not safely access store by one
means, another accessible means of entry “remained available for
her use”].) The Disabled Persons Act is not intended “to provide
a cause of action for disabled persons who have suffered physical
injury but to persons who have been denied the same access to
public facilities as persons without a disability. ... ‘[T]he
impediments to the physically handicappeds’ interaction in
community life is the inequity which [the Act] ... seek[s] to
prevent.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Because Garcia failed to raise a triable issue of fact that
she was denied equal access due to her disability, the trial court
properly granted summary adjudication on the cause of action
under the Disabled Persons Act.

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C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in
Favor of John Hancock on Garcia’s Premises Liability and
Negligence Claims
1. Applicable law
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability
claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and
proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)3 Every person owes a duty of
ordinary care that a reasonable, prudent person would use
considering all the circumstances. (Agustin v. Golden Empire
Transit Dist. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 426, 438; accord, Kuciemba
v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1016.)
“Carriers of persons for reward,” however, “have long been
subject to a heightened duty of care.” (Gomez v. Superior Court
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1125, 1128.) These “common carriers” instead
“must use the utmost care and diligence for ... safe carriage, must
provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise
to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” (Civ. Code, § 2100;
accord, Gomez, at p. 1130.) This heightened duty of care does not
make common carriers “insurers or render them strictly liable for
all injuries,” but it does require they “ ‘do all that human care,
vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the
circumstances,’ albeit ‘consistent with the character and mode of
conveyance adopted and the practical operation of [their]
business.’ ” (Smith v. Magic Mountain LLC (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1136 (Smith).) The parties agree John

3 Garcia does not distinguish between her premises liability
and negligence claims or otherwise suggest John Hancock is
liable for negligence beyond the premises liability allegations.
Thus, we will consider the claims together.

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Hancock owed this heightened duty of care as the owner of the
elevator. (See Gomez, at p. 1131; Champagne v. A. Hamburger &
Sons (1915) 169 Cal. 683, 690-691; Smith, at p. 1136.)
With respect to a breach of this duty—the disputed element
here—a commercial property owner may be liable for harm
caused by a dangerous condition if the owner had actual or
constructive knowledge of the condition or the owner could have
discovered the condition by the exercise of ordinary care and
should have realized that the condition involved an unreasonable
risk to invitees. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200,
1205-1206; Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1208.)
“The plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence
suggests that the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient
period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge.”
(Ortega, at p. 1206.) “Typically, to charge an individual with
constructive notice, he must have, ‘actual notice of facts or
circumstances which are sufficient to put a prudent person on
inquiry as to the existence of the fact with respect to which he is
charged with constructive notice.’ [Citation.] Therefore, a
landowner cannot be charged with constructive notice without a
showing of some overt feature surrounding the dangerous
condition, which would notify the landowner of its existence.”
(Jones, at p. 1209.)
“Where the dangerous or defective condition of the property
which causes the injury has been created by reason of the
negligence of the owner of the property or his employee acting
within the scope of the employment, the owner of the property
cannot be permitted to assert that he had no notice or knowledge
of the defective or dangerous condition in an action by an invitee
for injuries suffered by reason of the dangerous condition. Under

15
such circumstances knowledge thereof is imputed to him.”
(Hatfield v. Levy Bros. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 806; accord, Getchell
v. Rogers Jewelry (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 381, 385 [where “ ‘the
evidence is such that a reasonable inference can be drawn that
the condition was created by employees of the [defendant], then
[the defendant] is charged with notice of the dangerous
condition’ ”]; Oldham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1948)
85 Cal.App.2d 214, 218-219 [same].)

2. A triable issue remains as to whether John Hancock
created a dangerous condition
To show it did not have actual knowledge of any dangerous
condition with respect to Elevator No. 8, John Hancock pointed to
testimony of its building manager that she had not received any
report or indication that the elevator was not working properly
before Garcia’s fall. Other evidence showed the City had
inspected the elevator and approved it for operation six months
earlier, and less than a month earlier Otis had performed general
maintenance on the elevator and found no issues.
As for constructive notice, John Hancock emphasized that,
at the time of Garcia’s fall, it had several systems in place
regarding the maintenance and operation of the building’s
elevators that were designed to ensure building patrons could be
safely carried on its elevators. First, the elevators were regularly
inspected by the City. During these inspections, the City
evaluated the stopping accuracy of the elevators, whether the
elevators became substantially level within the landing zone, and
whether the power opening feature of the elevators was working
properly. The City inspected Elevator No. 8 in 2015, 2017, and
2019. Finding no safety issues or legal violations, the City issued
a permit allowing for the elevator’s continued operation after

16
each inspection. The latest permit was issued in September
2019, less than six months before Garcia’s fall, and was valid
until February 2021.
Second, John Hancock retained Otis to perform all
maintenance on the building’s elevators. An Otis mechanic was
physically at the building two days a week from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. As a part of their responsibilities, Otis mechanics
cleaned and examined the elevator equipment, inspecting it for
ordinary wear and tear and making any necessary repairs and
replacements of worn parts. Otis was also tasked with correcting
any issues noted by City inspectors. During each visit to an
elevator, an Otis mechanic would ride the elevator from top to
bottom, stopping at multiple floors and checking the overall
condition of the elevator, including the leveling of the elevator
car. In February 2020, less than four weeks before Garcia’s fall,
Otis performed four hours of maintenance on Elevator No. 8,
which consisted of observing the quality of the elevator ride, car
leveling, stopping accuracy, and door operation. In the five and a
half years before the fall, Otis did not observe any accidents or
receive any complaints of injury involving Elevator No. 8 similar
to those alleged by Garcia. Otis mechanic James Clark, who had
worked at the building since September 2019, never observed any
issues with the elevator before Garcia’s fall to indicate it was not
leveling properly.
Third, John Hancock retained a third party consultant,
H.H. Angus, to inspect the elevators and monitor Otis’s
performance in maintaining the elevators. H.H. Angus found no
deficiencies upon an inspection in 2013. Shortly after Garcia’s
fall, H.H. Angus conducted another inspection of the elevators

17
and determined that they were all in good condition and legally
compliant.
Fourth, John Hancock retained a janitorial staff that
vacuumed and wiped down the building’s elevators three times a
day. Plaintiff testified there was no debris, trash, or liquid in her
path of travel that could have caused her to fall.
Fifth, John Hancock had a program in place for individuals
to report any issues with the building’s elevators. In the seven
years before Garcia’s fall, John Hancock did not receive a report
of an issue with Elevator No. 8 not leveling correctly. As noted,
Garcia testified that she had used the building’s elevators
“hundreds of times,” including Elevator No. 8 “at least 25 to 50
times,” and had never complained to John Hancock about any
issues regarding the elevators.
This evidence was sufficient to meet John Hancock’s initial
summary judgment burden. However, Garcia proffered evidence
to show a triable issue nonetheless remains whether John
Hancock should be charged with notice because it created the
dangerous condition by failing to disable the advanced pre-
opening feature on Elevator No. 8. (See Getchell v. Rogers
Jewelry, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [where property owner
created dangerous or defective condition, owner is charged with
notice of the condition].)
It is undisputed that, at the time of Garcia’s fall, Elevator
No. 8 was the only elevator in the building with this feature
enabled, which City inspector Isidro found “abnormal.” Isidro
testified that the feature comes with risk because it allows the
elevator doors to open before the elevator car is level with the
landing floor. He explained that elevators installed after 1998
were prohibited by law from having the feature. While

18
acknowledging it remained lawful to enable the feature in
elevators like Elevator No. 8 that were installed before 1998,
Isidro still considered the feature to be “unsafe.” Like Isidro,
Garcia’s expert engineer, Joseph Stabler, explained the feature
“allows the elevator doors to open before the elevator is level with
the floor” and thus carries risk of the “misleveling of an elevator
upon passenger entry.” Stabler opined that disabling the feature
“would have more than likely eliminated the … trip and fall
hazard.”
This evidence is sufficient to establish a triable issue. John
Hancock did not respond to any of these facts in the trial court.
Nor does it address any of them on appeal. John Hancock
instead asserts only that the trial court correctly determined
there was no evidence showing it created a dangerous condition
because it was lawful to have the advanced pre-opening feature
enabled in Elevator No. 8. While the fact that the advanced pre-
opening feature was not unlawful might defeat a negligence per
se theory, this fact alone does not mean that, as a matter of law,
ordinary negligence cannot be proved, particularly given John
Hancock’s heightened duty of “utmost care and diligence.” (Civ.
Code, § 2100; see Smith, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1136 [“A
common carrier’s greater capability—and hence ‘great[er]
responsibility’—to avoid injury is what gives rise to the
heightened duty of care a common carrier owes its passengers.”];
Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 403, 421 [“[A] defendant property owner’s
compliance with a law or safety regulation, in and of itself, does
not establish that the owner has utilized due care. The owner’s
compliance with applicable safety regulations, while relevant to
show due care, is not dispositive, if there are other circumstances

19
requiring a higher degree of care.”]; Amos v. Alpha Property
Management (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 895, 901 [“ ‘We are mindful
that even though [a defendant] complied with all applicable
governmental safety regulations, this would not serve to absolve
it from a charge of negligence, but just negligence per se, for one
may act in strict conformity with the terms of such enactments
and yet not exercise the amount of care which is required under
the circumstances.’ ”].) Even if mere inadvertence led to the
advanced pre-opening feature being enabled in Elevator No. 8
while it was disabled in all the others, such a lack of
attentiveness could be found to be inconsistent with John
Hancock’s duty as a common carrier. (Smith, at p. 1137
[“common carriers must ‘do all that human care, vigilance, and
foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances,’ albeit
‘consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted
and the practical operation of [their] business’ ”].)
Although John Hancock suggested during oral argument
there is no evidence tying the alleged misleveling condition to the
feature being enabled, the evidence proffered does not foreclose
the possibility of such a connection. As discussed, Stabler stated
that disabling the feature would have more than likely
eliminated such a hazard.
A triable issue of material fact thus remains regarding
whether John Hancock created a dangerous condition by not
disabling the advanced pre-opening feature on Elevator No. 8.
Because there is a triable issue on Garcia’s premises liability and
negligence claims, we reverse the order granting John Hancock’s
motion for summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and order granting summary judgment on
Garcia’s premises liability and negligence claims are reversed.

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The order granting summary adjudication on Garcia’s Disabled
Persons Act claim is affirmed. On remand, the trial court is
directed to vacate its order granting the motion for summary
judgment and to enter a new order denying the motion. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

GIZA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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