County of Sonoma v. Kelly CA1/3

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Filed 5/20/26 County of Sonoma v. Kelly CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

COUNTY OF SONOMA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173236

v. (Sonoma County
THOMAS P. KELLY III, Super. Ct. No. SFL-087881)
Defendant and Appellant,
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
MELISSA ANN JONES, AND DENYING REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Respondent.

THE COURT*:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 30, 2026, be modified
as follows:
1. On page 9, immediately above the “Disposition” section, the following
paragraph should be added:
Nothing in this opinion is intended to prevent the
parties from entering into a new or amended settlement as
to these issues.
There is no change in the judgment.

Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.

* Tucher, P. J., Petrou, J., and Rodríguez, J. participated in the decision.

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Dated: 5/20/2026 Tucher, P. J.
Presiding Justice

A173236 / County of Sonoma v. Kelly

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Filed 4/30/26 County of Sonoma v. Kelly CA1/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

COUNTY OF SONOMA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173236
v.
THOMAS P. KELLY III, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SFL-087881)
Defendant and Appellant,
MELISSA ANN JONES,
Respondent.

Thomas P. Kelly and the mother of his minor child, Melissa Ann Jones,
entered into a settlement agreement to resolve ongoing disputes regarding
the minor’s medical care. That agreement limited Kelly’s responsibility for
future medical care to care prescribed by a “medical doctor.”
The parties subsequently disputed whether the minor’s longtime
pediatrician, who holds a Doctor of Osteopathy degree, qualified as a “medical
doctor.” The trial court struck that provision from the parties’ settlement on
the basis that there was no meeting of the minds as to their financial
responsibility for future medical care.
On appeal, Kelly contends the trial court erred in striking the provision
and instead should have interpreted the phrase “medical doctor” as only
applying to physicians with an “M.D.” degree. We conclude the trial court

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properly found there was no mutual assent to form an enforceable agreement
on this issue, but remand to the trial court to determine in the first instance
whether any portion of the parties’ settlement agreement is severable from
the disputed provision and remains enforceable.
BACKGROUND
In 2021, the superior court entered judgment on the parties’ stipulation
governing parental obligations and support. In relevant part, each parent
agreed to pay one-half of the minor’s “reasonable uninsured health-care
costs.”
In 2024, the Sonoma County Department of Child Support Services
initiated proceedings against Kelly concerning child support and tuition.
Following an initial hearing, the court modified the monthly support amount
and scheduled an extended hearing to address reimbursement issues,
including uninsured medical expenses.
At that subsequent hearing, the parties placed a settlement agreement
on the record. As relevant here, Jones’s counsel stated that Kelly would
advance his share of the minor’s healthcare costs, and “[t]he parties agree
that there will not be any treatment provided for [the minor] that is not done
. . . without prescription from a doctor, one of his treating physicians.” Kelly’s
counsel clarified that Kelly would not be responsible for any treatment “not
prescribed by a medical doctor,” citing concern about providers on the minor’s
treatment team who were not medical doctors. Kelly’s counsel stated the
parties intentionally used the term “medical doctor” rather than “physician,”
and Jones’s counsel agreed.
The court entered an order reflecting the agreement. It provided in
relevant part, “Any/all future uninsured health care expenses for the minor
child shall be paid equally by Mother and Father. Uninsured health care

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expenses shall include those prescribed by the minor child’s doctor(s). Any/all
such expenses that can be paid by each parent directly to the provider, shall
be paid by each parent directly to the provider . . . .” The order also included
the disputed limitation: “Father will not be financially responsible for any
medical care that is without a prescription from a medical doctor.”
A dispute soon arose over the scope of that limitation. Kelly took the
position that he was not obligated to contribute to any medical expenses
arising from treatment by a doctor of osteopathy rather than a doctor of
medicine. Kelly argued the parties entered into an enforceable settlement
agreement that limited his responsibility to care prescribed by an “M.D.” and
that the expenses at issue stemmed from referrals by a doctor of osteopathy.
Jones disagreed. She explained the minor’s primary care physician—a
pediatrician—holds a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degree and has treated
the child for approximately seven years. That physician provides routine
care for the minor, prescribes medication, and coordinates referrals for
specialized services, including occupational therapy, physical therapy,
hippotherapy, and neuropsychological testing. Jones maintained she
understood the agreement to encompass those treatments prescribed by the
minor’s pediatrician, and she would not have agreed to any provision
excluding them.
At the subsequent hearing, the parties disputed whether a doctor of
osteopathy was included in their prior agreement regarding medical
expenses. Jones emphasized the central role of the pediatrician in the
minor’s medical care and Kelly’s prior acceptance of treatment referrals from
that provider. Kelly, in contrast, asserted the pediatrician had historically
referred the minor for non-medical treatments, such as reiki-type treatments
and horseback riding lessons. He argued “the osteopath will refer to

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anything,” and the agreement excluded his financial responsibility for any
treatment prescribed by a doctor of osteopathy.
Following the hearing, the court found the parties lacked a meeting of
the minds as to the provision limiting Kelly’s financial responsibility to care
prescribed by a “medical doctor.” The court struck that portion of its prior
order, and only that portion, without prejudice.
DISCUSSION
Kelly asserts the court erred in striking the provision limiting his
financial responsibility for medical care. Specifically, Kelly contends the
parties’ settlement agreement was enforceable and its terms were not
ambiguous.
I. Mutual Consent
Kelly contends the trial court misconstrued the parties’ testimony as
demonstrating a lack of mutual assent. In his view, that testimony
constituted parol evidence that should have been used to interpret an
ambiguous term. The argument fails because it assumes the existence of a
contract the record does not establish.
“A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which
apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” (Weddington
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 (Weddington).) A
foundational requirement is mutual consent. (Id. at p. 811.) In other words,
the parties must ‘ “all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, a valid settlement agreement requires a “meeting of the minds” on all
material terms. (Id. at p. 797.) Whether such assent exists is determined
objectively—by outward manifestations, not undisclosed intent. (Id. at
p. 811.) On a motion to enforce a settlement, the trial court’s factual findings
must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 815.)

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Measured against these principles, the record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the parties did not mutually consent to the term at issue.
The dispute does not arise from a mere ambiguity in phrasing; it reflects a
fundamental disagreement over a material term—whether father would
share the cost of the minor’s primary care physician, a pediatrician with a
Doctor of Osteopathy degree.
At the time of the settlement agreement, the pediatrician had treated
the minor for approximately seven years and functioned as his primary care
provider. She delivered routine medical care, prescribed medication, and
coordinated referrals for specialized services, including occupational therapy,
physical therapy, hippotherapy, and neuropsychological testing. In practical
terms, she was central to all aspects of the minor’s medical care.
The parties’ negotiations confirm the absence of agreement on this
point. Kelly expressed concern about being financially responsible for
providers who were not “medical doctors,” referencing unspecified members of
the minor’s broader treatment team. But Kelly never indicated that he
sought to exclude the pediatrician who served as the minor’s primary
physician. Nor did he specify that a “medical doctor” would only encompass
those doctors with an “M.D.” degree. By contrast, Jones testified
unequivocally that she would not have agreed to any arrangement relieving
Kelly of responsibility for the pediatrician’s care. Her understanding was
that Kelly would continue to be equally responsible for the pediatrician’s
services.1

1 Kelly asserts the trial court erred in allowing testimony at the parties’

hearing. However, Kelly failed to raise any objection during the hearing to
such testimony, and his argument is thus waived. (Evid. Code, § 353,
subd. (a); Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
1253, 1260 [failure to object to inadmissible evidence waives the defect];
Bardessono v. Michels (1970) 3 Cal.3d 780, 794 [failure to object to the form of
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This divergence is not semantic; it goes to the core allocation of medical
expenses. Where one party understands a central provider to be included
and the other later claims that provider is categorically excluded, there is no
agreement “upon the same thing in the same sense.” (Weddington, supra, 60
Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) The trial court properly treated this as a failure of
contract formation, not an ambiguity susceptible to interpretation.
The authorities cited by Kelly do not compel a different result because
they address a different problem—interpretation or supplementation of terms
within an otherwise valid contract—not the threshold question of whether
mutual assent existed. Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 793, for example,
involved the improper insertion of a material term by a private judge. (Id. at
p. 818.) Similarly, In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434
concerned whether qualifying language could be added to an unambiguous
provision governing spousal support. (Id. at pp. 1438, 1440–1442.) And
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69
Cal.2d 33, 37 and Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 solely
addressed the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous contract
term; they did not address whether the parties ever reached agreement on a
material term in the first instance. None of these cases resolved the
threshold question here—whether there was a meeting of the minds.
The only case cited by Kelly that squarely addressed mutual assent,
Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724
(Bowers), underscores why his position fails. In Bowers, the court addressed
whether the parties agreed to settle their dispute through binding mediation.

evidence is ordinarily deemed a waiver of such objection].) Moreover, Kelly
does not identify any prejudice resulting from the court’s admission of such
testimony. (See Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1538.)

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In evaluating whether mutual assent was present, the court examined the
record for objective manifestations of agreement and found them. (Id. at
pp. 732–733.) Namely, the court noted the parties’ statements on the record
agreeing to binding mediation, the absence of any reference to a different
procedure, the fact the parties were already in the midst of a lengthy
arbitration, and the defendant’s failure to raise the issue in postmediation
correspondence with the mediator. (Id. at pp. 733–734.) Accordingly, the
court found the parties mutually agreed to allow the mediator to impose a
binding resolution. (Id. at p. 734.)
No comparable evidence exists here. The record contains no
manifestation of assent to exclude the minor’s pediatrician from shared
medical expenses. While Kelly expressed concern about horseback riding as a
medical treatment, nothing in the record indicates this concern extended
more generally to the care provided by the minor’s pediatrician. Nor does the
record support his post hoc attempt to equate “medical doctor” with “M.D.”
To the contrary, Kelly’s insistence on that interpretation highlights the
absence of a shared understanding at the time of contracting.
In sum, this is not a case of ambiguous language requiring
interpretation. It is a case in which the parties never agreed on a material
term. Without evidence that both parties assented to the same obligation
regarding core medical expenses of the minor—i.e., his long-standing
pediatrician—there is no mutual consent and no enforceable agreement.
(Bowers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 [“ ‘If there is no evidence
establishing a manifestation of assent to the “same thing” by both parties,
then there is no mutual consent to contract and no contract formation.’ ”].)

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II. Severability
Although the trial court properly struck the challenged provision, the
trial court does not appear to have considered whether that provision is
severable from the remaining settlement agreement, either in its entirety or
in part.
Unenforceable portions of a contract may be severed from an otherwise
valid contract, but only where the agreement is divisible. “It is settled that
where a contract has both void and valid provisions, a court may sever the
void provision and enforce the remainder of the contract. [Citations.]
California cases take a very liberal view of severability, enforcing valid parts
of an apparently indivisible contract where the interests of justice or the
policy of the law would be furthered.” (Adair v Stockton Unified School Dist.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1450; see Reid v. Landon (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d
476, 485 [“Whether a contract is susceptible of division depends on its terms,
the language employed, the subject matter covered, the nature and purpose
of the agreement, its relation to other documents in the transaction and the
intention of the parties as reflected in its terms.”].)
Here, the settlement reflects three principal objectives: (1) resolution of
outstanding child support and arrears; (2) agreements governing the method,
timing, and substance of parental communications regarding the minor’s
medical care, insurance, and expenses; and (3) allocation of financial
responsibility for the minor’s future medical expenses. Arguably, the first
two objectives were not necessarily affected by the absence of mutual assent
regarding what constitutes a “medical doctor.” However, Kelly stated the
issue of medical reimbursement “was part of a global settlement of all the
issues.” Kelly testified that his intent “was to have a clear, robust
understanding of what I would be financially responsible for, and what I

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would not be responsible for,” and he dropped his motion for reconsideration
of the child support modification based on his understanding of the parties’
settlement.
Based on the foregoing, we remand to the trial court to determine in
the first instance whether the remaining provisions are analytically and
functionally distinct such that they may be enforced without reference to the
invalid portion.
DISPOSITION
The section of the March 28, 2025 order striking the phrase, “Father
will not be financially responsible for any medical care that is without a
prescription from a medical doctor,” is vacated without prejudice. The matter
is remanded to the trial court to determine whether any portion of the
parties’ settlement is severable from this provision and remains enforceable,
or whether the entire settlement agreement must be stricken. In all other
respects the order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3), (5).)2

2 On January 20, 2026, Jones filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. On
January 26, 2026, Jones filed a motion for sanctions related to this appeal.
Kelly opposed both motions. The court deferred ruling on these motions until
consideration of the merits. We now deny both motions.

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P. J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

A173236 / County of Sonoma v. Kelly

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