CourtListener 10863053•Mather v. Pricewaterhousecoopers CA2/4
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Filed 5/21/26 Mather v. Pricewaterhousecoopers CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
NICOLE S. MATHER, B349827
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCV10767)
v.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
LLP, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steve Cochran, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with instructions.
Kibler Fowler & Cave, Michael D. Kibler, Matthew J. Cave,
Dominique Caamano, and Jesse Mentz, for Defendants and
Appellants.
Robins Kaplan, Roman M. Silberfeld, and Zachary A.
Cohen, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, PwC US Tax
LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services LLC
(collectively, PwC) appeal from the trial court’s order denying
PwC’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found the
arbitration agreement plaintiff Nicole S. Mather signed was
unconscionable and thus unenforceable. PwC contends the court
erred because the parties agreed to delegate questions of
enforceability to an arbitration panel and Mather failed to
demonstrate the delegation clause was unenforceable. We agree
and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2024, Mather entered into an agreement for tax
services with PwC. The agreement contained a provision
requiring any dispute relating to the agreement to be resolved by
arbitration. The arbitration would take place in New York before
a panel of three arbitrators and would be governed by New York
law. The arbitration panel would have no power to award non-
monetary or equitable relief or to award damages inconsistent
with a separate “Limitations on Liability” provision. All aspects
of the arbitration were to be treated as confidential.
The arbitration provision contained a delegation clause. It
stated: “The arbitration panel shall have exclusive authority to
resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability or formation of, or defenses with respect to, this
agreement, including but not limited to issues of arbitrability.”
After a dispute arose between the parties relating to the
tax services, Mather filed a complaint against PwC. PwC filed a
motion to compel arbitration and stay the action, arguing
Mather’s claims were covered by the arbitration agreement. PwC
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asserted Mather was the CEO of an international business and a
sophisticated professional who over the years had entered into
seven agreements with PwC for tax services. It argued that no
grounds existed to deny arbitration and that Mather agreed to
delegate exclusive authority to decide questions of arbitrability to
a panel of arbitrators.
In opposition, Mather argued the arbitration clause was
unenforceable because the agreement was unconscionable. She
contended the arbitration provision was “embedded in a
standardized, non-negotiable engagement letter presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis by one of the world’s most powerful
professional services firms.” She argued it included several one-
sided terms that solely benefitted PwC. Further, she asserted
the delegation clause itself was unconscionable because it was
“not within the adhering party’s reasonable expectations,”
created “a conflict of interest” for the arbitrators, and was
“embedded in the same adhesive, boilerplate agreement and
incorporated the same oppressive terms.” In reply, PwC averred
the court’s analysis was limited to the validity of the delegation
clause, which PwC argued was enforceable.
At the outset of the hearing on its motion, PwC informed
the trial court that the claims asserted in the case were pending
“before the agreed arbitration forum” and that the arbitration
panel had ordered the parties to brief arbitrability. PwC argued
the trial court did not need to decide unconscionability because it
was not “[the] court’s purview in light of the delegation clause.”
The trial court stated it was “going to opt to go forward and
decide” the matter. The court found the arbitration agreement
had “minimal procedural unconscionability, the usual take it or
leave it kind of thing.” Next, the court found the agreement had
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substantive unconscionability: “[T]he limit on the remedy, not so
much the equitable, but on the damages. And then this out of
state forum are troubling.” The court said it was finding
unconscionability and denied the motion. PwC appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Delegation Clauses
“Parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to delegate
to the arbitrator, instead of a court, questions regarding the
enforceability of the agreement.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances,
Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 241 (Tiri).) A delegation clause
is treated as a separate agreement to arbitrate issues of
enforceability. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
1551, 1559 (Malone).) Thus, “whether the arbitration agreement
as a whole is ultimately held to be unenforceable will have no
bearing on the enforcement of the delegation clause itself.”
(Ibid.) If a party makes a specific challenge to a delegation
clause, “the court must determine whether the delegation clause
itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of
enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the
delegation clause is enforceable).” (Id. at p. 1560, citing Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70 (Rent-A-
Center).)
“There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be
effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and
unmistakable. [Citation.] Second, the delegation must not be
revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.” (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 242.) In
this case, Mather does not dispute that the language of the
delegation clause is clear and unmistakable.
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B. The Trial Court Impliedly Found the Delegation
Clause was Unconscionable
PwC argues the trial court erred by failing to decide first
whether the delegation clause was enforceable before finding the
entire arbitration agreement unenforceable. We conclude the
trial court impliedly found the delegation clause was
unconscionable.
Mather, in opposition to PwC’s motion to compel
arbitration, argued the delegation clause was unconscionable.
After PwC argued at the hearing that issues of enforceability
were delegated to the arbitrators, the trial court stated it was
“finding unconscionability” and denied the motion. We presume
the court impliedly found the delegation clause was
unconscionable. (See Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1567 [when trial court makes no express
findings, we infer the court made every implied finding necessary
to support the order compelling arbitration].) Next, we determine
whether the trial court erred in making that implied finding.
C. The Delegation Clause is Not Unconscionable
“‘[T]he core concern of unconscionability doctrine is the
“‘“absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party.”’”’” (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.) The
party opposing arbitration has the burden of proving
unconscionability, which has both procedural and substantive
elements. (Id. at p. 244.) Any claim of unconscionability
involving a delegation clause “must be specific to the delegation
clause.” (Ibid.)
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Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression and
surprise. (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) “‘“‘Oppression
occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and
meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable
provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.’”’” (Malone,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1561.) “When the contract is a
contract of adhesion imposed and drafted by the party with
superior bargaining power, the adhesive nature of the contract is
‘evidence of some degree of procedural unconscionability.’” (Ibid.)
“‘Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of
an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they
are overly harsh or one-sided. [Citations.] A contract term is not
substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a
greater benefit; rather, the term must be “so one-sided as to
‘shock the conscience.’”’” (Malone, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1561.)
“‘Both procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability must be shown, but “they need not be present
in the same degree” and are evaluated on “‘a sliding scale.’”
[Citation.] “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract
term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable,
and vice versa.”’” (Malone, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1561.)
“‘Where there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the
degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement
is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of
substantive unconscionability is high.’” (Ibid.)
Unconscionability is a question of law we review de novo.
(Williams v. Atria Las Posas (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1055
(Williams).) However, “‘factual issues may bear on that
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determination.’” (Ibid.) “‘[T]o the extent the trial court’s
determination that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable turned on the resolution of conflicts in the
evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence,
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations
under the substantial evidence standard.’” (Ibid.)
1. The Agreement had Minimal Procedural
Unconscionability
Mather contends substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding of “minimal procedural unconscionability” because
the delegation clause was part of a contract of adhesion. We
agree.
As Mather argues, the agreement itself, including the
delegation clause, reflects standardized drafting. In her
supporting declaration, Mather stated the agreement was
presented to her on a take it or leave it basis without opportunity
to negotiate the arbitration provision. The trial court agreed
with Mather.
In arguing that Mather failed to demonstrate procedural
unconscionability, PwC primarily points to evidence which may
have supported a contrary finding or lessened the degree of
procedural unconscionability. It argues that Mather was a
sophisticated party. While PwC does not state it would have
removed the delegation clause, it argues Mather had the
opportunity to review and negotiate the agreement seven times.
In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence, we must examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mather. (Williams, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at
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p. 1055.) In doing so, we conclude the agreement and Mather’s
declaration provide substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of “minimal procedural unconscionability.” (Fisher
v. MoneyGram Internat., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1095
[adhesive contract establishes “at least some degree of procedural
unconscionability”]; Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 246
[“delegation clause procedurally unconscionable where presented
on take-it-or-leave-it basis”].)
2. The Agreement Was Not Substantively
Unconscionable
Because of the low degree of procedural unconscionability,
a “high showing” of substantive unconscionability was required
“in order to result in the conclusion that the delegation clause is
unenforceable.” (Malone, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570.) We
conclude Mather did not meet this burden.
In opposition to PwC’s motion to compel arbitration,
Mather asserted the delegation clause was substantively
unconscionable because the clause created a conflict of interest
for the arbitrators and was not within the adhering party’s
reasonable expectations. Though Mather appears to have
abandoned these grounds on appeal, we note they are insufficient
to demonstrate substantive unconscionability. An unsupported
claim that a delegation clause creates a conflict of interest for an
arbitrator “is nothing more than an expression of a judicial
hostility to arbitration, based on the assumption that a paid
decision maker cannot be unbiased.” (Malone, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 1569.) Further, Mather submitted no evidence
showing the delegation clause was outside her reasonable
expectations. Even if she had, it may not have been sufficient to
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establish a high degree of substantive unconscionability. 1 (Id. at
pp. 1570–1571.)
Mather now argues the delegation clause is substantively
unconscionable because (1) it requires threshold questions of
enforceability to be decided by a three-arbitrator panel in New
York, applying New York law, (2) is subject to strict
confidentiality, and (3) is bound by the same remedy limitations
and procedural constraints that govern the merits. PwC
contends that Mather forfeited these claims by not raising them
in the trial court. As these claims raise pure questions of law, we
consider them on the merits. (In re Marriage of Priem (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 505, 510–511 [new theory involving only question of
law may be considered for first time on appeal].)
Mather makes the conclusory assertion that requiring her
to arbitrate questions of arbitrability in New York, under its
laws, “materially burdens the . . . threshold challenge” and is a
“structural advantage” for PwC. Out-of-state forum and choice-
of-law provisions, however, are not inherently unconscionable.
(See Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
583, 588 [finding forum selection clauses provide certainty for
businesses and customers]; see also Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of
California, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1493 [recognizing
1 Malone noted it had “substantial concerns regarding the factual
basis” for assuming that a delegation clause was outside the parties’
reasonable expectations. (Malone, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570,
fn. 20.) “[W]hile it may have been true in 1995 that arbitrator
resolution of enforceability was generally outside the reasonable
expectation of the parties, by the mid-2000s, it appears to have been
the default position of two major nationwide arbitration providers, and
therefore, perhaps, more likely to be within the reasonable expectation
of the parties.” (Ibid.)
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plaintiffs bear a “heavy burden” in demonstrating “that
enforcement of the [forum selection] clause would be
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case”].) Mather did
not address the out-of-state forum in the declaration she
submitted with her opposition. She cites no evidence to show a
New York forum is unreasonable in this case, let alone
unconscionable “as applied to the delegation provision.” (Rent-A-
Center, supra, 561 U.S. at 74.) Mather cites no New York law
that would prejudice her ability to show the arbitration
agreement is unconscionable. The bare assertion that deciding
the issue of arbitrability in New York, under its laws, burdens
her more than PwC is not enough to show the delegation clause is
substantively unconscionable.
Mather similarly does not explain how the remedy
limitations or confidentiality provisions “as applied to the
delegation clause renders that clause unconscionable by impeding
her ability to arbitrate whether the arbitration agreement as a
whole is unconscionable.” (Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 248.)2 In simple terms, she does not connect-the-dots to show
2 Federal courts have also held that a party citing provisions
outside the delegation clause in making an unconscionability challenge
“must explain how those provisions make the fact of an arbitrator
deciding arbitrability unconscionable.” (Holley-Gallegly v. TA
Operating, LLC (9th Cir. 2023) 74 F.4th 997, 1002; see Bielski v.
Coinbase, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 87 F.4th 1003, 1009–1010 [“a party may
challenge the delegation provision and the arbitration agreement for
the same reasons, so long as the party specifies why each reason
renders the specific provision unenforceable”]; see also Heckman v.
Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 120 F.4th 670, 680–681
[“‘A party is . . . permitted under Rent-A-Center to challenge the
enforceability of a delegation clause by explaining how “unrelated”
provisions make the delegation unconscionable’”].)
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how the other provisions make the delegation clause
unconscionable. For example, she does not argue the remedy
limitations impair her ability to show or the arbitrators’ ability to
decide whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is
unconscionable. That is “a much more difficult argument to
sustain” than the argument that the remedy limitations render
the arbitration of her substantive claims unconscionable. (Rent-
A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at 74.) Because Mather did not
demonstrate the delegation clause was unconscionable or invalid,
it will be for the arbitrators to consider the enforceability of the
agreement as a whole.
D. The Trial Court Must Determine Whether to Stay the
Action in Whole or In Part
While PwC argued the entire action should be stayed
pending completion of the arbitration, Mather argued the
arbitration agreement did not cover all her claims.3 She argued
that staying the non-arbitrable claims would prejudice her.
The trial court has discretion to limit a stay under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.4 to those issues subject to
arbitration. (Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30
Cal.4th 303, 320.) Since the trial court did not have the
opportunity to rule on the scope of the stay request, we remand to
the court to determine whether a stay of any claims would be
appropriate. We express no opinion on the matter.
3 Mather’s complaint is not part of the record on appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying PwC’s motion to compel arbitration is
reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new order
granting PwC’s motion and to determine whether to stay the
action in whole or in part. PwC is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J. **
** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
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